Full text of "Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire Into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia: Together with a Separate Report by Commander J. Wedgwood and Appendices. 1917"

See other formats

This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized
by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the
information in books and make it universally accessible.

Google books galas

https://books.google.com Of®

32101 048260184

(RCPPA)

D568

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS.
. ‘with the undermentioned exceptions)
‘ can be p-ronased in the manner indicated on the first page of this
Hydrographital Publicatior- of the Adrairalty are sold by— |
gg SED Pottery 45, Sscrice, London, E.4. ie
Patent Office Publications are sold at— En aX
The P. ten! “foe, 25, Southampton Buildings, Chancery Lane, London, W.C.2.
N «.—Classified Abridgments of Patent Specifications are sold also by Wyman & Sons, Ltd.,
f- 29, Breams Buildings, Fetter Lane, London, E.CA.
Ordnauce Survey eud Geological Survey Publications can be purchased from—
T’.c icector General of the Ordnance Survey, Southampton ; or
‘he Superintendent, Ordnance Survey, Dublin ; or
_ Agents in most of the Chief Towns in the United Kingdom. .
_(N.B.—Small Scale Maps are, as a rule, procurable at Railway Bookstalls in England and Wales.) us
The Journal of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries is published monthly by the Board, and is obtainable from 3, St. James’s.
Square, London §.W.1. Price 44., post free.

The London Gazette is published on Tuesday and Friday evenings by Wyman & Sons, Ltd. Pricels. . . F

The following is a list of some recent Parliamentary and Official Publications :—
DARDANELLES COMMISSION.

Royal Commission for the purpose of inquiring into the Origin, Inception and Conduct of Operations of War in
the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, including the Supply of Drafts, Reinforcements, Ammunition and Equipment of the Troops
and Fleet, the Provision for the Sick and Wounded, and the Responsibility of those Departments of Government whose
duty it has been to minister to the wants of the Forces employed in that Theatre of War.

Report. Part I.—Ongin and Inception ; Higher Organisation previous to the Outbreak of War ; Higher Organisa-
tion adopted subsequent to the Outbreak of War—The War Council—The Admiralty—The War Office—Conclusions ;
Narrative of Events, with Summary of Transactions ; Results of the Operations ; Conclusions.

Minute of the Right Honourable Andrew Fisher ; Dissent and Suggestion by the Honourable Sir Thomas Mackenzie,
K.C.M.G. ; Minute and Memorandum by Walter Francis Roch, Esq., M.P.

[Cd. 8490] of Session 1917. Price 6d., post free 8d.

COMMITTEE ON ALLEGED GERMAN OUTRAGES
appointed by His Majesty’s Government and presided over by
Tae Rient Hon. VISCOUNT BRYCE, O.M., &c., &c.,
formerly British Ambassador at Washington.

REPORT.
Warrant of Appointment. Introductory Observations.

Part I. Conduct of German Troops in Belgium.

Part II. Breaches of Rules and Usages of War and Acts of Inhumanity in Invaded Territories. 1. Treatment
of the Civil Population :—Killing of Non-Combatants ; Treatment of Women and Children ; Use of Civilians as Screens ;
Looting, Burning, and Destruction of Property. 2. Offences against Combatants :—Killing the Wounded or Prisoners ;
Firing on Hospitals ; Abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag.

Conclusions. With two maps.
[Cd. 7894] of Session 1914-15. Price 6d., post free 74d.
APPENDIX.
Depositions, by Belgian, French, and British eye-witnesses of the Murder, Rape, Arson, Pillage, &c., by German
Troops in Belgium and France.

Extracts from diaries and papers taken from German corpses or prisoners of war, with reproductions of photo-
graphs of some of those documents.

Copies of Proclamations issued by the Germans.

Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Second Peace Conference held at the Hague in
1907—Section II. Of Hostilities. Section III. Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State).

Depositions taken and Papers forwarded by Professor Morgan.

[Cd. 7895] of Session 1914-15. Price 1s. 9d., post free 2s. 2d.

The above have been reproduced in 8vo. size, viz. :-—
Report. Price 3d., post free 44d. APPENDIX. Price 6d., post free 10d.
A cheap reprint of the Report, in smaller type, without Maps, is obtainable. Price 1d., post free 2d.

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY
during the first eight months of the War. (1915). Price 1d., post free 2d.

ALLEGED ILL-TREATMENT OF GERMAN SUBJECTS CAPTURED IN
THE CAMEROONS.
CORRESPONDENCE Telative to.

[Cd. 7974.] Price 5d., post free 64d.

GERMAN ATROCITIES, AND BREACHES OF THE RULES OF WAR IN AFRICA.
Papers relating to,
[Cd. 8306.] Price 93d., post free 114d.
TREATMENT OF ARMENIANS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1915-16. (

Documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by Viscount Bryce.
With a Preface by Viscount Bryce. :
[Cd. 8325] of Session 1916, Price 2s., post frees. 6d.

’
rig e = : . .
. PPA ae : uae
- - 7 = Za . of : hos 7 8
: * . ae Ag ys ‘+ mee othe 7% “a E :
bd : : “4 . 4 * » . + '?.
, | hse eee :’ \e- Fs Voy, Boul zea @ s
ASU +} te fot ae Ca ~ J\
q , ; sa /S ws g s a
fo] fo] : al Fs - aly - 4
. 7 * ~ ‘ \ 4 4 _
. wile 7 . | :
7 See , sh ‘ — ene > oe
5 . > a = et . E ree

REPORT

OF THE

Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire
into the Operations of War

MESOPOTAMIA,

TOGETHER WITH A

Separate Report
BY
COMMANDER J. WEDGWOOD, D.S.O., M.P.,

AND

Appendices.

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

PRINCETON
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFF]

To be purchased through any Bookseller or directly from
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses :
IMPERIAL HouskE, Kincsway, LONDON, W.C. 2, and 28, ABINGDON STREET, LONDON, S.W. 1] ,
37, PETER STREET, MANCHESTER; 1, St. ANDREW’S CRESCENT, CARDIFF ;
23, FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH ;
or from E. PONSONBY, Ltp., 116, GrRaFron STREET, DUBLIN;
or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies,
the United States of America ani other Foreign Countries of
T. FISHER UNWIN, Lrtp., Loxpox, W.C. 2.

1917.
[Cd. 8610.] Price Two Shillings Net. ‘

CYA)
DO56F

a TABLE OF CONTENTS.
oF

L977
TERMS OF PLEA ol AND REFERENCE

PART I.—PreErFace ..
A. Procedure
B. Physical and Climatic Peviliantise of Mestpotatiia,
C. Condition of Indian Army on Outbreak of War
D. India’s Overseas Expeditions on Outbreak of War

PART II.—Oriatn or Mesopotamia EXPEDITION

PART III.—-Apvance From Basra To Kurwna..

PART IV.—Tue Apvance To AMARA AND Kut

PART V.—CorRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE ON BAGHDAD
PART VI.—Tue Apvance From Kut To CTresIpHuon ..

PART VII.—Oprrations ror Rewer or Kut...

PART VITI.—ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT, REINFORCEMENTS, &C.

PART IX.—Transport ies
A. Shortage of River Transport es
B. Railways.. chs Si
C. Royal Indian Marine

PART X.—Mepicat BREAKDOWN...
A. The Vincent-Bingley Report al its Pauses Goncladions
B. Medical Administration of Colonel Hehir -
C. Medical Administration of Sir William Babtie
D. The Misuse of Reticence

E. Responsibility of cai of State, Viooroy, aad Goer
mander-in-Chief _...

F. Supplementary .
G. Medical Findings ‘a Pe eommnendations
PART XI.—Cavusres ContTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES ai
A. Division of Responsibility for Campaign Ss
B. Faulty Organisation of Indian Military Administration Ss

C. Relations between the Secretary of State and the aiieial
General and their respective Councils—Private telegrams

D. Atmosphere of Economy up to Date of War, and Effect 7
Military a seeaie inIndia_.. :

K. Sir John Nixon’s Appointment, ustniction: an Staff
F. Secretiveness and Lack of Co-ordination of Staffs .

PART XII:—A. Findings and Conclusions

B. Recommendations. . sa a ive
SEPARATE REPORT BY COMMANDER J. WEDGwooD, D.S8.0., M.-P.

APPENDIX J].—VINCENT-BINGLEY REPORT
APPENDIX IJ.—MEMORANDUM BY SiR BEAUCHAMP DUFF

. 101

. 103

. 107
. 108

». Lil
. 116

. 121

. 133
. 165

APPENDIX JIJ.—CoLongei HEnHIR’s ACCOUNT OF THE SIEGE OF KUT-EL-AMARA 169

INDEX To CoMMISSION’s REPORT .. hs ae ae s as 5s

179

TERMS OF APPOINTMENT AND REFERENCE.

ne ee

Extract from Section I of Special Commissions (Dardanelles and Mesopotamia) Act, 1916.

Be it enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and
consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows :—

The following persons, namely :—

The Right Honourable Lord George Francis Hamilton, G.C.8.I,,
The Right Honourable the Earl of Donoughmore, K.P.,

Lord Hugh Cecil, Member of Parliament,

Sir Archibald Williamson, Baronet, Member of Parliament,
John Hodge, Esquire, Member of Parliament, |
Commander Josiah C. Wedgwood, Member of Parliament,
Admiral Sir Cyprian Arthur George Bridge, G.C.B., and

( General the Right Honourable Sir Neville Gerald Ly{telton, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.,

Ny are hereby appointed Commissioners for the purpose of inquiring into the origin, inception,

\) and conduct of operations of war in Mesopotamia, including the supply of drafts, rein-
. forcements, ammunition, and equipment to the troops and fleet, the provision for the sick

aS and wounded, and the responsibility of those departments of Government whose duty it

\
S

(C 48—176) | Ag

PART I.—PREFACE. 5

A. PROCEDURE.

1. We, the Commissioners appointed by your Majesty under an Act of Parliament
in August, 1916, have the honour to submit to your Majesty the following report :—

2. The Statute, from which we derive our authority, constituted us Commissioners
for the purpose of enquiring into the origin, inception, and conduct of operations of the
war in Mesopotamia, including the supply of drafts, reinforcements, ammunition, and
equipment to the troops and fleet, the provision for the sick and wounded, and the responsi-
bility of those departments of Government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants
of the Forces employed in that theatre of war. We were further invested with certain
powers, rights and privileges of the High Court of Justice, and we have exercised those
powers to the best of our ability in obtaining evidence upon oath and in enforcing the
attendance of all witnesses and the production of all documents which in any way seemed
to us relevant to the subject-matter of our enquiry. The Public Departments concerned
showed the utmost readiness to assist us In our enquiry and furnished us so far as we are
aware with copies of all material records and documents at their disposal.

3. In the course of our enquiry we ascertained that the chief persons connected with
the campaign were either in England, or could be brought home without serious detriment
to public interests. There were also at home a great number of wounded and sick officers
of all ranks, returned from Mesopotamia, and we have had the advantage of seeing the
voluminous evidence collectedin Mesopotamiaand India by the Vincent-Bingley Commission.
We thus found that there was a large mass of evidence at our disposal in England, and
we did not feel justified in incurring the great delay and expense, which must have resulted
from proceeding to India and to Mesopotamia. But in addition to the evidence available
in England, we summoned home, and there appeared before us, all witnesses whose evidence
was in our judgment necessary for the elucidation of our task. Iu one case, however, in
which urgent war duties prevented an officer from vacating his post, we accepted writen
evidence only, without causing him to appear in person before us.

4, Early in our proceedings, allegations against an officer of subordinate rank were
made, which in our judgment required investigation. We felt that our primary duty was
to adjudicate upon the conduct of the higher authorities responsible for the campaign.
We were most desirous to prevent our energy and attention from being diverted from this
task by enquiries into a number of minor complaints against subordinate officers, and we felt
that we were neither intended nor well-fitted to undertake the functions of a number of
Courts-Martial or Military Courts of Enquiry. We therefore decided that in such cases
we would forward the evidence tendered to us to the Military Authorities with a request
that they would themselves take such action in the matter as in their judgment seemed
necessary. We adopted a similar procedure also in the few instances where the tactical
manceuvring and dispositions of generals under the rank of divisional commanders were
seriously called in question.

5. In the Act of Parliament constituting the Commission a proviso was inserted
directing us to proceed with all possible expedition to enquire with regard to the provision
for the sick and wounded, and to report the result of our enquiries on this matter as soon as
they were completed.

We considered this direction, but found that the medical aspects of the Mesopotamian

Campaign were so inextricably involved with the other branches of our enquiry, that it
would be impossible to anticipate our general Report by an interim Report on medical
matters.
To have attempted to separate the conduct of our Enquiry into two distinct parts,
would have led to delay, confusion, and possibly contradictory conclusions. We therefore
concentrated our attention upon the whole subject referred to us, being satisfied that by
this procedure we could most effectively expedite and complete our enquiry into the pro-
vision made for the sick and wounded.

It will be seen, however, that we have devoted a separate section® entirely to medical
arrangements and that this section is practically a complete Report in itself, dealing with
the provision for the sick and wounded.

* See Part X,

6 PART I.—PREFACE,

A. PROCEDURE.

6. Under the Terms of our Reference, we might have investigated the conduct of the
Mesopotamian campaign right up to the date of reporting. We believe—and we have acted
on that belief—that our main duties were to enquire into the operations antecedent to our
appointment, and that to investigate into and report upon pending or present operations
might seriously hamper the action of those now in charge of the campaign. We have,
however, as our Report will show, satisfied ourselves that in the latter part of the campaign
a marked improvement has been effected in the provision for the sick and wounded, and
also in the supplies and equipment of the troops.

7. We have held 60 meetings, and we have summoned before us over 100
witnesses, of whom the more important were :—

: a Marquess of Crewe, K.G., P.C., M.A., F.S.A., late Secretary of State for
ndia

Rt. Hon. Joseph Austen Chamberlain, P. C., M.P., Secretary of State for India.

Lord Hardinge, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.M. G., LS. O., ex-Viceroy of India.

Lord Inchcape, G. OM. G., KGS. I, KCL. E., Director of Anglo-Persian Oil
Company.

Sir Thomas William Holderness, K.C.8.I., K.C.B., I.C.8S., B.A., Under Secretary
of State for India.

General Sir Beauchamp Duff, G.C.B., K.C.V.0O., K.C.8.1., C.B., C.1.E., ex-Com-
mander-in-Chief in India.

General Sir O’Moore Creagh, V.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., K.C.B., ex-Commander-
in-Chief in India.

General Sir Edmund George Barrow, G.C.B., Military Secretary at the India
Office

General Sir John Eccles Nixon, K.C.B., A.D.C., General, late G.O.C., ; Mesopo-
tamian Expedition.
i“ Major-General Sir George Gorringe, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.8.0., late G.O.C., Tigris

orps.
co -General Sir Percy Lake, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Chief of General Staif, India,

late G.O.C., Force “ D.”

Lieut.-General Sir Fenton J. Aylmer, V.C., K.C.B., late G.O.C., Tigris Corps.

Major-General M. Cowper, C.I.E., late Deputy- -Adjutant and Quartermaster
General, Force “ D.”

Major-General K. 8. Davison, C.B., late Inspector-General of Communications,
Force “ D.”

Major-General G. V. Kemball, C.B., D.S.0., late Chief of General Staff, Force “ D.”

Major-General Sir George Younghusband, K.C.M.G., K.C.LE., C. B., G.O.C.,
7th Division.

Brevet-Colonel 8. H. Climo, C.B., D.S.O.

The following officers of the Royal Indian Marine also gave suideneas —
Captain Walter Lumsden, C.V.O., C.I.E., R.N., Director Royal Indian Marine.
Commander A. Hamilton, R.I.M., late Principal Marine Transport Officer.
Captain W. B. Huddleston, R.LM., late Principal Marine Transport Officer,
Force “ D.” |

As representing the War Office :—
Major-General F. B. Maurice, C.B., Director of Military Operations.
Brigadier-General the Hon. R. Stuart- -Wortley, Director of Movements.
Lieut.-Colonel H. F. P. Percival, D.S.O., Assistant Director of Supplies,
appeared before us.

We have also examined a considerable number of medical witnesses, including :—
Sir Alfred Keogh, G.C.B., Director-General of the Army Medical Service.
Surgeon-General Sir William Babtie, V.C., K.C.M.G., C.B., M.B., K.H.S., late
Director of Medical Services, India.
Surgeon-General H. G. Hathaway, C. B., late Assistant Director of Medical
Services, Force “ D.”
Surgeon- General MacNeece, C.B., inte Director of Medical Services, India.
; Colonel P. Hehir, C.B., M. D., LM. S., late Assistant Director of Medical Services,
orce “ D.”
Major R. Markham Carter, F.RB.C.S., ILM.S.

PART 1.—PREFACE. q

_A. PROCEDURE.

In addition evidence was also obtained from the following :—

Mr. E. A. Ridsdale, F.G.8., Red Cross Commissioner, Member of the Vincent-
Bingley Commission.

Sir Robert Carlyle, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., late Member of the Council of the Viceroy in

India.

Sir Mackenzie Chalmers, K.C.B., C.S.I., late Member of the Council of the Viceroy
in India.

Sir John Hewett, G.C.S.I., late Member of the Council of the Viceroy in India,
Chairman of Indian Soldiers’ Fund, Member of the Joint War Committee of the
British Red Cross and Order of St. John. |

Sir William Clark, K.C.S.I., late Member of Council of the Viceroy in India.

Mr. J. B. Brunyate, C.LE., C.S.1., L.C.8., Financial Secretary to the Indian
Government.

We have, in addition, heard or received statements from a large number of officers of
all ranks, and wherever possible, have obtained the testimony of non-official witnesses.
A complete list of our witnesses will be given in an Appendix. We have also had before us
many hundreds of statements of evidence taken by the Vincent-Bingley Commission,
both in Mesopotamia and India.

8. A great body of evidence, oral and written, has thus come before us. Amongst
the evidence are included a number of written statements by witnesses which were sworn
to, but not made the subject of oral examination. Where a witness’ written statement
only corroborated what had already been amply established in our evidence, we did not
think it necessarv to cross-examine ie but we required him to attend before us and swear
to his written statement, in order that it might be in the same position as other sworn
evidence. These statements thus partake of the nature of affidavits.

9. In accordance with the Statutory obligation imposed upon us by the Act of Parlia-
ment by which we were constituted a.Commission, we present our Report for publication
to both Houses of Parliament. There is no similar legal obligation upon us to publish
the evidence which we have taken. We therefore leave to the discretion of His Majesty’s
Government the question of its publication.

10. We must here refer tv what is known as the “ Vincent-Bingley Commission.”
In March, 1916, the Indian Government appointed a Commission, composed of the Hon.
Sir William Vincent, Kt., I.0.8., Major-General Bingley, C.B., C.I.E., and Mr. E. A.

Ridsdale, F.G.S., with instructions to proceed to Mesopotamia and to make enquiry under

the following Terms of Reference :—
“ (1) The Government of India have appointed you Commissioners for the pur-
pose of investigating and reporting upon the arrangements for dealing with the wounded
and sick in Mesopotamia, in accordance with the Terms of Reference attached.

“ (2) You will proceed to Basra where you will report to the General Officer

— Force “ D,” who will give you every facility in the execution of your
uties. .

‘“ (3) Copies of all war diaries, reports, ee books and maps, and other
information that you may require will be provided both by Army Headquarters and
General Officer Commanding, Force “ D.”

“‘ (4) You are entitled to call and examine any witness whose evidence you con-
sider necessary. :

“ (5) All communications, including your report, will be addressed to the Secretary
to the Government of India, Army Department, Simla.

Delhi. “B. Hottoway, Masor-GENERAL,
‘“‘ Secretary to the Government of India,
Army Department.”

TERMS OF REFERENCE.

(1) The Commission is appointed with the object of inquiring into and recording
the arrangements made for the collection, treatment and removal of the sick and
wounded during the operations in Mesopotamia to the date of your departure from
Mesopotamia.

6é

~
aa
8
‘ Ze
y Aan ee

8 PART I.—PREFACE.

A. PROCEDURE.

‘‘(2) The strategical situation in Mesopotamia during the above period and the
tactical obligations arising therefrom will be borne in mind throughout your proceed-
ings.
7s (3) You will distinguish clearly between the following phases :—

“‘(1) From the battlefields to the line of communication.

** (11) -Down the line of communication to Basra.
1) At Basra.
“(iv) From Basra overseas. ,

“* (4) In each phase, the forecast of the preparations considered necessary, the
preparations actually made, and the equipment, vehicles, stores and personnel actually
available at the localities, and on the vessel, during the operations, will be investigated.

(5) The amount of river transport allotted for the medical services will be ex-
amined. with regard to the total amount available, and the paramount military require-
ments for transportation of troops, supplies and ammunition.

“ (6) You will ascertain and record the relative order of arrival of the combatant
and medical units coming with reinforcements from overseas, in order to fix the re-
sponsibility for any deficiencies in personnel, equipment, and stores which could be
attributed to the order of embarkation for Mesopotamia.

““(7) Having reviewed the foregoing considerations your opinion is required
on the following points :— :

“(a) As to whether the wounded and sick underwent any avoidable suffering

and hardships during any of the phases defined in paragraph 3 above. If 80,

you will state the phase and will ascertain and assign the responsibility, showing

whether individuals or the system were to blame.
“(u) As to whether any avoidable shortage in the personnel, equipment,

: vehicles and stores occurred during any of the four phases defined in paragraph (3)

above. If so, you will state the phase, the shortage, and the reasons for it,

ascertaining and assigning the responsibility as in (1).

‘“‘(m1) As to whether any shortages which may have existed have now been
made good.”

11. The report of the Vincent-Bingley Commission was concluded and sent to the
Government of India at Simla on June 29th, 1916, but was not published. The Com-
missioners obtained a vast amount of documentary and oral evidence in Mesopotamia
and from the wounded in hospitals at Bombay, and in India. The evidence, which is
comprised in two volumes containing nearly 900 pages, has been forwarded to us. We
have examined its contents, and we have also taken a large amount of independent evi-
dence upon the subjects referred to this Commission. The report of the Vincent-Bingley
Commission is a very able and comprehensive document, and we have no hesitation in
adopting its main conclusions. The report is enclosed in the present volume, and
attached to it is a Minute of Sir Beauchamp Duff, Commander-in-Chief in India, comment-
ing upon its proceedings.

12. The work which these Commissioners so ably performed has greatly lightened our
task. Their review of the military operations and of supply and medical shortcomings
is thorough and detailed, and the information was obtained on the scene of operations.
Therefore we have thought it inadvisable to traverse the same ground in much detail
in our report, as it can be supplemented by a perusal of the Vincent-Bingley Report, and
the published despatches of Sir Percy Lake, describing the military operations up to the

end of August, 1916.

B. PoysicAL AND CLIMATIC PECULIARITIES OF MESOPOTAMIA.

13. On the very threshold of our report, we desire to focus attention on the physical
and climatic peculiarities of that tract of country known as Mesopotamia. The area
generally so called includes not only the territory enclosed between the Tigris and the
Kuphrates, but the country surrounding those rivers. The sole access from the sea to this
country is through a channel known as the Shatt-el-Arab, and the town of Basra 1s
situated on this channel about 70 miles* from the sea. The banks of the channel are
indented by numerous muddy creeks, which require to be bridged over for purposes of
land communication. Vessels drawing not more than 19 feet can make their way up to

* The mileages given are approximate, and unless otherwise stated are by river. They have been kindly
verified by the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty. A map of Mesopotamia will be found in Appendix I,
Annexure II, in this Volume.

PART I.—PREFACE. 9

B. PuysicaAL AND CLIMATIC PECULIARITIES OF MESOPOTAMIA.

Basra, where the channel of the river is about 4 mile wide. There were, in November,
1914, practically no quays or wharfage at Basra ; nor were storehouses or go-downs of any
size available for the accommodation of goods ; vessels were unloaded in mid-stream by
primitive methods into sailing craft known as Mahailas.

14. Kurna is some 50 miles higher up this channel at the junction of the Euphrates
and Tigris rivers. Between Basra and Kurna there is some 74 feet of water in the dr
season, and in the flood about 12 feet or even more. Beyond Kurna the River Tigris
narrows rapidly, and between Ezra’s Tomb and Kelat Sala, a stretch of 28 miles, the
navigation of the river is very difficult. It twists and turns with sharp bends and hairpin
corners, leaving at certain places little or no room for vessels towing a barge on either side
to pass each other. The stream is strong, about four knots an hour, and it is difficult for
steamers without independent paddles to avoid striking the banks when going round the
corners down stream. Vessels under such conditions occasionally turn completely round,
and it is a common experience to see lighters breaking adrift under the strain. :

15. Amara is some 90 miles above Kurna on the Tigris, the depth of water between
the two places averages 44 feet in the low-water season, and it is estimated that in navi-
gating this part of the river, boats should not draw more than 3 ft. 6 in.

16. Kut is again some 150 miles above Amara, but the navigation between the two
places, apart from some shoal patches, is easier, and the river is broader. Baghdad is
112 miles above Kut by road and 212 miles by river, and the meandering of the river
between these two places is more marked than in any other part of its tortuous course,
while not more than 3 ft. 6in. of water can be relied on. Baghdad is, distant by river,
502 miles from Basra.

Some 68 miles west of Kurna are the district and town of Nasariyeh, border-
jog upon the Euphrates, and access to this district is through the Hammar Lake, which in
hot weather is so low as to be impracticable for vessels drawing any depth of water. The
only trees in the country are date palms, wood for fuel or other purposes is unobtainable,
and of stone there is not a trace, except a small quarry South-West of Basra.

17. The country traversed by these two rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, 1s a vast
plain intersected by swamps, and, generally speaking, without roads of any description.
Above Kut, however, there is a caravan road to Baghdad. The soil is a sandy loam which
under rainfall is converted into a tenacious mud. In wet weather and floods, none of the
country bordering the river below Kut is fit for wheeled vehicles, being deep in water and
mud ; in the dry season wheeled transport is generally practicable, if the irngation canals
are bridged or filled up.

18. The Tigris is subject to sudden floods which overrun the banks, and convert the
adjoining terrain into temporary and almost impassable quagmires. The climate is
exceptionally hot, damp and enervating, with periodical snaps of icy storms in the winter.
In the heat of the summer a double-fly tent is an inadequate protection against sun-
stroke. Military movements are exceptionally difficult, the rivers being practically the
only means of transport, thus limiting the radius of activity of operating forces whose
communications entirely depend upon the river.

19 The Karun river, which rises in South-east Persia, and along whose left bank
the oil-pipe of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. runs, flows into the Shatt-el-Arab some 21 miles
to the east-south-east of Basra. This river is more rapid than the Tigris, and though
shallow in parts, is less winding and more easily navigated. The oil-pipe runs from the
oil-fields down to the island of Abadan, which is situated not far from where the river
joins the Shatt-el-Arab. On the island of Abadan are oil-refining works, and certain
workshops belonging to the oil company.

20. There is little steam navigation upon these rivers, though Messrs. Lynch
had a small fleet of steamers running up the Karun river and also plying between Basra
and Baghdad. ‘These steamers are of a peculiar type, being specially built and edapted
to the cecentricities of Mesopotamian river navigation.

21. This brief account of the Mesopotamian plains shows that the provision of ade-
quate and suitable river transport above Basra, and of sufficient wharfage and unloading
facilities at Basra, was a necessity, if effective military operations were to be carried out
inland. As an expeditionary army must be sca-borne, sea-supported and sea-victualled

(C 48—176) B

10 PART J.—PREFACE.

B. PHYSICAL AND CLIMATIC PECULIARITIES OF MESOPOTAMIA.

and well supplied with river transport, it was manifest from the outset that without these
facilities the orderly despatch and distribution of the reinforcements, ammunition, stores
and supplies necessary for the well-being and replenishment of an advancing force, would
be almost impossible. The treacherous climate, and the alternation of sweltering heat and
bitter cold in these regions made the continuous supply of such articles as warm clothing,
double-fly tents,sun-helmets, spine-pads, goggles, ice, ventilating-fans, mosquito-nets, quinine
and other tropical prophylactics indispensable, if the health and moral of the troops were
to be maintained at their accustomed high standard. Full rations, varied from time to
time to counteract the climatic diseases of the country, were very requisite. Sickness,
even with a full supply of such palliatives, was certain to be high, necessitating abnormal
hospital accommodation in addition to the ordinary provision for military casualties.
Hence it is clear that all the conditions of the campaign indicated the necessity for very
ample transport. :

22. By the expression “ transport’ we mean, not only the provision of the necessary
river steamers—in itself no easy task—but the conversion of Basra into such a port as
would make it an adequate base of operations for a large inland expedition. The latter
task required an experience and knowledge not possessed by the ordinary soldier and marine
officer in the employ of the Indian Government. It necessitated the engagement of those
who had a knowledge of the organisation of a port and were accustomed to the handling of
large masses of traffic. But the mere engagement of such officials would not be enough
in itself, unless they were authorised to incur heavy expenditure, and had at their disposal
the necessary personnel and matériel. ‘Such work, moreover, requires foresight and
time for its effective fruition. Hasty improvisation on a large scale was not possible,
and this criticism equally applies to the provision of river craft. :

C. ConDITION OF INDIAN ARMY ON OUTBREAK OF Wank.

23. For some years previous to the war a strong economy campaign had been carried
on in India by the Indian and Home Governments, especially in connection with military
expenditure. The gradual extinction of the opium revenue, amounting to three millions
sterling, and the friendly understandings arrived at with Russia, were both treated as
reasons for a reduction of military establishments in India. On September 9th, 1909,
Lord Kitchener was succeeded by Sir O’Moore Creagh as Commander-in-Chief. During his
regime a strong and continuous pressure in the direction of economy was exercised,
with the support of the Viceroy, over the detailed demands of the Military Budget. Reduc-
tions were made on the assumption that the Indian Army need not contemplate the
likelihood of a collision outside India with the army of a European power, and the provision
for the equipment, organisation and transport of the Indian Army was regulated by the
requirements of frontier warfare alone. The proportion of field guns per division was
cut down to a very low point, and of guns of a large calibre there were practically none,
as no increase to existing expenditure was to be sanctioned, while the number of divisions
available for immediate mobilisation was reduced from nine to seven. There was a
considerable exchange of opinions between the Home and Indian Governments upon these
reductions, and the last of a series of despatches relating to the help which, in view of the
economies effected, India would henceforward be able to afford the Empire in war
time, was only written by the Government of India on July 30th, one day before the out-
break of war. An aircraft establishment had been started a few months before, but its
scope was very limited. : :

24. The Indian Army was therefore relatively, as regards mechanical equipment,
uns, etc., in a less favourable position to confront European troops than it was at the time
of the South African War; but in no branch of military expenditure was the pressure so
much felt as in connection with the medical establishments. According to high medical
authorities the whole standard of medical establishments, of hospital equipment, and of
field ambulances in India has been for years past much below that in vogue in the British
Army. In consequence of the financial pressure alluded to, little or nothing was done to
raise this standard, whilst reserves, both of personnel and matériel, had been reduced to
‘a very low ebb when the war broke out.

_, . 25. The Indian Army was thus suddenly and unexpectedly called upon to participate
largely in an external warfare for which no preparation had been made, as the contingency

PART I.—PREFACE. — BI

C. CoNDITION OF INDIAN ARMY ON OUTBREAK OF WAR.

of such a.conflict had been assumed both by the Home and Indian Governments to be

outside the sphere of reasonable ager oan and the possibility of it occurring was actually

under discussion on the outbreak of war in August, 1914.

26. Under the existing organisation India was almost entirely dependent upon Great
Britain for her supply of white officers, and a very large proportion of her war munitions
come from the same source. British officers on the Indian establishment, who were on
leave in England on the outbreak of war were impounded by the War Office, and an almost
entire cessation of supply of war material was caused by the immense demands of the
new armies raised in Great Britain. From this combination of untoward circumstances
India found her resources for oversea expeditions somewhat exiguous, while the demands
made upon her were large and comprehensive.

D. Inpia’s OvERSEA EXPEDITIONS ON OUTBREAK OF WAR.

27. A number of telegrams were laid before us showing the series of demands made
upon India on the outbreak of war in connection with expeditions to be sent oversea.
These expeditions were known as Expeditions A., B., and C.—A. being the expedition to
France and Egypt, B. a defensive expedition to East Africa, and C. an offensive expedi-
tion to East Africa. The Indian Government strongly protested against being called upon
to provide Expedition C., but they were overruled. Under protest they accepted the
demands made upon them, but they pointed out that they would have extreme difficulty
in supplying any expedition for work at Basra or in Mesopotamia. The composition and
strength of these expeditions were settled by the end of September, 1914, 1.e., before the
Mesopotamian Expedition, known as Force “‘ D,” was decided upon.

28. Generally speaking, the arrangements made were that the control and conduct of
the expeditions A., B., and C. should be under the Home Government, who ultimately
. undertook to maintain the whole forces and provide the drafts and reinforcements for
all troops other than native Indians. But at the beginning cf the war the expeditions
were equipped, and to a large extent maintained, out of India’s resources, it being agreed
that the whole expenditure over and above the ordinary cost to India of the forces engaged
was to be borne by the Imperial funds. Certain other work in connection with sea
transport and other branches of service was also given India, for which she was reimbursed.

29. It should be noted that practically the whole of the important telegrams which
have been produced to us relating to Imperial demands upon the Indian Government for
military expeditions outside India, and the replies of India to these demands, are “* private ”
telegrams. A private telegram is the property of the person who sends it, and it 1s not the
practice to record it on the file of any public Department, though this may be done at the
option of the sender. Such telegrams are kept by the Private Secretaries and are, as a rule,
taken away at the termination of office by the person who sends or receives them. Later
on in our report we shall allude to this practice and its consequences.*

30. Before passing on to the consideration of the Mesopotamian Expedition, we
think it right to draw attention to the demands which, in their totality, the overseas
expeditions have imposed upon India. Lord Hardinge has told us that ‘‘ Approxi-
mately 80,000 British Officers and men and 210,000 Indian officers and men were despatched
overseas, inclusive of drafts and reinforcements.” In considering, therefore, as we shall
pg to do, the Indian Government’s responsibilities in Mesopotamia, it 1s fair to remem-

er that the Mesopotamian Expedition was only part of a larger effort, which involved not

only the maintenance in India of a considerable army for imterior and frontier defence,

but also the despatch overseas of troops approximating in number to the total army
maintained in India before the war.

* See Part XI. (page 102).
(C 48— 176) U2

fd T «ay “~

MS ta

12 PART II.—ORIGIN OF MESOPOTAMIA EXPEDITION,

1. Towards the close of September, 1914, it became self-evident that Turkey was
likely to become a hostile belligerent, and in anticipation of this contingency Sir Edmund
Barrow, Military Secretary of the India Office, wrote a Minute on September 26th, 1914,
entitled: “ The rdle of India in a Turkish War.” He was strongly in favour of an expedition
being sent to occupy Basra, and he concluded his Minute in the following words :—

This seems the psychological moment to take action. So unexpected a stroke at this moment would
have a startling effect :

(1) It would checkmate Turkish intrigues and demonstrate our ability to strike.

(2) It would encourage the Arabs to rally to us, and confirm the Sheikhs of Muhammerah and
Koweit in their allegiance.

(3) It would safeguard Egypt, and without Arab support a Turkish invasion is impossible.
(4) It would effectually protect the oil-installation at Abadan,
Such results seem to justify fully the proposed action.

2. With regard to the oil-installation referred to, we may explain that it belonged to
the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., in which the British Government had recently become large
shareholders on account:of the importance attached by the Admiralty to the oil-supply
from the Company’s wells.

3. A considerable correspondence now took place between India and England, from
which it appears that Enver Pasha and a number of German confederates were intriguing
against the British Government, and that arms and ammunition were being sent to different
places in Turkish territory, that many secret emissaries, including German officers, were
about to try and raise a Jehad in the countries lying between Mesopotamia and India.

4, The Government ultimately decided, after consultation with India, that a part of
Expedition A should be diverted to the Persian Gulf, and that it should land at Bahrein.
The proposal seemed sound and justifiable in itself, as it was likely to prove an effective
counter to German and Turkish intrigues. The force demanded by the India Office was
originally only a brigade of the Sixth Division to be followed by the remainder of that
division at a later date. In the telegrams which passed the Indian Government say :—

It is assumed you are satisfied the advanced brigade is sufficiently strong for the purpose required, but, as
we are unaware of its instructions and objective, we cannot judge of this.
Is it your opinion that the expedition should be managed direct by the Indian Office, or do you desire it

to be run by us?

In reply to this request for information, the Secretary of State on October 5th, stated
that —

pedition will devolve on you, but I will, of course. communicate with you regarding the scope of the operations,
In the meanwhile you should make preparations for the despatch of the remainder of the Division.

5. But the Imperial Government, in initiating this expedition apparently did not fully
realise that such an expedition, if once started, might require reinforcement and enlarge-
ment beyond the one division suggested, and was sure to provoke violent opposition
from the Turks who, under German supervision and control, would make strenuous efforts
to drive the British forces out of Mesopotamia.

6. The expedition, which started from Bombay under General Delamain, received
sealed orders, and arrived at Bahrein on October 23rd. Every effort was made to quiet the
Arabs’ apprehensions, and our political officers were successful in securing that object.
On the 5th November war with Turkey was declared. Two fresh brigades were
sent out under Sir A. Barrett which arrived on November 14th, and on November 22nd
Basra was occupied without much difficulty after a number of skirmishes. So far the
expedition had been a complete success, and in less than three weeks Basra—the key to
Mesopotamia—had been taken and occupied. The suddenness and secrecy of the move
had not only ensured success, but it had done so at very small cost to the expedition.

PART IJ.—ORIGIN OF MESOPOTAMIA EXPEDITION. 13

7. The force, which now amounted to a division, was armed and equipped as for a |

frontier expedition, and its medical equipment was even below that scale, but the conditions
which this expedition had to face, both climatic and military, proved to be of a very
different character from those which prevail on the frontiers of India.

8. General Delamain’s instructions were as follows :— :

INSTRUCTIONS.

For the Officer Commanding, I.E.F. “ D.”

(1) The réle assigned to your force is that of demonstrating at the head of the Persian Gulf. You will
bear in mind that Great Britain is at peace with Turkey, and that you are therefore on no account to land troops
in Turkish territory or to take any hostile action against the Turks without orders from the Government of
India, except in the case of absolute military necessity.

(2) You will ocoupy Abadan Island with the object of :—
(a) Protecting the oil refineries, tanks and pipe line.
(6) Covering the landing of reinforcements, should these be required.
(c) Assuring the local Arabs of our support against Turkey.

(3) With these objects you may disembark the whole or such part of your force as you consider necessary
at Abadan Island or Muhammareh, preferably at Abadan. In deciding on the point of disembarkation,
however, you will work in concert with the naval and political authorities.

(4) In your dealings with the Arabs in Persian or Turkish territory you should be careful to avoid any
action which is likely to cause friction with them, as their co-operation may be required in the event of a rupture
with Turkey.

Communication will be opened with :—

Bin Saud, Shaikh (Amir) of Najd,
The Shaikh of Muhammareh,
The Shaikh of Kuwait |

with the object of informing them of the despatch of your force.

(5) You will notify the arrival of the force off Abadan Island, and thereafter the progress of the dis-
embarkation to the Chief of the General Staff, Simla.
(6) The destination of your force is being communicated to the following only :—
Naval Commander-in-Chief,
Resident, Baghdad,
Consul, Basra,
The three chiefs above-mentioned,
Major Smyth,
Political Officer with your force (Sir P. Cox).
(7) In the event of hostilities with Turkey, the remainder of the 6th (Poona) Division is being held in
readiness to support your force, and will follow as quickly as possible.
In the meantime you will take such military and political action as you think feasible to strengthen
your position, and, if possible, occupy Basra.

9. As before stated, on November 14th, Lieut.-General Sir A. Barrett arrived in
Mesopotamia and took over command. We enclose all the operative portions of his
orders which are relevant to our enquiry :—

ORDERS.

(1) The 16th Brigade under General Delamain is now on board its transports off Bahrein, Persian
Gulf; and has been directed to hold itself in readiness for immediate action as required.

(2) The troops named in the margin will embark as soon as possible to reinforce Genera Delamain.
You, with your divisional headquarters, will accompany this reinforcement, and on arrival assume command
of the whole force detailed for operations at the head of the Persian Gulf. This force is designated Indian
Expeditionary Force “ D.”

(3) Your objective will be telegraphed to you

(4) Your disembarkation will be concerted in closest touch with the Senior Naval Officer, on whose
ship you should travel if possible.

(5) Sir Percy Cox is now with General Delamain as Political Officer ; he will come under your orders.
(6) Enclosed for your information and guidance are :—

(a) Copies of orders given to General Delamain.

(b) Copies of all subsequent correspondence with him and the Secretary of State.

(7) Captain Pulley who takes these orders to you also carries ciphers, books and maps for the use of
Force “ D.”

(10) You will satisfy vourself that the transports conveving your furce are coaled to their full capacity,
and that rations and fuel on the following scales have been placed on board.

é
"

~—~4,

14 PART IL—ORIGIN OF MESOPOTAMIA EXPEDITION.

In addition to rations for the voyage, two months’ supplies for the whole force, including baled fodder
for animals and fuel.

(12) You will acknowledge receipt of these orders and enclosures by wire to the Chief of the General
Staff, Army Headquarters, Delhi.

These orders were supplemented by the following telegram from the Chief of the
General Staff, India, to General Barrett, dated November 13th :—

Please see the third paragraph of your orders. Your objective is Basrah. If after discussion with and
taking over from Delamain, you consider your present force strong enough, you will move on Basrah.

PART III.—-ADVANCH FROM BASRA TO KURNA. 15

1. As soon as we had established our, occupation of Basra, it was suggested by our
Political Agent on the spot, Sir Percy Cox, that an announcement should be made that the
occupation would be permanent. This suggestion was peremptorily swept on one side by
His Majesty’s Government, on the ground that it would be utterly contrary to the agreement
come to between the Allies, if occupation of any conquered country were at once announced
to be permaneut, without waiting for the final settlement to be made at the close
of war. But whilst this proposal was stopped, the Military Secretary of the India Office
submitted, on November 27th, that it would be advisable to push on and occupy Kurna,
50 miles above Basra at the junction of the Euphrates and the Tigris. The advantages
of this position were :—

(1) Its commanding military value.

(2) The control it gives us of the whole navigable waterway to the Gulf.

(3) The possession of the whole of the rich cultivated area from Kurna to the
sea. .

(4) The fact that it completely covers Persian Arabistan and safeguards it

from Turkish intrigues or incursions. |

(5) The moral effect on the Arabs. 7

(6) The control of the telegraph up to this point and also of the passage of the
Euphrates.

2. Lord Crewe, who was Secretary of State for India at this time, whilst ready to assent
to an advance on Kurna, deprecated any idea of a further advance for the present. Opera-
tions against Kurna were successfully concluded on December 9th by the surrender of the
town together with the. Wali and 1,200 prisoners and nine guns. Our authority was thus
established over the whole of the river tract between Kurna and the sea. |

3. Early in 1915 news was received of a Turkish concentration for an attack on
Basra, and the oil-pipe was threatened up the Karun River. The threatened attack of
the Turks and the unrest of the Arabs necessitated further reinforcements, and another
brigade was sent from India, arriving on February 7th, 1915. The Indian Government,
though reluctant at first to send any further troops, finally acquiesced in the despatch of
this force. This reinforcement proved insufficient, and the position became somewhat
critical, There was an unsuccessful skirmish up the Karun River near Ahwaz, and the
situation became so acute that on March 5th the Government of India were peremptorily
ordered “by the Home Government to despatch another brigade. The Government in
England at the same time entirely relieved the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief from
any responsibility as to what subsequently might occur in India from this further depletion
of their available military reserves. This brigade, with two others, made up the second
Division in Mesopotamia, which is hereafter known as the Twelfth Division.

4, On April Ist, the Government of India decided, but without obtaining the consent
of the India Office, to reorganise the expedition as an Army Corps, and General Nixon
and Staff were landed on April 9th. At Basra, General Melliss, with the additional forces
previously sent, achieved a brilliant victory at Barjisiyah near Basra on April. 14th, 1915,
and there had also been successful fighting two days previously, near Shaiba. These victcries
and the increase of force enabled the expedition to consolidate its position ; but, though the
force was doubled, the medical equipment sent to the two last brigades was not up to
the authorised scale of equipment, and practically two divisions had medical equipment
for only one, and their equipment was upon the Indian and not the British scale. Neither
was there made such an addition to the river steamer transport as to bring its proportions
up to the requirements of the increased forces. These deficiencies do not seem to have had
sufficient recognition by the Government of India.

re aes ee eC; RAS

{
|
|

16 PART IV.—THE ADVANCE TO AMARA AND KUT.

1. Sir John Nixon’s assumption of the command of the Expedition makes a landmark
in its history. The occupation of Kurna which had taken place in December, 1914, and the
victory at Barjisiyah which coincided with his arrival, can realised the plan of the British
Government in sending the Expedition, save that something still remained to be done to
complete the protection of the supply of oil. Now we enter upon the story of operations
which are distinguished from the earlier ones by three features.

First, the initiative (except in regard to the security of the oil-supply) no longer comes
from London, but from Sir John Nixon, obeying the general instructions of the Indian
Government, and sustained by their concurrence. Secondly, though the earlier
advances up the Tigris are recommended only by the need for consolidating and defending
what has already been gained, the influence of a desire to move forward towards Baghdad
becomes more apparent. Thirdly, the problem of river transport becomes of crucial import-
ance. :

2. On the appointment of General Nixon as Commander of the Army Corps, he was
given written instructions by Sir Beauchamp Duff before leaving India on March 24th,
1915, and those instructions were as follows :—

(1) Indian Expeditionary Force “ D,”’ now operating in Mesopotamia under the command of Licutenant-

General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., has been reinforced and raised to an Army Corps Command, the
details and organisation of which are shown in a proof copy of Organisation Orders, Force “ D,’’ attached.

(2) You will proceed to Basra, and take over command of J.E.F. “‘ D ”’ from Lieutenant-General Sir A. A.
Barrett, who will retain command of the 6th Division.

(3) Please report by wire, both to the Chief of the General Staff, Simla, and to the Secretary of State for
India, the date on which you take over the command.

(4) You will render a daily report of your operations to the Secretary of State and to the Chief of the General
Staff, Army Headquarters, Simla.

(5) Sir Percy Cox, who is now with Lieutenant-General Sir A. Barrett as Political Officer, will come under
your orders.

(6) Instructions as to the operations of your force are in a separate document

OPERATIONS.

(1) Your force is intended to retain complete control of the lower portion of Mesopotamia, comprising
the Basra vilayet and including all outlets to the sea and such portions of the neighbouring territories as may
affect your operations.

(2) So far as you may find feasible, without prejudicing your main operations, you should endeavour to
secure the safety of the oilfields, pipe-line and refineries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

(3) After acquainting yourself on the spot with the present situation you will submit :—

(i) A plan for the effective occupation of Basra vilayet ;
(ii) A plan for a subsequent advance on Baghdad.

(4) In all operations you will respect the neutrality of Persia so far as military and political exigencies
permit. ‘

REPORTS ON SpEcIaL Points.

The following points are to be especially reported upon by you, after examination of the conditions in
Mesopotamia :—

(i) The advisability of reinforcing 6th Cavalry Brigade by one regiment of Imperial Service Cavalry,
which could be utilised for guarding the oil pipe-line.

(ii) The quantity and description of animal transport required for Force “ D ”’ in the operations con
templated.

(iii) The employment of a light railway, of which 137 miles of track, 20 locomotives, 240 trucks,
23 brake vans and 2 traction engines are reported available and in good condition. 7

(iv) The employment of armoured motors and mechanical transport.

(v) Aircraft.

(vi) The adequacy and suitability of the river gunboats and transprrts en route, namely :—
2 Nile gunboats, armament not yet known.

7 Paddlers from the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, with 2 flats from Eastern Bengal State
Railway. )
2 motor-boats.

4 tugs.
4 steam launches and 2 steam cutters and 2 horse-boats, understood to be coming from Egypt.

3. At the time these instructions were given to General Nixon they were not known
to the Home Authorities, though they were subsequently sent by mail to the India Office,
where they were received on May 2nd. In his evidence before us, the Viceroy also stated
that he did not remember having seen these instructions.

PART IV.—THE ADVANCE TO AMARA AND KOT. 17

On April 22nd, General Townshend arrived in Mesopotamia, and took command
of the 6th Division. On the 24th, General Nixon directed him to proceed at once to Kurna
and reconnoitre the Turkish position north of that place with a view to attacking it.

In the meantime the Home Government was concerned as to the safety of the oil
pipe and on the 19th, the Secretary of State urged an immediate move against the Turks
in that region, and on the same day General Nixon asked India for another Cavalry
Brigade in the following terms :—

The Cavalry Brigade now with this Force cannot meet the demands which will shortly be made on that
arm. The despatch of another Cavalry Brigade which should include a British Cavalry Regiment is requested.
It is very necessary that we should have the British unit. In view of heavy work which obstructions in the river,
and other works will cause, I also beg for the despatch of a battalion of Pioneers.

4. In reply to Sir John Nixon’s request the Viceroy regretted that he was unable
to supply any more Cavalry, and on April 24th, the Secretary of State made the
following communication to the Viceroy :— :

Your decision in connexion with Nixon’s request for a brigade of Cavalry is concurred in. To say nothing
of the impossibility of complying with his request the approach of the hot season renders it undesirable to
despatch any more troops, especially British. An important offensive movement is indicated by Nixon’s
demand. Any advance beyond the present theatre of operations will not be sanctioned by Government at
this moment, and I presume Nixon clearly understands this. During the summer we must confine ourselves
to the defence of oil-interests in Arabistan and of the Basra Vilayet.

If an advance to Amara with a view to establishing an outpost for the purpose of controlling tribesmen
between there and Karun, thus adding to the security of the pipe-line is possible after smashing the enemy in
the direction of Karun I should, if such a proposal received your support, be prepared to sanction it. Any pro-
posal involving possible demands for reinforcements or undue extension is to be deprecated however.

Our present position is strategically a sound one and we cannot at present afford to take risks by extending
it unduly. In Mesopotamia a safe game must be played.

This telegram was apparently sent in ignorance that Sir John Nixon’s instructions
from India involved the occupation of the vilayet of Basra, which includes both Amara and

Nasariyeh, and extends to within a few miles of Kut-el-Amarah.

5. General Nixon at that time had two military objectives in view—one on the Karun
and the other on the Tigris River. He had at his disposal the Sixth and Twelfth Divisions
and a Cavalry Brigade. There had been trouble up the Karun River, and General
Gorringe, with two Infantry Brigades of the Twelfth Division and one Cavalry Brigade,
was sent up to reopen communications with Ahwaz and to punish the enemy. This he
did very effectively, and he was able to demonstrate on his left flank towards Bisaitin.
This operation greatly assisted the impending advance of General Townshend up the Tigris,
and the floods prevented reinforcements from joining the Turkish forces on the Tigris in
time to oppose General Townshend’s advance. The Turkish forces facing General Gorringe
were so delayed on their march to Amara, that when they eventually reached it they found
General Townshend in occupation of the town. A portion of their advance guard was
captured, and the remainder had to seek safety in dispersion with the loss of two guns.

6. The Viceroy had advocated the advance to and occupation of Amara. Amara
town possessed importance, not only from an administrative and commercial point
of view, but also as a strategical military post, and there were obvious advantages likely
to accrue from its occupation. On May 23rd, the Viceroy indicated in a telegram that
Sir John Nixon proposed to take the offensive towards Amara, but he would not proceed
beyond Amara without the sanction of the Secretary of State. In reply, on May 23rd, the
Secretary of State sanctioned the proposed movement—

On the clear understanding that the General Officer Commanding Force “‘ D”’ is satisfied that he can concen-
trate a sufficient garrison at Amara to defy any attack from Baghdad during the summer. . .. Wecansend him
no more troops and he must clearly understand that his action must be guided by this fact. Arrangements for
the move in question must have been made some days back, and I am of opinion that General Nixon should
have submitted his proposals before the last moment. Under present circumstances only the Cabinet should
decide questions jointly affecting civil and military policy.

As in the case of the telegram of April 24th, this communication seems also to imply
a lack of appreciation by the Home Government of the scope of Nixon’s instructions
from India.

7. On May 27th, Lord Crewe left the India Office and was succeeded by Mr. Chamber-
lain, who at once endorsed his predecessor’s policy of caution in the following words
on May 28th :—-

Till I know the immediate objects contemplated and the force with which General Nixon 1s advancing,
Iam unable to give further instructions. Our policy must depend partly on local factors, forces locally available,
and partly on situation elsewhere. I should like to be informed what force General Nixon considers necessary
for garrisoning Amara, and how-generally he proposes to distribute his troops during the summer if the occu-
pation of that town is contemplated.

(C 48—176) C

18 PART IV.—THE ADVANCE TO AMARA AND KUT.

In reply to that telegram the Viceroy, on June 2nd, generally supported the advance,
and he added the opinion that it would be undesirable or dangerous to tie down General
Nixon with precise orders in case they might not fit in with the local situation confronting
him. ‘“ Under the original instructions he will, as soon as he is in a position to do so,
submit a plan for the occupation of the Basra vilayet, which includes Amara. . . . We
should not propose to authorise any advance beyond Amara for which his force is not
adequate.”

8. The advance on Amara—or “ Townshend’s Regatta,” as it was called locally—was
then very successfully carried out by that General. Boats of light draught were converted
into light-armoured gunboats, and were very effective. The enemy were pursued with
unrelenting vigour, in spite of the sweltering heat and the difficulties of navigation, and
were driven from position to position. On June 3rd Amara was reached, and General
Townshend with 22 sailors and soldiers achieved the surrender of a garrison of 700 Turks.
Next day the Norfolk Regiment arrived, and all further opposition collapsed. Asa military
operation this action was audaciously planned and well-timed, and it deserves high praise,
as it achieved great objects with comparatively small loss of life.

9. General Nixon now proposed, with the full support of the Government of India,
to strike in the direction of Nasariyeh, a place which is 68 miles west of Kurnah, access to
it being through the channel of the Euphrates and the Hammar Lake. The heat was
terrific.; still General Nixon deemed it expedient to carry on the enterprise. Major-General
Gorringe, who was in charge of this column, succeeded in capturing Nasariyeh on July 25th,
with 950 prisoners, 17 guns and much booty. These operations were initiated by the
General on the spot, supported by the Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy of India,
and acquiesced in by the Secretary of State. They appear to us to be sound from
both a military and political point of view. Our casualties amounted to 533 of all ranks,
but there was also much sickness.

10. This succession of victories seemed to stimulate the authorities in India to a fresh
advance, and on Julv 27th the Viceroy sent a telegram to the Secretary of State to the effect
that, ““ Now that Nasariyeh has been occupied the occupation of Kut-el-Amara is con-
sidered by us to be a strategic necessity.”” Communications ensued between the Secretary
of State and the Viceroy, and ultimately the Secretary of State assented to the advance
and accepted the military arrangements which General Nixon proposed to make after the
advance.

11. On September 14th, the Headquarters of the Sixth Division reached Sheikh
Saad, and on the 15th Abu Rummanah, which had been very strongly fortified by
the Turks. was captured by us. On the 29th, after severe fighting, the Turks were
in full flight, and our cavalry had entered Kut-el-Amara. During the fight we
captured more than 1,700 prisoners and 13 guns, and inflicted heavy losses in men
and material. This part of the campaign, again, was brilliantly executed by
General Townshend and the Sixth Division of the Indian Army, and the whole series
of military operations during the past three months had been so extraordinarily successful,
that it is not surprising that a spirit of optimism and over-confidence as to what could be
achieved overcame General Nixon and his Headquarter Staff. It 1s sometimes as dangerous
to over-estimate victories as to under-rate them. These successes had been achieved by
striking quickly and continuously, pursuit after victory being intense and persistent.
Audacity had accomplished wonders ; was there any limit to its possibilities ?

12. Although the expedition had by hard fighting achieved externally a series of mili-
tary successes, there had been even from the beginning of the campaign signs that the
internal organisation, as regards river transport and the distribution of supplies through
such transport, was working at its maximum capacity. From the time the expedition moved
above Kurna, the river transport had been either insufficient or barely sufficient for its
wants and could not sustain additional pressure. For reasons which we will subsequently
examine, the provision of the type of steamer and barge specially adaptable to the Tigris
had been delayed. Railway schemes had either been put on one side or not pressed by
the Indian Government. On July 10th, Sir John Nixon forwarded to India a demand for
six paddle-steamers, three stern-wheelers, eight tugs and forty-three barges. In making
this demand, Sir John Nixon stated that—

“The inadequacy of the light-draught fleet available has, nevertheless, been a constant source of delay,
uncertainty and anxiety. Now that it is clear that time and experience will not mend matters, but that wear
and tear and the course of events must inevitably tend to steady diminution of the shipping fit for military
operations in these rivers, I would strongly urge that the six paddlers, etc. . . . asked for in my telegram
under reference, may be provided.”’

PART IV.—THE ADVANCE TO AMARA AND KUT. 19

13. A full and complete memorandum by General Kemball, Sir J. Nixon’s Chiet of
the Staff, was forwarded with this request. In the memorandum he reviewed the whole
position of the river transport, pointing out the inability of the present fleet to comply
with the existing wants and the probability of a diminution in its effective number through
breakdown and want of necessary repairs. He concluded by saying :—

In short, more powerful light-draught river steamers and plenty of them, and not only ships, but personnel
and material for their maintenance, are regarded by the general Staff of this Force as our principal need.

It is also thought necessary to add the warning that if steps are not taken in good time to meet these
requirements we are running grave risks of a breakdown at possibly a serious moment.

At the present time we cannot make the most effective use of the troops available owing to want of ships,
and in any crisis insufficiency of river transport would limit the scope of reinforcements, while a breakdown of
shipping might have still more serious consequences. :

A properly equipped river fleet would double and treble the effective value of the Army in occupation
of Mesopotamia at the present moment, and would continue to be an important military asset, even if a broad-
gauge railway to Baghdad were built. The formation of this fleet is considered therefore as our special and most
important need at the present time.

14. The additional transport asked for was sanctioned after a lengthy correspondence,
but the execution of the order under any circumstances would have taken from 8 to 10
months before completion, and the ships would then have had to be conveyed either under
their own steam or piecemeal to Basra. Under no circumstances could they have been
available in Mesopotamia till towards the middle of the year 1916.

15. At this time the medical equipment of the expedition was not up to its proper
strength, even according to the low scale of Indian regulation. Although there had been
no actual breakdown, the wounded and sick, both in the actions on the Karun, at Nasa-
riyeh, and at Kut-el-Amara had been put to considerable discomfort through lack of
ambulance transport, stationary hospital accommodation and_ river hospital
steamers. The medical personnel was barely sufficient. Any further forward move-
ment up the river, associated with an influx of reinforcements at Basra, was almost certain
to convert the existing deficiencies in medical personnel and matériel into a deadlock of
the whole system, unless exceptional and continuous good luck should attend the new
offensive movement.

16. General Nixon had now secured at Kut a highly convenient halting place. It
was well described by Sir E. Barrow, Military Secretary at the India Office :—-

If we sit tight at Kut-el-Amara, we can consolidate our control of the Basra Vilayet, and fortify a strong
position at the apex of the triangle formed by the Tigris and the Shatt-el-Hai, which with our naval command
of the rivers, would be unassailable by any but a very superior force accompanied by heavy artillery, while it
would at the same time completely cover the main approaches to the territory now occupied by us.

There were other considerations in favour of calling a halt. The 6th Division had had very
hard work, and almost continuous fighting in a very trying climate, and though it had
done all that was demanded of it, it was not the fine fighting machine it had been.

(O48 174, C2

20 PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE
ON BAGHDAD.

1. Baghdad and the possibility of its becoming an objective of the expedition con-
stantly crops up in the evidence before us. On October 8th, 1914, 7.e., a week before the
expedition had actually left India, the Viceroy wrote unofficially to the Marquess of Crewe
to the effect that he would be ready for an attempt on Basra “ or even Baghdad ” in the
event of Turkey declaring war. On November 23rd, the day after Basra was occupied
by General Barrett's forces, Sir Percy Cox, the Indian Government’s Political Represen-
tative in Mesopotamia, telegraphed to the Viccroy : ‘‘ With General Officer Commanding,
I have been studying topographical details bearing on an advance to Baghdad in case
such an advance should be decided upon,” and he proceeded to outline a reasoned proposal
for an advance on Baghdad.; while three days later, on November 26th, the Senior Naval
Officer in the Persian Gulf wrote to the Indian Government indicating what his requirements
in gunboats would be in the event of an advance up the Tigris to Baghdad.

2. The Viceroy forwarded Sir Percy Cox’s proposal for an advance on Baghdad to
the Secretary of State on November 25th, and on November 27th Lord Crewe tele-
graphed back: “ We are not disposed to authorise an advance to Baghdad at present.”’
This decision was arrived at before the Secretary of State was in possession of the Vice-
roy’s views, but it appears from a subsequent letter that, after consulting the Commander-
in-Chief in India, the Viceroy did not think Sir Percy Cox’s project feasible at the time.
The letter in question, which is dated December 2nd, contains such cogent reasons for
rejecting a proposal which was subsequently almost enthusiastically accepted, that we
think it instructive to quote the following passages :—

VICEROY TO SECRETARY OF STATE.

You did not give me time to send you our views on Cox’s proposal to advance to Baghdad, for you sent me
a telegram crushing it. As a matter of fact, after consultation with Beauchamp Duff, I had arrived at the
conclusion that it would be impossible to execute at present. Uniike Basra, which is easy to capture from the
south and very strong against any attack from the north, Baghdad has no advantages as a position against
an attacking enemy, and, being an extensive town situated on both banks of the Tigris, would be particularly
difficult to defend. All communications with Baghdad would have to be by water, and Baghdad is about 500
miles up the river from Basra and 570 from the Gulf. It would not be possible to entrust this long line of
communications to the Arabs, since, if they failed, a disaster must result. To avoid undue risk, it would, in
the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, have been necessary to have a whole division in Baghdad and another
on the line of communications, to keep them open in the first instance and also ready to reinforce Baghdad if
attacked. In view of the large number of troops that we have sent overscas and the very reduced military
forces remaining in India, it would be impossible for India to carry out this scheme even with reasonable
safety.’ In the absence, therefore, of extraneous assistance, those political advantages, which are really con-
siderable, that might accrue from the capture and occupation of Baghdad must be subordinated to the military
objections that would be involved in such a course.

3. It will be seen that the terms of Lord Crewe’s telegram of November 27th, whilst
deprecating an advance on Baghdad at that time, did not specifically rule out such an ad-
vance as a possible operation in the future. It is quite clear that India at any rate did not
consider this telegram as an absolute veto on Baghdad as a possible objective, for on Feb-
ruary 12th, 1915, we find the Viceroy telegraphing to the Secretary of State: “ Baghdad
will consequently probably become our objective, and no harm will be done if in our
dealings with Persian Government we contemplate that contingency.”

4. We have already noticed that amongst the orders given by Sir Beauchamp Duff to
Sir John Nixon on March 24th, 1915, was an instruction to “ prepare a plan for a subsequent
advance on Baghdad.” This plan was not forwarded to India by Sir John until August
30th, 1915, but it is clear, from papers submitted to the Commission, that in December,
1914, and June, 1915, if not on other dates, appreciations were prepared by the General
Staff in India on the subject of an advance to Baghdad. Sir John Nixon’s plan was a
reasoned appreciation of the military situation on the Tigris at the time. In it Sir John
does not refer to his own difficulties in regard to transport, nor to the inevitable augmenta-
tion of these difficulties, which would result from prolonging his line of communications
by over 200 miles. But he sets out very clearly the advantages of following on the heels of
the Turkish Army fleeing into Baghdad after a defeat in the neighbourhood of Kut ; and
he contrasts with this plan, unfavourably and almost prophetically, the dangers of having
‘to fight his way to Baghdad through a Turkish Army well entrenched above Kut. Such
an operation, he says, “ might be more difficult and costly than anything yet met with,
and the result of a check be more serious for us,”’

PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE 21
ON BAGHDAD.

5. Sir John Nixon’s plan was favourably endorsed by Sir Percy Lake, then Chief of
the General Staff, at Simla, and sent by him, on September 9th, to the Commander-in-
Chief, Sir Beauchamp Duff, who, however, minuted Sir Percy Lake’s memorandum, “ unless
we can get back troops from France, Egypt, or elsewhere, I fear that Baghdad, invaluable
as its capture would be, is out of the question.”

6. It is not clear whether Sir John Nixon’s plan and the Commander-in-Chief’s
Minute on it, were ever sent to England or submitted to the Viceroy, but it is clear that
the latter never ruled out from his mind the possibility of advancing to Baghdad in the
future. Thus, on August 27th, in writing to Sir Thomas Holderness, the Viceroy advocates
an advance to Kut-el-Amara, and points out that “ at Kut-el-Amara we are in a good
position to strike at Baghdad should the necessity arise and more troops be available.”
Again, on September 17th, in writing to Mr. Chamberlain, he emphasises the desirability
of advancing to Baghdad if only sufficient troops can be made available.

But whatever may have been in the minds of the authorities in England, India and
Mesopotamia, with regard to Baghdad as an ultimate possibility, it does not appear to
have been brought forward as an immediately practicable proposition until October 3rd.

7. The position of the Expeditionary Force at that time was as follows :—Kut had been
occupied on September 28th, and General Townshend, with characteristic dash, had pushed
on his cavalry in pursuit of the enemy, and on October 4th they were at Aziziyeh, some 50
miles beyond Kut on the road to Baghdad.

On October 3rd, General Nixon, as General Officer Commanding the expedition, tele-
graphed to the Secretary of State :—

‘ T consider I am strong enough to open road to Baghdad, and with this intention I propose to concentrate
at Aziziyeh.”

On the next day he telegraphed to India :—

‘* With reference to my suggestion to open by another general action the road to Baghdad, will you kindly
let me know whether my force is to be reinforced to the extent of another division from France in order that my
position there may be maintained.”

These telegrams were despatched on the assumption that the demoralisation of the
retreating force was such that our pursuing vanguard could get into Baghdad upon their
heels. But only a day later it became clear from further communications that the enemy
were not so disorganised as to prevent their making a serious stand, and General Townshend
was cognisant of this fact,

8. On the 5th October General Nixon tetegraphed that the enemy appeared to be
no longer retreating, but had occupied the Ctesiphon position, and thereby constituted a
threat to us. Still, he considered it desirable to smash him while he could, and he “‘ saw
nothing which would justify letting slip such an opportunity.” It is necessary to emphasise
this point, as it is clear from subsequent telegrams that the sanction of the Home Govern-
ment to advance on Baghdad was given on the supposition that the Turks between Kut and
Baghdad were not likely to offer really serious opposition. The policy of the Cabinet up to
that date in Mesopotamia had been defined by Lord Crewe in a telegram dated April 24th,
1915, to the Viceroy, the concluding words of which were :
Any proposal involving possible demands for reinforcements or undue extension is to be deprecated however.

Our position is strategically a sound one, and we cannot at present afford to take risks by extending it
unduly. In Mesopotamia a safe game must be played.

9. This policy was endorsed by a telegram from Mr. Chamberlain, who had on May 27th
succeeded Lord Crewe as Secretary of State for India. The relations of the Cabinet to
the officers in the field were further defined in a telegram on May 23rd already alluded
to, in which the Secretary of State, while sanctioning the advance to Amara, added:

Under present circumstances only the Cabinet should decide questions jointly affecting civil and military
policy.

10. On October 4th, in accordance with that policy, the Secretary of State sent two
telegrams to the Viceroy, one private and one official, which ran as follows :—

Private. Sir J. Nixon’s plans. Please refer to my official telegram of to-day on this subject. Your
private letter of the 10th ultimo seems to render it imperative to stop the further advance of General Nixon’s
force. If you will communicate to me your views early I shall be grateful.
and :—

Will you kindly inform me what General Nixon’s present intentions are, as, if on account of navigation
troubles there is no probability of the retreating cnemy being caught up and smashed, there is no object in the
pursuit being continued.

22 PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE
ON BAGHDAD.

The latter telegram was repeated to General Nixon from India in a telegram dated
October 5th, which also stated :—

“* At present no reinforcements can be spared from this country, so that unless arrangements can be made
by the Secretary of State for the despatch of an Indian Division from France an advance on Baghdad cannot
be carried out. Under these circumstances there seems to be no advantage in concentrating at present so
far forward as Aziziyeh as the only gain in this is if a move toward Baghdad takes place. Commander-in-
Chief considers that no advance in strength should be carried out beyond Kut-al-Amara until it is certain (and
this appears to us very doubtful), that the reinforcements from France may be expected.

Finally on October 6th, the Viceroy sent the following telegram to the Secretary of

State :—
“ Orders to stop further advance were telegraphed yesterday to General Nixon.”

Thus the plan of an immediate advance on Baghdad was apparently abandoned ; and
that this was the belief at the front in Mesopotamia is evident from the following
Divisional Order issued by General Townshend on October 11th, 1915 :—

The General Officer Commanding 6th Division wishes to tender his grateful thanks to all ranks of the
division for the gallant and noble spirit in which they have advanced some 180 miles from Amara, defeated
the enemy in an extremely strong position, and moved on another 50 miles or so in pursuit.

That we did not catch the retreating Turks is due to the fact of the shallow water of the river, and to the
fact that the Turks are endowed by nature with strong knees. 7

He wishes he could have announced to the troops the end of their labours in Mesopotamia, but these
operations naturally depend on those operations now being carried out in the Dardanelles, whence we now
hope for good news. !

He desires to tell the troops that orders have been received from Government in England that we are, for
the present, to hold the position we have gained and thus our present orders are not to advance to Baghdad.
It is the intention, therefore, of the G.O.C. to make the force as comfortable as it is possible to do under the
circumstances ; tents, &c., will be brought up as soon as possible.

(Signed) R.G. PEEL,
Colonel, General Staff.
11. Meanwhile on October 4th the Cabinet met, and the Secretary of State reported
the position to them, and the opinion of the Cabinet was conveyed to the Viceroy on
October 5th in the following terms :—

The position was reported vesterday to the Cabinet, and they have decided to appoint a committee of
Foreign Office, General Staff, Admiralty, and India Office, to consider in all its possibilities and policy advance

on Baghdad. .
If forces available are sufficient tc take and hold the place. political reasons were thought to make occupation
desirable. ... It is thought by Barrow that we mizht be able to capture Baghdad, but that forces weakened

by further losses would be insufficient both to hold it securely against counter-attacks and to maintain com-
munication. Kitchener can hold out no hope of reinforcements from Europe or Egypt.

12. On the following day, October 5th, General Nixon replied to the Secretary of
State’s telegram of October 4th, as to ‘‘ navigation troubles ” in the following terms :—

By marching the troops with land tiansport and by lightening the vessels and employing them to tow
loaded barges, we have overcome the difficulties of navigation . . . . . .

The view I take is that before us lics an enemy who has been shaken, who is short of ammunition and has
lost 13 guns, and while we have the chance it is obviously profitable for military reasons to overwhelm him
T hope I can destroy him, as the position in which he has taken refuge is one where we are able to manceuvre.

Should we let such an opportunity slip by us, I can see no arzuments by which we could justify ourselves.

As will be subsequently seen, misunderstanding arose about the first sentence of this
telegram. It was understood to affirm a general sufficiency of transport, but it really
only answered the Viceroy’s telegram of October 4th,* relating to the immediate local

difficulties of navigation.
In a private telegram of the same day, the Viceroy stated :—

The following is the present situation :—

With the forces at his disposal General Nixon could, without much difficulty, capture Baghdad, and at
the same time take or destroy the Turkish steamers and other boats thus practically preventing any further
attacks down stream. But without himself being reinforced by one Division of troops he could not remain
there exposed to attack by Turkish reinforcements from Mosul or Aleppo. To advance to Baghdad and to
retire later, under pressure from the Turks, would be a grave error. Consequently Nixon must remain at
Kut-el-Amara unless it be possible to reinforce him from elsewhere other than from India.

On the 7th, a telegram from the Viceroy stated that the Commander-in-Chief in India
agreed that it would be unwise to occupy Baghdad with the present forces.

As regards this telegram, Sir Beauchamp Duff informed us that the telegram which he
proposed to send was couched in somewhat different terms, and ran as follows : —

I have consulted the Commander-in-Chief, who has no doubt that as things stand at present we could
capture Baghdad, but that our available troops would nct be sufficient to hold it should the Turks mass troops
for a counter-attack and that the effect of entering Baghdad and subsequently having to retire would
be disastrous Moreover, he doubts whether in the present state of the river, combined with our present

id: ts ==

* See para. 10 ante. This telegram was con municated to General Nixon.

PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE 23
ON BAGHDAD.

insufficient number of light-draught steamers, we could adequately supply our troops there. As a military
operation, therefore, he holds that to occupy Baghdad with our present forces would be most unwise.

(Then follow various reasons in justification of this contention.)

The Viceroy did not accept this telegram, and in his reply omitted all allusion to
the Commander-in-Chief’s doubts as regards the sufficiency of existing river transport,
which doubts therefore were unknown to the Home Authorities.

13. On October 8th, the Secretary of State addressed the following question to General
Nixon :—

Very urgent. To both occupy and hold Baghdad what addition to your present force are you confident
will be necessary ?
and on the 8th the Secretary of State sent the following telegram to the Viceroy :

Private. The Cabinet are so impressed with great political and military advantages of occupation of
Baghdad that every effort will be made by us to supply the force that is necessary. We do not wish to attempt
it with insufficient forces. I shall be glad to know whether you are satisfied that one division will suffice.

On the same day General Nixon telegraphed as follows : ‘‘ No additions are necessary
to my present force to beat Nur-ed-din and occupy Baghdad ; of this I am confident,” but
he. added that he would require an additional division and one cavalry regiment to
enable him permanently to occupy Baghdad.

14. On October 9th, in a telegram, the Secretary of State stated to the Viceroy :—

Private. I hope in a few days to give you definite information as to possibility of reinforcements. Mean-
while Nixon should maintain his present position and he should be prepared to advance if reinforcements asked
for can be sent to him. I should be glad if you would instruct him accordingly.

On the same day the Viceroy in a telegram to the Secretary of State states as follows :—

Private. I am glad of the Cabinet’s decision. After consultation with Sir B. Duff, I am of the opinion
that Sir John Nixon is in the best position to judge as to the number of troops that will be required, and when
a division is mentioned by him we understand him to mean a division fully organised with its proper proportion
of British troops and guns and its divisional cavalry. He asks for a cavalry regiment in addition to this.

We are prepared to accept his opinion, but we consider that it will also be necessary to ensure that the
British units now with him are to be kept up to strength by drafts from England, and these cannot be supplied
by this country. The Indian units will be kept at full strength by us. We may add that the reinforcing
troops should reach Baghdad not later than one month after the capture of that city, and this is the period
which we calculate must elapse before the Turks could concentrate in strength to attempt its recapture.

15. On the 14th, the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy :—

Private. Reinforcements for Force ‘“‘D.” A question has been raised as to the sufficiency of the reinforce-
ments which General Nixon has asked for, or even of two divisions to hold Baghdad against forces which might
eventually be brought against him by the Turks. The General Staff are now considering this, and the Cabinet
hope to be given their report in three days.

We continue to attach the greatest importance to the capture of Baghdad if we can hold it securely. Please
let me know whether the chances of eventual successful advance are prejudiced by delay.

to which the Viceroy replied :—

Private. With reference to your private wire, regarding Baghdad, dated October 14th. Unless Baghdad
is strongly reinforced by the Turks in the meantime, and of this we see no immediate signs, the chances of
eventual successful advance will not be prejudiced by delay, although owing to the longer time the enemy will
have at their disposal for completing their defences the step will be more costly.

16. On the 15th, the Secretary of State telegraphed to Viceroy :—

Private. Advance on Baghdad. If report of the General Staff is favourable to occupation of Baghdad,
the War Office contemplate transfer of the two Indian Infantry divisions from France to Egypt with the inten-
tion of placing them at your disposal for Mesopotamia. But they cannot guarantee date of departure owing
to uncertainty of position in Near Kast and possible need of transport for other purposes. They do not con-
sider it would be safe under the circumstances for Nixon to advance to Baghdad before these troops have
actually started from Egypt unless you can undertake to supply him temporarily with a division from India
in the event of these reinforcements being unavoidably delayed. I request early reply as to the possibility
of your undertaking the liability.

This is in continuation of my private telegram of October 14th.

17. On October 17th, the Viceroy telegraphed :—

After consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, we agree that in no case could J undertake to supply from
India, even temporarily, a further force of the strength of a division.

On the 21st the Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy in a full and reasoned telegram
marked “ Private,” discussed alternative courses of action and gave their opinion in favour of
the plan of taking and occupying Baghdad. This, they stated, would present no difficulty
whatever provided they were guaranteed reinforcements of a full division of troops
reaching Mesopotamia in two months.

EP OE COLE

24 PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE
ON BAGHDAD.

18. On the 21st October the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy, as
follows :—

Private. Baghdad advance. Report of combined Staffs estimates that General Nixon has only some
9,000 Turkish troops and some irregulars to deal with for next two months ; that Turkish forces may be some-
what increased by the end of the year, and they might conceivably reach a total of 60,000 by end of January,
and even larger figures during 1916. They consider if reinforced by two Indian Divisions from France he might,
with assistance of river flotilla, face risk of attack by 60,000, but there would remain possibility of enemy
receiving at later date further reinforcements. The staffs hold, therefore, that from a military point of view
it would be unwise to occupy Baghdad unless military authorities have power to withdraw troops at once
without regard to political considerations if military exigencies make this necessary. The War Office would
give the two Indian Divisions, but could not under any circumstances spare further reinforcements, and are
doubtful of their capacitv even to supply drafts if wastage from casualties or sickness is severe. They think
Baghdad can be easily taken and held for some time, but it might become untenable later as explained above.
At present moment it seems the German attempt to break through to Constantinople will succeed, and our posi-
tion and prospects in Gallipoli are most uncertain. . . . Arabs are wavering, and will probably join
Turks, unless we can offer them great inducement. We are therefore, in great need of striking success in the
East. . . . It is suggested that we should occupy Baghdad, giving assurances to Arab leaders that we
favour creation of Arab State independent of Turks. . . . Unless you consider possibility of eventual
withdrawal is decisive against the advance, all other considerations seem to us to render it desirable, and we
are prepared to order it.

On the 23rd Octcber the Viceroy replied :—

Private. Your private telegram of the 21st instant. Baghdad advance. Your description of the
situation in the Near East proves conclusively the necessity for action in the Middle East. We accept the
calculation of the combined Staffs of possible strength of Turks that may with time be brought against us ;
but with reinforcement of two Indian divisions from France we believe that Sir J. Nixon has a fair prospect
of being able to hold his own against 60,000 or 70,000 Turks, provided he occupied Baghdad as soon as he 1s
ready. Although I realise that the occupation of Baghdad is a provocation that will probably determine
the Turks to send large forces to attack us, which however, will not be easy for them to do, and although the
bad effect of a possible withdrawal in the future cannot be ignored, I am confident right policy at the present time
is to take the risk and to occupy Baghdad with the least possible delay, relying upon you to send two divisions
from France as quickly as possible to Mesopotamia. On this understanding 1 propose, unless 1 hear from you
before Monday to the contrary, to order Nixon to march on Baghdad at once.

Finally, on the 23rd October, the Secretary of State sent the following telegram :—

If Nixon is satisfied that the force he has available is sufficient for the operation, he may march on Baghdad.
Two divisions will be sent to him as soon as possible, but owing to relief and transport arrangements, reinforce-
ments will take time to despatch. Probable date will be (? wired) later.

19. During the period of three weeks covered by these telegrams a number of meetings
had been held, and memoranda written by the Military Advisers of the Government in
London. These papers and consultations were less concerned with the taking of Baghdad
than with the question whether it would be possible to hold it after it had been taken.
On October 4th, General Barrow, the Military Secretary, India Office, had written a
memorandum in which he expressed the opinion that to attempt to go to Baghdad with the
present force was to incur unjustifiable risk.

On October 6th, the General Staff, in a memorandum, stated that to hold Baghdad,
except with forces very much larger than at present with Sir John Nixon, and with propor-
tionately increased river transport, would be to court disasters. 60,000 Turks could be
assembled and conveyed within a few weeks to Baghdad, and to withdraw from
Baghdad after occupation would have a most unfortunate effect.

On October 14th, another paper was drawn up by the General Staff on the question
of occupying Baghdad. They estimated that if Baghdad was to be taken and occupied,
General Nixon must have reinforcements of two Indian divisions. On the 19th the joint
Naval and Military General Staff further considered the question, and came to the con-
clusion that if there were very strong political objections to a withdrawal from Baghdad
then its occupation should not be attempted.

On October 16th General Barrow, the Military Secretary, India Office, modified his
previous proposals by stating that if he had a firm promise of two divisions, he was entirely
in favour of going to Baghdad.

20. Expert opinion was therefore unanimous on the point that to attempt to take
and occupy Baghdad with the existing force would be an unjustifiable risk, and that for
the task of holding Baghdad, General Nixon should have a reinforcement of two
divisions. There was, however, a concurrence of expert opinion that Nixon’s existing
force was sufficient in the first instance to take Baghdad.

21. In addition to the ordinary Military Authorities with whom questions of this kind

PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE 25
ON BAGHDAD.

are discussed by the Government, the Prime Minister summoned a special Inter-Depart-
mental Committee, composed of members of the India Office, the War Office, the Admiralty
and the Foreign Office, to which he submitted certain questions on the subject of the strate-
gical situation in Mesopotamia. Mr. Chamberlain, Secretary of State for India, had some
doubts as to whether he or Sir Thomas Holderness should be Chairman of this Committee,
but he finally decided in favour of Sir Thomas Holderness in the belief that the other
members of the Committee would more freely express their opinions before an Under-
Secretary than a Secretary of State. Sir Thomas Holderness, though a distinguished
civilian, had no special experience or training in the class of questions submitted to the
Committee. The other members of the Committee were :—

Sir Edmund Barrow, Military Secretary, India Office.

Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, Admiralty.

Sir Louis Mallet, Foreign Office.

Mr. Launcelot Oliphant, Foreign Office.

Colonel Talbot, War Office.

Captain Paddon, War Office.

' 22, The case was one of such high importance that, in our opinion, the Representatives
of the War Office and the Admiralty on the Committee should have been officers of official
position and experience more nearly on a par with those of Sir E. Barrow, who was the
Senior General of the Indian Army and also Head of the Military Department of the
India Office. During their discussions, the question of transport, as we ascertained from
Sir Thomas Holderness, became quite a subsidiary subject. There were three communi-
cations from Mesopotamia—one contained in a despatch and memorandum, dated 10th
July, 1915, and two in telegrams dated respectively 25th September, 1915, and 9th October,*
1915, which unmistakably expressed the inadequacy of the river transport even for the
wants of the existing force of two divisions. These documents, though received at the
India Office, were either unknown to the Committee or, if they were brought before them,
were not seriously considered. Sir Thomas Holderness told us that his apprehensions as
regards transport were largely removed by General Nixon’s telegram of the 5th October,f
stating that “ by marching the troops with land transport and by lightening the vessels
and employing them to tow loaded barges, we have overcome the difficulties of navigation.”
He did not appreciate the limitations of this assurance, and thought it applied to the general
question of adequate river transport. After discussing the definite questions put to them,
Sir Thomas Holderness’s Committee came to the conclusion that, on both political and
military grounds, the occupation of Baghdad was most desirable if the necessary reinforce-
ments could be assured. Failing these, General Nixon was not to attempt it.

23. It was the promise of reinforcements that alone induced this Committee to advocate
an advance to Baghdad, but, as in the case of the other authorities consulted, they ap-
parently passed over the all-important problem of how these reinforcements, after arrival
at Basra, were to be conveyed as fighting units to the front, a distance of some 500 miles.
We lay stress upon this serious omission, especially in the case of the Committee presided
over by Sir Thomas Holderness. The despatch of troops from France or Egypt could not
affect any fighting around Baghdad after its capture, unless, after their arrival in Meso-
potamia, they were conveyed as an organised force to the scene of action. The arrival
of troops at Basra, without transport or their proper medical complement, with their
Headquarter Staff scattered and disorganised and without the means of conveyance up
the river, was not 2 reinforcement in the sense defined by the Viceroy in his private telegram
of the 9th of October, in which he thus expressed himself :—

We may add that the reinforcing troops should reach Baghdad not later than one month after

the capture of that city, and this is the period which we calculate must elapse before the Turks could
- concentrate in strength to attempt its recapture.

24, It seems to us that it should have been a primary duty of the Military Advisers
of the Government, both in India and in England, to have thoroughly investigated the
conditions attending the dispatch of troops from Europe and Egypt and their transport
up the Tigris, so as to be sure that they could perform the functions assigned to them of
being a fighting addition to the advance columns located in Baghdad.

In this connection it should be noted that Sir Beauchamp Duff, in his examination
before the Commission placed the same interpretation as did Sir Thomas Holderness,
upon the telegram of General Nixon of the 5tht of October, in which he used the words:
“We have overcome the difficulties of Navigation.”

* See Part IX., paras. 8 and 10. + See paragraph 12, ante.
(C 48—176) D

\ \

26 PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE
| ON BAGHDAD.

Sir Percy Lake, who at the time this telegram was received at Simla was Chief of the
General Staff, did not accept Sir Beauchamp Dufi’s interpretation of the meaning of this
telegram, and he told us so in his evidence. (General Kemball, who, as Chief of Sir John
Nixon’s Staff in Mesopotamia, had sent the telegram, emphatically repudiated Sir
Beauchamp’s reading of it.

A reference to the telegraphic correspondence, makes it self-evident that General
Nixon’s reply referred to the delay caused to the pursuing river column by shoals and
shifting banks, as reported by General Nixon to the Secretary of State on October the Ist.
It in no sense counteracted or modified his previous statement that his transport was inade-
quate. Indeed, only four days later, on October 9th, he asked, as an urgent need, for
more river craft to be procured from India and indicated that his operations were very
seriously impeded by the insufficiency of his existing river craft. |

25. The warning conveyed in a private telegram of October 21st* from the Secretary
of State to the Viceroy of a possible concentration of 60,000 Turks at Baghdad in January,
1916, was acknowledged by the Viceroy in a private and reasoned telegram accepting the
risk. The information thus conveyed introduced a new factor into the situation, and
one which ought at once to have been forwarded to Sir John Nixon. Sir John Nixon in
his evidence before us could not recollect receiving this information, and Sir Beauchamp
Duff has informed us that this telegram was not transmitted to Mesopotamia. He
accounted for this oversight by the fact that 1t was a private telegram to the Viceroy
of which he had no official cognisance, nor was it filed in his Department. Sir John, how-
ever, intimated that 1f he had been warned in time he could have stopped the advance
to Baghdad even on November 17th, 2.e. a month later than this telegram. On that day,
1.e. four days before the battle of Ctesiphon, the War Office telegraphed from London
to General Nixon that General von der Goltz had left for Baghdad on November 10th,
and that 30,000 Turks were marching from Anatolia to Irak. On the 20th General Nixon
replied :—

For more than a fortnight my own agents have been giving me similar news of a large force under Von der
Goltz, but at present I do not accept these reports as conclusive for various reasons.

Sir John Nixon’s over-confidence in his ability to crush the Turkish forces between
him and Baghdad might have induced him in October to ignore the warning from London
as to the large enemy reinforcements which might be brought down to Baghdad. Still,
the neglect to convey to him so vital a piece of information reflects seriously on the system
which allowed such inadvertence to be possible. If the substance of this important telegram
had been conveyed to the Viceroy in an official instead of a private telegram, it would,
as a matter of course, have been transmitted to Mesopotamia.

26. In alluding to the introduction by the Cabinet of political considerations into
the consultations of their military advisers, we do not wish to imply that this widening of
their survey is to be condemned or that it necessarily subjects those so acting to criticism
or censure. In a world-wide war the views, wants and aims of allies must be considered
and weighed, and operations may become necessary for the continuance and consolida-
tion of existing alliances and of the co-operation which such alliance ensures. But when
such considerations do obtrude themselves into a military campaign the incidence of respon-
sibility tends to shift itself. The military experts cannot be made solely responsible for
the consequences of a decision into the consideration of which outside political factors have
necessarily entered.t Sir Beauchamp Duff in part of his evidence laid stress upon the
introduction of outside political considerations into the conduct of the campaign, and
he stated that when such political arguments were adduced by those above him in authority,
he was ready to incur greater risks than would be justifiable if the matters under discussion
were to be regarded solely from a military standpoint.

27, In the decision arrived at by the Home Authorities, they were doubtless largely
influenced by the extreme confidence of those on the spot. There seems to have been a
general idea—not only amongst the Headquarter Staff of General Nixon, but also amongst
the Commander-in-Chief’s Staft in India—that there would not be anv serious fighting
before Baghdad was reached. Even amongst the General Staff at Whitehall, the idea
prevailed that the difficulty was not to get to Baghdad but to remain there. The retreating
Turks were supposed to be thoroughly demoralised, and insufficient attention was paid to
the warnings of the War Office Intelligence Department that a very large number of

a a ee,

anal

* See paragraph 18, ante.
+: See Secretary of State’s telegrams of October 5th, 8th, and 21st, in paras. 11, 13, and, 18 ante.

PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE 27
ON BAGHDAD.

Turkish reinforcements would shortly be concentrated at Baghdad. It might also have
been surmised that these reinforcements under Marshal von der Goltz would be disciplined
and trained under (serman officers and armed with the most modern equipment.

28. It is not very easy to fathom the interchange of views between General Towns-
hend and General Kemball, Chief of the Staff to Sir John Nixon, as to the advis-
ability of an advance to Baghdad. On October 3rd an important telegram was sent by
General Townshend to General Kemball. Sir John Nixon states that he does not remember
seeing it, but it is surprising if he did not. It certainly should not have been dealt with
without reference to him, and in our opinion it should have been passed on to higher
authorities. In it General Townshend says :— |

If on the other hand it is the desire of Government to occupy Baghdad, then, unless great risk is to be run,

it 1s, in my opinion, absolutely necessary that the advance from Kut should be :arried out methodically by two
divisions or one Army Corps or by one Division supported closely by another complete Division, exclusive of
the garrisons of the important places of Nasariyeh, Ahwaz, and Amara.
On the same day General Kemball answered this communication, and informed General
Townshend that it was Sir John Nixon’s intention “‘ to open the way to Baghdad, as he
- understands another division will be sent here from France, and he would like to know
your plan for effecting this object.” General Townshend received this the same day, and
noted on it in his diary: ‘‘ There is nothing definite known about this, and no earthly
chance of its being in this country in time.” Nevertheless, in his answer, also dated
October 3rd, he wires to General Kemball : “‘ You did not mention the arrival of a division
from France in this country, and that makes all the difference in my appreciation.” These
two statements are not easy to reconcile, but General Townshend, like many other born
fighters, was somewhat mercurial and changeable in his views.

29. A fortnight later, on October 19th, General Kemball visited General Townshend on
other business, and the above correspondence was discussed by them at this and at two
subsequent interviews, viz., October 30th and November 5th. The matter is not quite
clear, but General Kemball’s opinion is that the reinforcements which General Townshend
received—4.e., five squadrons of cavalry, three battalions of infantry, and a R.H.A. battery
—were very much what he asked for, and there was also the promise of two divisions from
France, the leading troops of which General Kemball expected to arrive at Basra at the
end of November. Whether General Townshend was satisfied or not is not certain, but
he does not seem to have pressed his objections hard.

But misgivings were present in his mind as late as November 2nd, for on that day he
wrote to the Viceroy a letter in which these expressions occur :—

These troops of mine are tired and their tails are not up, but slightly down ; the Mahomcdans are not pleased
at approaching the sacred precincts of Suliman Pak at Ctesiphon—the troops are not confident and have had
enough ; as it is now, the British soldier and the Sepoy, as the Roman soldier did under Belisarius, look over
their shoulders and are fearful of the distance from the sea, and go down, in consequence, with every imagin-
able disease.

These are not the words of a General commanding a force in the field who has confidence
in the capacity of his troops to achieve the task assigned to them.

Apparently the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Beauchamp Duff, did not at the time see
these communications from General Townshend, but if he had, we have his word for it
that they would not have materially changed his views as to the wisdom of the advance.
But General Townshend was an experienced and successful commander, and in our opinion
his words were well worth weighing, especially in connection with an enterprise of which
he was the selected chief.

30. It should be added that several months later, on April 7th, 1916, General Towns-
hend sent in an amplification of his appreciation of October 3rd, which seems to have been
in his mind when he wrote that appreciation. On April 7th, he said: ‘ My opinion most
certainly was that we were taking a grave risk in continuing a strategic movement against
Baghdad with my weak Division alone, the British battalions of which were reduced to
half their strength, and besides this the drafts to replace casualties at the battle of Kut
consisted of raw recruits from India, while there were no other troops to support me,
and the distance to the sea was over 300 miles.” General Kemball in giving evidence
before us did not accept these statements as to the condition of the troops. He regarded
them as exaggerated.

That. General Townshend’s Division was much below its normal strength is we
believe beyond dispute,* and moreover physically the troops were much debilitated by
their previous strenuous exertions in the hot months of June, July, August and September.

* See Part VITT, para. 13.
(C 18-—176) D 2

12 PART II.—ORIGIN OF MESOPOTAMIA EXPEDITION.

1. Towards the close of September, 1914, it became self-evident that Turkey was
likely to become a hostile belligerent, and in anticipation of this contingency Sir Edmund
Barrow, Military Secretary of the India Office, wrote a Minute on September 26th, 1914,
entitled: “‘ The rdle of India in a Turkish War.” He was strongly in favour of an expedition
being sent to occupy Basra, and he concluded his Minute in the following words :—

This seems the psychological moment to take action. So unexpected a stroke at this moment would
have a startling effect :

(1) It would checkmate Turkish intrigues and demonstrate our ability to strike.

(2) It would encourage the Arabs to rally to us, and confirm the Sheikhs of Muhammerah and
Koweit in their allegiance.

(3) It would safeguard Egypt, and without Arab support a Turkish invasion is impossible.
(4) It would effectually protect the oil-installation at Abadan.
Such results seem to justify fully the proposed action.

2. With regard to the oil-installation referred to, we may explain that it belonged to
the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., in which the British Government had recently become large
shareholders on account of the importance attached by the Admiralty to the oil-supply

from the Company’s wells.

4. The Government ultimately decided, after consultation with India, that a part of
Expedition A should be diverted to the Persian Gulf, and that it should land at Bahrein.
The proposal seemed sound and justifiable in itself, as it was likely to prove an effective
counter to German and Turkish intrigues. The force demanded by the India Office was
originally only a brigade of the Sixth Division to be followed by the remainder of that
division at a later date. In the telegrams which passed the Indian Government say :—

It is assumed you are satisfied the advanced brigade is sufficiently strong for the purpose required, but, as

we are unaware of its instructions and objective, we cannot judge of this.
Is it your opinion that the expedition should be managed direct by the Indian Office, or do you desire it

to be run by us?
In reply to this request for information, the Secretary of State on October 5th, stated
that — |

The intention is to occupy Abadan, with the Force under orders, protect the oil-tanks and pipe-line,
cover the landing of reinforcements, in the event of such being necessary, and show Arabs that our intention
is to support them against the Turks. With a warship at Muhammereh the troops detailed are considered
ample for the purposes mentioned. Inthe event of Turkey becoming a belligerent the management of the ex-
pedition will devolve on you, but I will, of course. communicate with you regarding the scope of the operations,
In the meanwhile you should make preparations for the despatch of the remainder of the Division.

to drive the British forces out of Mesopotamia.

6. The expedition, which started from Bombay under General Delamain, received
sealed orders, and arrived at Bahrein on October 23rd. [Every effort was made to quiet the
Arabs’ apprehensions, and our political officers were successful in securing that object.
On the 5th November war with Turkey was declared. Two fresh brigades were
sent out under Sir A. Barrett which arrived on November 14th, and on November 22nd
Basra was occupied without much difficulty after a number of skirmishes. So far the
expedition had been a complete success, and in less than three weeks Basra—the key to
Mesopotamia—had been taken and occupied. The suddenness and secrecy of the move
had not only ensured success, but it had done so at very small cost to the expedition.

PART II.—ORIGIN OF MESOPOTAMIA EXPEDITION. 13

7. The force, which now amounted to a division, was armed and equipped as for a |

8. General Delamain’s instructions were as follows :—

INSTRUCTIONS.

For the Officer Commanding, I.E.F. “ D.”

(2) You will occupy Abadan Island with the object of :—

(a) Protecting the oil refineries, tanks and pipe line.
(6) Covering the landing of reinforcements, should these be required.
(c) Assuring the local Arabs of our support against Turkey.

Communication will be opened with :—

Bin Saud, Shaikh (Amir) of Najd,
The Shaikh of Muhammareh,
The Shaikh of Kuwait
with the object of informing them of the despatch of your force.

ORDERS.

(1) The 16th Brigade under General Delamain is now on board its transports off Bahrein, Persian
Gulf; and has been directed to hold itself in readiness for immediate action as required.

(3) Your objective will be telegraphed to you

(4) Your disembarkation will be concerted in closest touch with the Senior Naval Officer, on whose
ship you should travel if possible.

(5) Sir Percy Cox is now with General Delamain as Political Officer ; he will come under your orders.

(6) Enclosed for your information and guidance are :—

(a) Copies of orders given to General Delamain.

(b) Copies of all subsequent correspondence with him and the Secretary of State.

(7) Captain Pulley who takes these orders to you also carries ciphers, books and maps for the use of
Force “ D.”

(10) You will satisfy vourself that the transports conveving your furce are coaled to their full capacity,
and that rations and fuel on the following scales have been placed on board.

_— i »§ sat ff. ~ ao ae ae

14 PART IJ.—ORIGIN OF MESOPOTAMIA EXPEDITION.
In addition to rations for the voyage, two months’ supplies for the whole force, including baled fodder

for animals and fuel.
(12) You will acknowledge receipt of these orders and enclosures by wire to the Chief of the General

Staff, Army Headquarters, Delhi.
These orders were supplemented by the following telegram from the Chief of the
General Staff, India, to General Barrett, dated November 13th :—

-— Me Re ey

PART III]—ADVANCH FROM BASRA TO KURNA. 15

1. As soon as we had established our occupation of Basra, it was suggested by our
Political Agent on the spot, Sir Percy Cox, that an announcement should be made that the
occupation would be permanent. This suggestion was peremptorily swept on one side by
His Majesty’s Government, on the ground that it would be utterly contrary to the agreement
come to between the Allies, if occupation of any conquered country were at once announced
to be permanent, without waiting for the final settlement to be made at the close
of war: But whilst this proposal was stopped, the Military Secretary of the India Office
submitted, on November 27th, that it would be advisable to push on and occupy Kurna,
50 miles above Basra at the junction of the Euphrates and the Tigris. The advantages
of this position were :—

(1) Its commanding military value. |

(2) The control it gives us of the whole navigable waterway to the Gulf.

(3) The possession of the whole of the rich cultivated area from Kurna to the
sea. — ,

(4) The fact that it completely covers Persian Arabistan and safeguards it

from Turkish intrigues or incursions. |

(5) The moral effect on the Arabs.

(6) The control of the telegraph up to this point and also of the passage of the
Euphrates. | | |

3. Early in 1915 news was received of a Turkish concentration for an attack on
Basra, and the oil-pipe was threatened up the Karun River. The threatened attack of
the Turks and the unrest of the Arabs necessitated further reinforcements, and another
brigade was sent from India, arriving on February 7th, 1915. The Indian Government,
though reluctant at first to send any further troops, finally acquiesced in the despatch of
this force. This reinforcement proved insufficient, and the position became somewhat
critical. There was an unsuccessful skirmish up the Karun River near Ahwaz, and the
situation became so acute that on March 5th the Government of India were peremptorily
ordered by the Home Government to despatch another brigade. The Government in
England at the same time entirely relieved the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief from
any responsibility as to what subsequently might occur in India from this further depletion
of their available military reserves. This brigade, with two others, made up the second
Division in Mesopotamia, which is hereafter known as the Twelfth Division.

4. On April 1st, the Government of India decided, but without obtaining the consent
of the India Office, to reorganise the expedition as an Army Corps, and General Nixon
and Staff were landed on April 9th. At Basra, General Melliss, with the additional forces
previously sent, achieved a brilliant victory at Barjisiyah near Basra on April 14th, 1915,
and there had also been successful fighting two days previously, near Shaiba. These victcries
and the increase of force enabled the expedition to consolidate its position ; but, though the
force was doubled, the medical equipment sent to the two last brigades was not up to
the authorised scale of equipment, and practically two divisions had medical equipment
for only one, and their equipment was upon the Indian and not the British scale. Neither
was there made such an addition to the river steamer transport as to bring its proportions
up to the requirements of the increased forces. These deficiencies do not seem to have had
sufficient recognition by the Government of India.

16 PART IV.—THE ADVANCE TO AMARA AND KUT.

1. Sir John Nixon’s assumption of the command of the Expedition makes a landmark
in its history. The occupation of Kurna which had taken place in December, 1914, and the
victory at Barjisiyah which coincided with his arrival, at realised the plan of the British
Government in sending the Expedition, save that something still remained to be done to
complete the protection of the supply of oil. Now we enter upon the story of operations
which are distinguished from the earlier ones by three features.

ance.

(1) Indian Expeditionary Force “ D,”’ now operating in Mesopotamia under the command of Licutenant-

(2) You will proceed to Basra, and take over command of IJ.E.F. “‘ D ”’ from Lieutenant-General Sir A. A.
Barrett, who will retain command of the 6th Division.

(3) Please report by wire, both to the Chief of the General Staff, Simla, and to the Secretary of State for
India, the date on which you take over the command.

(4) You will render a daily report of your operations to the Secretary of State and to the Chief of the General
Staff, Army Headquarters, Simla.

(5) Sir Percy Cox, who is now with Lieutenant-General Sir A. Barrett as Political Officer, will come under
your orders.

(6) Instructions as to the operations of your force are in a separate document

OPERATIONS.

(2) So far as you may find feasible, without prejudicing your main operations, you should endeavour to
secure the safety of the oilfields, pipe-line and refineries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

(3) After acquainting yourself on the spot with the present situation you will submit :—

(i) A plan for the effective occupation of Basra vilayet ;
(ii) A plan for a subsequent advance on Baghdad.
(4) In all operations you will respect the neutrality of Persia so far as military and political exigencies

permit.
REpoRTS ON SPECIAL Pornts.

The following points are to be especially reported upon by you, after examination of the conditions in
Mesopotamia :—
(i) The advisability of reinforcing 6th Cavalry Brigade by one regiment of Imperial Service Cavalry,
which could be utilised for guarding the oil pipe-line.
(ii) The quantity and description of animal transport required for Force “ D ”’ in the operations con

templated.
(iii) The employment of a light railway, of which 137 miles of track, 20 locomotives, 240 trucks,

23 brake vans and 2 traction engines are reported available and in good condition.

(iv) The employment of armoured motors and mechanical transport.

(v) Aircraft.

(vi) The adequacy and suitability of the river gunboats and transprrts en roule, namely :—
2 Nile gunboats, armament not yet known. |
7 Paddlers from the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, with 2 flats from Eastern Bengal State

Railway. |

2 motor-boats.

4 tugs.
4 steam launches and 2 steam cutters and 2 horse-boats, understood to be coming from Egypt.

PART IV.—THE ADVANCE TO AMARA AND KOT. 17

4, In reply to Sir John Nixon’s request the Viceroy regretted that he was unable
to supply any more Cavalry, and on April 24th, the Secretary of State made the

following communication to the Viceroy :— :

Your decision in connexion with Nixon’s request for a brigade of Cavalry is concurred in. To say nothing
of the impossibility of complying with his request the approach of the hot season renders it undesirable to
despatch any more troops, especially British. An important offensive movement is indicated by Nixon’s
demand, Any advance beyond the present theatre of operations will not be sanctioned by Government at
this moment, and I presume Nixon clearly understands this. During the summer we must confine ourselves
to the defence of oil-interests in Arabistan and of the Basra Vilayet.

Our present position is strategically a sound one and we cannot at present afford to take risks by extending
it unduly. In Mesopotamia a safe game must be played.

This telegram was apparently sent in ignorance that Sir John Nixon’s instructions
from India involved the occupation of the vilayet of Basra, which includes both Amara and

Nasariyeh, and extends to within a few miles of Kut-el-Amarah.

6. The Viceroy had advocated the advance to and occupation of Amara. Amara
town possessed importance, not only from an administrative and commercial point
of view, but also as a strategical military post, and there were obvious advantages likely
to accrue from its occupation. On May 28rd, the Viceroy indicated in a telegram that
Sir John Nixon proposed to take the offensive towards Amara, but he would not proceed
beyond Amara without the sanction of the Secretary of State. In reply, on May 23rd, the

Secretary of State sanctioned the proposed movement—

On the clear understanding that the General Officer Commanding Force “‘ D ”’ is satisfied that he can concen-
trate a sufficient garrison at Amara to defy any attack from Baghdad during the summer. . . . Wecansend him
no more troops and he must clearly understand that his action must be guided by this fact. Arrangements for
the move in question must have been made some days back, and I am of opinion that General Nixon should
have submitted his proposals before the last moment. Under present circumstances only the Cabinet should
decide questions jointly affecting civil and military policy.

As in the case of the telegram of April 24th, this communication seems also to imply
a lack of appreciation by the Home Government of the scope of Nixon’s instructions
from India.

7. On May 27th, Lord Crewe left the India Office and was succeeded by Mr. Chamber-
lain, who at once endorsed his predecessor’s policy of caution in the following words
on May 28th :—-

Till I know the immediate objects contemplated and the force with which General Nixon is advancing,
Tam unable to give further instructions. Our policy must depend partly on local factors, forces locally available,
and partly on situation elsewhere. I should like to be informed what force General Nixon considers necessary
for garrisoning Amara, and how-generally he proposes to distribute his troops during the summer if the occu-
pation of that town is contemplated.

(C 48—176) C

18 PART IV.—_THE ADVANCE TO AMARA AND KUT.

In reply to that telegram the Viceroy, on June 2nd, generally supported the advance,
and he added the opinion that it would be undesirable or dangerous to tie down General
Nixon with precise orders in case they might not fit in with the local situation confronting
him. ‘“ Under the original instructions he will, as soon as he is in a position to do so,
submit a plan for the occupation of the Basra vilayet, which includesAmara. . . . We
should not propose to authorise any advance beyond Amara for which his force 1s not
adequate.”

8. The advance on Amara—or “‘ Townshend’s Regatta,” as it was called locally—was
then very successfully carried out by that General. Boats of light draught were converted
into light-armoured gunboats, and were very effective. The enemy were pursued with
unrelenting vigour, in spite of the sweltering heat and the difficulties of navigation, and
were driven from position to position. On June 3rd Amara was reached, and General
Townshend with 22 sailors and soldiers achieved the surrender of a garrison of 700 Turks.
Next day the Norfolk Regiment arrived, and all further opposition collapsed. Asa military
operation this action was audaciously planned and well-timed, and it deserves high praise,
as it achieved great objects with comparatively small loss of life.

9. General Nixon now proposed, with the full support of the Government of Indra,
to strike in the direction of Nasariyeh, a place which is 68 miles west of Kurnah, access to
it being through the channel of the Euphrates and the Hammar Lake. The heat was
terrific.; still General Nixon deemed it expedient to carry on the enterprise. Major-General
Gorringe, who was in charge of this column, succeeded in capturing Nasariyeh on J uly 25th,
with 950 prisoners, 17 guns and much booty. These operations were initiated by the
General on the spot, supported by the Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy of India,
and acquiesced in by the Secretary of State. They appear to us to be sound from
both a military and political point of view. Our casualties amounted to 533 of all ranks,
but there was also much sickness.

10. This succession of victories seemed to stimulate the authorities in India to a fresh
advance, and on Julv 27th the Viceroy sent a telegram to the Secretary of State to the effect
that, ‘‘ Now that Nasariyeh has been occupied the occupation of Kut-el-Amara 1s con-
sidered by us to be a strategic necessity.” Communications ensued between the Secretary
of State and the Viceroy, and ultimately the Secretary of State assented to the advance
and accepted the military arrangements which General Nixon proposed to make after the
advance.

11. On September 14th, the Headquarters of the Sixth Division reached Sheikh
Saad, and on the 15th Abu Rummanah, which had been very strongly fortified by
the Turks. was captured by us. On the 29th, after severe fighting, the Turks were
in full flight, and our cavalry had entered Kut-el-Amara. During the fight we
captured more than 1,700 prisoners and 13 guns, and inflicted heavy losses in men
and material This part of the campaign, again, was brilliantly executed by
General Townshend and the Sixth Division of the Indian Army, and the whole series
of military operations during the past three months had been so extraordinarily successful,
that it is not surprising that a spirit of optimism and over-confidence as to what could be
achieved overcame General Nixon and his Headquarter Staff. It is sometimes as dangerous
to over-estimate victories as to under-rate them. These successes had been achieved by
striking quickly and continuously, pursuit after victory being intense and persistent.
Audacity had accomplished wonders ; was there any limit to its possibilities ?

‘‘ The inadequacy of the light-draught fleet available has, nevertheless, been a constant source of delay,
uncertainty and anxiety. Now that it is clear that time and experience will not mend matters, but that wear
and tear and the course of events must inevitably tend to steady diminution of the shipping fit for military
operations in these rivers, I would strongly urge that the six paddlers, etc. . . . asked for in my telegram
under reference, may be provided.”

oe
Ae es,

PART IV.—THE ADVANCE TO AMARA AND KOT. 19

13. A full and co = ger memorandum by General Kemball, Sir J. Nixon’s Chiet of
the Staff, was forwarded with this request. In the memorandum he reviewed the whole
position of the river transport, pointing out the inability of the present fleet to comply
with the existing wants and the probability of a diminution in its effective number through
breakdown and want of necessary repairs. He concluded by saying :—

It is also thought necessary to add the warning that if steps are not taken in good time to meet these
requirements we are running grave risks of a breakdown at possibly a serious moment.

A properly equipped river fleet would double and treble the effective ‘value of the Army in occupation
of Mesopotamia at the present moment, and would continue to bean important military asset, even if a broad-
gauge railway to Baghdad were built. The formation of this fleet is considered therefore as our special and most
important need at the present time.

15. At this time the medical equipment of the expedition was not up to its proper
strength, even according to the low scale of Indian regulation. Although there had been
no actual breakdown, the wounded and sick, both in the actions on the Karun, at Nasa-
riyeh, and at Kut-el-Amara had been put to considerable discomfort through lack of
ambulance transport, stationary hospital accommodation and _ river hospital
steamers. The medical personnel was barely sufficient. Any further forward move-
ment up the river, associated with an influx of reinforcements at Basra, was almost certain
to convert the existing deficiencies in medical personnel and matériel into a deadlock of

the whole system, unless exceptional and continuous good luck should attend the new

offensive movement.

16. General Nixon had now secured at Kut a highly convenient halting place. It
was well described by Sir E. Barrow, Military Secretary at the India Office :--

(C48 174, C 2

i Ege “FT .4,. sé

20 PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE
ON BAGHDAD.

1. Baghdad and the possibility of its becoming an objective of the expedition con-
stantly crops up in the evidence before us. On October 8th, 1914, 7.e., a week before the
expedition had actually left India, the Viceroy wrote unofficially to the Marquess of Crewe
to the effect that he would be ready for an attempt on Basra “ or even Baghdad ” in the
event of Turkey declaring war. On November 23rd, the day after Basra was occupied
by General Barrett's forces, Sir Perey Cox, the Indian Government’s Political Represen-
tative in Mesopotamia, telegraphed to the Viceroy: “‘ With General Officer Commanding,
I have been studying topographical details bearing on an advance to Baghdad in case
such an advance should be decided upon,” and he proceeded to outline a reasoned proposal
for an advance on Baghdad ; while three days later, on November 26th, the Senior Naval
Officer in the Persian Gulf wrote to the Indian Government indicating what his requirements
in gunboats would be in the event of an advance up the Tigris to Baghdad.

2. The Viceroy forwarded Sir Percy Cox’s proposal for an advance on Baghdad to
the Secretary of State on November 25th, and on November 27th Lord Crewe tele-
graphed back: ‘‘ We are not disposed to authorise an advance to Baghdad at present.”’
This decision was arrived at before the Secretary of State was in possession of the Vice-
roy’s views, but it appears from a subsequent letter that, after consulting the Commander-
in-Chief in India, the Viceroy did not think Sir Percy Cox’s project feasible at the time.
The letter in question, which is dated December 2nd, contains such cogent reasons for
rejecting a proposal which was subsequently almost enthusiastically accepted, that we
think it instructive to quote the following passages :—

VICEROY TO SECRETARY OF STATE.

You did not give me time to send you our views on Cox’s proposal to advance to Baghdad, for you sent me
a telegram crushing it. As a matter of fact, after consultation with Beauchamp Duff, I had arrived at the
conclusion that it would be impossible to execute at present. Uniike Basra, which is easy to capture from the
south and very strong against any attack from the north, Baghdad has no advantages as a position against
an attacking enemy, and, being an extensive town situated on both banks of the Tigris, would be particularly
difficult to defend. All communications with Baghdad would have to be by water, and Baghdad is about 500
miles up the river from Basra and 570 from the Gulf. It would not be possible to entrust this long line of
communications to the Arabs, since, if they failed, a disaster must result. To avoid undue risk, it would, in
the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, have been necessary to have a whole division in Baghdad and another
on the line of communications, to keep them open in the first instance and also ready to reinforce Baghdad if
attacked. In view of the large number of troops that we have sent overseas and the very reduced military
forces remaining in India, it would be impossible for India to carry out this scheme even with reasonable
safety. In the absence, therefore, of extraneous assistance, those political advantages, which are really con-
siderable, that might accrue from the capture and occupation of Baghdad must be subordinated to the military
objections that would be involved in such a course.

4. We have already noticed that amongst the orders given by Sir Beauchamp Duff to
Sir John Nixon on March 24th, 1915, was an instruction to “ prepare a plan for a subsequent
advance on Baghdad.”’ This plan was not forwarded to India by Sir John until August
30th, 1915, but it is clear, from papers submitted to the Commission, that in December,
1914, and June, 1915, if not on other dates, appreciations were prepared by the General
Staff in India on the subject of an advance to Baghdad. Sir John Nixon’s plan was a
reasoned appreciation of the military situation on the Tigris at the time. In it Sir John
does not refer to his own difficulties in regard to transport, nor to the inevitable augmenta-
tion of these difficulties, which would result from prolonging his line of communications
by over 200 miles. But he sets out very clearly the advantages of following on the heels of
the Turkish Army fleeing into Baghdad after a defeat in the neighbourhood of Kut ; and
he contrasts with this plan, unfavourably and almost prophetically, the dangers of having
‘to fight his way to Baghdad through a Turkish Army well entrenched above Kut. Such
an operation, he says, “ might be more difficult and costly than anything yet met with,
and the result of a check be more serious for us.”

PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE 21
ON BAGHDAD.

6. It is not clear whether Sir John Nixon’s plan and the Commander-in-Chief’s
Minute on it, were ever sent to England or submitted to the Viceroy, but it is clear that
the latter never ruled out from his mind the possibility of advancing to Baghdad in the
future. Thus, on August 27th, in writing to Sir Thomas Holderness, the Viceroy advocates
an advance to Kut-cl-Amara, and points out that “ at Kut-el-Amara we are in a good
position to strike at Baghdad should the necessity arise and more troops be available.”
Again, on September 17th, in writing to Mr. Chamberlain, he emphasises the desirability
of advancing to Baghdad if only sufficient troops can be made available.

On October 3rd, General Nixon, as General Officer Commanding the expedition, tele-
graphed to the Secretary of State :—

‘ T consider I am strong enough to open road to Baghdad, and with this intention I propose to concentrate
at Aziziyeh.”

On the next day he telegraphed to India :—

** With reference to my suggestion to open by another general action the road to Baghdad, will you kindly
let me know whether my force is to be reinforced to the extent of another division from France in order that my
position there may be maintained.”

8. On the 5th October General Nixon tetegraphed that the enemy appeared to be
no longer retreating, but had occupied the Ctesiphon position, and thereby constituted a
threat to us. Still, he considered it desirable to smash him while he could, and he “ saw
nothing which would justify letting slip such an opportunity.”’ It is necessary to emphasise
this point, as it 1s clear from subsequent telegrams that the sanction of the Home Govern-
ment to advance on Baghdad was given on the supposition that the Turks between Kut and
Baghdad were not likely to offer really serious opposition. The policy of the Cabinet up to
that date in Mesopotamia had been defined by Lord Crewe in a telegram dated April 24th,
1915, to the Viceroy, the concluding words of which were :
Any proposal involving possible demands for reinforcements or undue extension is to be deprecated however.

Our position is strategically a sound one, and we cannot at present afford to take risks by extending it
unduly. In Mesopotamia a safe game must be played.

; Under present circumstances only the Cabinet should decide questions jointly affecting civil and military
policy.

10. On October 4th, in accordance with that policy, the Secretary of State sent two
telegrams to the Viceroy, one private and one official, which ran as follows :—

Will you kindly inform me what General Nixon’s present. intentions are, as, if on account of navigation
troubles there is no probability of the retreating cnemy being caught up and smashed, there is no object in the
pursuit being continued.

22 PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE
ON BAGHDAD.

The latter telegram was repeated to General Nixon from India in a telegram dated
October 5th, which also stated :—

‘* At present no reinforcements can be spared from this country, so that unless arrangements can be made
by the Secretary of State for the despatch of an Indian Division from France an advance on Baghdad cannot
be carried out. Under these circumstances there seems to be no advantage in concentrating at present so
far forward as Aziziyeh as the only gain in this is if a move toward Baghdad takes place. Commander-in-
Chief considers that no advance in strength should be carried out beyond Kut-al-Amara until it is certain (and
this appears to us very doubtful), that the reinforcements from France may be expected.

, Finally on October 6th, the Viceroy sent the following telegram to the Secretary of
tate :—
“* Orders to stop further advance were telegraphed yesterday to General Nixon.”

the enemy in an extremely strong position, and moved on another 50 miles or so in pursuit.
That we did not catch the retreating Turks is due to the fact of the shallow water of the river, and to the

fact that the Turks are endowed by nature with strong knees. 7

circumstances ; tents, &c., will be brought up as soon as possible.
(Signed) R.G. PEEL,

Colonel, General Staff.
11. Meanwhile on October 4th the Cabinet met, and the Secretary of State reported
the ee to them, and the opinion of the Cabinet was conveyed to the Viceroy on
October 5th in the following terms :—

The position was reported yesterday to the Cabinet, and they have decided to appoint a committee of
Foreign Office, General Staff, Admiralty, and India Office, to consider in all its possibilities and policy advance

on Baghdad.
If forces available are sufficient tc take and hold the place. political reasons were thought to make occupation
desirable... . It is thought by Barrow that we might be able to capture Baghdad, but that forces weakened

by further losses would be insufficient both to hold it securely against counter-attacks and to maintain com-
munication. Kitchener can hold out no hope of reinforcements from Europe or Egypt.

12. On the following day, October 5th, General Nixon replied to the Secretary of
State’s telegram of October 4th, as to ‘‘ navigation troubles ” in the following terms :—

By marching the troops with land tiansport and by lightening the vessels and employing them to tow
loaded barges, we have overcome the difficulties of navigation . . . . . . |

The view I take is that before us lies an enemy who has been shaken, who is short of ammunition and has
lost 13 guns, and while we have the chance it is obviously profitable for military reasons to overwhelm him
I hope I can destroy him, as the position in which he has taken refuge is one where we are able to manceuvre.

Should we let such an opportunity slip by us, I can see no arguments by which we could justify ourselves.

difficulties of navigation.
In a private telegram of the same day, the Viceroy stated :—

The following 1s the present situation :—

On the 7th, a telegram from the Viceroy stated that the Commander-in-Chief in India
agreed that it would be unwise to occupy Baghdad with the present forces.
As regards this telegram, Sir Beauchamp Duff informed us that the telegram which he
proposed to send was couched in somewhat different terms, and ran as follows : —

I have consulted the Commander-in-Chief, who has no doubt that as things stand at present we could
capture Baghdad, but that our available troops would nct be sufficient to hold it should the Turks masstroops
for a’ counter-attack and that the effect of entering Baghdad and subsequently having to retire would
be disastrous Moreover, he doubts whether in the present state of the river, combined with our present

eee ee

eee eo

* See para. 10 ante. This telegram was com municated to General Nixon.

PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE 23
ON BAGHDAD.

(Then follow various reasons in justification of this contention.) :

13. On October 8th, the Secretary of State addressed the following question to General
Nixon :—

Very urgent. To both occupy and hold Baghdad what addition to your present force are you confident
will be necessary ?

and on the 8th the Secretary of State sent the following telegram to the Viceroy :—

Private. The Cabinet are so impressed with great political and military advantages of occupation of
Baghdad that everv effort will be made by us to supply the force that is necessary. We do not wish to attempt
it with insufficient forces. I shall be glad to know whether you are satisfied that one division will suffice.

On the same dav General Nixon telegraphed as follows : ‘‘ No additions are necessary
to my present force to beat Nur-ed-din and occupy Baghdad ; of this I am confident,” but
he. added that he would require an additional division and one cavalry regiment to
enable him permanently to occupy Baghdad.

14. On October 9th, in a telegram, the Secretary of State stated to the Viceroy :—

Private. I hope in a few days to give vou definite information as to possibility of reinforcements. Mean-
while Nixon should maintain his present position and he should be prepared to advance if reinforcements asked
for can be sent to him. I should be glad if you would instruct him accordingly.

On the same day the Viceroy in a telegram to the Secretary of State states as follows :—

Private. I am glad of the Cabinet’s decision. After consultation with Sir B. Duff, I am of the opinion
that Sir John Nixon is in the best position to judge as to the number of troops that will be required, and when
& division is mentioned by him we understand him to mean a division fully organised with its proper proportion
of British troops and guns and its divisional cavalry. He asks for a cavalry regiment in addition to this.

15. On the 14th, the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy :—

Private. Reinforcements for Force “‘D.”’ A question has been raised as to the sufficiency of the reinforce-
ments which General Nixon has asked for, or even of two divisions to hold Baghdad against forces which might
eventually be brought against him by the Turks. The General Staff are now considering this, and the Cabinet
hope to be given their report in three days.

We continue to attach the greatest importance to the capture of Baghdad if we can hold it securely. Please
let me know whether the chances of eventual successful advance are prejudiced by delay.

to which the Viceroy replied :—

16. On the 15th, the Secretary of State telegraphed to Viceroy :—

Private. Advance on Baghdad. If report of the General Staff is favourable to occupation of Baghdad,
the War Office contemplate transfer of the two Indian Infantry divisions from France to Egypt with the inten-
tion of placing them at your disposal for Mesopotamia. But they cannot guarantee date of departure owing
to uncertainty of position in Near East and possible need of transport for other purposes. They do not con-
sider it would be safe under the circumstances for Nixon to advance to Baghdad before these troops have
actually started from Egypt unless you can undertake to supply him temporarily with a division from India
in the event of these reinforcements being unavoidably delayed. I request early reply as to the possibility
of your undertaking the liability.

This is in continuation of my private telegram of October 14th.

17. On October 17th, the Viceroy telegraphed :—

After consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, we agree that in no case could I undertake to supply from
India, even temporarily, a further force of the strength of a division.

On the 21st the Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy in a full and reasoned telegram
marked “‘ Private,” discussed alternative courses of action and gave their opinion in favour of
the plan of taking and occupying Baghdad. This, they stated, would present no difficulty
whatever provided they were guaranteed reinforcements of a full division of troops
reaching Mesopotamia in two months.

24 PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE
ON BAGHDAD.

18. On the 21st October the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy, as
follows :—

Private. Baghdad advance. Report of combined Staffs estimates that General Nixon has only some
9,000 Turkish troops and some irregulars to deal with for next two months ; that Turkish forces may be some-
what increased by the end of the year, and they might conceivably reach a total of 60,000 by end of January,
and even larger figures during 1916. They consider if reinforced by two Indian Divisions from France he might,
with assistance of river flotilla, face risk of attack by 60,000, but there would remain possibility of enemy
receiving at later date further reinforcements. The staffs hold, therefore, that from a military point of view
it would be unwise to occupy Baghdad unless military authorities have power to withdraw troops at once
without regard to political considerations if military exigencies make this necessary. The War Office would
give the two Indian Divisions, but could not under any circumstances spare further reinforcements, and are
doubtful of their capacitv even to supply drafts if wastage from casualties or sickness is severe. They think
Baghdad can be easily taken and held for some time, but it might become untenable later as explained above.
At present moment it seems the German attempt to break through to Constantinople will succeed, and our posi-
tion and prospects in Gallipoli are most uncertain. . . . Arabs are wavering, and will probably join
Turks, unless we can offer them great inducement. We are therefore, in great need of striking success in the
Kast. . . . It is suggested that we should occupy Baghdad, giving assurances to Arab leaders that we
favour creation of Arab State independent of Turks. . . . Unless you consider possibility of eventual
withdrawal is decisive against the advance, all other considerations seem to us to render it desirable, and we
are prepared to order it.

On the 23rd October the Viceroy replied :—

Private. Your private telegram of the 2]st instant. Baghdad advance. Your description of the
situation in the Near East proves conclusively the necessity for action in the Middle East. We accept the
calculation of the combined Staffs of possible strength of Turks that may with time be brought against us ;
but with reinforcement of two Indian divisions from France we believe that Sir J. Nixon has a fair prospect
' of being able to hold his own against 60,000 or 70,000 Turks, provided he occupied Baghdad as soon as he 1s
ready. Although I realise that the occupation of Baghdad is a provocation that will probably determine
the Turks to send large forces to attack us, which however, will not be easy for them to do, and although the
bad effect of a possible withdrawal in the future cannot be ignored, I am confident right policy at the present time
is to take the risk and to occupy Baghdad with the least possible delay, relying upon you to send two divisions
from France as quickly as possible to Mesopotamia. On this understanding I propose, unless I hear from you
before Monday to the contrary, to order Nixon to march on Baghdad at once.

Finally, on the 23rd October, the Secretary of State sent the following telegram :—

On October 14th, another paper was drawn up by the General Staff on the question
of occupving Baghdad. They estimated that if Baghdad was to be taken and occupied,
General Nixon must have reinforcements of two Indian divisions. On the 19th the joint
Naval and Military General Staff further considered the question, and came to the con-
clusion that if there were very strong political objections to a withdrawal from Baghdad
then its occupation should not be attempted.

20. Ixpert opinion was therefore unanimous on the point that to attempt to take
and occupy Baghdad with the existing force would be an unjustifiable risk, and that for
the task of holding Baghdad, General Nixon should have a reinforcement of two
divisions. There was, however, a concurrence of expert opinion that Nixon’s existing
force was sufficient in the first instance to take Baghdad.

21. In addition to the ordinary Military Authorities with whom questions of this kind

PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE 25
ON BAGHDAD.

Sir Edmund Barrow, Military Secretary, India Office.

Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, Admiralty.

Sir Louis Mallet, Foreign Office.

Mr. Launcelot Oliphant, Foreign Office.

Colonel Talbot, War Office.

Captain Paddon, War Office.

' 22, The case was one of such high importance that, in our opinion, the Representatives
of the War Office and the Admiralty on the Committee should have been officers of official
position and experience more nearly on a par with those of Sir E. Barrow, who was the
Senior General of the Indian Army and also Head of the Military Department of the
India Office. During their discussions, the question of transport, as we ascertained from
Sir Thomas Holderness, became quite a subsidiary subject. There were three communi-
cations from Mesopotamia—one contained in a despatch and memorandum, dated 10th
July, 1915, and two in telegrams dated respectively 25th September, 1915, and 9th October, *
1915, which unmistakably expressed the inadequacy of the river transport even for the
wants of the existing force of two divisions. These documents, though received at the
India Office, were either unknown to the Committee or, if they were brought before them,
were not seriously considered. Sir Thomas Holderness told us that his apprehensions as
regards transport were largely removed by General Nixon’s telegram of the 5th October,
stating that “ by marching the troops with land transport and by lightening the vessels
and employing them to tow loaded barges, we have overcome the difficulties of navigation.”
He did not appreciate the limitations of this assurance, and thought it applied to the general
question of adequate river transport. After discussing the definite questions put to them,
Sir Thomas Holderness’s Committee came to the conclusion that, on both political and
military grounds, the occupation of Baghdad was most desirable if the necessary reinforce-
ments could be assured. Failing these, General Nixon was not to attempt it.

23. It was the promise of reinforcements that alone induced this Committee to advocate
an advance to Baghdad, but, as in the case of the other authorities consulted, they ap-
parently passed over the all-important problem of how these reinforcements, after arrival
at Basra, were to be conveyed as fighting units to the front, a distance of some 500 miles.
We lay stress upon this serious omission, especially in the case of the Committee presided
over by Sir Thomas Holderness. The despatch of troops from France or Egypt could not
affect any fighting around Baghdad after its capture, unless, after their arrival in Meso-
potamia, they were conveyed as an organised force to the scene of action. The arrival
of troops at Basra, without transport or theic proper medical complement, with their
Headquarter Staff scattered and disorganised and without the means of conveyance up
the river, was not 2 reinforcement in the sense defined by the Viceroy in his private telegram
of the 9th of October, in which he thus expressed himself :—

We may add that the reinforcing troops should reach Baghdad not later than one month after

the capture of that city, and this is the period which we calculate must elapse before the Turks could
- concentrate in strength to attempt its recapture.

24. It seems to us that it should have been a primary duty of the Military Advisers
of the Government, both in India and in England, to have thoroughly investigated the
conditions attending the dispatch of troops from Europe and Egypt and their transport
up the Tigris, so as to be sure that they could perform the functions assigned to them of
being a fighting addition to the advance columns located in Baghdad.

In this connection it should be noted that Sir Beauchamp Duff, in his examination
before the Commission placed the same interpretation as did Sir Thomas Holderness,
upon the telegram of General Nixon of the 5tht of October, in which he used the words:
“ We have overcome the difficulties of Navigation.”

ee eee ee _ —————

* See Part IX., paras. 8 and 10. t See paragraph 12, ante.
(C 48—176) D

296 PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE
| ON BAGHDAD.

Sir Percy Lake, who at the time this telegram was received at Simla was Chief of the
General Staff, did not accept Sir Beauchamp Dufi’s interpretation of the meaning of this
telegram, and he told us so in his evidence. General Kemball, who, as Chief of Sir John
Nixon’s Staff in Mesopotamia, had sent the telegram, emphatically repudiated Sir
Beauchamp’s reading of it.

25. The warning conveyed in a private telegram of October 21st* from the Secretary
of State to the Viceroy of a possible concentration of 60,000 Turks at Baghdad in January,
1916, was acknowledged by the Viceroy in a private and reasoned telegram accepting the
risk. The information thus conveyed introduced a new factor into the situation, and
one which ought at once to have been forwarded to Sir John Nixon. Sir John Nixon in
his evidence before us could not recollect receiving this information, and Sir Beauchamp
Duff has informed us that this telegram was not transmitted to Mesopotamia. He
accounted for this oversight by the fact that 1t was a private telegram to the Viceroy
of which he had no official cognisance, nor was it filed in his Department. Sir John, how-
ever, intimated that if he had been warned in time he could have stopped the advance
to Baghdad even on November 17th, 7.e. a month later than this telegram. On that day,
i.e. four days before the battle of Ctesiphon, the War Office telegraphed from London
to General Nixon that General von der Goltz had left for Baghdad on November 10th,
and that 30,000 Turks were marching from Anatolia to Irak. On the 20th General Nixon
replied :—

For more than a fortnight my own agents have been giving me similar news of a large force under Von der
Goltz, but at present I do not accept these reports as conclusive for various reasons.

Sir John Nixon’s over-confidence in his ability to crush the Turkish forces between
him and Baghdad might have induced him in October to ignore the warning from London
as to the large enemy reinforcements which might be brought down to Baghdad. Still,
the neglect to convey to him so vital a piece of information reflects seriously on the system
which allowed such inadvertence to be possible. Ifthe substance of this important telegram
had been conveyed to the Viceroy in an official instead of a private telegram, it would,
as a matter of course, have been transmitted to Mesopotamia.

26. In alluding to the introduction by the Cabinet of political considerations into
the consultations of their military advisers, we do not wish to imply that this widening of
their survey is to be condemned or that it necessarily subjects those so acting to criticism
or censute. In a world-wide war the views, wants and aims of allies must be considered
and weighed, and operations may become necessary for the continuance and consolida-
tion of existing alliances and of the co-operation which such alliance ensures. But when
such considerations do obtrude themselves into a military campaign the incidence of respon-
sibility tends to shift itself. The military experts cannot be made solely responsible for
the consequences of a decision into the consideration of which outside political factors have
necessarily entered.f Sir Beauchamp Duff in part of his evidence laid stress upon the
introduction of outside political considerations into the conduct of the campaign, and
he stated that when such political arguments were adduced by those above him in authority,
he was ready to incur greater risks than would be justifiable if the matters under discussion
were to be regarded solely from a military standpoint.

27. In the decision arrived at by the Home Authorities, they were doubtless largely
influenced by the extreme confidence of those on the spot. There seems to have been a
general idea—not only amongst the Headquarter Staff of General Nixon, but also amongst
the Commander-in-Chief’s Staff in India—that there would not be anv serious fighting
before Baghdad was reached. Even amongst the General Staff at Whitchall, the idea
prevailed that the difficulty was not to get to Baghdad but toremain there. The retreating
Turks were supposed to be thoroughly demoralised, and insufficient attention was paid to
the warnings of the War Office Intelligence Department that a very large number of

oe en ee

aal

* See paragraph 18, anfe. .
+; See Secretary of State’s telegrams of October 5th, 8th, and 21st, in paras. 11, 13, and, 18 ante.

PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE 27
ON BAGHDAD.

If on the other hand it is the desire of Government to occupy Baghdad, then, unless great risk is to be run,

it is, in my opinion, absolutely necessary that the advance from Kut should be :arried out methodically by two
divisions or one Army Corps or by one Division supported closely by another complete Division, exclusive of
the garrisons of the important places of Nasariyeh, Ahwaz, and Amara.
On the same day General Kemball answered this communication, and informed General
Townshend that it was Sir John Nixon’s intention ‘‘ to open the way to Baghdad, as he
understands another division will be sent here from France, and he would like to know
your plan for effecting this object.”” General Townshend received this the same day, and
noted on it in his diary: “ There is nothing definite known about this, and no earthly
chance of its being in this country in time.” Nevertheless, in his answer, also dated
October 3rd, he wires to General Kemball : ‘‘ You did not mention the arrival of a division
from France in this country, and that makes all the difference in my appreciation.” These
two statements are not easy to reconcile, but General Townshend, like many other born
fighters, was somewhat mercurial and changeable in his views.

29. A fortnight later, on October 19th, General Kemball visited General Townshend on
other business, and the above correspondence was discussed by them at this and at two
subsequent interviews, viz., October 30th and November 5th. The matter is not quite
clear, but General Kemball’s opinion is that the reinforcements which General Townshend
received—.e., five squadrons of cavalry, three battalions of infantry, and a R.H.A. battery
—were very much what he asked for, and there was also the promise of two divisions from
France, the leading troops of which General Kemball expected to arrive at Basra at the
end of November. Whether General Townshend was satisfied or not is not certain, but
he does not seem to have pressed his objections hard.

But misgivings were present in his mind as late as November 2nd, for on that day he
wrote to the Viceroy a letter in which these expressions occur :—

These troops of mine are tired and their tails are not up, but slightly down ; the Mahomedans are not pleased
at approaching the sacred precincts of Suliman Pak at Ctesiphon—the troops are not confident and have had
enough ; as it is now, the British soldier and the Sepoy, as the Roman soldier did under Belisarius, look over
their shoulders and are fearful of the distance from the sea, and go down, in consequence, with every imagin-
able disease.

These are not the words of a General commanding a force in the field who has confidence
in the capacity of his troops to achieve the task assigned to them.

30. It should be added that several months later, on April 7th, 1916, General Towns-
hend sent in an amplification of his appreciation of October 3rd, which seems to have been
in his mind when he wrote that appreciation. On April 7th, he said: ‘ My opinion most
certainly was that we were taking a grave risk in continuing a strategic movement against
Baghdad with my weak Division alone, the British battalions of which were reduced to
half their strength, and besides this the drafts to replace casualties at the battle of Kut
consisted of raw recruits from India, while there were no other troops to support me,
and the distance to the sea was over 300 miles.”” General Kemball in giving evidence
before us did not accept these statements as to the condition of the troops. He regarded
them as exaggerated.

That, General Townshend’s Division was much helow its normal strength is we
believe beyond dispute,* and moreover physically the troops were much debilitated by
their previous strenuous exertions in the hot months of June, July, August and September.

* See Part VIII, para. 13.
(C i8—176) D 2

28 PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE
ON BAGHDAD.

31. Major Bastow, who was A.D.C. to General Townshend, and who in his examina-
tion before us had General Townshend’s diaries to which to refer, told us that it was lack
of suitable river transport which prevented General Townshend from smashing up the Turks
after their defeat at Kut-el-Amara. General Townshend wished to retire when he found
that he could not overtake the Turks before they reorganised at Ctesiphon. General
Nixon subsequently ordered the 6th Division to concentrate at Aziziyeh. This concen-
tration occurred a few days after General Nixon telegraphed that he could open the road
to Baghdad. General Townshend’s reluctance to advance, when he discovered that the
enemy in front of him had reorganised, was due partly to his belief that his force was insufh-
cient and tired, partly to the inadequacy of his transport which had already failed him,
and partly to the great length of his line of communications. He was not informed before
the Battle of Ctesiphon of the possible Turkish reinforcements which he might have to
encounter.

Major Bastow further stated that General Delamain, one of General Townshend’s
Brigadiers who had commanded a brigade with great success from the commencenient of
the campaign, was of opinion that his brigade had already been tried enough in storming
fortified trenches, and it was not: faix to put them up again against such obstacles without
adequate artillery preparation.

32. All the previous advances had been justified and advocated as defensive measures
for the protection and consolidation of our existing position. The move on Baghdad was
strictly offensive, and those authorising it, both civilians and military, do not seem to
have realised sufficiently the change thus made in the character of the expedition nor the
increased necessity of associating with that change the enlargement of the subsidiary
services. Moreover, from its position at the head of the navigable tide-way, it was
inevitable that Basra should remain the base of the expedition, and little, if anything,
had been up to this date done to increase the discharging facilities of the port.

PART VI.—THE ADVANCE FROM KUT TO CTESIPHON. 29

1. The total force at the disposal of Sir John Nixon at the time the advance was made
to Baghdad was only some two divisions or about 24,000 to 25,000 men. Of these there
went up with General Townshend the Sixth Division, plus one Infantry Brigade and
two and a half regiments of cavalry with a brigade and certain batteries of artillery,
numbering in all from 15,000 to 17,000, according to the estimate of General Gorringe,
who was at the time in command of the troops on the Lines of Communication. The
remainder of the force, some 6,000 to 8,000 men, were left to guard the lines of communi-
cation and our positions on the Euphrates at Nasariyeh and on the Karun at Ahwaz.
The line of communications from Basra to Baghdad via the River Tigris 1s 502 miles.

2. It will thus be seen that on General Gorringe’s estimate, 75 per cent. of our total
available force was required for the offensive. The remaining 25 per cent. were guarding
the communications and rear positions and could not be looked upon as a reserve. The
Turkish forces between Kut and Baghdad were believed to be about 9,000, and it was fur-
ther assumed that they were considerably demoralised by a succession of defeats to which
they had been subject.

3. Based upon these estimates, a spirit of intense optimism animated the Head.
quarter and Administrative Staff. This is shown by their estimate of impending casualties,
preparation being made for only 500 severely wounded. Two river steamers, the “ Mosul ”’
and the ‘‘ Julnar,” were put on one side to be temporarily fitted up by Surgeon-General
Hathaway for the reception of wounded, the arrangements being that the more seriously
wounded were to be moved down to Kut in these vessels and the more lightly wounded
located in Baghdad. No apprehension of an effective repulse or of our inability to reach
Baghdad seems to have been entertained by those directing the advance.

4. After some skirmishing, our advancing forces, consisting according to General
Townshend of only some 11,000 effectives, were concentrated on the left bank of the Tigris
at Laj. The enemy. estimated at 11,000 to 13,000 men, were entrenched a few miles up the
river, their defences consisted of two strong lines of trenches, and between these two
lines was the archway of Ctesiphon. General Townshend attacked this position on the
morning of November 22nd, and after severe fighting he captured the first position, taking
with it 1,300 prisoners. Our troops then penetrated the second line of trenches and
captured eight guns. Here they were heavily attacked by Turkish reinforcements and
forced back into the first line which they had previously captured. November 23rd was
spent in reorganising these positions and collecting the wounded, and on the 24th and 25th
prisoners and wounded were evacuated to Laj, where they were put in steamers and taken
down stream.

5. In the meantime, the enemy was largely reinforced, and General Townshend found
himself after his heavy casualties not only numerically very inferior to the enemy, but in
some danger of being surrounded and cut off. He was also short of supplies. He retired
during the night of November 25th to Laj, falling back further on the 27th to Aziziyeh.
He there fought a rearguard action back to Umm-al-Tubal where several of his steamers
grounded, and he had to remain there till December Ist, by which time they were refloated.
A heavy attack by the Turks on the morning of the 1st was repulsed with great loss to the
enemy, and, taking advantage of a successful counter-attack made by the cavalry brigade,
General Townshend retired to Shadi, a distance of 30 miles, which place was reached on
the same night. On December 3rd the troops, greatly exhausted, arrived at Kut-el-Amara.
Our losses at and since the battle of Ctesiphon amounted to more than 690 killed and 3,800
wounded, a loss of over 30 per cent. of the total advancing force.

6. It has been alleged that the failure to reach Baghdad was in part due to the delays
caused by the lengthy discussions as to whether the advance should take place or not. This
may have been partly so; but if these discussions had been shorter than they were, the
state of the transport would have prevented General Townshend from advancing much
sooner than hedid. After his victory at Kut-el-Amara, on September 28th, six weeks were
spent in bringing up reinforcements and supplies, and his original plan of a rapid pursuit
and following close on his enemies’ heels into Baghdad soon proved impracticable.

The Turks had ample time to prepare a strong position at Ctesiphon: but had it
not been for the reinforcements which reached them before our attack took place, it
appears clear that they would have been defeated. The British Force had the utmost
confidence in their leader, and the manner in which they fought did not indicate any
loss of moral.

30 PART VI.—THE ADVANCE FROM KUT TO CTESIPHON.

7. Notwithstanding the deficiencies of medical equipment and of transport, all the
wounded were evacuated and all the prisoners were taken to Kut. This was a remarkable
military achievement, carried out during a hazardous retreat against overwhelming odds
and with lines of communication threatened and at times cut by marauding Arabs. Great
credit is due to the medical officers for their devoted work in thus evacuating their wounded,
but many of those so moved suffered terribly, as the two prepared steamers could only
accommodate* a small proportion of them. (Later on we will particularise the nature of
these sufferings.) The remainder had to be put in any craft that was available and so
hurriedly that, as on other occasions when vessels carrying up animals were utilised,
there was not time to clear them of their accumulation of filth and dung. General Town-
shend and his force in these exceptionally trying circumstances fully maintained their
previous splendid reputation, and if for the first time defeat instead of victory attended
their efforts, this was due to the exceptional difficulty of the military task imposed upon
them, for the numerical odds and adverse conditions with which they had to contend were
too much even for their fighting superiority.

8. After full consideration, Sir John Nixon and General Townshend agreed that Kut
should he held by General Townshend and that his relief should be effected as quickly as
was possible with the reinforcements on the way from France and elsewhere. This decision
received the assent both of Simla and Whitehall. The sick, wounded, and prisoners
were evacuated and sent downstream tu Basra. On the 6th December the Cavalry
Brigade left Kut, and on the 7th the Turkish investment of that place was complete.

* See Part X., paras, 23-26 and 57-61.

PART VIL—OPERATIONS FOR RELIEF OF KUT. 31

1. After the retreat from Ctesiphon, General Nixon returned to Basra to organise a
force for the relief of Kut. He was in bad health at the time, and his ailments so grew upon
him that in the subsequent month he was invalided home. Sir Percy Lake, the Chief of the
General Staff in India, was appointed in his place, and took over the command on January
18th, 1916.

Sir John Nixon, upon his arrival at Basra in December, had at once ordered the
28th Infantry Brigade to strengthen the 6th Cavalry Brigade at Ali Gharbi. In anticipa-
tion of the arrival of the two divisions from oversea, Sir Fenton Aylmer, Adjutant-General
of the Indian Army, was sent to take command of a force designated as the “ Tigris Corps,”
in which were to be incorporated the two expected divisions, the troops located at Ali
Gharbi and ultimately other reinforcements. The two Divisions, the bulk of which was
still on the high seas, were gradually arriving at Basra, but their piece-meal embarkation
and disembarkation were very detrimental to their efficiency as fighting units ; their whole
organisation was upset by the methods of their transmission and disembarkation, and
there was no time for their proper re-organisation before advancing. The available trans-
port in Mesopotamia was not sufficient even to carry the men and ammunition to the
front, and it was in these disadvantageous circumstances that the military operations
were commenced.

2. The history of the attempts to relieve Kut is melancholy reading enough—a
record of a prolonged struggle carried on with inadequate means under abnormal conditions
of atrocious weather, and terminating in failure.

3. The task which confronted General Aylmer, the General Officer commanding
the relieving force, meant in most cases an advance over ground deep in mud and devoid
of cover. Moreover, as a rule tthe position of the enemy made frontal attacks inevitable
against trenches held by Turks whose tenacity on the defensive is proverbial.

His army had been hastily got together—there are numerous complaints about ‘‘scratch’’
staffs, and the equipment, especially in heavy artillery, was far below what was required.
A large proportion of the reinforcements at Basra were unable to join the Army at the front
through lack of transport. It therefore seemed all-important to wait until his army had
been properly organised and deficiencies made good.

4. But before such reorganisation was possible an early start was made, and it is to
this that the unfortunate result was mainly due. The reasons which thus precipitated
matters are to be found in a succession of telegrams which General Townshend despatched
from Kut during December. In these he urges, as reasons for his immediate relief, the
dangers of enemy reinforcements and of a determined onslaught by superior numbers, the im-
paired moral of his troops, heavy losses in British officers, anxiety a8 to ammunition, etc., etc,
But it is noteworthy that throughout this month he never, except on December 5th, puts
forward deficiency of supplies as a reason for accelerating his relief. On December 5th,
he wired, “ I hope we can be relieved by a month, my rations for British troops are only
one month, and 55 days Indian troops. I shall have to reduce a scale of rations, and
commandeer all bazaar supplies.” This estimate was, however, corrected two days later,
by a telegram of December 7th, in which he says that he has 60 days’ rations for both
Indian and British troops, 2.e., enough to carry them on until the beginning of February.
After this telegram of December 7th, the question of food and rations is never even men-
tioned by General Townshend until January 16th, 2.e., after the first attempt at relief
had failed. As General Townshend is still a prisoner we have been unable to hear his
explanation on this.

5. It is strange that neither General Nixon nor General Aylmer seem to have thought
of definitely asking General Townshend how long his supplies would permit him to hold
out; nor did General Townshend himself definitely ascertain this most important fact
till several weeks after he was shut up in Kut. No doubt he had received positive assur-
ances that he would be relieved within two months at the outside, and as he was satisfied
that his supplies would easily last for that period, he did not attach so much importance to
the food factor as he ought to have done. However this may be, telegrams from
General Aylmer on January 25th, and General Lake on the 29th indicate that the neglect
of General Townshend to intimate his true position as regards supplies was one of the main
factors in the hurried advance; although it appears that the Assistant Directer of
Supplies in Kut, had ascertained on December 11th, that there were full ratvons in many
essentials for 70 days, and large additional stocks were discovered later on.*

ea: OS ei es OY tt

* See AppendixjlIL., para. 117.

32 PART VII.—OPERATIONS FOR RELIEF OF KUT.

6. General Townshend arrived at Kut on December 3rd ,where, for what seem to be suffi-
cient reasons, he determined to remain, and in this resolve he was supported by Sir John
Nixon and by India. The Turks closed in on him on the 7th, and at first the assaults
were numerous and severe, especially about Christmas, when there were three days’ fighting,
which terminated in the enemy being repulsed with such heavy losses that no serious
attempts to storm were made for the remainder of the siege.

There was, however, plenty of shellig and sniping ; but the real enemy was starvation,
and it was this that compelled the surrender of the place on April 29th, 1916, after a
most gallant and tenacious defence of 147 days.

7. This disaster would have been averted for a long time if the Arab population,
about 6,000, had been expelled before the investment began. Sir P. Cox, the political
adviser, was averse to such a measure, as he was unwilling to hand them over to the tender
mercies of the Turks and hostile Arabs, but their retention undoubtedly added to the
difficulties of supply.

_ §. The Tigris Army Corps, as the relief force was called, had been reinforced by two
divisions which had taken part and been severely punished in the murderous fighting in
France. In some quarters there was an impression that their moral had been impaired by
the trench conditions of warfare prevailing there, and that they were not so ready to face
the open as they might have been. However, we are of opinion that their conduct, under
the very arduous conditions which prevailed in Mesopotamia, does not lay them open to
this charge, and their heavy losses during the operations show how stoutly they fought.

9. It is not proposed to go at all thoroughly into the actions fought im the
course of these operations. That would involve the study of strategic and tactical
considerations which had better be left to the experts to whom the history of the war will
be entrusted, when criticism will be easier than it is now. An exception is made in the
case of the attempt to take the Dujailah Redoubt at the battle of Es-Sinn (March 8th,
1916), and to a certain extent in the case of the battle of Sanaiyat (April 6th and 8th, 1916),
as the results were exceptionally unfortunate and perhaps decisive so far as the relief of
Kut was concerned. We are indebted to our colleague, General the Hon. Sir N. Lyttelton,
G.C.B., for the ensuing analysis of these two engagements which in our opinion is justified
by the evidence placed before us.

10. The advance from Ali Gharbi took place on January 4th, 1915. Fighting of
a severe description soon began. On January 6th, General Younghusband was heavily
engaged on both banks of the River Tigris, and held his ground with difficulty. On
reinforcements coming up, the attack met with some measure of success on the right
bank, where the Turks were driven out of their entrenchments, and fell back from Sheikh
Saad to a new position on the Wadi, 10 miles up stream. On the 9th this position was
also forced, and the Turks again retreated 5 miles further to Hannah. ‘These successes
were dearly bought, the losses amounting to nearly 6,000. Thenext attack, on the Hannah
position, January 21st, failed with considerable losses, 2,741, and for some time no very
serious fighting took place. General Aylmer blames General Younghusband for not following
his directions on January 4th, which were not to commit himself, but merely to hold
the enemy. General Younghusband admits receiving the order, and says he advanced
and “felt the enemy hard on both banks,”’ which does not seem to have been quite in
keeping with the order. General Aylmer says “ he felt them too hard,” and this
seems to be true. General Aylmer also says that he fought the action on the Wadi
against his better judgment, acting under superior order, and that he had proposed another
plan of attack, which was not accepted by Headquarters. This seems to have been the
case, and further it was clear that the hard fighting and heavy losses had told on the
men. Moreover, there was a shortage of artillery ammunition.

11. The first attempts having thus failed, General Aylmer determined in March on
another plan. An important keypoint was the Dujailah Redoubt, about the nght centre
of the Turkish lines. General Gorringe, Chief of the Staff, Tigris Corps, told us that it had
been ascertained that owing to an insufficient water-supply this fort was very lightly held,
the bulk of the troops told off for its defence having to camp on the bank of the river four
or five miles off. Consequently it was hoped that by a night march a superior force could
be moved across the Turkish front so as to arrive by daybreak near the redoubt and carry
it by assault before the reinforcements could arrive. On the face of it the idea seemed
practicable and sound; all depended on the element of surprise, and this could only
be attained by strict punctuality. Let us see how the scheme worked out It must be

PART VII.—OPERATIONS FOR RELIEF OF KUT. 33

added that General Aylmer told us he knew nothing of the short water-supply and
consequent weakness of the garrison—a bewildering statement in view of General
Gorringe’s evidence on this point.

12. A night march is far from being an easy operation at any time. The difficulties
vary with the nature of the ground, the distance to be traversed, and the number of troops
engaged. It requires good march discipline and first-rate staff work, especially when, as
in this case, an attack is to follow immediately. To General Kemball was entrusted the
task of turning the flank to be attacked in co-operation with a column on his right.

13. In a statement submitted by him to us General Kemball calls attention to the
well-known night march in 1882, when a British force under Lord Wolseley successfully
stormed the Egyptian entrenched camp at Tel-el-Kebir. On that occasion 13,000 men
had to march about 34 miles over easy ground, and for this Lord Wolseley allowed 3}
hours. In the official account of the campaign we read: “ . from previous
experience it was calculated that, making all allowances for delays, etc., during the night,
the actual rate of progress . . . would be a mile per hour,” and this proved exactly
correct. There were 48 guns, but no other impedimenta worth mentioning.

14. At Es-Sinn the ground was also on the whole favourable, but other conditions
widely differed. Nearly 20,000 men, with all sorts of impedimenta, transport, ambulances,
animals, etc., had to march distances varying between 12 and 16 miles. Some of the troops
had been on the move the night before, many had to march 1 or 2 miles from their bivouacs
to the rendezvous, the artillery 5 or 6. A margin of one hour was allowed for unforeseen
delays such as may occur in any night march.

15. The troops had to be concentrated at 8.30 p.m. on March 7th, in time to start at
9 p.m. and reach their objective by dawn, about 5.45 a.m.

In one very important particular Lord Wolseley had a marked advantage. His
small army was entirely composed of well-trained British troops with a most efficient
Staff. General Aylmer’s force was heterogeneous, British and Indian troops being mixed
up together, and he and other Generals make many complaints of the “ scrappy ”’ character
of their Staffs. This army was expected to march about 14 miles in rather less than
nine hours.

The uncertainties of a night march were speedily revealed. Many of the troops were
late at the rendezvous, and the start did not take place till 10.22. Thus more than the one
hour margin allowed was lost before the start. A second hour was lost through a division
missing its way ; the men were so weary that they fell dead asleep at the halts, and were
with difficulty roused. Other delays occurred, and the result was that General Kemball’s
column, which had the farthest to go, instead of being at the pomt Z, where it was to
deploy for attack, at 5.30 a.m., was still 1,500 yards short of it at 6.30, when it was broad
daylight. This of course was fatal to the success of the operation so far as surprise was
concerned.

16. General Gorringe holds that in spite of this, energetic and bold action on the
part of General Kemball would still have forestalled the enemy in his attempts to reinforce
Dujailah. General Kemball’s excuse is that he received no proper support till late in the
afternoon. He adds that when the enemy’s weakness in the redoubt was discovered,
Column C on his right should -have been put in, in spite of Column A’s late arrival. If
Headquarters were correct in their assumption that there was only a small garrison in
Dujailah, a long flank march was unnecessary, and a direct attack might have been made
from Point Y, where the columns bifurcated. |

17. It is pointed out by General Kemball that General Gorringe’s statement that
everything went well up to the time the columns separated (at point Y) is quite incorrect ;
they were 24 hours late there. General Kemball also takes exception to other
assertions of General Gorringe.

18. There is a good deal of technical evidence as to the proper formations for the march
and the tactical dispositions for the fighting on the 9th March, and Generals Aylmer and
Gorringe attribute great blame to General Kemball in these respects, and to a certain extent
they are supported by General Lake, G.O.C. ““D” Force. It is not our province to go
exhaustively into these points ; they are detailed at length in their evidence and statements,
to which reference can be made. We may, however, point out that in a night march
which is to be followed immediately by an assault, it is obvious that the troops should
march in such a formation as to enable them to attack with the least possible delay when

(C 48—176) E

af MT 4: BP. tid. ieee

34 PART VII.—OPERATIONS FOR RELIEF OF KUT.

the objective is reached. That was Lord Wolseley’s intention at Tel-el-Kebir—to arrange
the troops in such order that it should require no manceuvring to pass from the formation
of march to the formation of attack, but although this intention was not fully carried out
and the Divisional Commanders did not adopt the same formation, there was no serious
difference, and the spirit of the Commander-in-Chief’s order was not infringed. Lord
Wolseley allowed more latitude to his Divisional Commanders than General Kemball
enjoyed. Whether any such formation in a night march is possible under modern con-
ditions is hard toimagine. We conceive that the question for us is whether the night march
under the conditions already described offered a reasonable prospect of success.

19. General Aylmer himself admits that the march was a close run—that an hour’s
margin was scanty ; but owing to the necessities of the situation he could not spare more,
and that the plan of attack he adopted was the only one he could think of as
likely to succeed. Our opinion is that the chances of A Column being up
to time were slender; that the operation, to use a term that has cropped up elsewhere,
was of the nature of a “gamble” in which the odds against success were high, but whether
they were too high to justify the action taken cannot be stated in terms of certainty.

20. There is another matter which demands attention—whether it was necessary to
break off the fight on March 9th, as was done by General Avlmer’s orders. General Kemball
declares that the Turks had been retiring in the night and he reported this to Headquarters.
However, the report was not credited. General Gorringe, in his despatch, says the aero-
plane reconnaissance showed no signs of withdrawal, and it may be that it was only partial.

21. General Kemball said that in spite of their severe losses, he had full confidence
in his men; that he had been in a much tighter place at Sheikh Saad and had come out
successfully, and was anxious to try again. Headquarters did not accept this offer, and
it can hardly be said that they were wrong. The other reason given for not renewing
the attack was the deficiency of water. General Kemball asserts that there was plenty
where he was, and very likely there was enough for his men, but it is not clear there was
for the whole force. On the whole we do not see sufficient reasons for imputing blame to
the Corps Headquarters for the action they took.

22. We have gone at length into this controversy because much depended on this
battle, and because we think that the unfortunate result had so much to do with the
final catastrophe of the fall of Kut; and for the same reason we propose to go with some
minuteness into the details of the defeat at Sanaiyat, which followed not long after.

23. The battle of Sanaiyat was in two parts. The first, on April 5th, on both banks
of the river, was highly successful, the 13th British Division, under General Maude, recently
arrived from Egypt, particularly distinguishing itself by carrying five lines of entrench-
ments in succession. General Gorringe commends General Maude and all under his
command for the brilliant success of this assault.

24. This fine piece of work was followed on the evening of the same day by another
equally good, carried out by the same division, of which General Gorringe speaks in these
terms: “ The highest praise is due to General Maude and his Brigade Commanders and
all under their command for this successful night attack, a difficult operation at all times,
requiring great dash and good leadership as well as personal bravery among the junior
commissioned and non-commissioned ranks.” These eulogiums are quoted to justify
the belief that this new army division would prove itself equal to any duty that might
be imposed upon it. It should be added that it was not without experience of war ;
it had served in Gallipoli and suffered heavy losse; there.

25. There was no time to be lost ; the sands were running out at Kut, and the situation
there was very critical. The river was rising, and more floods were to be expected, and
no intermission in active operations was possible. On April 6th, at 1 a.m., the 7th Division
attacked the left of the Sanaiyat position undervery unfavourable conditions; they could not
break through, and in the afternoon they were flooded out of their trenches. It was evident
that no attack by day over such sticky and open ground could succeed, nor even at night
unless the assaulting force could be assembled under cover within assaulting distance, so
preparations were made for this to be done. These were completed by evening on the 8th
and the 13th Division were again selected to assault, and they started at 4.20 a.m., the 9th.

26. At first it seemed as if the successes won on the 5th were going to be repeated.
The leading lines, moving with great dash, penetrated into the centre of the enemy's

PART VII.—OPERATIONS FOR RELIEF OF KUT. 35

front-line trench without suffermg heavily in doing so. Unfortunately the supporting
lines failed to maintain the advantage thus won, they were driven back and the Turks
retook their lost trenches.

27. General Gorringe considered Sanaiyat to be the key to the position, and that
if this attack had succeeded the relief of Kut in all probability would have followed. It
appears that no such favourable opportunity recurred.

There was great cause for anxiety in the state of the supplies of the relieving force.
The Army was living from hand to mouth, a state of things to which the usual deficiency
of transport largely contributed. Still all hope was not abandoned; the Army Com-
mander, Sir Percy Lake, had come up, and under his instructions further attempts were
made. The troops responded to the call, and continuous fighting went on till the 22nd.
Occasional successes were gained, the 3rd Division accomplishing some good fighting ;
but hardly any real progress was made. The heavy floods made all movements most
difficult, and the men at times could not even use their rifles, which were clogged with
mud. After 16 days’ continuous fighting, not only against the Turks, but against the
floods, all hope of relieving Kut had to be given up. The losses had exceeded 33 per cent.,
and were even greater in British officers, and the fighting efficiency of the force was
seriously affected. |

28. Kut managed to hold out for another week ; then the inevitable happened, and
it surrendered after a most determined defence on April 29th. Right up to the end of the
siege General Townshend and his brigadiers retained the confidence and allegiance of their
men. One witness informed us that after the terms of surrender had been settled and the
Generals were departing in a steamboat as prisoners of war, their men formed up along
the riverside and gave them a parting cheer as a proof of their unbroken loyalty.

The extremities to which the garrison was reduced during their long-drawn agony
are vividly depicted in Colonel Hehir’s report and in General Townshend’s telegrams
from Kut. The difficulties in rationing the Indian troops were much enhanced by caste
prejudices as to food. For a long time many of them refused to eat horse or mule flesh.
Had it not been for this, these animals could not only have been used as food for the men,
but the grain they consumed could have been devoted to the same purpose. It is doubtful,
however, if this would have done more than prolong the agony. The relieving force was
not strong enough in artillery, high-explosive shells, and other appliances, without which
attacks on modern entrenchments seem absolutely futile.

Sir Percy Lake summarised the three main causes of failure as being—premature
attacks, inadequate transport, and exceptionally unfavourable weather. We endorse
these findings, but we add to it another, namely, insufficient numerical superiority over
a strongly-entrenched enemy. This drawback may be included under the head of “ inade-
quate transport,” for during the whole of this period of critical fighting, large numbers of
troops and many guns were at Basra quite unable, for lack of transport, to be conveyed
and take part in the fighting.

29. As stated above, Force “D” was not a homogeneous body. For instance, in
each Cavalry Brigade of three regiments one was British, in each Infantry Brigade of
four battalions one was British, the remaining units being Indian with a small proportion
of British officers. In many a hard-fought field these Indian soldiers proved themselves
worthy of standing shoulder to shoulder with their British comrades.

This army had been put to a severe test, the 6th Division in particular. It had
been almost continuously fighting or marching or moving by water for the best part of a
year. It had been repeatedly short of supplies, and owing to its frequent movements had
felt acutely the want of adequate water transport. Nevertheless it had performed feats
of fighting and endurance of which any army might have been proud. The part of the
advance called by the troops “ Townshend’s Regatta* ” was an astounding piece of work. —

It may be that the moral of the troops fell off to a certain degree, but in what army
would this not have occurred after such ordeals as the battle of Ctesiphon, the defence
of Kut, and the series of stubbornly contested actions fought by the Tigris Army under
exceptionally unfavourable conditions in the vain efforts to relieve their beleaguered com-
rades in Kut? Whatever faults of organisation and equipment there may have been,
no discredit attaches to the fighting men for the failures of the operations in Mesopotamia.

30. During the hot season after the fall of Kut, the army suffered much from sickness,
and the transport and supply arrangements, though improving, were still inadequate. In

* See Part IV., para. 8.
(C 48—176) E 2

36 PART VII.—OPERATIONS FOR RELIEF OF KUT.

April, 1916, the immediate policy to be followed in Mesopotamia had been clearly indicated
by the Imperial General Staff. Briefly summarized it was as follows :

At present our policy in Mesopotamia is defensive . . . Lake should . . . maintain as forward
& position as van be made secure tactically, and be ready to take advantage of any weakening of the Turks
on his front, so long as this can be effected without incurring heavy loss, whether caused by the enemy or by
unhealthy conditions . . . His forces are superior to those of the enemy . . ._ he should, therefore,
have no difficulty in carrying out tlie above policy until the Turks are strongly reinforced . . . he must
be clearly shown that the security of his force is of primary importance.

These instructions were strictly adhered to during the summer and autumn, and Sir
Percy Lake and his successor, Major-General Maude, confined themselves during this
period to developing river and railway communications and the supply organisation,
with very satisfactory results.

31. We have already pointed out that early in February, 1916, the War Office assumed
control] of the expedition. Later on, in July, 1916, all the administrative work in connection
with the expedition was transferred to the War Office, and from that date they became solely
responsible for the policy and management of the expedition. But the War Office have not,
even under these arrangements, any control over Indian Military Establishments in the
sense of being able to order reinforcements from India to Mesopotamia. We have not
thought it desirable or necessary to make detailed investigation beyond the date of the
operations which failed to relieve Kut. Since then new plans of campaign have been
devised, and are in active operation. We have, however, satisfied ourselves that the
transfer of the conduct of the expedition to the War Office had been most beneficial so
far as the supplies and comfort of the troops are concerned. Officers selected for high and
responsible command have shown both decision and ability in grappling with and surmount-
ing difficulties, which face them : the transport has been greatly increased, and although a
certain amount of hardship may still from time to time be experienced by the troops located
in Mesopotamia, this is due more to the inconvenience inevitable in a campaign than to
lack of prescience and organisation on the part of the administrative authorities. The
medical equipment, both in personnel and material, is also altogether on a higher standard
than in the past.

We may add that we have been very favourably impressed by the evidence of the
representatives of the War Office, and from that evidence we deduce that the difficulties
of campaigning in Mesopotamia are fully recognised by the War Office, and that in sur-
mounting them neither time nor expenditure will be spared in future.

We were directed by the terms of our reference to enquire into the origin, inception
and conduct of the operations in Mesopotamia. We have partially performed this task,
so far as the origin and inception of the campaign are concerned, by the narrative we
have given. We now propose to give fuller attention to the conduct of the campaign, and
this task includes an investigation into the “ supply of drafts, reinforcements, ammunition
and equipment to the troops and Fleet, the provision for the sick and wounded, and the
responsibility of those Departments of the Government whose duty it has been to minister
to the wants of the forces employed in the theatre of war.”

As our narrative has already indicated, the main difficulties to be overcome in
Mesopotamia were those connected with transport. This branch of our enquiry, practically
covers questions connected with all classes of supplies and reinforcements, and it also
materially affected the provision made for the sick and the wounded. We therefore intend
to make a close and detailed examination (1) into transport requirements and the measures
taken both in India and Great Britain to meet these requirements, and (2) the provision
for and treatment of the sick and wounded. |

The supply of armament, equipment, and reinforcements necessary for the exped-
tion, will also require notice, and we will deal with this forthwith.

ee ee

—

PART VIII.—ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT, REINFORCEMENTS, ETC. 37.

1. Every General who appeared before us agreed that the Mesopotamian Expedition
was badly equipped. Sir Beauchamp Duff informed us that the Indian Army, which fur-
nished the expedition, was organised only for semi-savage fighting, was not well found for
an overseas expedition, to a large extent used second-rate equipment, and was “ backward
in every particular.” He thought, however, that the equipment was adequate for an Indian
Frontier campaign, but even in this very modified commendation he is not supported by
Sir Percy Lake, for many years Chief of the General Staff in India, who declared that the
Indian Army was badly equipped even for frontier warfare. Both General Nixon and his
Chief of the Staff, General Kemball, maintained that the expedition was ill-equipped.
Other witnesses, such as General Aylmer and General Younghusband, agreed in
this view, the latter indeed asserting that the expedition was badly equipped in every
essential, especially transport, ambulance and commissariat.

2. We have elsewhere* expressed our opinion that the unpreparedness of the Indian
Army for its task in Mesopotamia was primarily due to a long standing policy of economy
and restriction of military preparation to the needs of frontier warfare. For this policy
and its results on the outbreak of war in 1914, the Home and Indian Governments were, of
course, responsible, and not Sir Beauchamp Duff and the General Staff at Simla. But the
unpreparedness for overseas warfare was well-known to the Indian Military Authorities, and
when they undertook the management of an expedition which was to fight against Turkey
supported by Germany, they ought immediately to have striven energetically to brin
the equipment of the expedition up to the standard of modern warfare. We shall deal
in the next two Parts of our report with their omissions in this respect as regards transport
and medical provision and we regret to find similar omissions in nearly every other branch
of military provision, with the exception of the commissariat, though even here the standard
was low, and the distribution of food uneven. Serious defects in mihtary equipment,
resulting in unnecessary suffering and casualties among the troops, were allowed to persist
month after month during the first fourteen months of the campaign, when the Indian
Government were responsible for its management.

3. It is true that India was not herself in a position to supply some of the lacking
material, such, for example, as heavy guns ; and it is also fair to recognise that before the
Mesopotamian Expedition was despatched, India had already sent to Europe much of
her finest artillery. But when the responsibility of the Mesopotamian Expedition was
assumed by India, the Indian Military Authorities do not appear, for at least a year, to
have appraised, anticipated or represented to England the needs of the expedition in this
very important particular. From the evidence of Major-General Sir Stanley von Donop,
late Master-General of the Ordnance in England, it would appear that it was not till Decem-
ber, 1915, after the reverse of Ctesiphon and more than twelve months after the expedition
had landed at Basra, that any request for heavy guns for Mesopotamia was received by
him, and it was not till May 26th, 1916, more than two months after the Chief of the General
Staff at Whitehall had asked what were the requirements of Mesopotamia in guns, that the
full artillery requirements in Mesopotamia were at last communicated by India to the
War Office.

4. During these months the troops in Mesopotamia had, without adequate preparation
by heavy artillery, to attack across the open and, at the cost of heavy casualties, strongly
fortified trenches, and General Nixon in his evidence stated that his artillery was not only
deficient in number, but out of date in quality. Major Bastow, who was General Towns-
hend’s Aide-de-Camp, stated that the advance against Ctesiphon was undertaken with only
eighteen field guns, and six horse artillery guns ; and Sir Fenton Aylmer informed us that
the lack of proper artillery contributed to the failure of the operations for the relief of Kut.
We may note that the chief shortage felt was in howitzers.

5. But if it was outside the productive power of India to make good portions of the
defective equipment such as aeroplanes, artillery, high explosive shells, machine-guns,
etc., there were various other articles which India could have arranged to supply, but the
supply of which was not seriously attempted until 1916. The list of deficicnt equipment
disclosed by witnesses is long and multifarious, and we will only mention some of the chief
items.

* See Part I., para. 23, and Part XI., D.

38 PART VIII.—ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT, REINFORCEMENTS, ETC.

There is a consensus of evidence that the force was deficient, even as late as the spring of
1916, in wire-cutters, telephones, watercarts, Véry lights, rockets, tents, mosquito-nets,
sun-helmets, periscopes, telescopic sights, loophole plates, flares, bombs, hand-grenades,
and even blankets and clothing. Our heavy casualties and reverses were in fact largely
due to the lack of articles essential to the success of war carried on under mcdern condi-
tions.

6. Sir Beauchamp Dufi’s apology for some of these defects 1s, that articles such as
wire-cutters, rockets, Véry lights, etc., were not available or usually needed in India, or
that they were not heard of before the war. This is no defence for the failure to provide
them in Mesopotamia eighteen months after the beginning of the war, and we feel it a
discredit to the Indian Military Authorities that such a modern device as Véry lights
should have been in use by the Turks in Mesopotamia, before it was supplied to our own
troops.

7. Our evidence abundantly shows how detrimental the absence of these modern
requirements was to our men ; but we wish to draw special attention to the suffering caused
by the neglect to supply two articles of equipment, which the most ordinary foresight on
the part of the Indian Authorities sont tas shown to be necessary. The power of the
sun in Mesopotamia was well known in India, but the troops were normally only supplied
with light-weight, single-fly tents, quite insufficient to keep out the sun. Sir Percy Lake
‘and other witnesses informed us that sunstroke and heat-stroke were not uncommon
amongst those using these tents, and Captain Herbert, M.P., stated that as late as April,
1916, “there were 21 lb. single-fly tents for four men, which would not have been healthy in
a cold climate, and were intolerable in Mesopotamia. These tents have only one fly, and
the casualties from sunstroke could be expected to be appalling.” It may be added that
the heat is so extreme that even in double-fly tents there is dangcr ot casualties from the
sun in Mesopotamia.

8. Even in such an obvious necessary as clothing, the Indian Government seems to
have been unable adequately to supply the force in Mesopotamia, small as it was in com-
parison with our armies in France and elsewhere. Colonel Hehir tells us that there was
a lack of proper clothing even for the patients in the hospitals in the summer of 1915,
while Captain Herbert in April, 1916, heard many complaints that in the bitter winter
months in Mesopotamia, troops had been sent from India in “ shorts,” and tropical clothing.
The nights throughout a considerable part of the year are cold, and, during the winter
and spring, the country is subject to cold winds and icy storms. Yet apparently the Com-
mander-in-Chief in India originally intended to leave the provision of warm clothing for
the troops to private benevolence, and only consented to undertake such provision after
a protest by the Viceroy. Writing to Sir Thomas Holderness on October 21st, 1914,
Lord Hardinge, who was then Viceroy, says :—

When some weeks ago I enquired of the Commander-in-Chief whether proper provision had been made
for warm clothing for the troops, he told me that he was relying on private charity for this. I told him at once
that I could not possibly agree to our troops being dependent for warm clothing upon private charity, and
that I insisted upon the troops being properly clad at the expense of the Government. It will cost six or seven
lakhs, but,in a war like this what does that matter? It is far better to have warm men in the field than men
dying of pneumonia in the hospitals. It is the cheapest course in the long run.

9. Among the defects of equipment one of the most important was the want of aero-
planes. But for this the Indian military authorities were not responsible. When the war
broke out, they were just beginning to organise an aviation service. and had established a
Flying School. But at the request of the War Office they closed the school, and sent the
officers who were pilots back to England. These were only three in number, as matters
were in a very embryonic stage. But early in the Mesopotamia Expedition the need for
acroplanes was apparent. In January, 1915, General Barrett represented the importance of
this matter more than once, and Lord Hardinge strongly urged the need for aeroplanes upon
the War Office. But it was found impossible to supply any until May, 1915. Then two
Maurice Farmans were sent, in July two Caudrons, and in August six Martinsyde Scouts.
Somewhat later, three hydroplanes of the Short type were sent, and two naval aeroplanes,
one a Voisin and one a Henry Farman, fitted with a Canton Unné engine. In October,
four B.N.2 C’s arrived. But there were many misfortunes. The hydroplanes were not a
success, and among the aeroplanes there were losses through engine failure, through
other accidents and through normal wear and tear. These misfortunes scem to have
worked with aggravated effect by reason of the difficulties of repair, which in part

PART VIII.—ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT, REINFORCEMENTS, ETC. 39

depended on the difficulty of transport. The upshot was that at the date of the Battle
of Ctesiphon there were only reckoned to be five aeroplanes belonging to the Royal Flying
Corps in Mesopotamia, and of these only three seem to have been actually available at
the battle—a Maurice Farman, a B.E.2 C. and a Martinsyde. This reckoning does not
appear to include the naval aeroplanes, of which, however, only one was of any use. None
of these machines were fitted either for photography or with wireless apparatus; and
though valuable work was done, they were of course inadequate for what was required. The
personnel of the Royal Flying Corps was organised as a Flight, and there were six flying
officers and forty-four rank and file. During December, 1915, and January, 1916, owing
to two machines being shut up in Kut, to accidents, and to the ill-health of pilots, some-
times only one aeroplane was available. Another Flight of aeroplanes was sent out in
February, 1916, and from then onward, the Royal Flying Corps maintained a supply
of new machines. After that date, there does not appear to have been a shortage in
numbers of machines, and from the same time apparatus both for photography and wireless
telegraphy came into use. But early in February, 1916, the Turkish troops, who till
then had been without aeroplanes, were furnished with three fast aeroplanes of the Fokker
type, which were much more formidable fighting mach nes than anything possessed by
the British Army. The presence of these fast machines with the Turkish Army placed the
British airmen at a great disadvantage ; and the want of at least one efficient fast fighting
machine was keenly felt.

10. It is clear that the lack of a sufficient supply of aeroplanes of any kind in the
operations which led to the Battle of Ctesiphon seriously hindered our troops in the task
they had to perform, and that the want of fast fighting aeroplanes later prevented the Royal
Flying Corps being of as much service to the Expedition as they might have been. How
far these defects were remediable by the War Office opens up the w:de question of the
general supply of aeroplanes for the purposes of the War, which has been the subject of
an independent enquiry. We are not in a position to express any opinion upon that ques-
tion, and we certainly should not deny that the first claim upon the resources of the Royal
Flying Corps was in Europe and not in Mesopotamia. It is not, however, clear why a
larger number of aeroplanes of a type not sufficiently fast for service in France should
not have been available for the advance on Bagdad, nor why those which were sent
were not equipped for photography and wireless telegraphy. The difficulty of sparing
fast machines in the spring of 1916 to fight the three Turkish Fokkers is more intelligible.
But we note the deficiency of aeroplanes as one of the defects of equipment which
contributed to the ill-success of the British Army in Mesopotamia during the winter and
spring of 1915-16. |

DraFTs AND REINFORCEMENTS.

11. In considering the question of reinforcement for the Mesopotamian Force, it must
be borne in mind that the term “ Reinforcements ” technically covers both the additional
units sent to strengthen the original force in the field, and drafts sent to replace wastage
in such units as are already in the country. We have, therefore, for the sake of clearness
used the term “ Reinforcements ” as covering additional units sent to augment the existing
strength of the force, and have placed under the heading “ Drafts ” all personnel sent to
make good casualties, whether they be from death, wounds, sickness or any other cause.

6¢

12. As a basis of our enquiry into the supply of drafts to Force “ D,” it may be useful
to take the standard laid down in Field Service Regulations. At the same time it must be
remembered that after several months of experience of modern warfare this standard has
had to be considerably modified, and although it may be said that the Turks were not armed
and equipped in the same thorough manner as the Germ:ns (at any rate during the earlier
stages of the campaign), yet against this must be set the fact that the expedition was
destined to fight in one of the most trying climates and disease-ridden countries in the
world, a fact of which the Indian Government and indeed the Ilome Government must have
been fully aware, and which accounted for a very large proportion of the wastage.
The Field Service Regulations state that units on mobilisation shall have additional
personnel known as “ first reinforcements ” to the extent of 10 per cent. of the rank and
file of each unit. Of the troops sent out of India to France and elsewhere, even had this
standard been attained to, which is not at all certain, wastage had eaten up the whole of

40 PART VITI—ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT, REINFORCEMENTS, ETC.

DRAFTS AND REINFORCEMENTS.

the “ first reinforcements ” long before they were sent to Mesopotamia, this applry.
equally to British and Indian troops, whilst with regard to those sent direct from Ini.
to Mesopotamia, even those that mobilised with their full personnel were soon in need |
reinforcing drafts.

|
Drafts for British Troops. |

13. Each Bnitish infantry unit ordered on service was supposed to have 25 per cer
of its strength at its depdt in India, and each Cavalry Regiment 33 per cent., to repla:
wastage until drafts arrived from home. When these depdts were exhausted, 1t devolv:
upon the War Office to keep British Units in Mesopotamia up to strength, and each unr
no doubt, had or should have had a depét or reserve battalion in England preparn.
and training men to replace casualties. There were a few reservists in India, numberir.
altogether 651, of whom 2855 in private employ were called up in August. 1914, whilst th
remainder in Government and Railway employment were not called up till later, and the:
only those employed by the railways, an effort which produced another 250 ; but no doutl:
India looked, and we think rightly, to the War Office to keep the British units supplic:
with suitable and sufficient drafts. |

Sir Beauchamp Duff tells us, however, that not till October, 1915, a year after the firs
landing, were any drafts sent to India or Mesopotamia by the War Office. On May 21st
1915, the War Office wires as follows to the Commander-in-Chief, India :— :

Owing to great and increased losses which you, no doubt, know of, every available man is now required
to replace casualties ; consequently, though we will bear in mind your request, we cannot bind ourselves as:
to when we can meet your needs. This refers to your telegram of May, 1915, No. 8. 10101.

No real blame can be attached to the War Office for this shortage of drafts. It arose
from the imperative necessity of replacing losses incurred in France and Gallipoli, but the
failure of the War Office to keep to the previous understanding did unquestionably embar-
rass the Indian Military Authorities.

The effect of this inability to provide drafts is illustrated by General Townshend's!
statement, that on October 3rd, his English battalions were reduced to mere half battalions. |
This description is perhaps not quite accurate, but Major Bastow speaking more precisely!
has told us that at the battle of Ctesiphon the strength of the British Battalions were :—
Dorsets, 573 ; Norfolks, 520; and Ist Oxfords, 619. The full strength of these battalion:
should have been some 2,500, and they were therefore nearly 33 per cent. beloy,
establishment in eficctives at this impcitant battle. What the state of these battalior
would have been had they net been supplied with drafts from Territorial Regiments 1,
India may be well imagined.

Drafts for Indian Troozs.

14. The regulations applicable to Indian troops require men to serve 25 years for:
pension. Such a system means that there must be a lerge number of men in the rank
who would be entirely unfit for the rigours of active service, and its effect is illu
trated by the fact that the Indian Government were requested to send to France no me!
who had had more than fifteen years’ service. It was obvious beforehand, therefore, tha’
there would be need for abundant drafts to teke the place of unfit men in any activi
operations in which Indian trocps were engeged.

But our evidence shcws that the supply of drafts to Indian battalions at the commence:
ment of the campaign from the Army reserve was a complete failure. Sir Beauchamp Dui
told us that this reserve for the Indian Army Units proved practically of no value. In
fact, we do not hesitate to say that the Indian reserve system entirely broke down under
the stress of war conditions. These reserves either as regards numbers, in all some 30,000,
or efficiency were quite unable to meet the calls made upon them to maintain the strength
of the Divisions sent to France; in fact it was only on the recall of these Divisions, and
consequent lowering of the numbers of casualties, that the authorities in India were mn
any way able to overtake the wastage in Mesopotamia. After that, though a great stram
was felt during the efforts to relieve the garrison of Kut, when the casualties to Indian troops
amounted to very nearly 20,000, the wastage was fairly well met with new recruits from
India. But we cannot believe that the steps taken to obtain recruits were very thorough
For instance, recruiting officers, who in peace time numbered 9, were only increased to I!

PART VIII.—ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT, REINFORCEMENTS, ETC. 41

DRAFTS AND REINFORCEMENTS.

under the stress of war, whilst assistant recruiting officers, who numbered 14 before the war,
were only increased to 25. Other steps were certainly taken, such as the formation of
local recruiting committees, obtaiing of assistance from local Governments and native
states, etc., but these seem to us somewhat inadequate methods for raising men at such
a time.

At the same time it is only fair to say that although the means taken may seern rather
meagre, yet the recruits obtained were sufficient to enable the ranks of the Indian forces
in the field to be kept at a fairly generous numerical standard after the withdrawal of the
Indian Divisions from France. These recruits were mostly utilised to increase the establish-
ment of existing units. This process within limits is preferable to creating new formations,
especially in view of the difficulty of obtaining British Officers.

Reinforcements.

15. The history of the supply of reinforcements to Force “ D” is a melancholy tale
of altercation between London and Simla. Although up to the time of the advance on
Baghdad the expedition was always numerically strong enough to cope with the Turkish
forces, yet this result was only attained after protracted wrangling between the Govern-
ments at home and in India, neither of whom appeared willing to accept the task of re-
inforcing an expedition, for the success of which they were jointly responsible. When at the
commencement of the campaign the 6th Division was ordered to the Persian Gulf by the
Home Government in October, 1914, we cannot find that the India Office or their Military
Adviser, Sir Edmund Barrow, ever contemplated or arranged for its reinforcement from
England in case of need, although it was obvious that even if the expedition were successful,
the Turks would make strong efforts to oust 1t from Mesopotamia, whilst if it were unsuccess-
ful the need for reinforcement would have been even more urgent. On the other hand,
the Indian Government adopted the attitude that, having already denuded India of
troops by overseas expeditions, it was impossible to send reinforcements from India
to Mesopotamia. The danger and friction created by such a situation is well exemplified
by what happened in the early part of 1915. At that period the military authorities
in England and India were agreed that the Mesopotamia Expedition was in danger of
attack by superior Turkish forces, and that its remforcement by a Division was imperative;
but the Secretary of State informed the Viceroy that no reinforcements could be despatched
from England, and the Viceroy informed the Secretary of State that no further troops could
be spared from India. The difficulty was only got over after much delay and discussion
by the Home Government definitely ordering India to send reinforcements to Mesopotamia,
and relieving the Viceroy of all responsibility for any consequent danger to India. The
reinforcements were sent, though only at the last moment, and they enabled Sir J. Nixon
to defeat and drive the Turks before him in the spring and summer of 1915.

16. The next occasion on which considerable remforcements were required in Mesopo-
tamia was in connection with the advance on Baghdad, which was sanctioned in October,
1915. Again both the Indian and Home Governments agreed that reinforcements amount-
ing to one or two divisions were essential if the advance was to be undertaken, and again we
find each Government trying to put upon the other the responsibility for providing part or
all of the necessary troops. Owing to the uncertain position of the operations in other
theatres of the war, the Imperial authorities found it difficult to guarantee the despatch of
two divisions to Mesopotamia within the necessary time, and asked India whether, pending
such despatch, she could not, in the meantime, herself provide another division. With
the intention of evading this liability, the Indian Government resorted to procedure which,
to say the least of it, was disingenuous. There were at the time available in India as
reinforcements three batteries of artillery, three cavalry regiments, and two infantry
brigades. Information as to the availability of these reinforcements was, however, with-
held from the Home Government, and the explanation of this omission is given in a letter
from the Military Secretary of Sir Beauchamp Duff to the Military Secretary of the Viceroy
in the following words :—

It is clear that the Home Government are very anxious that Baghdad should be taken, and they will
send us the required force if we hold out, but they will give us nothing if the least sign of willingness to find

reinforcements is shown by us, and we shall have to do it all by ourselves, and be so weak everywhere that both
in India and in Mesopotamia we shall be in danger.

17. Ultimately, the Home Government agreed to find and despatch the two divisions re-
quired, but they did not arrive within the time limit originally regarded by India as essential ;
(C 48—176) F

I Js Mm i

42 PART VIJI—ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT, REINFORCEMENTS, ETC.

DRAFTS AND REINFORCEMENTS.

they came in advance of much of their necessary equipment, and before sufficient arrange-
ments had been made for their transport from Basra to the front. Consequently, at a crisis
in the fortunes of the expedition, they were largely useless for the purpose for which they
had been sent. This incident vividly illustrates that lack of co-ordination between thie
Home and Indian authorities, which was at the root of so many of the difficulties in
Mesopotamia.

18. Such a lack of method in arranging for reinforcements can hardly be termed
satisfactory. Itis only fair, however, to say that from time to time, up to November, 1915,
the Indian Government sent to Mesopotamia a few fresh units, generally a battalion or two
at a time. Moreover, under the pressure of events after the retreat from Ctesiphon, in
December, 1915, the Indian Government did send two more divisions, one in December,
1915, and another early in 1916, a fact which makes it difficult to believe that India could
not have reinforced Mesopotamia at an earlier date.

CHAPLAINS.

19. It was stated in evidence before us that the establishment of chaplains for British
troops in India is more limited than for British troops in the United Kingdom. It was
also stated that there were not sufficient chaplains with the Mesopotamian Expedition
even on the lower basis of the Indian Establishment. This last insufficiency is evidently
regrettable, and we draw attention to it accordingly. In regard to the general question
of the establishment of chaplains for British troops in the Indian Army, there may be
special difficulties in obtaining a sufficient supply of chaplains for this service. But we
commend the matter to the notice of the Indian Government, so that so far as possible
there may be the same spiritual care for the British troops in India as elsewhere. In the
evidence before us we have had proof of the value of the chaplain’s labours and the sustaiming
and encouraging effect they have upon soldiers constantly face to face with death.

PART IX.—TRANSPORT. 43

A. SHORTAGE OF RIVER TRANSPORT.

1. River transport was from the beginning of the campaign a dominant factor, as
its sufficiency or insufficiency regulated the movements of the expedition. This funda-
mental matter has been treated at considerable length in paragraphs 73 to 87 of the
Vincent-Bingley Report.* We concur with the finding therein, but as the terms of reference
to that Commission were more limited than ours, they were not able to go so far into the
matter as we have been able to do, nor to carry their investigations later than April,
1916. |

2. Evidence is overwhelming that a shortage of river transport existed from the time
of the occupation of Kurna in December, 1914, and became serious from and after May,
1915. Despite additions that were made, the shortage had become relatively even greater
in April, 1916, than at any carlier period of the campaign, owing to the increased numbers
of the force. Practically at no time after the advance above Kurna was river transport
adequate to requirements. It greatly delayed military operations, in which celerity was an
important factor for success, it affected the comfort and feeding of the troops, and it was
a direct cause of suffering to the sick and wounded. As evidence of the shortage, we
have been told that it took nearly two months to concentrate troops and supplies for
the advance from Amara to Kut-el-Amara, and that again the advance from Kut and
Aziziyeh towards Baghdad was fatally delayed from the same cause. It seems almost
certain that, but for the shortage of river transport, the Turkish Army would have been
destroyed between Amara and Ctesiphon; but the want was most acutely felt during
the strenuous time when every day counted in the attempt to relieve the siege of
Kut. Here, in view of the straits in which General Townshend reported his force to be,
time was of the utmost importance.

3. General Lake, at that time General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia, tele-
graphed to the Chief- of the General Staff, Delhi, on March 22nd, 1916, as follows :—

I doubt firstly whether the paralysing effect which the inadequacy and late supply of river craft has had
on the operations up the Tigris is fully realised by the General Staff at home, and secondly, why our forecasts
as to what it will be possible to convey up river have varied, and of late have considerably developed. On
January 21st, 1916, when Aylmer fought his action at Hannah, there were 10,000 infantry and 12 guns in the
country available as reinforcements, but which, owing to this cause, could not be sent up to him in time.

On March 8th, the date of his last operations, I had, approximately, 12,000 infantry and 26 guns
which, for similar reasons, cou!d not be forwarded.

The evidence shows conclusively that shortage of river transport was the chief cause
of the failure to relieve Kut.

4. River tonnage available for transport from Basra up river, and the requirements
at different periods, were as follows :—

Daily tonnage available. Daily requirements.
November, 1915 .. +e. 150tons .. es .. 208 tons.
April, 1916. yt .. 250to 300 tons... .. 598 tons.
August, 1916 .. st .. 450tons.. = .. 650 tons.

These figures are given in the Vincent-Bingley Report, and by Major-General Cowper
D A. and Q.M.G., though we make from the latter’s calculation of tonnage available the
deductions necessary according to evidence, on account of steamers broken down, or
undergoing repair. It will be observed that in each case the requirements have been
largely in excess of the tonnage available, without allowing for a further increase of
the force or for loss of steamers. It may be well to note that since the War Office took
over the management of the campaign in 1916, more foresight in preparation and energy
in action are evident. To a recent estimate of requirements (namely, 800 tons per day),
a 50 per cent. margin for possible increase of force or eventualities has been added,
and a large fleet, capable of carrying up river 1,200 tons daily, now has been, or is being,
provided, in addit:on to the transporting capacity of the railways.

5. The evidence before us tends to show that improved control and administration of
the river craft available would have mitigated the evils arising from the shortage, although
at no time could such improvement have entirely overcome them. In this connection it
should be noted that the work of controlling and managing a miscellaneous fleet of river
steamers, tugs and barges, with their crews, their upkeep and their traffic, was not in the
usual line of Army or Royal Indian Marine experience. It is, we think, unfortunate that

-* See Appendix I.
(C 48—176) F 3

44. PART IX.—TRANSPORT.

A. SHORTAGE OF RIVER TRANSPORT.

someone with experience of the management of such flotillas on one of the rivers of India
or Burma was not at an early date appointed to assist in this work. Being clearly of
opinion that shortage of transport was one of the chief causes of the failure to capture
Baghdad and to relieve Kut, as well as a cause of deplorable suffering of the sick and
wounded, we have endeavoured to ascertain where the responsibility primarily lay.

6. In November, 1914, when General Barrett took possession of Basra, the river
tiansport available consisted of three steamers, viz., the “‘ Medjidieh,” which was the
most serviceable, the ‘‘ Julnar,” which required new engines, and the “ Salimi,”’ which
was used asa ferry boat between Basra and Kurna. Besides these there were four lighters
of 60 tons, one of 80 tons, two of 110 tons and ten of 200, making seventeen in all, and
some country sailing boats, or mahailas, with a capacity of from 25 to 35 tons. In the

words of a witness :—

“The mahailas were very useful for unloading ships in the stream, and bringing the contents to shore.
But to go any distance they take a very long time indeed, and if the wind is against them and the tide is
against them and the current is against them they cannot move at all. The mahailas that went from Basra
to Kurna, about 30 miles roughly, used to start one day and get up there on the third day, or afterwards.”

7. On November 23rd 1914, after Basra was occupied, at a conference held at Arm
Headquarters, Commander A. Hamilton, R.I.M., recommended to the General Staff that
they should at once ask for 12 river steamers of the “ Medjidieh” class. Commander
Hamilton had previously been on the Tigris for two years, and had surveyed the river from
Basra to Baghdad. He was, therefore, competent to speak with exceptional knowledge
both of the river and of the class of steamer most suitable to its navigation. He urged
the necessity of giving orders early, and, owing to the necessary delay in building the
vessels, which he estimated at 12 months, he suggested that they should be got from India
ready-built. There is reason to believe that had Commander Hamilton’s foresight, know-
ledge, and advice at once been acted upon, subsequent difficulties would have been miti-
gated, if not altogether avoided. General Barrett does not remember the circumstances.
He may perhaps have been influenced by the limited scope of the immediate operations
then authorised, but we must note that it is clear from his evidence to us and the Vincent-
Bingley Commission that he realised that the expedition would in all probability have to
advance as far as Amara and Nasariyeh. At any rate, the Staff at that time did not
consider the matter urgent, although it was allowed that six more steamers might be
required. Nothing, however, was done until January 2nd, 1915, when, in reply to an
enquiry as to the steamers available for use above Kurnah, General Barrett telegraphed
to India that, in order to carry a force of one brigade, one squadron, one battery and one
company of sappers and miners, with 500 mules and supplies for 10 days, seven steamers
and one or two lighters would be required in addition to the existing flotilla. . These seven
steamers and two lighters were purchased in India during February, 1915. They arrived
at Basra in May of the same year. On February 17th, 1915, General Barrett asked for
four river tugs, which were purchased in India early in March, 1915, and arrived at Basra
shortly after the seven steamers.

8. On May 27th, 1915, General Nixon, who had in April taken command, informed
India that the paddle steamers and tugs sent could not be relied upon to work above
Kurna, owing to their comparatively deep draught and to the lowness of the river at certain
seasons, and asked for six more tugs of certain power, and with a draught not to exceed
3 feet, subsequently modified to 3 feet 6 inches. There were difficulties in finding in
India tugs conforming to the specification, and the order was ultimately passed on to England
and merged in the August demand* for river craft to be built there. On J uly 8th, 1915,
a comprehensive memorandum was drawn up by General Kemball and forwarded to India
by General Nixon. In this memorandum the shortage of river craft and the urgent need
for further supplies of craft of a suitable type were strongly emphasized, and warnings
given that if steps were not taken in good time to meet these requirements grave risks
were being run of a breakdown at possibly a serious moment. General Kemball says :—

Had we had sufficient river transport we could have entered Nasiriyeh at the heels of the Turkish force
defeated at Shaiba, and at the same time despatched troops to drive off the Turks then threatening the pipe
line up the Karun. We had sufficient troops, but not sufficient steamem, to undertake simultaneous opera
tions.

The same conditions have obtained ever since.

Before an advance could be made from Qurnah the return of the ulcamers taken by General Gorringe
up the Karun had to be awaited.

* See paragraph 9 below.

PART IX.—TRANSPORT. 45

A. SHORTAGE OF RIVER TRANSPORT.

Before a force could be despatched against Nasiriyeh the vessels which transported the troops to Amara
had to be brought back down the river.

At the present time, before the 6th Division can be fully concentrated at Amara in readiness for a
further advance or to meet a forward movement of the Turks, the steamers with the Nasiriyeh expedition
will have to be withdrawn.

Military exigencies have permitted no pause in our operations and the consequence has been that all
the steamers have been used incessantly. Indeed, these vessels have only been sent for overhaul when they
actually break down; but, in spite of these exertions, it has been impossible to prevent operations being
prolonged into a season which on account of low water and heat adds difficulties which greater celerity might
have avoided.

Such are the conditions to-day and there can be no doubt that river transport will continue to be the
governing factor in any future operations.

From the nature of the country and the distribution of the population and political centres any
operations against the Turks have to be made along rivers, and the ease and success with which operations
can be carried out must naturally depend on the number of suitable steamers, tugs and barges available.

Now up to the present time we have never managed to transport more than 5 battalions with field and
heavy guns (but without animals), at any one time. . . . 1...

In short, more powerful light-draught river steamers and plenty of them, and not only ships, but
personnel and material for their maintenance, are regarded by the General Staff of this Force as our principal
need.

It is also thought necessary to add the warning that if steps are not taken in good time to meet these
requirements we are running grave risks of a breakdown at possibly a scrious moment.

At the present time we cannot make the most effective use of the troops available owing to want of
ships, and in any crisis insufficiency of river transport would limit the scope of reinforcements, while a
breakdown of shipping might have still more serious consequences.”

It was thus pointed out that the most effective use of the troops available could not
be made owing to want of river transport, and that in any crisis aid by reinforcements
would be limited, while a breakdown of steamers might have still more serious con-
sequences. With the memorandum came a pressing request for the building in England
of :—

6 paddle steamers of the “‘ Medjidieh ” class.
3 stern-wheelers of lighter draught.

8 tugs of the “ Sumana”’ class.

43 barges of specifications given.

9. The purport of these requirements was telegraphed to London on August 4th,
1915. Delay took place, and it was not until a mail despatch from the Government of
India, dated August 20th, was received in London on September 9th, that active steps
were taken to place the orders. Even after this date there was further delay—only in
part unavoidable—and eventually orders for the six paddle steamers, three stern-wheel
steamers and eight tugs were placed on November 3rd, 1915, orders for the
barges being placed a few days later. The first of these tugs reached Abadan in April,
1916, the first paddlers and stern-wheelers in June, 1916, and the 43 barges arrived at
different dates between April, 1916, and the end of the year. All except the six paddle
steamers were shipped either in sections or in the form of plates, and had to be erected
after arrival in Mesopotamia, so that a considerable period elapsed after their arrival
before they were available for use. Some were not ready in January, 1917.

10. Finding that the order from England meant at least 12 months’ delay, and in
‘view of the supreme importance of meantime obtaining more river transport without
delay, General Nixon telegraphed to India on October 9th, 1915, as follows :—

Please procure quickly some powerful light-draught tugs or stern-wheelers in India, which will serve present

needs and thereby greatly strengthen military operations, which are very seriously impeded. This is a very
urgent need.

and again on October 13th, 1915 :—

If anything of suitable draught and approximating to other requirements can be sent here soon they will
serve as useful stopgaps till new craft arrives. Please, therefore, do whatever is possible to meet our urgent
difficulties meanwhile.

In response to these pressing messages, the Indian Government eventually secured in
India a large number of steamers and barges which did not, however, arrive till January to
April, 1916. Subsequent orders followed during 1916 for the supply of many more river
iva from Eng'and, but we do not think it in the public interest to give details as to
these.

It will be sufficient to state generally that upwards of 700 river craft of all kinds
have been sent or are on order, and that the margin over estimated requirements now
provided for should safeguard the future. The foregoing summary of the demands for

46 PART IX.—TRANSPORT.

A. SHORTAGE OF RIVER TRANSPORT.

tonnage up to the beginning of 1916, covers the period which is the main subject of our
enquiry. Any vessels asked for after January, 1916, even if ready-made in India, could
not have had any effect either upon the operations for the capture of Baghdad in 1915
or for the relief of Kut.

11. In order to appreciate the responsibility attaching to General Nixon, it 1s necessary
to look at the position on the various dates on which he suggested the main moves up the
river, or received authority to make these advances. The three most critical dates may be
taken as those of the decisions to advance from Kurva to Amara,-from Amara to Kut,
and from Kut and Aziziyeh to Baghdad. Each of these advances, it must be remembered,
involved a special demand on the River Tiansport in respect of the carnage of troops,
ambulance transport, artillery, &c., and pro tanto diminished the amount of River Transport
available for ordinary supply. The dates when these advances were authorised were
May 23rd, 1915, August 7th, 1915, and October 23rd, 1915. ee

General Cowper gives the daily tonnage available on these three dates as 175 tons,
less an allowance for vessels off work for repair, leaving, say, 150 tons daily available at each
of the three dates.

General Lake, in the despatch describing the operations of the force under his command,
writes as follows :—

The number of steamers available in January, 1916, for river transport purposes was practically the
same as when, in June, 1915, the first advance up the Tigris took place.

In addition to steamers and barges, a certain number of native sailing craft, called
mahailas, were utilised, but were unreliable owing to their being unable to make progress
up river against wind and current.

12. It is important to remember what General Nixon had before him in taking the
first step from Kurna up the river. Each of the advances from Kurna to Amara, Kurna
to Naseriyeh, Amara to Kut, and Kut towards Baghdad, was, it is true, only taken after
it was recommended by the General, and authority obtained from the Government of
India and the Government in London. Nevertheless it is our definite opinion that these
advances—at least as far as Kut (just outside the limit of the Basra Vilayet)—should
have been anticipated by General Nixon and provided for in time, seeing that even the
possibility of an advance to Baghdad could not have been out of his mind, in view of
the instructions given to him on his proceeding to Mesopotamia to take command.

13. The following is an extract from the orders given to him by the Commander-in-
Chief in India, dated March 24th, 1915 :-—

“Operations. After acquainting yourself on the spot with the present situation, you will submit :—
1. A plan for the effective occupation of Basra Vilayet.

2. A plan for the subsequent advance on Baghdad.”

It is clear, however, that the Government in London had no intention at this time of
authorising an advance, so far ag Baghdad. The correspondence shows that they
deprecated too large a commitment in Mesopotamia, and the limits of action indicated by
them were the protection of the pipe line from the Anglo-Persian oilfields to Abadan
and the occupation of Basra Vilayet which extends to a point just below Kut-el-Amara.
But in the case of military operations dependent on river transport, the need for timely
preparation was of special importance. It would appear in these circumstances no more
than ordinary prudence to prepare long in advance for all contingencies, and not to advance
until the necessary transport had been provided. |

14. The total tonnage on the river on May 28rd, 1915, was small—too small even for
the existing force, if it was to advance and thereby lengthen the lines of communication.
Moreover, of the steamers available more than half exceeded a draught of 3 feet 6 inches, and
it had already been found that it was practically impossible to get suitable steamers
from India, with a maximum draught not exceeding this limit. The only alternative,
therefore, so far as river transport was concerned, was to build new steamers, and these
could not be available under 12 months from the date of the order being despatched.

15. A great deal of correspondence and some misunderstanding took place between
General Nixon and India as to the specification, and in particular the maximum
draught of steamers suitable for Mesopotamia. It is difficult to visualise the conditions
of the river and of the country. At certain times of the year the river overflows its
low banks, and the plain is turned into a vast sea of water. Transport by road,

PART IX.—TRANSPORT. 47

A. SHORTAGE OF RIVER TRANSPORT.

herefore, cannot be relied on, although practicable with difficulties during part of the
ear. Just above Kurna are what may be called the Straits, where the passage of the
iver at all times is difficult, and particularly so at the season of low river. One witness
—Commander Huddlestone, R.I.M., writes in an appendix to his evidence :—
The river between Kurna and Amara is roughly very narrow—some 85 to 250 feet broad—with real
airpin corners, and very shallow, and a very strong current, some 3 to 6 knots. The banks are from 3 to
feet high, and the bend so sharp that the advance of the vessel coming down, notwithstanding the helm,
2nds. her—or rather, her barges* right smack against the banks. If she has not got barges she goes
gainst them herself. The result is not so bad at this time of tho year, as would be expected, because
he bank gives way, and the vessel or barge bounds off again, cannons against the other side, and proceeds,
nd repeats the performance some two or three times an hour, sometimes more, sometimes less. In
tuummer, when the banks are hard, the damage done to vessels and barges is immense, and even now they
.O a considerable amount of damage to themselves, and so, in designing vessels, I give you what I think
re the chief points to be borne in mind :—

(1) Draught should not exceed 3 feet 6 inches for steamers, and 3 feet for barges.
(2) Length should not exceed 212 feet for steamers, and 170 feet for barges.
(3) The steamers should be made of steel, with independent paddles.

16. Another witness, Commander Hamilton, R.I.M., stated in his evidence :—

I doubt if steamers really suitable for the Tigris exist anywhere, especially as troop-ships. So the only ones
hat we can call really satisfactory (other than Lynch’s), will be the ones specially built, or building, in England
-O our design on Lynch’s pattern. It is the shallow draught required, combined with the necessary size of
vessel and horsepower which renders any ready-made ones from other parts of the world more or less, and in
nany cases quite, unsuitable. It must be remembered that the Tigris in the low-river season (a normal low-
‘iver season) is, after all, only a glorified ditch in many parts. It is not yet fully realised by the Army, I think,
shat last low-river season (August to March, 1915), was abnormally high. ‘The result was that the compara-
sively deep-draught steamers (about 5 feet actually), which we received from Burma were actually able to run
regularly right up to the front during all the low seasons. We had stipulated, and still stipulate, that 3 feet
f inches is the standard safe draught for that river in low season. It is so normally, but the Army have got
30 used to seeing the deeper-draught ones going successfully that I feel rather anxious about the outlook should
the river take it into its head to fall as low, as it can do on occasions. Should it do so, I fear a large part of
our ready-made imported fleet of paddlers would be out of action, as most of them are much over 3 feet 6 inches
whenloaded. . . It has been found by experience (Lynch Bros. records), that it is not worth risking a draught
of over about 3 fect 6 inches in the low river. Besides which paddle-steamers “ settle ” 7 or 8 inches when moving
n such shallow water, so that they always require several inches more water than their stationary draught
vould lead one to suppose.

Above the Kurna Straits navigation is easier as far as Kut, except for some shallow
yatches. Above that point the river is again difficult, and 3 feet 6 inches is the maximum
lraught suitable. Jt is evident from all the information before us, that to rely on the
leeper draught vessels being able to navigate the river above Kurna at all times of the

7ear was to take a great risk, and what this risk might involve it is not difficult to picture.

17. In our opinion General Nixon was perfectly right in insisting that the maximum
lraught of vessels supplied to him should not exceed 3 feet 6 inches, but he might have
nade it more clear to the authorities in India that, failing these, he could make use of
leeper draught steamers during part of the year and during all the year on certain stretches
{ the river. On the other hand, Geral Nixon does not appear to have appreciated
t an early stage in the operations that such vessels as he required were not obtainable
‘cady-made, and would have to be specially built. The result was that demands were sent
orward embodying cast-iron conditions which could not all be fulfilled by ready-made
ressels, while the authorities in India showed little appreciation of General Nixon’s |
lifficulties, and were not very helpful in suggesting substitutes, many of which, it was
ifterwards found, were available, although not in all respects suitable. It was only on
July 10th, 1915, that General Nixon sent forward General Kemball’s survey of the
situation, and recommended the building of steamers, tugs and barges suitable for the
river. These could not reasonably have been expected to be available for use before the
nriddle of 1916, and, as a matter of fact, they were not ready until later.

18. In making the advance from Kurna to Kut (a distance by river of 243 mules),
we are of opinion that General Nixon took great risk (1) on account of the inadequacy
of his river transport as a whole, and (2) on account of the inability of a large portion of
it to navigate the river above Kurna in a normal low-water season. Our opinion in regard
to this is even stronger when we come to consider the advance from Kut towards Baghdad,
because, first, the river above Kut is shallow, secondly, the distance from the base is
greater (an additional dificulty if river transport above Kut was to be relied on), and
thirdly, General Nixon by that time knew of the large reinforcements which he was to

* Which are attached to her on either side.

48 PART IX.—TRANSPoRT.

A. SHorRTAGE OF RIVER “'RANSPORT.

receive, and that an amount of transport inadequate to a smaller force and shorter line:
communication must be still more inadequate for a larger force and longer line of ct:
munication. We think the plea that steamers and barges had been asked for is not:
answer. It was known that what had been asked for could not be available for a long tir.
and certainly not until long after the operations referred to had been carried out. Moreov-
Sir John Nixon was informed on the 28th October by his Inspector-General of Commu:
cations that he estimated that in addition to the shipping already ordered, 12 m
steamers and 24 barges would be required in view of the expected reinforcements. 1:
estimate he did not apparently pass on to India or London. If he had done so, in v:
of the insistence by both the Indian and Home Governments on the necessity for t:
prompt arrival at Baghdad of the reinforcing two divisions, it is at least open to dot
whether the sanction to the advance would not have been countermanded.

19. The responsibility for making the respective advances with insufficient transp'
and for the military reverses, discomfort of the troops, and abnormal suffering of the s
and wounded which resulted from such insufficiency, attaches primarily to General Nix:
whose estimate of the military exigencies of the moment must, however, be taken 1
account. At the same time we cannot exonerate the Commander-in-Chief and the Gene:
Staff in India, who had a survey of the river in their possession, knowledge of ¢
difficulties of its navigation, a list of all the steamers available, knowledge that many ..
them were of too deep a draught for the low season, and information as to the lengthening:
the communications and the reinforcements which were being sent In these circumstan:
to authorise and even recommend to the Government in London the various advance
without satisfying themselves that the expedition was properly equipped with nv:
transport, and, indeed, actually with the knowledge that it was not, involves Sir Bear
champ Duff in a large measure of responsibility. While a copy of General Nixon:
despatch of July 10th, 1915, and of General Kemball’s memorandum was received lb:
the India Office and forwarded to the War Office in September, it was not laid before the
Secretary of State for India. Moreover it does not appear that General Nixon’s actw.
shortage of river transport was brought by the Military Department of the India Oth:
before the various expert bodies subsequently consulted in such a way as to attract the:
attention, and in consequence the War Council or Cabinet when they were asked to sancti:
the advance on Baghdad were not cognisant of the risk. As these documents were attach.
to a requisition for a large amount of 1iver transport the Military Branch of the Ind.
Office sent them all on to the Stores Branch of that Department as an indent ; and thou
the memorandum was forwarded to the War Office, it was not accompanied by any let”
calling special attention to the revelation made as to the grave shortage of transpu
This blunder led to serious consequences, for which General Barrow cannot be exonerat:
as the head of the Military Department at the India Office. We have shown elsewhe
that the advance on Baghdad was proposed and sanctioned on the understanding t!
there would be large reinforcements for General Nixon’s forces, and such reinforceme:
were of little immediate value if the River Transport to convey them from Basra to t
front was not available. It may well have been that had General Kemball’s significa:
reminder of the correlation between reinforcements and transport been brought to t
notice of the War Council, the Baghdad adventure and its attendant misfortunes wou
have been avoided. :

Responsibility for Shortage of River Transport.

20. Important witnesses before us have differed widely as to the incidence ‘
responsibility for the supply of river transport for the Mesopotamia Expeditic
Sir Beauchamp Duff informed us that Sir J. Nixon in Mesopotamia rather than th:
General Staff in India was responsible for calculating how much river-transport wi
required. On the other hand Sir J. Nixon said, “ It was the duty of India to ask and fine
out what was required for the forces, and not to impose the intolerable burden on me o:
having continually to fight to obtain the necessary supplies, etc.,” and in support of th:
contention he referred us to the Field Service Regulations. !

21. Under the Field Service Regulations the Commander-in-Chief in tl
Field (in this case, Sir John Nixon) is “ relieved of direct responsibility for the conduct '’
the business of providing the requirements of the forces in the field.” It is also laid dov-
that “‘ responsibility for the adoption, modification, or revision of plans of operations re:

PART 1X.—TRANSPORT. 49

A. SHORTAGE OF RIVER TRANSPORT.

with the Government, who, on approving a plan assume responsibility in principle for the
provision of the requisite forces.” Sir J. Nixon assumed, and we think justly, that
‘* requisite forces’ must be held to include all the requisite auxiliary services. Inthe
present case, the management of the Expedition had been devolved by the Home Govern-
ment upon the Indian Government ; it would seem, therefore, that the primary responsi-
bility for providing the requisite river craft, not only for the original plan of campaign,
but also for the extension of such plans involved in the successive advances to Amara, Kut
and Baghdad, rested with the Indian Government.

22. On the other hand the Regulations provide that the Commander-in-
Chief in the Field “ is responsible for the efficiency of the forces in the field,” and anticipate
that he is to make demands for what he requires. Where, therefore, as in the present
case, the efficiency of the forces was absolutely dependent on the supply of river craft,
it would seem clear that Sir John Nixon was responsible for placing his needs in river
craft before the Indian Government in an adequate manner and with anticipation.

23. Between the two authorities concerned, viz., the Government of India and the
General Officer Commanding in the Field, in our opinion there was to a large extent joint
and mutual responsibility. In any case, the true test is to be found in common sense,
and not in questioning the legal interpretation of what is in a book of Field Service
Regulations, written, no doubt in contemplation of very different circumstances from those
of the Mesopotamia campaign. In our view the situation called for co-operation, thoughtful
anticipation of needs, mutual and ready helpfulness. General Nixon’s expectations as
to the existence of suitable steamers, and the promptness with which they, or others
specially built in England, could be delivered in Mesopotamia, erred on the side of optimism,
but he was necessarily devoid of the requisite information on which to form a correct
judgment. The Government of India was in a position to know the facts, and, as regards
the all-important supply of river steamers, failed lamentably in co-operation, anticipation
of needs and ready helpfulness. We consider that responsibility for the shortage of river
transport rests mainly with the Government of India, in its various Departments. For
their failure in this matter, which was the foundation of all the troubles in Mesopotamia,
no censure could, in the circumstances, be too grave.

Provision of River Craft from India.

Bearing these considerations in mind, we now proceed to examine how the supply
of river craft for Mesopotamia was dealt with.

24. The general conditions in Mesopotamia were known in India at the beginning of
the war. The absence of roads, the importance of the rivers as means of communication,
many of the peculiar features of those rivers, and the number and class of river steamers
in the country in the autumn of 1914, are all noted in a small hand book of information
furnished to the Expedition by the Indian General Staff. Moreover, further particulars
as to navigation of the Tigris were accessible to the Indian Government—the Royal Indian
Marine had for years maintained a “ Station” ship at Baghdad, and one of their officers,
Commander Hamilton, had made a survey of the Tigris in 1905-1907. We think, therefore,
that it was incumbent on the Indian Government to have foreseen that a large supply
of special river craft would become a necessity for the Expedition directly it advanced
above Kurna, the limit on the Tigris for ocean-going steamers.

25. This necessity and a responsibility for meeting it was indeed to some extent
recognised by the General Staff in India as early as December 30th, 1914, when they asked
General Barrett to find out how many steamers he could procure locally for use above
Kurna, and what number of craft he would require in the event of an advance up the
Tigris or Euphrates. General Barrett replied that he would require 7 more steamers
and some lighters. It is important to remember that this estimate of General Barrett
related only to his then force of roughly one division, although later on, when these steamers
were provided, viz., in April-May, 1915, it was apparently considered by the Indian Govern-
ment that they constituted a sufficient increase of river transport to meet the needs of two
divisions. But in their communication to General Barrett the Indian Authorities did at
any rate definitely recognise some responsibility for ascertaining what river craft would be
required in the event of an advance. From this time, however, up to the beginning of
1916, they do not seem to have again recognised this responsibility. Before the advance
from Kurna to Amara was sanctioned, they did not make any inquiries as to the sufficiency

(C 48—176) q

50 3 PART IX.—TRANSPORT.

A. SHORTAGE OF RIVER TRANSPORT.

of the transport; before the advance from Amara to Kut-el-Amara was sanctioned the:
contented themselves with obtaining general assurance from General Nixon that he wi
able to maintain the force of a division or more at Kut in all states of the river. They mat:
no efforts to ascertain or estimate what the requirements in river craft would be for th:
advance to Baghdad, or for the reinforcements which they sent or asked to be sent ti
Mesopotamia. Indeed so much out of touch was Simla with the actual situation in Mes.
potamia, that we find the Indian General Staff, in “ appreciations”’ in June and Septembe:
1915, definitely stating that the Expedition was well supplied with river craft, and usi:
this among their arguments for the advance to Baghdad.

26. During the whole period of the most important developments of the campaig::
viz., from January, 1915, to January, 1916, the attitude of the Indian Government, therefor.
seems to have been that they had little or no responsibility in the matter of providir:
river craft, beyond attending to the specific demands sent to them from Mesopotam:
itself. We think that both the ee, oc and common sense demanded that tl
authority responsible for providing the requisite river craft should have taken greatei
care to ascertain what was requisite. The Indian Government did not in fact exercis:
that oversight and foresight over the needs of Mesopotamia in river craft which wa:
demanded of them by their position and responsibilities as the authority placed 1
management of the campaign. On the other hand, General Nixon did not in ow
opinion sufficiently assist the Indian Government by informing them well beforehand «
his anticipated needs in river craft. |

27. With regard to delay in fulfilment of orders for river transport we made inquir
into the procedure, and investigated the causes of delay. Correspondence was usuallt
conducted between the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia and the Chief 0:
the Staff in Simla or Delhi. From the latter officer anything about river craft would be|
transmitted to the Quartermaster-General, who would thereafter communicate what he '
thought necessary to Captain Lumsden, the Director of the Royal Indian Mame
at Bombay. The work falling upon Captain Lumsden, R.N., and an insufficient stall,
in connection with ocean transport appertaining to four Indian Expeditionary Force:
has been heavy. He was not in touch with all that was going on in Mesopotamia, no:,
informed of the scope of the expedition. Neither the Quartermaster-General nor Captatr
Lumsden appears to have fully appreciated in time—certainly down to July, 1915-;
the seriousness of the river transport situation. Orders for craft involved a divide
responsibility between the Quartermaster-General up-country, who was in touch wit!
Mesopotamia but not with river craft, and the Director of the Royal India:
Marine in Bombay, who was to some extent in touch with river craft but not wit:
Mesopotamia. The result has been lack of knowledge, initiative and resource, as wel
of helpful anticipation mm the important first nine months of the campaign. |

28. It was undoubtedly General Nixon’s duty to formulate his own needs wit!
regard to class of vessels and to specify what was required, but it is, we think, unfortunat:
that when difficulties first arose as to their specifications and draught, a competent persot:
preferably with experience of river craft, was not at once sent from India to look into th:
matter on the spot, and confer with General Nixon as to the usefulness or otherwise «.
what could be obtained ready-made in India. But this was not done. Captain Lumsde:
did not think it necessary to go himself, he failed to rise to the occasion, and 1n consequence
it was not till late in 1915 that boats in large numbers were offered by India which:
might have been offered long before. Many of them were accepted by Mesopotamia,|
and although a number proved unsatisfactory, some have been of use. In con-|
sequence of the delay, however, none of these boats arrived in Mesopotamia until early in
1916. Had they been available for General Nixon between October and November, 1915.
they would have materially lightened his transport problems, and might, perhaps have
even altered the history of the campaign.

29. In response to General Barrett’s request, the first craft, namely 4 tugs and 7
paddle steamers, had been sent by India. They arrived in April—May, 1915. The
following is a paraphrase of the communications that ensued between General Nixon and
the Chief of the General Staff in India :—

May 27th, 1915.—Mesopotamia asked that in view of deep draught of steamers,
and tugs received, rendering them unreliable for use above Kurna, 6 tugs of 3-ft.

draught should be sent. |

~~ ore 3 - oe ee

7 rT Oe Cae

PART IX.—TRANSPORT. 51

A. SHORTAGE OF RIVER TRANSPORT.

June 14th—India asked whether 4 named paddle steamers, 2 stern-wheeled
steamers and 2 tugs, the draught of all being between 2 ft. 3 ins. to 3 ft. 6 ins.,
would be suitable if available.

June 16th.—Mesopotamia cabled accepting as many of the 8 as were procurable.

June 20th.—India telegraphed that some of them were found to be too deep,
and that the others of suitable draught were not available (no reason given). They
added—‘ no tugs, as asked for on May 27th, available in India.”

June 20th.—Mesopotamia cabled asking for 4 tugs of 3-ft. 6-in. draught.

July 10th.—Mesopotamia asked for 6 paddle steamers, 3 stern wheelers, 8 tugs
and 43 barges to be specially built (in England). The draught specified was 3 ft. 6 ins.
for the steamers, and 3 ft. 5 ins. for the tugs.

(N.B.—Orders for these were placed with builders in the United Kingdom in
November, 1915.)

July 17th.—India telegraphed that tugs suitable to the requirements cabled
on June 20th were “ not at present available.”

October 9th.—Mesopotamia telegraphed to India: ‘“ Vessels over 3 ft. 9 ins. now
useless; send quickly some light-draught tugs and stern wheelers to serve immediate
needs.”

October 12th.—India replied: ‘‘ Have tried Indian rivers without success.”

October 13th.—Mesopotamia telegraphed, draught admissible for tugs 3 ft. 5 ins.,
stern wheelers, 2 ft. 6 ms., adding, ‘‘if anything of suitable draught, and approxi-
mating to other requirements, can be sent here soon, they will serve as useful stop-gaps
till new craft arrive. Please do whatever is possible to meet our urgent difficulties
meanwhile.”

October 26th.—India telegraphed, ‘‘ No tugs of description given in your telegram
of October 13th are procurable in India or Burma, and stern wheelers cannot make
sea journey.”

October 27th.—Mesopotamia telegraphed, ‘‘ Please wire description of any tugs
that are available, with draught.”

November 6th.—Mesopotamia telegraphed, “ Matter urgent, please wire details.”

November 7th.—India wired that they were receiving such large lists of steamers
that they were having them “ whittled down by a special staff,’ with a view to select-
ing only such vessels as would be suitable. They promised to forward a list shortly.

November 9th.—Mesopotamia telegraphed, “ Please telegraph the list of ships,
details can follow by post. You know our requirements as regards dimensions.
Draught should not exceed 3 ft.6 ins. Please treat the matter as very urgent.”

November 10th.—India telegraphed to Mesopotamia the names and particulars
of no less than 48 river steamers.

30. Of these latter, according to the description, 9 fulfilled the requirements as to
draught sent by Mesopotamia on May 27th, although on June 20th and October 12th the
Indian authorities had telegraphed that no such tugs were available in India. Other 4
fulfilled the requirements of June 20th. It may be that some of these 13 tugs, while being

' of suitable draught, were not in all other less important respects exactly what was wanted,

but, in view of Mesopotamia’s urgent need, we are impressed by what appears to us as
serious neglect on the part of the Director of the Royal Indian Marine in not
offering these craft to Mesopotamia at a much earlier date. If they had been offered, and
accepted in response to the requirements cabled on May 27th, June 20th and October
9th, they could have been strengthened and prepared for the sea voyage to Basra, in
ample time to make the voyage as soon as the monsoon permitted—say in October or
November, 1915—and have arrived in time to relieve the very critical condition as to
transport which existed in December, 1915.- It further appears to us that Captain
Lumsden fai'ed to appreciate his duty, in that he did not at an early date have a complete
list and survey made of all the river steamers and light-draught tugs in India and Burma.

Placing of Orders for River Transport in Englard.

31. We have already referred to the order sent to the India Office for 6 paddle steamers
of the“ Medjidieh ” class, 3 stern-wheel steamers of lighter draught, 8 tugs of the “ Sumana ”
class, and 43 barges. The order was cabled on August 4th, 1915, and written despatches
with full particulars were received in London on September 9th, 1915. The urgency of
the order, and the necessity of adhering to the type, dimensions, and draught of the

(C 48—176) G2

52 PART IX.—TRANSPORT.

A. SHORTAGE OF RIVER TRANSPORT.

vessels required, were emphasized by Commander Hamilton, General Kemball, General
Nixon, the Commander-in-Chief in India, and finally by the Viceroy and his whole Council
Previous experience had demonstrated the defects of ready-made craft received from India,
and of any other boats not specially built to meet the exceptional conditions of the Tigris.
Success and possibly the safety of the Expedition depended upon ability to get transport
up and down the river at all times. After many years of experience, Messrs. Lynch Bros.
who held a concession for a steamer line on the Tigris, had evolved a type of steamers,
of tugs (to tow large flat barges, one lashed on either side), and of barges, which were con-
sidered by those with local knowledge to be the only types entirely suitable for the river.

32. It was a sine qua non of the order that these models only be sent, and the Indi
Office was requested to contract for the building of the craft with Messrs. Lynch Bros.:
or to engage their assistance, obtain the loan of their plans, and the benefit of their exper
knowledge. Messrs. Lynch Bros. of London and Basra, not being shipbuilders themselves.
and all yards being at: the time precluded from accepting orders for early delivery fror.
anyone but the Government, could not contract to supply the boats, but offered the:
assistance, plans and expert knowledge, including bringing home their supervising enginee:
from Basra, for a commission of 5 per cent. on the cost of the boats on this side, and t:
erect them at Basra at cost without any addition of profit. Finally, the India Office offered
Messrs. Lynch 1,500 guineas, to which the latter replied that, while it was not on a commer-
cial scale, on patriotic grounds they would give their services and plans for 2,000 guineas.
The value of the order to be placed and supervised was about £600,000. To this offer
no reply was sent for some weeks. Meantime, the India Office consulted Sir John B:les,
their expert naval architect (who was employed on a commission basis), to assist them.
With the power of a Government Department behind him, Sir John Biles was able to
go direct to the builders of the “ Medjidieh,” belonging to Lynch Bros., and get a copy
of the plan of their steamer. The transaction might perhaps be criticized from other

oints of view, but we are more concerned with the failure to make use of the unique

owledge, and to engage the expert assistance which was available, in the face of the

strongly expressed wishes of the General in Command in Mesopotamia, and of the Viceroy,
and in view of what ensued therefrom.

33. The six new paddle steamers asked for were to be duplicates of the ‘‘ Medjidieh,”
with certain interior improvements in the arrangements. The India Office, no doubt
acting on the advice of Sir John Biles, thought it well to give the boats more power.
Without consulting Mesopotamia, they ordered heavier machinery, and altered the
dimensions of the hulls. As a consequence, the new boats draw more water than the
‘* Medjidieh,” burn considerably more fuel, and are more difficult to manceuvre, particularly
when navigating with two barges abreast through the Narrows. Even if barges are not
required for cargo or troops, they are required for protection of steamers’ paddle-wheels.
which otherwise would be stripped of their floats by collision with the banks. Above
Ezra’s Tomb the river is very narrow for a distance of 28 miles. In this portion its
maximum breadth does not exceed 200 ft., and in certain places is not more than 140 it.
from bank to bank. The difficulty, from the navigation point of view, is enhanced by
the twistings and turnings of the river—which, in certain cases, amount to the sharpest
of bends—and by the rapid current. —

34. General Cowper informed us that—
It is impossible to adequately convey or describe the extraordinary difficulties of this portion of the river.
In short, they must be seen to be appreciated, especially the passage of them made both up and down in 2
river steamer, towing two barges abreast, and bumping her way, when coming down stream, from side to side
as she rounds the various bends.

35. After these new vessels reached the Tigris, and were put into commission, a tele-
gram dated August 26th, 1916, was sent from Mesopotamia to the Commander-in-Chief in
India, in which, referring to the suitability of the new river vessels, it was stated :-— :

“* Medjidieh ’ represents extreme in regard to limits for length, breadth, width. River vessels designed |
constructed in England, of new ‘ Medjidich ’ class, are unsuitable for river, particularly during the low-wate!
season ; cannot navigate without barges to protect their paddles, and their beam is then too great for manwuv
ring either for Narrows or channels through all shoals up river.”

36. With regard to the barges, the India Office, ignoring instructions that they were
to be built 150 ft. long, and to be on Lynch’s model, which have pointed bows, ordered
them 170 ft. long and to have square or punt-shaped ends. While these square-ended
barges may be suitable for other parts of the world, they were fatally unsuitable for
the navigation of the Tigris, where, owing to the crashing of the barges into the

PART [X.—TRANSPORT. 53

A. SHortacE or River TRANSPORT.

river banks in the Narrows, and the collisions that frequently occurred with passing
vessels, 1t was essential to have rounded or pointed ends. The matter might appear,
at first sight, of minor importance, but it turned out otherwise. As soon as the
General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia became aware of the departure from the
orders sent home, he telegraphed, on March 27th, 1916, protesting against the change,
and against the omission to make use of Messrs. Lynch’s assistance and experience, further
asking that any barges that remained to be constructed should be of the model asked for.
The India Office, in their reply of March 31st, refused to accept the General’s view, and
adhered to their opinion that the barges they had designed were “ suitable for the Tigris,
and in many respects superior to anything there.” On April 6th, 1916, the General tele-
graphed re-stating his conviction as to the unsuitability of bows of square shape, which
_conviction he stated was based upon the best local expert advice. He pointed out that
_ it was dangerous to make experiments, and better to adopt what had proved to be successful,
_ beyond which, if the square-ended barges proved unsuitable, as he feared, the consequent
- delay and difficulty might have a paralysing effect on the success of future operations.
_ In reply to this, the India Office not only declined to alter the barges which were being
- built, but directed that further 25 barges about to be built should also have the square-
_ shaped pontoon bows.

37. Pressed as he was at that time by overwhelming difficulties, with a starving
garrison in Kut hoping daily for succour, inadequate forces at the Front to effect their
relief, and 10,000 men at Basra who could not be got up the river in time, owing to inade-
quacy of transport, it would be surprising if the General Officer in Command was not driven
to something approaching desperation. This is indicated in the following extract from
his telegram to the India Office, dated April 11th, 1916, in which he surveys the attitude
of the India Office :—

It is incumbent on me to invite your attention to what, in my opinion, is an incontrovertible fact, but
the relative importance of which it is difficult for anybody outside this country to estimate. In my Judgment
it is quite beyond the ability of anyone in England or elsewhere, unless he possesses a wide personal knowledge
of this country, to form any correct estimate of the peculiarities of Mesopotamia or, in particular, of the idiosyn-
crasies of the Tigris. Full details of the specifications of what I required in regard to barges and river craft
_ which were to be specially constructed for eventful use in this country were given in my telegrams dated 10th
_ July, and July 17th, 1915 to the Chief of the General Staff, Simla, with the object of further ensuring that all
_ vessels would be constructed on lines essential to successful employment in Mesopotamia. I recommended in
my telegram of July 23rd, 1915 to the Chief of the General Staff, India, that the consulting engineer to Lynch
_ Bros., Mr. Thomas, should be despatched to England to superintend the construction of steamers subsequently,
' vide my telegram of August 5th to the Chief of the General Staff, India. I suggested that ouragents inthe matter
should be Lynch Bros. In spite of the above and having regard to the fact that Tigris craft have been navigated
for upwards of 70 years by Lynch Bros., and also that the practical experience gained by the Officers of the
Royal Indian Marine since the beginning of military operations in Mesopotamia is coincident with Lynch Bros.’
unique knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of the Tigris it seems that your naval architect has thought it desirable
to design a type of barge which is suitable in his opinion. Having regard to the facts stated above and in the
event of these barges, with square above ? (bows), proving a failure which is expected here I think it very necessary
that I should lay before you the fullest details of the case as it now stands. Not only is there the question
' of loss to the State, but what is of greater importance the possibility also of my being sent a large number of
_ barges which although the intention was that they should be specially built for a particular purpose may not
_ be found suitable for local requirements.

38. It was then too late to alter a large number of the barges appertaining to the first
order sent home. Thirty-five barges, each of 250 tons capacity, and seven of smaller
dimensions, all with square ends, were shipped. They were, after trial on the Tigris, con-
demned as totally unsuitable for navigation of the river. Much delay was involved in
replacing them. Months of time were lost, and a large amount of public money.

39. Responsibility for these errors must rest with the India Office, who authorised
or concurred in departure from the lines of'an order laid down with so much emphasis
in the despatch to which we have already referred. But the matter does not end here ;
barges, tugs and stern-wheel steamers were sent out in sections, or in plates and angles.
Arrangements for their erection in Mesopotamia were made by the India Office, with little
prevision of what would be required. The arrangements proved to be quite inadequate.
[t was a work of no little magnitude to discharge, assemble, erect and fit up complete, 11
steamers and 43 barges, with insufficient plant and mechanics and under trying local
conditions Much loss of valuab’e time occurred, and vessels expected to be ready for
use a few weeka after arrival were not available for many months. Some of the craft
Were sent in very large and heavy sections. Means of handling them in Mesopotamia
proved inadequate and when an attempt was made to put them together in the river it

54 PART IX.—TRANSPORT.

A. SHORTAGE OF RIVER TRANSPORT.

was found almost impossible, and some sections sank in 30 ft. of water. Part of the

remaining sections were the nordered to be sent on to Bombay for erection there, and
thereafter to be towed back to Basra, involving much cost, risk and delay. Material fe:
erection of the barges and other craft was sent out in large shipments. No descriptiv:
note of contents of packages accompanied the first shipments, and no drawings
erection plans were sent with them. The latter were only received in September, 191é.
for vessels, the materials for which had arrived four-or five months previously. TI:
confusion which arose from this unbusinesslike proceeding was almost unbelievabl:'
and must have been heartbreaking, in view of the urgent need for the vessels. Cas-
were discharged up and down the bank of the river and stretched a long distance. 1:
find a particular piece required for the completion of any particular barge, tug, or steam:
was almost hopeless. |
To sum up :—
(1) The paddle steamers sent were unhandy and otherwise unsuitable.
(2) The square-ended barges proved a complete failure. |
(3) Arrangements for erection of craft were altogether adequate.
(4) Sections sent were too heavy for the local facilities. |
(5) Lists of the contents of packages were not sent.
(6) Necessary erection plans and drawings were not forthcoming. |
More inept proceedings than those connected with the purchase and shipment ¢:
river craft in England in 1915 and early in 1916 would be hard to find. |
It is difficult for us, owing to the divided organisation of the India Office, to exactl*
apportion personal blame for this series of blunders, which were not only costly but alse.
caused regrettable delay. The Director-General of Stores apparently acted upon the
advice of Sir John Biles in allowing the specifications of the steamers and barges to be
altered. His action in other matters was unbusiness-like. ,

Erection and Repair Shops.

Port of Basra.

_ 40. The workshops and slips which existed in Mesopotamia on the outbreak of war were
naturally of small size and quite unfitted to cope with the erection and repair of the large
fleet of river craft required by the Expeditionary Force. So far as normal conditions
were concerned, and even with the outlook of greater trade after the War, there was nothing:
in prospect to induce the local firms largely to increase their workshops. In consequence
of arrangements with the Admiralty and India Office some extensions were undoubtedly
made, but these were far short of the needs. In our opinion, the importance of adequat:
provision of workshops, slips and docks for the erection and repair of river vessels was not
apprehended by General Nixon, the Indian Government or the India Office. The under
taking turned out to be one of great magnitude, and mvolved very large expenditure.
From incurring the latter General Nixon apparently shrank, and his demands towards th:
end of the period of his command appear to have been on too small a scale. The fact tha'!
provisions were not made at a much earlier date unfortunately greatly delayed the avail
ability for service of river craft—old and new. After the War Office took control durin;
1916, the matter was comprehensively taken in hand. Since that time over 7,000 tons
plant for workshops have been sent from England, and large numbers of skilled mechanic:
from England, India and elsewhere.

41. Up to October, 1914, Basra was a comparatively small commercial port, at which
the arrival of two or three steamers was a full weekly allowance. Owing to a bar at Fao,
only vessels drawing not more than 18 to 19 feet can reach Basra. It was largely a port of
transit for Baghdad and other places up the river, to and from which cargo was conveyed
by Messrs. Lynch Bros.’ steamers or by mahailas. The equipment of the port was primitive
and barely in keeping with the modest volume of its trade. There were no wharves for
ocean steamers, and the merchants’ warehouses were of small dimensions.

42, The facilities were, from the first, inadequate to cope with the needs of the Expe-
ditionary Force, and to give reasonably rapid despatch to steamers bringing supplies. As
the force grew, and as the line of communications and voyages of the river steamers
lengthened, congestion at the port became greater. Administration of the port,
direction of the mooring of shipping, provision of lighters or mahailas, and discharge of
cargo overside, were placed in the hands of an officer of the Royal Indian Marine, under the
Inspector-General of Communications. Reception of cargo ashore was in the hands of
various military authorities, who each had their depéts, such as Supplies and Transport,

PART I[X.—TRANSPORT. 55

A. SHORTAGE oF River TRANSPORT.

Ordnance, Medical, &c. When traffic grew, accommodation for receiving and storing
cargo ashore proved more and more inadequate. Most of the land round Basra was
subject to flooding at the period of high river, but it was not covered deeply, and if foun-
dations were raised, or the water kept out by earth dykes, stores were free from risk of
damage. After struggling with congestion at Basra, a decision was ultimately come to
late in 1915 to handle a portion of the traffic at Magill, situated about 5 miles above Basra.
Here the depth of water permitted ocean steamers to come close in to the bank. By the
aid of moored mahailas and planks, improvised landing stages were constructed, across
which cargo could be carried from ocean steamers to the stores. At a later date,
December, 1915—it was decided to construct proper wharves and otherwise improve the
facilities of the port. These improvements were in progress during the whole of 1916. We
have been informed that delays to steamers were at first occasioned, not so much by. inability
to get cargo out and placed in lighters or mahailas, as by inability or unwillingness of the
military departments ashore to receive it with sufficient rapidity. It 1s clear that manage-
ment of the traffic of a port and discharge of cargo was not work to which officers of the
Royal Indian Marine had previously been accustomed. They found themselves at Basra
with a task on hand of which they had had no experience, with an inadequate and inex-
perienced staff, shortage of labour, a port where the facilities ashore were of the most
meagre description, and where traffic was constantly increasing and congestion becoming
greater. We are told that at one time there were 40 steamers waiting to discharge, and
that they lay in a line 8 miles long up and down the river. Small wonder that arrange-
ments broke down, despite the willing efforts of the officer in charge. Much of the difficulty
could have been avoided, in our opinion, if, from the first, someone accustomed to traffic
management of a commercial port, and the handling of _— had been appointed to
assist. Men with these qualifications were known to be employed in one or other of the
great Indian and Burmese river ports. Their advice was not asked for; and their assist-
ance was not utilised until more than a year after the landing of the Expedition in
Mesopotamia when conditions at Basra had become serious.

43. In the words of General Davison : —

I doubt whether the training of Royal Indian Marine officers specially fits them for high administrative
- appointments or the control of so big a charge as we have here (Basra). It demands the training of a shipping
_ expert, with large commercial experience, or a traffic expert, such as the Manager of a big railway.

As some indication of the volume of traffic handled at that period, we have been
: informed that the number of troops and followers disembarked in Mesopotamia in the four
* months December Ist, 1915, to March 31st, 1916, was :—

: Personnel, number... pe = we .. 129.500
: Animals és “3 - ~ a .. 33,000
: Vehicles i ‘c a ax Sa ae 4,100
Cargo, tons... 2 oe ine .. 71,500

. While officers of the Royal Indian Marine were struggling with conditions at the port of
Basra, which were, in our opinion, beyond their powers, we cannot omit to notice that the
general organisation of traffic was under the Inspector-General of Communications, who

from April, 1915, to April, 1916 was General Davison. He was also responsible for

matters connected with improvement of the port, such as the building of additional ware-

' houses or the provision of additional wharfage.

44, General Gorringe stated in this connection :—

I have no doubt that great improvements could and should have been effected during the first 12 months,
and so on in proportion afterwards. There was reluctance to spend money on improvements which would
at all partake of a permanent character. No improvement in the unloading wharves for ships was made

. until December, 1915, when the reinforcements of two divisions were coming out. Then, and not till then,

_ Was that taken in hand. That is to say, that as long as we had only two divisions there, although the

_ accommodation was bad and congested for stores of every kind being unloaded, no attempt was made to improve

the facilities for unloading until the latter part of December, 1915, beyond making temporary stages and so
On. There was no building of new wharves.

We think the criticism implied is justified, and that General Davison did not show
— prescience and enterprise which the situation demanded, especially during the second
all of 1915.

56 PART IX.—TRANSPORT.

A. SHORTAGE OF RIVER TRANSPORT.

45. In January, 1916, the Government of India sent Sir George Buchanan, a civilian
who had been in charge of the Port of Rangoon, with a view to his becoming Director-
General of the Port of Basra, and reorganising the traffic and facilities of the port. He
did not receive any formal or definite appointment indicating the position he was to hol
or specifying his duty, though a titular designation was given to him, viz., that o

_ Director-General of Port Administration and River Conservancy. It was, unfortunately,
left to Sir John Nixon to arrange with Sir George Buchanan, after his arrival, exactl:|
what the duties of the position were to be. Differences naturally ensued. Sir Georg:
Buchanan’s powers were so limited by Sir John Nixon, that the former considered h:
services were not put to their proper use. After a short stay he returned to India. Mea.
time his report on the conditions as he found them on arrival at Basra was communicate:
to Simla. In this he makes the following observations :—

I found it difficult to realise that we had been in occupation of Basra for a year, as the arrangemen:'
for the landing and storing of goods and stores of every description were of the most primitive order, an:
in the absence of roads, the whole area was a huge quagmire. To a new-comer appearances were such ths
troops and stores might have been landed, for the first time, the previous week. . . . The militar
expedition to Basra is, I believe, unique, inasmuch as in no previous case has such an enormous force be:
landed and maintained without an adequately prepared base.

46. About the middle of 1916 Sir George Buchanan returned to Basra, the port an:
trafic management was radically reorganised, and Sir George Buchanan was placed in
full control. Since that time and since the War Office took over the charge and responrisi-
bility of the expedition, energy has been shown in building wharves, increasing
the facilities, and generally making the port more capable of meeting the growing
demands upon it. But these operations mean heavy expenditure and take time.
Much of the material required had to be manufactured in England or the United
States ; consequently it is not surprising that the improvement visible during 1916 was
not more rapid. We find, however, that there has been marked and consistent improve-
ment during the period June to December, 1916. We have been supplied with statements
showing the time occupied by vessels bringing supplies for the Expeditionary Force from
the time of their crossing the bar at Fao, inward bound, until they, having completed their
discharge, passed outwards. It appears that the average number of days in port of each
ship bringing supplies to Basra was—

ems ee ee

Average number of

Month. Days in Port of Vessels
bringing Supplies.
July... ons oes se ses 39
August ee a sis -~ 23
September aia eg sh is 26
October re ee sis ai 24
November ee we si oe 20
December ~ dis vei ee 20

47. From the full statement given to us it appears that while the number of ships
bringing supplies increased threefold during the six months, the number of days in port,
as above shown, had considerably diminished. The improvement is manifest and com-
mendable. It cannot, however, be considered that 20 days in port is a satisfactory rate
of discharge. With ample lighterage, wharfage and labour, despite the bad climate, it
should be possible to reduce the detention by another 10 days, and every effort should
be made to accomplish this. A reduction of a further 10 days on the number of steamers
now arriving per month with cargo would save the country over £600,000 per annum.

River Hospital Steamers.

48. Karly in the Mesopotamia campaign when operations were on a minor scale and not
very far from tidal water, there seems to have been no thought of special river hospital
steamers. ‘The need had not then been felt and was not foreseen. In February, 1915, 4
hospital barge, the “‘ Bengali,” was offered by Bengal and accepted, but foundered on the
voyage. Replacement was not asked for. Between February and August, 1915, various
communications passed between Mesopotamia and India concerning motor launches and

PART IX.—TRANSPORT. 57

A. SHORTAGE OF RIVER TRANSPORT.

on Ny

_~
Ne

tugs to tow native boats called mahailas for removing sick and wounded. These arrange-

ments concerned local or short-distance transport only. Sick and wounded were brought
down river on steamers and barges which had taken up troops, animals or supplies. On
August 13th, 1915, a special hospital steamer is mentioned for the first time. On that
date Surgeon-General Hathaway made application to the Inspector-General of Communica-
tions at Basra for a steamer to be set apart and fitted for conveyance of sick and wounded,
or alternatively a tug and two mahailas. The steamer and tug were refused on the ground
that all were required for movement of troops and supplies, and Surgeon-General Hathaway
did not carry the matter any. further. Except some telegrams offering motor launches
nothing further occurred until November 23rd, when India asked Mesopotamia if evacuation
rom the front was satisfactory, adding :

“There should be a well equipped fleet of boats or steamers on the lines of a hospital ship to be used
exclusively for the transport of sick. Have you any suggestion to make? Wire what you require.”’

On December 7th Surgeon-General Hathaway replied approving the suggestion. On
December 10th he telegraphed that local experience favoured steamers with independent
paddles, towing a barge on each side. On December 31st India cabled London that four
river hospital steamers would require to be built, and that plans were being sent. On
March Ist it was finally settled that two should be built in England and two in Calcutta.
Meantime India decided to improvise in addition several hospital steamers, and fit up barges
from amongst those obtainable in India. The first hospital steamer on the river, the stern-
wheel steamer “‘ Sikkim,” with accommodation for 144 cot cases, arrived at Basra about
the middle of March, 1916—one year and five months after the campaign commenced,
and three to four months after the battle of Ctesiphon, in which there were over 3,500
wounded. Owing, no doubt, to the complaints of what had happened at Ctesiphon,
which were now spreading, the Indian Government during the first half of 1916, and the
War Office after they took charge of the campaign during the second half, supplemented
the provision largely. There were on March Ist, 1917, eight hospital steamers in Mesopo-
tamia, four on the way, and twenty-nine on order, besides several specially fitted barges.
It is manifest from this bare statement of the present position that the provision of hospital
steamers was taken in hand much too late.

49. The awful sufferings of some of the sick and wounded during 1915 and the earlier
part of 1916 caused by want of river hospital steamers have been referred to at length in
another part of our Report.* Consideration of the evidence as to the causes of this want
leads us to the following conclusions: General Nixon was responsible for advancing without
sufficient river transport to meet all needs, which in turn involved inability to set aside
special steamers to be fitted for hospital use. The outstanding importance of having such
steamers before advancing does not appear to have been sufficiently realised by Surgeon-
General Hathaway, or, if realised, was not impressed by him, as it should have been,
upon General Nixon. Surgeon-General Hathaway showed little foresight ; even his small
request of August 13th, 1915, for an improvised Hospital steamer or tug was not urged
persistently or with sufficient emphasis. He never suggested building special hospital
steamers. The suggestion came eventually from India. He failed to grasp the require-
ments of the situation. In the matter of river hospital transport the Commander-in-Chief
in India showed solicitude and initiative, although too late. The absence of requests
for hospital steamers from Surgeon-General Hathaway naturally prevented anxiety for
a time.

50. Execution of orders for hospital transport was far from satisfactory. Mesopotamia
had, after much insistence made it plain that steamers with independent paddles, towing a
steel barge abreast on either side were the only vessels entirely suitable for the river. Never-
theless, stern-wheel steamers were sent which could not manceuvre with barges coming down
stream at the narrow hair-pin corners. A number of the barges sent were built of wood
and as they crushed in on collision with the banks, had to be replaced. The hospital steamers
ordered in England were twin screw instead of independent paddles, as desired. The onus
of making these deviations rests with the Director of the Royal Indian Marine at
Bombay. It is difficult to find excuse for them, especially as there had been a similar
experience with ordinary river craft a few months before. It always seemed that the
Director thought he knew what was required better than those on the spot. Waste
of money and delay were thus incurred.

* See Part X., paras. 57-63.
(C 48—176 H

58 PART IX.—TRANSPORT.

B. RAILWAYS.

51. We have already considered the manner in which the Indian Government
dealt with inland communications by water. We now turn to the question of com-
munications by rail. In August, 1916, Sir William Robertson, the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, informed the Committee of Imperial Defence: ‘‘ As regards
the question of communications the Committee is aware that India declined to
sanction certain proposals for railway construction, and that in general operations were
allowed in 1915 to develop without proper regard to the vital questions of supply and
maintenance.” The justice of this criticism on the Indian Government became apparent
to us when we ascertained that two applications from the General Officer Commanding
in Mesopotamia had been made to the Indian Government for the building of railways,
that on each occasion the application was based either on the grounds of improving supplies
or communications, and that on each occasion the application was not agreed to by the
Indian Government.

52. The first mention of the desirability of a railway in Mesopotamia was made by
General Barrett, then General Officer Commanding the Expedition, on February 28th,
1915. He wired to India :—

I consider that the best solution for any advance towards Nasariyeh or even one or two marches beyond
Shaiba would be a light railway. Once Nasiriyeh was reached, tle railway would be much used for moving
produce to and from Basrah. Thus, if it were once constructed, it would not only solve our supply difficulty,
but would also tend towards pacifying the country.

In a subsequent telegram General Barrett explained that he had asked for the railway
because he found it impossible otherwise to move any force larger than one brigade across
the desert. On March 13th he sent in particulars of the route which he suggested the
railway should follow, and added, ‘‘ 1 recommend that personnel and material should be
in Basra by May at latest, as I think it important that work should begin as soon as floods
subside.” So far as we can ascertain no action appears to have been taken by the Indian
Government on this application, except that they instructed Sir John Nixon (who succeeded
General Barrett in April, 1915) to report on the aaa of the employment of a light
railway of which material for 137 miles was available in India. The Indian Government
apparently did not attach importance to General Barrett’s recommendation, although it
was put forward on the military grounds of the desirability of facilitating supplies and com-
munications and increasing the mobility of the force.

53. Owing to the flooded state of the country and other reasons into which it is not
necessary to enter, it was not till the beginning of August, 1915, that Sir J. Nixon raised
the question of railways with the Indian Government.

On August 2nd, 1915, he telegraphed to the Chief of the General Staff in India askin
for particulars as to the 137 miles of light railway understood to be available. He aske
if it was the railway—said to be very indifferent—which had been used at the Coronation
Durbar.

He also wrote to tell the Chief of the General Staff that he did not want that material,
but that he did want a railway. On August 11th, 1915, the Chief of the General Staff
wrote to him that he had backed up his request for a railway, and had proposed standard
light 2-ft. 6-in. material used by the North-Western Railway, and not the light military
(Durbar) line. .

On August 14th Sir J. Nixon forwarded to India a long despatch, supported by
memoranda from his technical officers, in which he asked for a railway from Basra to
Nasariyeh on (1) military, (2) political, and (3) commercial grounds. The military grounds
were principally the necessity for quick communication between Basra and Nasariyeh.
General Nixon added a demand for a suitable staff to carry out the preliminary work
in October, and concluded—

Finally it is most desirable that the general policy, as regards the railway, which I strongly recommend
as necessary, shall be determined as early as possible and a decision communicated. Next cold weather,
November to March inclusive, should be availed of to the fullest extent not only in preliminary investigation
but in actual construction.

54. General Nixou.’s despatch reached Headquarters in India on August 25th, but as
he had received no reply to it by October 24th, he then wired to India asking how the
question of railway construction in Mesopotamia stood. He was informed on October 30th
that the matter was still “under the consideration of the Government.” A further
reminder from General Nixon on November Ist at length produced a reply from the Chief
of the General Staff, Delhi, on November 14th, that “for the present the Government

PART I[X.—TRANSPORT. 59

B. RAILways.

have decided not to proceed with the construction of the railway, on the ground of expense.”
Thus the Government of India’s decision on Sir J. Nixon’s application for a railway was
not given until nearly three months after they had received his despatch asking for an
early determination of the matter.

55. We have been unable to ascertain definitely the reason for this delay on the part
of the Indian Government in dealing with so important an application from the General
Officer Commanding the Mesopotamia Expedition. As the proposal involved considerable
expenditure it was submitted to the Finance Department of the Government of India,
but was not formally considered by Sir William Meyer, the Finance Member, until October
5th, when he forwarded to the Army Department the following note :—

‘1, I confess to being somewhat sceptical as to the line being at all so remunerative as is at present
represented, at any rate for some time to come. Apart from this too, it is perfectly clear that, in present
financial circumstances, with which His Excellency the Army Member is acquainted, we cannot embark on
large expenditure on such a project for other than the most urgent military reasons. We have already had
to cut our coming railway programme in India to the quick, and may have to adopt other drastic measures
to make both ends meet. Further, we have at present no right to act as if we were certain of getting
Mesopotamia or a very considerable portion of it, after the war.

2. If, however, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and Army Member can definitely assure me
that this project is absolutely necessary for the safeguarding of our military position, having regard, inter
alia, to the time which the line must take to construct, I cannot, of course, resist a reference home on this
basis. (In regard to the time factor, it must be borne in mind that, although the Railway Board think that
the line might be built in from 6 to 8 months, we know from past experience that the best provisional estimates
of this character are liable to get considerably exceeded in practice.) In that event it will be necessary, as
Mr. Fell says, to indicate to the Secretary of State that the cost, as a military measure, must, under present
arrangements, fall on the Home Government.

3. We should not, of course, in the telegram say anything about the contingency which Mr. Fell
adumbrates, and which I think not at all improbable, of our having eventually to pay the full cost of the
Mesopotamia operations, or at any rate a very large part of it. But this contingency adds to the necessity
for caution in proposing expenditure which may ultimately fall upon India.

4. His Excellency the Viceroy should of course see before final action is taken.”

56. On receipt of this note the Commander-in-Chief discussed the question with
Sir Percy Lake, the Chief of the General Staff, who put forward a memorandum on
October 26th generally favourable to Sir John Nixon’s proposal, and in the last
paragraph of which he said—

It would be imprudent, to say the least of it, not to refer this proposal to the Secretary of State and
the Cabinet, upon whose decision would then depend the ultimate responsibility for our capacity to hold
Mesopotamia, a problem in which the security of Nasariyeh is an essential factor.

Sir Beauchamp Duff’s decision on this memorandum was conveyed in the following
note :—
“His Excellency considers that when the occupation of Baghdad and the reinforcement of Sir J. Nixon’s

ane = taken place the necessity for the immediate construction of a railway to Nasariyeh will have largely
ost its force.”’

57. The full grounds upon which the Government of India rejected the proposal are
stated in a telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated July 24th, 1916,
to have been as follows:— '

Basrah-Nasariyeh Railway.—The proposal to construct this line was put forward by General Nixon
on military, political and commercial grounds. The large expenditure involved could not in our opinion
be justified on either political or commercial consideration. We had not acquired the status in Mesopotamia
which would justify such a charge upon Indian resources nor had we the right to act as if we were sure of
retaining Mesopotamia or a large portion of it after the war. We had to consider whether the project was
absolutely necessary for the safeguarding of our military position before we could recommend the construction
of the line as a definite war measure, the cost of which would fall on the Imperial Government. Having
regard to the facts that sanction had recently been accorded to the advance on Baghdad, which would, we
hoped, attain its objective, in which case the Basra-Nasariyeh line would cease to be essential from the military
point of view owing to our command of the Euphrates line, and after weighing the various considerations
we arrived at the conclusion that the necessity for the immediate construction of a railway to Nasiriyah had
to a great extent lost its force and that the advantages to be gained would not be commensurate with the
cost of its construction. We therefore decided not to recommend the proposal and informed you accordingly,
vide paragraph 3 of Lord Hardinge’s telegram of the 14th November last, No. H.-9125. The various considera-
tions which influenced our decision were not, however, fully stated in that telegrams.

We do not ourselves feel called upon to criticise the military arguments in this
telegram, but we cannot help noting that when the War Office took control of the opera-
tions, they pressed for and ultimately built this railway preliminarily to the second advance
on Baghdad.

(C 48—176) H 2

60 | PART IX.—TRANSPORT.

B. RAILWAYS.

58. Moreover, if military considerations really entered so largely into the Indian Govern-
ment’s decision to refuse the railway, it was most unfortunate that both the Home
Government and Sir John Nixon were, at the time, informed that the railway was refused
on the ground of expense. This aspect of the matter is well brought out by Sir J. Nixon,
who says—

The difficulties of the Hammar Lake crossing were known in India, the extreme heat prevailing in
the summer was known in India, the discomfort and suffering not only to the wounded but to fit men was

known in India, and this proposal was rejected on the score of expense. This single instance seems to me
to disprove the claim that the Finance Department has not exerted a sinister influence on the operations.

The refusal of the railway and the terms in which the refusal was announced were
in fact bound to create the impression that the Indian Government were unwilling, in the
interests of economy, to provide Mesopotamia with what was desirable in the interests
of the troops.

Our conclusion is that the railway was refused because Sir Beauchamp Duff did not
agree with Sir John Nixon’s estimate of its military necessity and, apart from an assurance
from the Commander-in-Chief that the railway was absolutely necessary on military
grounds, the Indian Government were not prepared even to put the proposal before the
Secretary of State, because they were afraid that the expenditure might ultimately fall
upon India.

59. In January, 1916, Sir Percy Lake (the author of the memorandum of October 26th
in favour of the railway from Basra to Nasariyeh) had succeeded Sir John Nixon in com-
mand of the Mesopotamia Expedition. Sir Percy Lake was apparently so much impressed
with the finality of the Indian Government’s decision not to sanction the building of
railways in Mesopotamia that he did not raise the matter until April, 1916, when specifically
asked to do so by the War Office, who in the meantime had taken over from the India
Office the control of military operations. Ultimately two railways were decided on in
Mesopotamia, but it was not until the War Office took over the administration in addition to
the control of the campaign in July, 1916, that the railways were really pressed forward with
the vigour which the situation demanded. We think it would be inadvisable to go into
details as to the exact position of the railway question at the present time, but we are
satisfied that the War Office have taken and are taking all the steps which are
necessary.

60. It is interesting to note that the cost of all the railways now being built in Mesopo-
tamia is, according to the estimates, less than the cost of the river craft, and that if the
railways had been authorised at an early date a portion of the river craft might have been
unnecessary. Moreover, while it has required from one year to eighteen months to obtain
specially built steamers, the railways have been completed in eight to nine months.

From this brief history of the railway question in Mesopotamia it is obvious that
the Indian Government never paid to this vital matter the attention which the War Office
considered so essential directly they became responsible for the military operations.

61. Although the railway from Basra to Nasariyeh was strongly recommended by
General Barrett on February 28th, 1915, and by General Nigon on August 14th, 1915,
the proposal was dealt with in a dilatory manner by the Indian Government, and was
negatived by them in November, 1915, on the ground that it did not justify the expenditure
involved. It was only when asked for by the third General Officer Commanding the
expedition, General Lake, and under pressure from the War Office in April, 1916, that the
Indian Government assented to the proposal, and awoke to the necessity of railways for
the expedition. We feel that a grave responsibility attaches to the Indian Government for
their failure to realise at an earlier date the importance of an energetic railway policy in
Mesopotamia.

CONCLUSIONS AS TO TRANSPORT.

62. The enquiries we have made, and the evidence, both oral and documentary, which
we have taken in this part of our investigation, lead us to the following conclusions
regarding the critical period up to April, 1916 :—

(2) From the first the paramount importance both of river and railway transport in
Mesopotamia was insufficiently realised by the Military Authorities in India.

PART IX.—TRANSPORT. 61

CONCLUSIONS AS TO TRANSPORT.

(6) A deficiency of river transport existed from the time the army left tidal water and
advanced up river from Kurna. This deficiency became very serious as the lines of
communication lengthened and the numbers of the force increased.

(d) Kor want of comprehensive grasp of the transport situation, and insufficiency of
river steamers, we find the Military Authorities in India are responsible. The responsi-
bility is a grave one.

(e) River hospital steamers were an urgent requirement for the proper equipment of
the Expedition, and were not ordered until much too late.

(f) With General Sir John Nixon rests the responsibility for recommending the advances
in 1915 with insufficient transport and equipment. The evidence did not disclose an
imperative need to advance without due preparation. For what ensued from shortage of
steamers, General Sir John Nixon must, in such circumstances, be held to blame. The
extent of his responsibility in relation to the sufferings of the wounded is considered in
Part X. of our Report and in Part XII., paragraph 17.

(g) During the first four months of 1916, the shortage of transport was fatal to the
operations undertaken for the relief of Kut. Large reinforcements could not be moved
to the front in time to take part in critical battles. Based upon information received
from General Townshend, as to the urgent necessity for his immediate relief, operations
were undertaken, notwithstanding the extreme transport difficulty, but in all the circum-
stances we do not attach blame for this to the Generals in Mesopotamia directing the
operations.

(h) Facilities for the discharge and handling of cargo at Basra, also provision of works
for the erection and repair of river craft were hopelessly inadequate.

(7) Proceedings in connection with the filling of orders for river craft by the Director
of the Royal Indian Marine in India, and the India Office in London, were far from
satisfactory.

(k) Looking at the facts, which from the first must have been apparent to any adminis-
trator, military or civilian, who gave a few minutes consideration to the map, and to th
conditions in Mesopotamia, the want of foresight and provision for the most fundamental
needs of the Expedition reflects discredit upon the organising aptitude of all the authorities
concerned. General Sir William Robertson, Chief of the General Staff, Whitehall, in a
document to which we have already referred, states: “In general, the operations
were allowed in 1915 to develop without proper regard to the vital questions of supply
and maintenance,” in which opinion our investigations lead us unreservedly to concur.

C. Royvat INDIAN MARINE.

63. It is not easy to describe with anything like precision the status and functions
of the Royal Indian Marine Department. It is enough here to say that its position 1s not
considered satisfactory by its present Director, nor by the late Secretary of State for India,
Lord Crewe. The latter indeed informed us that he had been so impressed by the unsatis-
factory position of the Marine Department that he had in contemplation changes in it
when the War broke out.

64. The external communications of India have always been and still are sea-
communications. No reinforcement from outside and no replenishing of military stores
not produced in the country can reach India except by sea. It is evident that what may
be called the maritime or marine side of the Indian Government should be strong, whereas
it 18 admitted to be, and undeniably is, weak. This it will continue to be until a change
is made in the status of the Marine Department.

65. In earlier days there was a regular Indian Navy, the officers and seamen of which
were Kuropeans, the Marines—who were carried in the larger ships—being native Sepoys.
This force was under the Bombay Government, and was called the Bombay Marine until
the reign of William IV., who ordered it to be re-named the Indian Navy. Its reputation
in both war and peace was high. Its headquarters were at Bombay. It remained in
existence for some few years after the assumption of the Government of India by the Crown,
and was then abolished.

62 PART IX.—TRANSPORT.

C. Royvat InpIAN Marine.

66. After an interval the Royal Indian Marine Department was created. It was not
a naval force in the real meaning of the term. It was largely occupied in transport work,
the movement of troops by sea. Its headquarters were fixed at Bombay, certainly the
most suitable place for them. Some of the officers of the Department were detailed for
duty at great Indian seaports, and worked under the local Governments. These officers
do ay deal with the traffic or with the loading, unloading, or quick despatch of commercial
vessels,

67. The Royal Indian Marine Department is under the Army Department at the centre
of the Government, and gets orders from it. At the same time the Royal Indian Marine
Department sometimes gets orders from the Quartermaster General, who is a member, 80
to speak, of the Commander-in-Chief’s Department. Occasionally also the Royal Indian
Marine receives something very like instructions from the Indian General Staff. There
seem, therefore, to be in effect three sources from which orders to the Director, Royal
Indian Marine, emanate. The Military Secretary to the Government of India in
the Army Department, when sending communications to the Director Royal Indian
Marine, heads them “ Marine Department,”’ and these two words are the only indication
that the Central Government in India has any direct connection with maritime affairs.
There is no one at the seat of Administration with nautical experience or knowledge.
The Director of the Royal Indian Marine was not granted—at any rate did not exercise—
any Initiative in maritime or nautical matters. He had, in his own words, to wait until
he was told what was wanted.

68. The time of the Director and Senior Officers of the Indian Marine is much taken
up with mere office or desk work. The amount of writing which they have to get through
—or at all events do get through—can only be described as enormous. This involves
intolerably long hours of work in an office when open-air activity and supervision are
of much greater importance. Much of the writing work requires no maritime experience
or nautical knowledge, both of which are often necessary in the case of open-air supervision
when a great war is 1n progress.

69. The Director of the Royal Indian Marine gave to the Commission a list of the
duties, the discharge of which he considered rendered it impossible for him to visit Mesopo-
tamia and see for himself the actual state of things there. Most of the duties specified
required neither maritime experience nor nautical knowledge, and could have been performed
by any alert business man, even though he may have never been on blue water in his life.

We feel strongly that the Royal Indian Marine Department requires reorganisation
with a view to giving its Director a higher status and a staff adequate to his work.

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAK-DOWN. | 63

A. THE VINCENT-BINGLEY REPORT AND ITS PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS.

1. We have already referred to the fact that our labours as regards the Medical arrange-
ments for the campaign have been very greatly facilitated by the report of the Commission
appointed by the Government of India, of which Sir Wiliam Vincent was the Chairman,
and Major-General Bingley, and Mr. E. A. Ridsdale were the members. We desire to
acknowledge the thoroughness of their enquiry, and the proved accuracy of their account
of the facts. It is a somewhat novel occurrence that the report of one Commission should
by force of circumstances come under the immediate review of another, before whom
those found wanting by the first Commission get the opportunity of criticising and replying
to the condemnation passed upon them. We think Sir William Vincent and his colleagues
are to be congratulated on the fact that practically none of their main conclusions are
impugned ; they are certainly not disproved. The vast majority of them, stated as they
are with studious moderation, are admitted.

2. Sir Alfred Keogh indeed drew attention to the fact that the non-inclusion of a doctor
on the Commission was doubtless responsible for a technical error as regards the numbers
fixed for medical officers and medical subordinates in certain hospitals, which had led -
the Commissioners somewhat to over-estimate the paucity of doctors in the cases in ques-
tion ; the attention of the Commissioners had not been drawn to the fact that the authorised
establishment of General Hospitals includes an allowance to enable casualties in action
amongst medical officers to be instantly replaced. This small technical error does not,
however, we are satisfied, vitiate the Commissioners’ conclusions as to the undoubted short-
age of medical personnel. We should add that Sir Alfred Keogh, speaking generally,
said, “‘ I think it is a good report.” |

3. Again, the Commissioners, speaking of the effect of the arrival of the 3rd and
7th Divisions from France, on the medical breakdown of January, 1916, say: “‘ The
medical establishment of the force was insufficient, before the arrival of these two Divisions,
and this deficiency was accentuated by the fact that they were despatched from France
in advance of their medical units.’’ The evidence before us shows that the 7th Division
fought in January, without the presence at the front of its own proper Field Ambulances.
But as regards the 3rd Division, a letter from Major-General Keary, who commanded the
Division, has been put before us which states :—

It is clear that two out of five Field Ambulances of the 3rd Division were concentrated complete with all
personnel and equipment at the front by January 19th, and were fully utilised in the fighting which took place
on January 19th, 20th and 21st. At this time only three battalions, and one double company of the 3rd Division
proper had arrived at the front.

The facts stated in this letter are supported by other evidence before us, and the obvious
effect of this evidence is to increase the proportion of the blame attributable to the authori-
ties in Mesopotamia for the breakdown in January. In the case of the 7th Division we
do not attach blame to the British Military Authorities in France, who embarked the two
Divisions at Marseilles in the belief that they would be disembarked and reorganised
In Egypt. But this reorganisation did not take place, because later it was decided by
the War Office to hasten their arrival at Basra.

4. We think itis remarkable that the conclusions of an enquiry of this nature and scope
should, after almost meticulous examination, be only found liable to criticism in such
obviously detailed matters. That these two cases should stand almost alone is an eloquent
tribute to the value of the public service rendered by the Commissioners in their Report.
Of course, there are points on which those censured differ from the Commission. In any
case where the further evidence put before us seems to demand a qualification of the
Commissioners’ views, we have embodied that qualification in subsequent paragraphs
of this part of our Report.

5. Accepting therefore, the value and importance of the report of Sir William Vincent’s
Ommission (usually known as the Vincent-Bingley Commission, owing to the fact that
x W. Vincent, and General Bingley were the two original members of it), we have printed

the Report itself in this volume,* together with a memorandum by Sir Beauchamp Dui,

Commander-in-Chief in India, criticising the procedure of the Vincent-Bingley Commission.

Oa a
* See Appendix I

Hospital River Steamers.

Medical Personnel and Equipment.

Hospitals.
11. As to hospitals, the Report says :—
From the date [early in 1915] on which the 2nd Division came to Mesopotamia, the general hospite
accommodation was insufficient for the needs of the force. :
There has been a consistent shortage in the personnel necessary to treat the number of sick and wounded.
The deficiencies in Stationary and Clearing Hospitals have been equally great.
Land Transport. .

64 PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

A. THE VINCENT-BINGLEY REPORT AND ITS PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS.

We wish now to draw attention to the comments which the Commissioners mad
upon the following subjects.

6. They state that :—

The absence of any river steamers equipped for the transport of sick and wounded, and of any separat
medical establishment for such vessels, . . . . has had more prejudicial results than almost any other defe:
in the organisation. It has constantly delayed evacuation, dislocated medical arrangements, and caus
great suffering and injury. So long as the operations were confined to the immediate vicinity of Basra the
was no need for any such transport, but directly columns advanced up the Tigris, Euphrates and Karun, t:
necessity of some means of speedily evacuating the sick and wounded by water became apparent.

They add later :—

We are indeed forced to the conclusion that the necessity for an adequate provision of this kind .
transport was overlooked both in India and in Mesopotamia, until the sufferings of the wounded in Ctesiph:
made it apparent that some systematic steps must be taken to remedy the deficiency.

7. It is fair to say by way of comment on this that on November 23rd, 1915—that :
before the battle of Ctesiphon concluded—a telegram was despatched from Army Heac
quarters, India, to Basra, pointing out the desirability of organising a fleet of Hospiti
River Steamers on the Tigris, but such an intimation came too late to be of any practici.
value, in meeting or easing the sufferings of those who were wounded in this battle, and u:
the retreat which followed immediately afterwards. Even acceptance from private donor
of a hospital river barge, the ‘‘ Bengali,” in February, 1915, had failed to bring home t:
the responsible authorities the necessity for providing special river accommodation for the
sick and wounded. On the loss of this barge on her way to Mesopotamia, nothing adequate
was done to replace her. Surgeon-General Hathaway, who in April, 1915, became Principal
Medical Officer in Mesopotamia, was, until August, 1915, of opinion that tugs and special
fitted ‘‘ mahailahs ” would be an efficient substitute, an opinion in which we do not concur.

8. We have stated our views at greater length in another part of our report* upon this
subject of hospital river steamers, and therefore need not elaborate the point here, beyond/:
pointing out that the use of the ordinary transport steamer which takes troops or supplies}
up the river can never provide a satisfactory means of bringing the sick and wounded down):
on the return journey. The sick and wounded require special fittings and appliances,
and a crowded steamer going up with troops or supplies cannot find room for the storag
of such things.

9. The Commissioners say :—

Another difficulty of the first magnitude has been the inadequacy of medical personnel and equipmet'
. » . There was in our opinion no reason to think that the ordinary scale of medical units, as laid down &
“War Establishments, India,” would not be needed. Experience has indeed shown that, if anything, thi
standard requires to be increased.

10. Our evidence shows that the organisation orders of Force “ D” contemplated
lower establishment than is laid down for a frontier campaign and that the actual amount}.
of medical personnel in Mesopotamia was during long periods far below even this meagrt}
scale. But even had the full authorised establishment been provided and proved insutt:
cient, the blame for such insufficiency would rest on the medical authorities in Indi,
as medical establishments are not fixed by immutable laws, but according to the highet
military authorities’ estimate of what will actually be required on active service.

12. The Commissioners speak of “ the failure throughout the campaign to provide |
land ambulance transport for the wounded.” They proceed “we consider this matter 0 |
be one of great moment, as it is proved that the defect has been the cause of intense suffering,
and must have prejudiced the chances of recovery in certain cases.”

* See Part [X., paras 48-50.

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 65

A. Tue VINcENT-BINGLEY REPORT AND ITS PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS.

Land Transport (conclusion).

The original organisation orders of Indian Expeditionary Force “‘ D ” did not include any wheeled transport
for the sick and wounded. According to ‘‘ War Establishments, India,’ each field ambulance should have
been accompanied by 8 ambulance tongas, in lieu of which the original orders for this force allotted an additional
number of riding mules.

We have no evidence that these riding mules were ever used by the wounded, though

their presence on one occasion in a very restive state is recorded by a witness. They
are obviously useless for serious cases.

13. The Commissioners continue :—

The omission to send wheeled transport was probably due to the fact that operations for some time were
likely to be confined to the immediate neighbourhood of the Shatt-el-Arab. The history of the campaign
shows, however, that very shortly after the capture of Basra the operations extended to a considerable distance
from any river, and no satisfactory reason has been assigned for the failure to provide the ordinary form of
land ambulance transport for these operations. It is in evidence that on many occasions during the campaign
wheeled ambulances could have been employed. In fact, a few motors were used in the Ahwaz operations in
April and May, 1915, and again at Ctesiphon in November, and ambulance wagons of the English pattern were
employed with conspicuous success, to our own knowledge, in the operations up the Tigris in the beginning of
April, 1916. But throughout the campaign the usual form of ambulance transport has been the army transport
cart, that is, a small, springless cart made of wood and iron, drawn by mules or ponies, and ordinarily employed
for the carriage of supplies. When the evidence of the suffering caused by this means of conveyance, particu-
larly in cases of fracture and severe injury, is considered, it is difficult to avoid criticising the action of those
responsible for this deficiency in severe language.

We entirely concur in this view.

We have been told that one or two motor cars were at the disposal of the General
Officer Commanding after the battle of Kut, and in the advance to Ctesiphon. We feel
strongly that a country which was practicable for cars for the General Officer
Commanding was equally practicable for motor convoys for the wounded. By April,
1916, a few motor ambulances were in use at the front, and Sir Beauchamp Dufi’s evidence
is to the effect that ten were at the disposal of Force “ D.” We do not think they were
all in use at the front. On the other hand, telegrams before us show that the Turks had
twelve available at the front. We do not think it is creditable that in this matter the
provision by the Turkish Army, situated as it was, should have exceeded our own.

Medical Stores and Bauipment.
14. The arrangements for the supply of surgical and medical stores and appliances to meet the require-
ments of the various units in Mesopotamia were, up to March, 1916, unsatisfactory. In the first place the
system of supply, laid down in the Medical Manual (War), India, was ill-adapted to meet the demands of a
large force operating 1,600 miles from India overseas. In the second place, owing to lack of river transport,
there was such delay and uncertainty in the delivery of these supplies, that medical officers have frequently
been hampered in their work.
For example, in the advance to Amara there was, if we are to accept the evidence
given us, a shortage of drugs, including castor oil, epsom salts, emetine, quinine and supply
of medical comforts, and the supply of lime juice and fresh vegetables was deficient.

We ourselves are convinced by the evidence before us that, though there was never
any general shortage of drugs, dressings, etc., at Basra, yet these and similar medical
necessities were On many occasions either in insufficient quantities or altogether lacking at
the front, when the need for them was great.

15. As regards electric fans, the Commissioners say (reporting in May, 1916)—
A certain number of fans were put into the general hospitals at Basra last year, but these were not sufficient

ve all the wards, and none of the new hospitals there had up to the time of our leaving Basra been fitted with
these fans.

16. As regards ice, they say :—

_ We are informed that ice was available for all the hospitals in Basra during the hot weather of 1915, but
It certainly was not regularly available at Ahwaz, Nasariyeh or Amara, and up to the time of our departure
80 far as we are aware, Government had not supplied any ice manufacturing plant to any station outside Basra.

17. The Commissioners add :—

This is a somewhat serious matter, as ice is not a luxury, but having regard to climatic conditions, an
absolute necessary for the treatment of the sick.

and we concur.

Preventive Sanitation.
18. On the subject of water supply the Commissioners say :—
Generally speaking, however, the only source of water supply at present is the nearest river, and we are

hot satisfied that systematic and methodical attempts are made to render this water potable and innocuous
efore it is used for drinking purposes.

(C 48—176) I

66 PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

A. THe VINCENT-BINGLEY REPORT AND ITs PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS.

This refers to the state of things at the base at Basra. As regards the state of things
elsewhere we quote the following :—

On the river steamers and barges which are utilised both for the conveyance of troops and the sick, the
arrangements for the supply of good drinking water appear to us to be defective. On some of the vessels
there are no water tanks. On some the tanks supplied are useless, and on many steamers and barges there
are no arrangements for purifying the drinking water that is used by the troops.... Water supply arrange-
ments at the actual front were also, until recently, far from satisfactory. The recent outbreak of cholera is
attributed by sanitary experts to the failure to supply the troops with a sufficient amount of purified drinking
water.

The Commissioners state, however, that the failure to supply a good water supply
to the trenches was (at the time of their making their report) ‘ being rectified.”

Elsewhere in this Report reference is made to the lack of sweepers for sanitary work,
and the fact that a number of those sent out were not of the proper caste. For a con-
siderable time also the Commissioners record “ the absence of any suitable machinery for
disinfecting clothing and other articles,’ but they state that this had been recently

supplied.

19. The above are merely small quotations showing the general tenor of the report
and of the defects which it discloses in almost every branch of the arrangements for dealing
with the sick and wounded, and the health of the troops. Full appreciation of the case
presented by the Commissioners can only be attained by reading the text of their report.

20. We agree generally in the Vincent-Bingley Commission’s historical account of
the manner in which the foregoing defects affected the various phases of the campaign;
but, as regards the early period up to the summer of 1915, we have amplified that account
in other parts of this Report,* |

Advance to Amara and Nasartyeh.

21. We agree that during May, June and July, 1915, in the advance to Amara and
the operations round Nasariyeh, the first substantial lengthening of the lines of
communications, the sick and wounded suffered considerable hardships. Hospital
River Steamers had now become essential, and they were not even asked for.
The general position can perhaps be best summed up in the words of one of our witnesses,
Colonel Giffard, a senior officer of the Indian Medical Service who was in command of 4
hospital ship running between Bombay and Basra. He told us that up to June, 1913,
“there was nothing either at Basra or Bombay that could be considered a breakdown,”
but that in May, 1915, it was “ obvious to most of us medical officers, that even at Basra
the breaking strain was nearly reached.” He states that—

The patients in the hospitals at Basra were not comfortable. The heat was almost unbearable, and they
were largely housed in thatched sheds. I saw these sheds badly overcrowded, the attendants were too few,
there was hardly any ice; electric fans, although offered by the Madras Fund in December, 1914, had not been
installed, and in every way it was a poor performance.

lirst Battle of Es Sinn or Kut-el-Amara.

22. At the battle of Kut-el-Amara (September 28th, 1915), the medical arrange-
ments were not satisfactory. The Field Ambulances were insufficient and overcrowded.
The river transport used for evacuating the wounded was unsuitable. The steamers used
were insufficiently equipped. Part of the battlefield was eight miles distant from the river,
two motor cars were available, but otherwise severe cases had to be evacuated in Army
transport carts, a most inefficient substitute for motor ambulance transport or the light
pony tongas sent to Mesopotamia later. The hardships, in fact, of the wounded, who
numbered over 1,100, were considerable, though not nearly as severe as in later actions.

Battle of Ctesiphon.

23. After the battle of Ctesiphon (November 22nd, &c.) we have no hesitation in
saying there was a complete breakdown. The casualties (roughly 4,500 in 4
fighting force of 13,500) were heavily underestimated. Here again, the conclusions of
the Vincent-Bingley Commission are abundantly supported by independent evidence
submitted to us.

_* See Part X., B and,C,

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 67

A. THE VINCENT-BINGLEY REPORT AND ITS PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS.

Battle of Ctesiphon.
24, They say that—

The medical establishment available on this occasion was inadequate to meet the demands made on
it, and that the arrangements for collecting the wounded on the battlefield, and accommodating them, pending
evacuation to the river bank, were far from satisfactory. It was very difficult for wounded men to ascertain
where they had to go for medical aid, and when field ambulances and collecting stations were found, the supply
of food, tents, blankets, hot water and any kind of comfort was insufficient. Further, owing to the shortage
of medical personnel, many of the patients both in the field ambulances near the battlefield, and at the encamp-
ments by the river bank, did not receive proper treatment. There was some delay in evacuating the wounded
to Laj, where the steamers to convey them to the base were moored, and it was not until the 25th that the
last of the wounded were removed to this spot. In the meantime, many suffered from exposure, want of food
and inadequate attention.

In the second place, save for two motor ambulances which were employed with great success, no proper
ambulance land transport was provided for the removal of the wounded to the river bank. There were a
number of steamers at Laj, some eight or nine miles from the battlefield, two only of which, however, had been
in any way prepared for the reception of the sick. Many of the wounded were, it is true, able to walk or ride
to the river bank, but for the conveyance of stretcher cases the two motors already mentioned, and ordinary
transport carts, alone were available.

Thirdly, the lack of properly equipped river hospital steamers proved, as may be well understood, in the
circumstances, disastrous.

The medical and subordinate personnel for these steamers, which was taken from field ambulances, was
inadequate for the number of the patients: The supply of medical stores and appliances, and even of food,
was in some cases insufficient. The arrangements for cooking the food were defective, and the personnel to
distribute it was wanting. The arrangements for water-supply were unsatisfactory, the latrine accommoda-
tion was insufficient, and there were not enough sweepers and bed-pans for the necessities of those patients
who could not struggle to the latrines. Finally, the wounded were huddled together as close as they could
be packed on the decks, without beds or mattresses, and it was almost impossible for the medical officers to
attend to them properly. In some cases the vessels had, moreover, been used for the carriage of animals, and
it was impossible, in the time available, to clean and disinfect them.

Wounds which required dressing and re-dressing were not attended to, and the condition of many of the
patients who travelled by these steamers was, when they reached Basra, deplorable. There the wounds of
many were found to be in a septic condition, and in urgent need of re-dressing. In some cases bed-sores had
developed, more than one patient arrived soaked in feeces and urine, and in a few cases, wounds were found to

contain maggots.

Surgeon-General Hathaway admitted to us that the arrangements made “ were
absolutely inadequate,” and that the “ wounded suffered intolerable discomfort.” Sir
John Nixon when asked whether he dissented from the general proposition that the wounded
did. suffer very great hardships on this occasion replied ‘‘ No, I do not dissent at all.”

25. We shall comment later on the very different description of things telegraphed
home to the Secretary of State at the time, but we would say here that, had the authorities
in India or at home had any inkling of the true state of affairs at the beginning of December,

special efforts might have been made at any rate to reinforce the medical personnel in
Mesopotamia in view of future operations.

26. Full credit should be given to all concerned for the fact that the wounded were
brought away in the retreat from Ctesiphon, and saved from Arab indignities and brutali-
ties. At the same time, we believe that much of the sufferings of the wounded might have
been avoided, if adequate forethought had been shown in the planning and preparations
for the advance to Baghdad. For the actual arrangements on the battle-field Colonel
Hehir was responsible. We have had the advantage (not open to the Vincent-Bingley
Commission) of hearing Colonel Hehir’s detailed evidence on the subject. Having regard
to the inadequate means at his disposal we do not consider that his dispositions are open
to serious criticism. We are of opinion, however, that he should have taken more vigorous

steps to represent the shortages in medical personnel and equipment before both the battle
of Kut and the battle of Ctesiphon.

Kut Relief Operations. January, 1916.
27. The medical arrangements during the January fighting, that is to say the battles
of Sheik Saad, Wadi and Hannah, resulted in the most complete. breakdown of all.
The fact that the 7th Division had not its proper complement of Field Ambulances,
has already been alluded to, but though this may have been a contributory cause, it cannot
be accepted as an adequate explanation of the breakdown.

28. The testimony of our witnesses allows no shadow of doubt as to the accuracy of the
description of the facts in paragraphs 135 to 140 of the report of Sir W. Vincent’s Com-
mission. The Field Ambulances were so overcrowded that patient after patient passed
through them without receiving medical attention or food. The river steamers were
short of equipment, sweepers, orderlies, bandages, medical comforts, blankets, bedpans,

(C 48—176) 12

68 PART X,.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

A. THE VINCENT-BINGLEY REPORT AND ITS PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS.

urine bottles, cutlery and crockery. Many patients got no treatment after the application
of their field dressing until they reached Basra.

29. The Vincent-Bingley Commission state the main causes of the breakdown at this
time as :—

(1.) The lack of proper hospital river steamers.

(2.) The lack of River Transport.

(3.) The insufficiency of the medical and subordinate staff and of medical store:
and accessories, and

(4.) The weather conditions.

To this we would add a 5th viz. :—The incorrect estimate as to the period for whic!
General Townshend’s food supplies would enable him to hold out, which caused General
Aylmer to attack before his force could be organised complete at the front. . -

It was known when General Aylmer commenced the operations for the relief of Kut,
that his columns were inadequately organised as regards transport, staff and, above all,
that the medical complements were quite insufficient. Military exigencies were assumed
to justify an advance in spite of these deficiencies, and it was with a full knowledge of;
such deficiencies that the advance commenced. The Vincent-Bingley Commission in|
their personal references to General Aylmer, acquit him of responsibility for these short- |
comings. We concur with them. He was acting under peremptory orders, as time was
then considered to be a paramount consideration.

March—A pril, 1916.

30. As regards the March fighting, we again quote and adopt from the report of the

Vincent-Bingley Commission :— .

For various reasons the medical arrangements for the evacuation of the wounded at the battle of Es-Sinn
were much more successful than during the operations of January.

The arrangements were in many respects far from ideal, but we have reason to believe that the improve-
ment was realised by everyone and much appreciated.

The main sources of discomfort were twofold, the use of transport carts for the conveyance of wounded
by land, and the lack of river hospital steamers. i

Subject to these defects, we think that the arrangements were satisfactory, and that great credit is due
to the officers directly responsible for the collection and evacuation of the wounded.

31, Sperking of the battles between April 5th and 24th, the Vincent-Bingley Commis-
sloners say that the—

‘“ Arrangements were carefully thought out and proved very successful. The number of stretcher bearers
was sufficient, the collecting stations were conveniently situated, and ample provision was made for the comfort
and medical treatment of the wounded, who were promptly evacuated to the camp at Wadi by the “ Aerial
motor boat, and in motor cars and ambulance waggons. ‘The organisation was methodical and worked smoothly
and the Commission saw nothing to call for unfavourable criticism in the arrangements made, save that the
provision of more motor boats and of additional ambulance transport would have been a convenience.”’

They add, |

“We think that the administrative and executive medical officers deserve great credit for the successfu.
collection and evacuation of the large numbers of wounded in the almost continuous fighting which took place
during this month.”

We would add ourselves that the force had by this time profited by the experience of
medical officers who had served in France.

Elsewhere we print a memorandum* handed in to us by Colonel Hehir which explains
the medical arrangements made by him and his subordinates during the siege of Kut.
They seem to us to have been excellent.

B. Mrepicat ADMINISTRATION OF COLONEL HEHIR IN MESOPOTAMIA.

32. It was only at a comparatively late period of their enquiry that the terms of
reference of the Vincent-Bingley Commission were enlarged so as to include the earlier
part of the campaign. Moreover, the chief medical officers responsible during the early
period, Colonel Hehir in Mesopotamia and Surgeon-General Babtie in India, were not
available as witnesses before that Commission. or these and other reasons the Vincent-
Bingley Report does not deal, as fully as it might otherwise have done, with the medical
arrangements for the Mesopotamian Expedition up to the summer of 1915. The indica-
tions which the Report contains as to these arrangements are, however, amplified rather
than contradicted by the evidence which we ourselves have taken.

* See Appendix ITI.

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 69

B. MepicaL ADMINISTRATION OF COLONEL HEHIR IN MESOPOTAMIA.

33. Colonel Hehir’s able statement of evidence gives his official account of the medical
arrangements during the period up to April, 1915, when he was principal medical officer
in Mesopotamia. He has submitted to us his periodical reports to Surgeon-General
Babtie in India and in the direction of sanitary and preventive medicine they display a
watchfulness and foresight over the needs of the situation, which are in refreshing contrast
with the administration of his successor, Surgeon-General Hathaway. Thus at the very
outset of the campaign he calls attention to the crying need for a proper water-supply at
Basra and does his best to grapple with the insanitary conditions in that town and else-
where. He suggests and obtains spine-pads, tinted glasses, mosquito-nets, soda-water, &c.,
kc. He asks for a dentist and a bacteriological expert. He takes scientific measures to
cope with a possible outbreak of malaria, and he warns the Indian Government against the
danger of scurvy arising from the deficient ration of the Indian troops. He cables early in

February for typhoid and small-pox vaccine and anti-tetanus serum, and by using the latter
is able to report that there was only one case of tetanus out of nearly a thousand wounded at

Shaiba. We consider that Colonel Hehir worked with zeal and on the whole with success :
and he can take credit for a remarkably low rate of sickness in the force during the winter of

1914-15. But it is quite clear from Colonel Hehir’s evidence, and from other sources, that

‘many of the defects in the care of the sick and wounded, which afterwards proved so
disastrous, were existent during the earlier phases of the campaign, and were only prevented

from becoming conspicuous, by a certain combination of good luck and good management,
which distinguished Colonel Hehir’s administration.

34. The battle of Sahil, November 17th, 1914, was the first battle in the campaign
in which the casualties were considerable. The medical experience of this battle

indicated defects, which, if they had been appreciated and remedied in time,

would have saved much suffering later in the campaign. The battle was fought
before the full medical personnel had arrived, the personnel had been separated from
their equipment by the embarkation officers at Bombay, some of the’wounded were left

out all night, and the absence of any hospital ship necessitated wounded being sent back

to India in an ordinary transport, which had previously carried animals. But the com-
paratively small number of casualties and the energy of Colonel Hehir in dealing with them

would seem to have minimised in his own mind, and in those of the authorities in India and

‘Mesopotamia the serious nature of the defects disclosed at this battle. At any rate every
one of these mistakes was repeated later in the campaign with disastrous results.

35. Colonel Hehir had been D.D.M.S. at Simla and had worked out with Surgeon-

General Babtie the medical requirements of Force “ D.’’ He must therefore have been
- aware that no British Stationary Hospital accompanied the force and also that the British

General Hospital was 50 beds below the standard scale. He knew too that by the end of
March the force had been doubled in size, and brought up to the strength of two divisions

without any additional Stationary, Clearing, or General Hospitals being provided, and he
made no protest against the omission to provide such hospitals. Owing to the fact that it

was the cool weather and that such fighting as occurred was spasmodic and not as a rule

severe, Colonel Hehir was able to manage normally with the existing hospital accommoda-

[

tion without serious overcrow din. But even so, he was forced at times into such doubtful

‘expedients as the use of trausports as overflow hospitals, the borrowing of medical per-

sonnel from the field ambulances, and the use of field ambulances as General Hospitals.
All these measures diminished the pressure on the hospitals and their staffs in a manner
which would have been impossible in times of widespread sickness or continuous fighting.
Unfortunately, however, his success in overcoming these difficulties led Colonel Hehir
not sufficiently to realise the danger of allowing the original shortage of medical personnel
and equipment to persist. He was content to “‘ make do ” with the low scale of medical

_ personnel provided and such deficiencies as he represented were only in respect of shortages
on that scale. He even acquiesced in the failure of the Indian authorities to send out

with the reinforcements at the beginning of 1915 their proper complement of field ambu-
lances and hospitals, and it was not till towards the very end of his administration as
Principal Medical Officer that he appears to have begun to realise the dangers of the
situation. It is an ironic comment on Colonel Hehir’s policy that, in giving evidence as
to medical administration in periods of stress under his successor, Surgeon-General
Hathaway, he is again and again forced to criticise the perpetuation and development of
expedients which he himself initiated in easier times.

36. A case in point is the non-provision of hospital river steamers. In his evidence

70 PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

B. MEDICAL ADMINISTRATION OF COLONEL HEHIR IN MESOPOTAMIA.

before us (after the event) Colonel Hehir says: ‘“‘ The absence of special river transpo
for sick and wounded was felt from the earliest stage of the campaign and this war
became progressively more pronounced as time went on.” Yet General Barrett, speaking
the period of Colonel Hehir’s administration, stated to the Vincent-Bingley Commission
“T was never asked by any of my medical officers to apply for any river hospital steamers.
The fact was that Colonel Hehir was content to overcome the difficulty by securing frox
the A.Q.M.G. (often only after much importunity) ordinary river boats for the transport :
the sick on special occasions. When the number of sick was small, as under Colonel Hebi:
administration, this was a possible expedient and Colonel Hehir was able, he assures us, 3
see that the boats were properly cleaned and sanitated before being used for patients. Bi
such a system was bound to fail when there came a large increase in the number of patie}
and in the demands upon the steamers for ordinary transport purposes. And Colonel He!
points out that “ these steamers were always unsatisfactory ”’ and that (in Surgeon-Gener
Hathaway’s time) “ their absence became more felt as the number of sick a
wounded increased and at the battles of Kut and Ctesiphon we were in consequen
faced with difficulties which could not be overcome satisfactorily.”

37. Another defect, which was evident, though not accentuated, under Colonel Heh:
administration was the failure to supply the expedition with suitable vehicles for carryili
the wounded. The only land ambulance transport provided were stretchers and ndu:
mules. Stretchers are not suitable for distances beyond 2} miles, if for no other reasc
because of the strain on and consequent failure of the stretcher bearers. This is a vite
objection where, as in the Mesopotamian campaign there was often an actual shortag:
of bearers. Mules are, of course, impossible for severely wounded cases, and at one of tle
early engagements in the campaign (Rotah, January 20th, 1915) a R.A.M.C. officer informe!
the Vincent-Bingley Commission: ‘ These animals were very restive and not suitable fc:
wounded men to ride upon” with the consequence that the wounded, luckily very few in
number, had to be carried back between 6 and 7 miles on stretchers. There were n
motor vehicles available, except one or two provided from private sources. Consequenth.
whenever it became necessary to carry the wounded any distance, resort was had to th:
ordinary army transport cart (usually known as A.T. carts), which is thus described li
the A.D.M.S. of the 3rd Division :

“The ambulance transport of these units consisted of the army transport cart, which is without spring
has no cover to give protection against rain or the direct rays of the sun ; and the bottom of which consists:
bars of iron which, even when liberally covered with mattresses or other padding, renders the placing 0!.

wounded man, especially cases of fracture, in such a conveyance, a practice which can only be designated :
barbarous and cruel.”’

38. Colonel Hehir himself recognises that the use of A.T. carts for the wound
“gives rise to a vast amount of suffering that would have been avoided |
the use of suitable vehicles with proper springs.’ He did not, however, :
Principal Medical Officer, apply for any wheeled ambulance transport, becaus
as he told us, he thought the fighting would continue to be on, or near ©
of the rivers, and also because from February to June, the country was like:
to be flooded. Our comment on this defence is that battles near a river are, as We
seen at Es Sinn and Ctesiphon, likely to extend further from the river than the distance !«
which wounded can be properly carried by stretcher. While, as regards the floods, ‘
would not have been too early to apply in January for a special form of wheeled transp0!
to be prepared for the time when the floods would subside in July. The fact was that!
the earlier fighting in the campaign the number of the wounded to be removed a ot:
distance was either very small as at Rotah, or else as at Shaiba the distance to be covered b!
wheeled ambulances was not very great. Colonel Hehir was, therefore, able to cope with
the situation, either by using only stretchers, as at Rotah and Sahil, or by using paddet
A.T. carts to supplement the stretchers as at Shaiba. Thus, when he was Princip:
Medical Officer, we find him writing to the D.M.S. in India that the A.T. carts wer
“invaluable in transporting the wounded from the battlefield” at Shaiba, while later 0:
in his evidence before us, he frankly deplores having to use them (under the administratio!
of General Hathaway) at the battles of Es Sinn and Ctesiphon.

In these and other instances, we think that Colonel Hehir was to blame for failing ©
requisition India for equipment, which, though not indispensable at the time, was certal”
to be indispensable in the future. It was a mistake to risk disaster before taki!
measures which ordinary foresight would have adopted long before.

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 7

C. MeErpicaL ADMINISTRATION OF SURGEON-GENERAL Sir WILLIAM BABTIE.

39. But, whatever blame may attach to Colonel Hehir in not having made sufficient
requisitions for the proper equipment of the expedition, the primary responsibility in
respect of such equipment must, in our opinion, rest with the authorities in India. Up
to the first week in June, 1915, Surgeon-General Babtie was Director of Medical Services in
India. He is a man, both in experience and ability, above the average. He had
previously been employed at the War Office, and had been “ intimately connected ” with
the details of medical mobilisation He was considered of sufficient importance to be
letached to Egypt in the Spring of 1915, m connection with medical problems which
iad arisen there; and in June of the same year need of his ability was experienced else-
where in connection with the war, and he was recalled from India. Sir William Babtie
nust therefore have been well aware of the standards and requirements of modern warfare,
and was to some extent in a position in India to ensure that such standards should be
conformed to. In his own words: “ The position of D.M.S. in India in relation to an expe-
dition operating over the sea is practically the position of the War Office with regard
to an expedition operating in France.’’ We will now briefly examine how, in possession
of this position and experience, Sir William Babtie carried out his responsibility for properly
equipping the Mesopotamian Expedition in regard to medical requirements.

40. In one sense, the numerous sanitary and precautionary requisitions of Colonel
‘Hehir, which we have already detailed, are a measure of Sir William Babtie’s omissions.
We have seen that during the first months of the campaign, Colonel Hehir was forced to

wire to India for sun glasses, anti-toxin, mosquito-nets, spine-pads, &c., &c. Though
it is true that Sir William Babtie was not technically responsible for the actual provision of
all of these requisites, yet it is quite clear that they were essential to the maintenance of the
health of the troops, and in our opinion Sir William Babtie should have made it his duty to
have impressed upon the Quartermaster General’s or other Departments concerned the
necessity for providing well beforehand, these and other medical ancillaries in which the
expedition is proved to have been deficient. He did not do this, with the result that many
of these essentials did not reach the troops in sufficient time and sufficient quantities.

41. In regard to the rations of the Indian troops we consider that an even more severe
comment should be passed on the Director of Medical Services’ omission. In an official
‘report to the D.M.S. in India dated April 8th, 1915, Colonel Hehir reports a small out-
break of scurvy amongst the Indian troops, and adds as follows :—
| “I am of opinion that the present field service diet of Indian troops and followers has certain intrinsic
defects, and it is suggested as desirable that the whole question should be reconsidered and the dietary in some
respects reconstructed. An enquiry into the caloric value, vitamine content and anti-scorbutic attributes
of the present dietary appears to be indicated. The only vegetable now allowed is 2 ounces of potatoes
! and the only fresh meat 28 ounces a week. It is very doubtful whether this authorised ration, if not supple-
, mented by other vegetables and more meat, is sufficient to prevent scurvy. Cases of scurvy have invariably
. occurred whenever campaigns have lasted longer than four months, and the prevalence of the disease has then

: Mai with the extent to which the ration could be supplemented by fresh vegetables and fresh meat obtained
locally.”

| 42. Sir William Babtie informed us: “ As regards rations, I brought up the question
_ of rationing the troops at the Commander-in-Chief’s conference, and an additional ration
. to that which was hitherto in force for field service in India was sanctioned.” We
. have not been able to obtain any confirmation of this assertion, and if the suggestion ever
. emerged from the phase of discussion into the reality of action, we can only suppose that it
‘Telated merely to modifications of the extras which the Commanding Officer on the spot
18 empowered to sanction. It will be observed that Colonel Hehir’s letter is an indictment
of the whole constitution of the Indian ration. In the papers which have been laid before
us by Sir B. Duff from the Quartermaster-General’s branch in India it is definitely stated
Until March, 1916, no suggestion was made that for Indians the authorised ration was
hot entirely suited to the conditions of Mesopotamian Service,’ and we gather from the
Same document that the ration had, prior to that date, remained unaltered since it was
. hghtly modified in 1912. If Surgeon-General Babtie, with the knowledge that he must
have had of the proneness of Indian troops to scurvy, had authoritatively pressed Colonel
ehir’s suggestions upon the Commander-in-Chief and the Quartermaster-General in
India, it is difficult to suppose that a general improvement of the Indian ration would not
ave been sanctioned. As it was, the ration remained generally as fixed in 1912, and though
‘Some additions were made in May, 1916, in the summer of the same year a very serious
outbreak of scurvy occurred amongst the Indian troops in Mesopotamia, resulting in some

Personnel.

72 PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

C. MEDICAL ADMINISTRATION OF SURGEON-GENERAL SiR WILLIAM BABTIE.

7,500 men being lost to the force in 19 weeks. This epidemic was definitely ascribed by:
War Office Sanitary Commission to deficiencies in the Indian ration.

43. The failure to insist on necessary precautions against so obvious a danger is
in our opinion, a very good instance of the kind of responsibility which attaches to k
Wilham Babtie for not having originally foreseen, and afterwards kept a proper oversig!:
over, the health needs of the troops.

44, But the gravamen of the criticism which we feel bound to pass on Sir Williax
Babtie is that, knowing the Army Medical Service in India to be organised only for front:
warfare, knowing the provision of the field ambulances and hospitals to be deficient, az
knowing the medical personnel to be insufficient, he yet made no adequate efforts 1
improve these defects so as to equip the Mesopotamian Expedition in a manner suital)
for campaigning in an unhealthy, tropical climate against an enemy, who was 1n alliance
with and supported by the foremost exponents of modern warfare.

45. We will now proceed to examine to what extent Sir William Babtie was responsil!:
in connection with the three main medical defects in the campaign, viz.: (1) Personnel:
(2) River hospital transport ; (3) Land transport for the wounded.

46. The Indian authorised scale of medical personnel was calculated for the needs of
frontier warfare, where casualties were not: likely to be large and the resources of India were
close behind. But Surgeon-General Babtie despatched Force “ D” eighteen hundred
miles from its base, with medical personnel short even of the authorised scale. Wha
reinforcements were sent he took, or acquiesced in, measures which even further reduced
this exiguous scale, so that in the words of the Vincent-Bingley Commission ‘‘ whereas the
force was increased to two divisions plus a cavalry brigade, the medical establishment way,
save for the addition of seven sections of a field ambulance, that which had been thought
necessary for one division only.” And Sir William Babtie himself admitted to us that
each division was only supplied with twelve sections of field ambulance instead of the
proper complement of twenty.

47. As regards hospitals the position was equally bad. The strength of the Force
was doubled during Sir William Babtie’s administration, but no additional hospital:
whatever were sent over by him. Attempts were made to meet the deficiencies locall:
by expanding the existing hospitals in Mesopotamia. On April 22nd, Colonel Heli
informed Sir W. Babtie, that the British and Indian General Hospitals had been thu:
extended from 250 to 350, and from 600 to 1,000 beds respectively. No additional per-
sonnel was despatched by Sir W. Babtie to mcet these extensions, and in response ti
demands for it, Mesopotamia was even told to obtain personnel from the Field Ambulance:
Staffs, which, as we have shown, were already gravely deficient. The additional equipmen'
required was not all in Mesopotamia even as late as October, 1915. The hospital expansion:
were in fact, in Sir W. Babtie’s time, to a large degree merely “‘ paper expansions.”

48. The medical position was, therefore, obviously a highly dangerousone It has beet
justified by Sir William Babtie on the ground broadly that it was necessary to economise 0
Mesopotamia in order to provide for the medical needs of forces mobilised in India fot
internal defence. We have examined the memorandum on this subject prepared by Col.
Hendley, A.D.M.S., about a fortnight after Sir W. Babtie’s departure from India.
From this document, the gist of which was telegraphed to the Secretary of State on
July 3rd, it would appear that all the medical personnel was at that date retained in India,
which was necessary for frontier and internal defence and that there was a small margin
over. We are not convinced that the policy of preparing for possible warfare in
India at the expense of actual warfare in Mesopotamia was justifiable. But even if this be
conceded as a justification for allowing Mesopotamia to be severely understaffed in medical
personnel, it was, in our opinion, clearly the duty of Surgeon-General Babtie to impress on
the authorities in India and at home, the dangers of such a proceeding and to have urged
strongly upon the authorities in India that they should apply to England for assistance.
This he does not seem to have done, and it is noteworthy that the first demand for assistance
from England was sent almost: immediately after Sir William Babtie’s departure from
India, and was promptly complied with, although the Home Government was only givet
a very misleading account of the actual deficiencies in medical personnel
Mesopotamia.

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 73

‘C. MEpIcAL ADMINISTRATION OF SURGEON-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM BABTIE.

River Hospital Steamers

49. In his examination before us Sir William Babtie agreed that in a campaign of this
kind, if casualties on a considerable scale were certain and the only transport along the
river, the authorities on the spot ought to have pressed for special river hospital accom-
modation. We are of the opinion that in such circumstances it, to a certain extent,
devolved upon Sir Wiliam Babtie himself to have suggested and asked for the provision
of such river hospital steamers. His defence for not doing so is, we gather, that he was
not aware that there was any intention of an extensive campaign up the rivers, and that
his preparations were made for a campaign limited to the conquest and retention of Basra
and the oil fields. He told us that he was not informed of Sir John Nixon’s instructions
and that “if there had been a hint of Baghdad the arrangements would have had to be
absolutely put into the melting-pot.” He was also unable to recollect being told of the
actual advance to Amara. Subsequently, however, under cross-examination, he admitted
that he knew from hearsay that both Amara and Nasariyeh were necessary for the defence
of Basra and the oil-fields. It does not, therefore, appear to us that he can escape all
responsibility for not having suggested the provision of this necessity in what he knew
from the outset to be more or less a riverine campaign. The extent of his activities mn
this direction was a suggestion of, or acquiescence in, a proposal made by a voluntary
association to provide and equip a hospital river barge. When this barge sank on its way
out to Mesopotamia, Sir William Babtie took no further steps in the matter beyond
offering one motor launch also provided by voluntary effort.

Land Transport.

50. His attitude in regard to land transport for the wounded was hardly more satis-
factory. The only such special transport provided under the Indian organisation consisted
of stretchers, riding mules and ambulance tongas, which are vehicles drawn by bullocks.
When the equipment of the expedition was being considered tongas were ruled out by Sir
William Babtie and the staff at Simla as being unsuitable for the country and Colonel Hehir
was so informed. We have already dealt in a previous paragraph* with the inadequacy of
stretchers, and riding mules, the only land ambulance transport provided with the expedi-
tion. It follows that army transport carts were the only vehicles available for the sick
aud wounded where land transport was necessary. We have received an overwhelming
mass of evidence as to the inhumanity of using these carts for the wounded. Padding for
them was not always available. In some cases dead bodies were even used as cushions.
Even when padded they were cruel and dangerous for certain classes of wounded. All
this must have been well-known to Surgeon-General Babtie, or might have been easily
ascertained by enquiry or experiment. His only action in regard to developing a more
suitable vehicle than the bullock-tonga was to ask the Maharajah of Benares to provide a
special corps of pony tongas—none of which were, however, available in Mesopotamia till
long after Sir William Babtie had left India. In addition, he sent one private motor
ambulance to Basra in March and offered a second in April, which was curtly refused.
The reason for this refusal has never been satisfactorily explained to us. Motor cars
were used as ambulances just previously at Shaiba and subsequently both up the Karun
and the Tigris. But in any case an unexplained telegraphic refusal of a particular motor
cannot (any more than the failure of Colonel Hehir to ask for tongas after he had been told
that they were not being sent) be accepted as relieving Sir William Babtie of his responsi-
bility for not providing wheeled ambulance transport. Knowing it was not provided he
does not seem to have even asked for any special report or made any special enquiries as
to how the expedition were managing without it. Like Colonel Hehir, so long as no evident
disaster or scandal arose, he was content to “ carry on”’ with obviously insufficient equip-
ment. Though the expedition must inevitably fight and push forward by land and by
river, he provided no proper land or river transport for the sick and wounded. He was
content to leave developments in this respect to the haphazard efforts of private
benevolence, and he never pressed upon the Indian Government or the Quartermaster-
General the necessity for an organised effort to modernise its out-of-date ambulance vehicles.

51. Surgeon-General Babtie’s omissions in regard to the Mesopotamian Campaign are
all the more remarkable because of his promptitude and firmness in pressing war-provisions
on the Indian Government which were necessary for the overseas expeditions generally.
Thus, on the outbreak of war, he urged the formation of a fleet of ocean hospital ships;
the construction of hospital trains, and the expansion of the Army Bearer Corps. It mav
be that, as we have noticed in other phases of the expedition, Mesopotamia was in medical
grea oe ee ee ee ee

+ See para. 37 ante.
(C 48—176) K

74 PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

C. MepicAL ADMINISTRATION OF SURGEON-GENERAL Sir WILLIAM BABTIE.

matters also regarded as a “ small side-show ” and did not for that reason receive proper
attention to its special and unique requirements. At any rate and for whatever reason,
Surgeon-General Babtie’s administration was marked by serious faults, for which he must
be blamed, and the importance of which cannot be minimised. But we recognise that
the shortness of his experience as Director of Medical Services when the war broke out,
and the fact that he had to work in an atmosphere very unfavourable to reforming innova-
tion, must be regarded as diminishing the weight of the censure he deserves. He is
undoubtedly a man of great ability, and having regard to all the circumstances, we desire
to say that the faults of his administration were not, in our judgment, such as to prove
him unfit for important responsible administrative posts.

D. THE MISUSE OF RETICENCE.

52. Elsewhere in our report, we have discussed the effects of the campaign of economy
in India.* We have seen how it tended to create an indisposition to put forward, or to
press demands involving expenditure, and we have quoted and endorsed in general terms,
the views of the Vincent-Bingley Commission in this connection. We now propose to
detail from our own evidence a number of instances, 1n which there has been a failure to
report to higher authorities serious defects in existing arrangements. In almost all these
cases the reporting and remedying of the defects would have involved considerable
expenditure, and possibly censure of the responsible officers. There is no _ proof
that economy was the motive of the omissions to report. But economy, as we have seen,
engendered a disposition to reticence, and when this was reinforced by the natural tendency
m all men to avoid censure, we fear that there grew up a dangerous habit of concealment.
In matters affecting the sick and wounded the want of frankness has painfully im-

pressed us.

The Colaba Hospital.

53. Until 1916, practically the only Military Hospital for British sick and wounded
in Bombay, was the Colaba Station Hospital. In May, 1915. allegations were made that
this hospital was poorly equipped, and in response to a telegram from the Secretary of
State, Sir William Babtie, then Director of Medical Services in India, visited and reported
on the hospital. The gist of his report was telegraphed to England, and we give in full the

telegrams on the subject.
Telegram from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated May 26th, 1915.

1864. Allegations being made that Military Hospital at Bombay to which wounded from Persian Gulf
are being sent, is unprovided with X-ray apparatus and otherwise poorly equipped. Please cable facts.

Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated June 3rd, 1915.

H. 5304. Your telegram of the 26th ultimo, No. 1864. The station hospital at Colaba is equipped
according to regulation, but much additional equipment for officers and men has been provided through the
agency of funds, local and others. Arrangements were made some months ago for the provision of electric
fans and light, but the supply has been delaved, owing to shortages of material. The number of X-ray apparatus
available for military use in India is at present limited to one portable sct per division, the rest having been
sent overseas, fresh supplies indented for not having been received from home. The Sixth Divisional apparatus
with the specialist is sent to Bombay, when convoys of wounded are expected, and in addition use can be made
of the apparatus in the civil hospitals. Director, Medical Services, will visit Colaba within a week and the gist
of lis report will be telegraphed to you.

Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated June 16th, 1915.

H. 5620. In continuation of our telegram of the 2nd instant, No. H. 5304. Surgcon-General Babtie
inspected Station Hospital, Colaba, and confirms former report. X-ray apparatus and arrangements for
X-raying patients previously reported. No risk of any failure in this respect. He has arranged officers
accommodation which will not materially affect soldiers. Cooking quite good and sufficiently varied, there
were no complaints. Electric lights and fans should be working in a fortnight. Hospital well staffed with
medical officers and nurses, but some shortage in assistant surgeons, nursing orderlies and menials, which,
as far as present conditions allow, will be met. Director of Medical Services satisfied that all sick and wounded
officers and men have been well looked after and well cared for in a good hospital, and, taken all in all, Colaba.
Hospital is better found than the majority of station hospitals in India.

54. It will be observed that the failure up to date to supply electric fans and light
is admitted. It is also admitted that X-ray apparatus Is only sent to the hospital, when
convoys of wounded are expected ; but Sir William Babtie declares that in this respect
“ There is no risk of failure.” A shortage of assistant surgeons and orderlies is also admitted,
but there is a direct denial of any shortage of medical officers and nurses, and the con-
cluding paragraph of the last telegram might easily be read as a denial of any other serious
defects in equipment. Bearing these assertions and denials in mind, we will now quote

* See Part I. C and Part XI. D.

PART X._MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 15

D. THe MIsusE oF RETICENCE.

extracts from the evidence given to us by a witness, who was Surgical-Specialist at Colaba
Hospital, between February, 1915, and August, 1916 :—

When I took over the surgical wards on March Ist, 1915, from an officer of the I.M.S. there were some
twenty wounded officers and men in the hospital, which was, at that time, quite unprepared for the reception
of acute surgical cases from overseas. The equipment of wards and operating theatre was quite inadequate.
There was no X-ray installation. In fact, no apparent preparations had been made for establishment of the
hospital as an overseas base, although the Mesopotamian Campaign had been in existence for several months.

No fresh batch of wounded arrived until May 10th, 1915, when those from the Shaiba engagement were
admitted. On this date there was still a complete lack of preparation for the reception of wounded.

‘* There was a serious deficiency in ward equipment. During most of the time patients suffered from
lack of sufficient air-beds, water-beds, ring pillows, and their treatment was hindered by lack of splints and
other surgical apparatus, and by the impossibility of obtaining these necessaries in time to be of use.”

‘* There was a serious shortage of medical personnel during the twelve months commencing March, 1915.
This necessarily affected the care of the patients. . . . During the emergency in August, 1915, I was
frequently obliged to perform operations in the wards, and to give the anvesthetic myself, in order to get
through the work each day.”

‘* The shortage of the nursing staff was a serious hindrance to the care of the patients during all of the most

important periods. . . . There is no doubt that the patients suffered from this cause, and that the nurses
were at all times overworked between February, 1915, and April, 1916. The difficulty was overcome as
far as possible by the splendid service of those who were available. . . . . The inadequacy of the

establishment of orderlies was a source of perpetual worry and inefficiency in carrying out the work. . . .
I cannot condemn too strongly the behaviour of whoever was responsible for the disgraceful lack of
efficient X-ray apparatus, when this was urgently needed. I have good reason to fully realise the trouble
due to this deficiency, as it affected my work considerably. In February, 1915, there was no X-ray apparatus
in the hospital. The wounded from Shaiba were radiographed by the Divisional Specialist in Electrical
Science (Capt. Stephen, R.A.M.C.), who brought his field apparatus from Divisional Headquarters
at Poona, and took it back there by order some davs later. Capt. Stephen was, however, transferred
to Bombay with his apparatus in June, 1915. There was no X-ray room, so a small ward was used as
a makeshift, and here Capt. Stephen carried on this important work as best he could, with an apparatus that
any modern hospital would have refused to contain.”

The Captain Stephen referred to, himself stated in evidence before the Vincent-
Bingley Commission, that many patients were not X-rayed, because of the inefficiency of
the apparatus, and that although he had asked for a proper installation in July, 1915,
no order for it had been sent to the makers by March, 1916. He had further been debarred
from obtaining “ tubes ”’ from London, and although an insufficient number of inefficient
tubes was ultimately supplied to him in India, he was informed by the Superintendent
of the X-Ray Institute, Deh-Ra-Dun, that he was not entitled to them because they
had not been indented for in 1914.

All these statements (with one exception) refer specifically to the date of
Sir William Babtie’s report or to the months immediately preceding it, and they there-
fore constitute a serious impeachment of that report.

55. With regard to conditions in the hospital, prior to Sir William Babtie’s report,
we have also the evidence of the Viceroy himseif, who visited it in February, 1915. Lord
Hardinge pointed out the deficiencies as regards electric light and fans, and told us that
the cooking was dirty, and the food indifferent. He added that he felt it “so hard that
the British soldiers and officers were so indifferently treated.” As regards the state
of the hospital after Sir William Babtie’s visit, the Surgical Specialist before quoted,
informs us that in August (when the wounded arrived in a very bad condition after the
Nasariyeh fighting), and in December, 1915, the hospital became grossly overcrowded,
and was infested with vermin, while the shortage of personnel was accentuated rather
than diminished as promised in the Viceroy’s telegram. We have also the evidence of
Surgeon-General MacNeece, Sir William Babtie’s successor, who visited the hospital
early in July and considered it unsatisfactory. “‘ Officers were crowded and badly done,”
he says in a letter to Sir Alfred Keogh, “and rank and file not much better,” and his
evidence before us confirms this description. He found it necessary to recommend improve-
ments and alterations which involved considerable expenditure, although the calls likely
to be made at the hospital had not increased since Sir William Babtie’s inspection. The
evidence shows that the Staff did their best, but notwithstanding this it is clear that Sir

William Babtie’s report was misleading as regards the adequacy of the Colaba Hospital
arrangements.

First Battle of Kut.
56. Between September 26th and 28th, 1915, in and about the first battle of Es Sinn
or Kut, General Townshend’s force sustained some 1,300 casualties. Owing to insuffi-
ciency of Field Ambulances and personnel, a lack of wheeled transport and river steamers,
(C 48—176) K 3

76 PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

D. THe MIsusE oF RETICENCE.

and a scarcity of blankets, the wounded in these engagements suffered very considerably.
Some of the fighting units were without stretcher-bearers, and there was a lack of co-
ordination in some of the medical arrangements. Wounded men were left on the field
of battle all night, some of them being stripped, maimed and killed by Arabs. These
defects were so well-known that they resulted in a telegram from General Nixon, in which
he said, “I see no possible excuse for what I am forced to look on, as the most indifferent
work done in the collection of the wounded.” Colonel Hehir, who was in charge of the
medical arrangements on the battlefield, officially explained that these incidents wer |
largely due to shortages of field ambulances and transport. The matter must have been
well-known to the D.M.S. in Mesopotamia, General Hathaway, who was actually at General
Nixon’s Headquarters when the explanation of the officers concerned was received. More-[
over, some time after the battle, Colonel Hehir personally brought to Surgeon-General
Hathaway’s notice the shortage of field ambulances on this occasion. At the end of
October, Surgeon-General Hathaway sent in to Surgeon-General MacNeece, D.M.S., in
India, an official report dealing with this period. He sets out the casualties in the engage-
ments in question, and comments on the small proportion of killed to wounded. But in
the whole of his report there is no single word, which gives any inkling that there had been
deficiencies in the medical arrangements or that anything untoward had happened.

Battle of Ctesiphon.

57. There are two methods of concealing a failure. The first is to suppress all mention
of it. The second is to obscure its significance by the glare of a contemporaneous achieve.
ment. The first method was, as we have seen, used at the first battle of Kut. It was the
second method which obtained after the battle of Ctesiphon, when the military success of
withdrawing all the wounded in the face of a pursuing enemy diverted attention from the
grave medical defects which were disclosed in the course of that operation.

58. We do not here enter fully into the details of the Battle of Ctesiphon
and of the lamentable breakdown of medical arrangements which followed it. Thisis
done at length by the Vincent-Bingley Commissioners and elsewhere in our own Report.’ |.
It will be sufficient to recapitulate that a tactical victory was turned into a strategical defeat: |.
General Townshend was obliged to retire before superior forces with casualties amounting |:
to approximately one-third of the force with which he entered into battle. Over 3,500
wounded had to be removed from the battlefield to the river bank, in some cases a distance |
of ten miles, without proper ambulance transport, and with an insufficiency of medical
personnel, of food and of comforts, so that a large proportion had to make their way on foot |
in spite of their injured condition. When they arrived at the river, the available steamer |
accommodation was gravely inadequate. The wounded and weary men had to be crowded
into steamers and barges without sufficient medical attention, appliances, or conveniences.
Some of the wounded were disembarked at Amarah, but the majority went on down to
Basra, a journey from the battlefield, which, in some cases, took as much as fourteen
days, and the discomforts of which were aggravated for the wounded by the presence ou
board of many cases of dysentery and other sickness.

59. Thus the sick and wounded were put to great sufferings during the evacuation
from the battlefield to the river bank at Laj, and also during the protracted journey down
the river. Though the successful evacuation of the wounded in the face of a superior
and pursuing enemy was a fine military performance, it was carried out in a manner which
involved for the sick and wounded conditions of neglect, misery, and suffering, which
were lamentable. Not a hint of this regrettable breakdown is to be found in the official
report sent to England after the battle.

60. We are reluctant to describe the details of the condition in which many of the
wounded arrived at Basra, on account of their sickening horror ; but we deem it necessary
to quote one witness on this subject, because it brings home the appalling nature of the
sufferings which were thus glossed over by the authorities. Major Carter, I.M.S., who was in
medical charge of the hospital ship “ Varela” at Basra, waiting for the wounded from
Ctesiphon, thus describes the arrival of one of the river convoys :—

“T was standing on the bridge in the evening when the ‘ Medjidich ’ arrived. She had two steel barges:
without any protection against the rain, as far as I remember. As this ship, with two barges, came up to us
I saw that she was absolutely packed, and the barges too, with men. The barges were slipped, and the ‘ Med-
jidieh ’ was brought alongside the ‘ Varela.’ When she was about 300 or 400 yards off it looked as if she was
festooned with ropes. The stench when she was close was quite definite, and I found that what I mistook
for ropes were dried stalactites of human faces. The patients were so huddled and crowded together on the
ship that they could not perform the offices of Nature clear of the edge of the ship, and the whole of the ghip 8
Sa AR Se SN i a ARS 7 Ue cam

* See Part X., para. 24.

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 77

D. THe Misus& oF RETICENCE.

Battle of Ctesuphon (continued).

side was covered with stalactites of human feces. This is what I then saw. A certain number of men were
standing and kneeling on the immediate perimeter of the ship. Then we found a mass of men huddled up
anyhow—some with blankets and some without. They were lying in a pool of dysentery about 30 feet square.
They were covered with dysentery and dejecta generally from head to foot. With regard to the first man
I examined, I put my hand into his trousers, and I thought that he had a hemorrhage. His trousers were
full almost to his waist with something warm and slimy. I took my hand out, and thought it was blood clot.
{t was dysentery. The man had a fractured thigh, and his thigh was perforated in five or six places. He
1ad apparently been writhing about the deck of the ship. Many cases were almost as bad. There were a
vertain number of cases of terribly bad bed sores. In my report I describe mercilessly to the Government
of India how I found men with their limbs splinted with wood strips from ‘ Johnny Walker’ whisky boxes,
* Bhoosa ’ wire, and that sort of thing.”
Were they British or Indian ?—British and Indian mixed.

| 61. We do not wish it to be inferred that the conditions on all the river steamers
reached this pitch of horror. The conditions, for example, in the “ Blosse Lynch” and
the “ Mosul,” two ships which on this occasion had been prepared beforehand for the
wounded, though unsatisfactory, were probably superior to those in the ‘ Medjidieh.”
On the other hand there is evidence that the conditions in some of the other boats were
as bad as or worse than in the ‘“ Medjidieh.”’

62. We will now see how the evacuation of the wounded, resulting in such
appalling conditions, was officially described by the General Officer Commanding the
Expedition. We append two telegrams on the subject :—

From—Secretary of State for India.
To—General Nixon, Basra.
Dated December 4th, 1915.
C. 243. On arrival wounded at Basra. Please telegraph urgently particulars and progress.
From—General Nixon.
To—Secretary of State for India.
Dated December 7th, 19154

940/28/A. Your C. 243. Wounded satisfactorily disposed of. Many likely to recover in country com-
fortably placed in hospitals at Amara and Basra. Those for invaliding are being placed direct on two hospital
ships that were ready at Basra on arrival of river boats. General condition of wounded very satisfactory.
Medical arrangements under circumstances of considerable difficulty worked splendidly.

We have had great difficulty in ascertaining who actually drafted this telegram and
was responsible for its despatch. Sir John Nixon, who was ill at the time it was sent,
in his evidence before us stated that he had only a dim, if any, recollection of the circum-
stance, but he admitted having seen it the day after its despatch, and as it was sent in
his name he accepted the responsibility for it.

_ 63. Sir John Nixon has communicated to us a letter he has lately received from
-&@ member of the Staff in Mesopotamia, which states that this telegram was
drafted by, and is in the handwriting of, Surgeon-General Hathaway, though it is
not initialled by him, but by two members of Sir John Nixon’s Staff, subordinate
officers in the office of Major-General Cowper, then Deputy Assistant and Quartermaster-
General of Force “ D.” Surgeon-General Hathaway told us that he had assisted in framing
it. Major General Cowper stated to us that he personally had no share in the despatch
of this telegram, and that he did not himself submit it to Sir John Nixon before his subordi-
nates despatched it. These two subordinate officers seem to have accepted Surgeon-
General Hathaway’s authority as sufficient. It is impossible to believe that Surgeon-
General Hathaway was ignorant of the condition and sufferings of the sick and wounded.
He had been at Laj when the wounded arrived from the battlefield, and he had himself
worked with great energy in embarking them on the steamers. He had also travelled
down the river with the wounded and was, according to one witness, actually at Basra
at the date of the “ Medjidieh’s ”’ arrival.

Major Carter stated to us that he had insisted upon seeing Sir John Nixon in order that
he (Sir John Nixon) might personally know of the condition of the wounded on their
arrival at Basra in the ‘“‘ Medjidieh.”’

64. Sir John Nixon, Major-General Cowper and Surgeon-General Hathaway all assured
us that the telegram was not despatched with the object of misrepresenting the state of
things. Sir John Nixon informed us that at the time the telegram was sent his “ thank-
ulness was great at having got the wounded down safely under circumstances of great
difficulty without letting them be exposed to mutilation ” by the Arabs, and that what
illed his mind was the resource and unceasing efforts of the medical officers to alleviate
the sufferings of the wounded. Surgeon-General Hathaway said that he meant the latter

78 PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

D. Tue Misuseé oF RETICENCE.

part of the telegram as “a tribute to the people who had really accomplished a mo;
wonderful achievement.” It is very difficult to accept these explanations, for whatever mi
have been the motive for so wording the despatch, the effect was to conceal from tl:
authorities outside Mesopotamia the real facts as to the medical breakdown in Noveml«:
gravely to mislead the Secretary of State, and through him Parliament and the publi.
and to deceive all into a state of false security in view of future operations. If the fu!
facts had been frankly reported immediately after the battle of Ctesiphon, 1t would hui:
been possible for the authorities to make strong efforts to remove or mitigate many of t!:
defects before the next fighting took place. But this was not done, with the result th.-
for the wounded the horrors in January, 1916, equalled or even exceeded the horrors «
Ctesiphon in November, 1915.

65. It is possible, of course, to assume that Sir John Nixon and Surgeon-Gene:
Hathaway’s relief of mind on their safe arrival with the wounded at Basra may ha’
eliminated from their perspective the defects in medical arrangements, and the suffer:
of the wounded, which occurred during the evacuation. Yet even on this assumption, the:
defects and sufferings should have been reported to the authorities when there had be«.
time to obtain reports from medical officers and from the wounded themselves, and tl
generally to correct the first impressions of the evacuation. But nothing of the kind seen.
to have been done. On December 18th, Surgeon-General Hathaway sent in to th:
D.M.S. India a detailed report of the evacuation of the wounded from Ctesiphu:.
Nobody reading that report would gather that anything untoward had happened, «:
that the wounded had undergone any special or avoidable sufferings. On Christma:
Day, General Nixon again wired to India, “ Taking into account the large number
of wounded, the very limited means at my disposal, the great difficulties entaile
I am of the opinion that the evacuation of the wounded after the battle of Ctesiphu
was extraordinarily well carried out.” As late as January 4th, when Surgeon-General
MacNeece had called his attention to the condition in which the wounded arrived at
Basra, and to the complaints as to the defects in the medical arrangements, Surgen-
General Hathaway persisted in regarding the evacuation as a “ glorious achievement
which had received from Sir John Nixon the commendation it deserved.

66. The first, and so far as we know, the only official report, which disclosed th:
serious condition of the wounded after Ctesiphon, was sent in by an officer who was 1
in any way responsible for the arrangements for their evacuation from the battlefield t:
Basra. Major Carter, whose evidence we have already quoted, posted in Bombay
December 14th, his report on the third voyage of the hospital ship “ Varela,’”’ address:
to the D.M.S. at Delhi. This report, which must have reached Delhi a few days later
emphasized the grave condition of the wounded as they arrived at Basra, and ascribe:
this condition to the absence of river hospital-steamers. The report* gave also indirect!
a vivid account of the sufferings of the wounded on their passage down the river. U-
the day on which it was posted, Surgeon-General MacNeece himself visited the “ Varela.
on its arrival at Bombay, inspected and questioned the wounded, and therefore knew !!
some detail of the medical breakdown after Ctesiphon.

67. The next day (December 15th), Surgeon-General MacNeece wrote a letter '
Sir Percy Lake, Chief of the General Staff at Delhi. In this letter he described the suffer
ings of the wounded. “‘ The whole business,” he said “is bad.” He asked that thi
letter should be shown to Sir Beauchamp Duff. But Sir Beauchamp Duff denies that ht
saw either this letter or Major Carter’s Report ; nor is there any evidence that he dit
Both documents were however accessible to him, and would doubtless have been furnishe!
to him if he had made enquiries in his own Headquarter Office about the condition of tht
wounded ; and that there was reason for enquiry he knew, because Surgeon-Gene!!|
MacNeece referred to the sufferings of the wounded after Ctesiphon at a conference at whic!
the Commander-in-Chief was present on December 23rd. Surgeon-General MacNeece*
recollection is quite definite on this point, and Sir Percy Lake, though unable to swear
the exact date of the conference, corroborates Surgeon-General MacNeece as to the fact
that the matter was referred to in conference about that time. Moreover, private notes
made at the time by Surgeon-General MacNeece, though they do not specifically mentio!
the wounded at Ctesiphon, show that the affairs of Force “ D ” were much discussed at the
conference on December 23rd.

68. Surgeon-General MacNeece also told us that the sufferings of the wounded after
ee oe ee aa

come a —_—

* See Part X., para. 89.

PART X.—_MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 79

D. THe MiIsusE oF RETICENCE.

‘tesiphon were a matter of common talk at Delhi about this time. Though the events
{ter Ctesiphon were still unknown in England, stories were coming from home as to
he general unsatisfactory working of the medical arrangements. The private letters
f the Secretary of State to the Viceroy as far back as October had expressed anxiety
m this point. On December 3rd, Mr. Chamberlain wrote: ‘I do beg you to urge
Juff to go thoroughly into this matter,” and suggested that a special officer should
ve sent out to inquire into all the medical arrangements in Mesopotamia. The Viceroy
wressed tthe suggestion on the Commander-in-Chief and prevailed on him to consent.
ir Beauchamp Dufi’s letter of December 30th we have quoted in full elsewhere.* He mini-
nised the importance of the rumours that had alarmed Lord Hardinge. “ My
ifhieial reports,’’ said he, “indicate nothing wrong except the shortage of river trans-
sort which we are straining every nerve to supplement, and even that has only become a
xurnIng question since “D” force began to grow larger.” Such language cannot be
ustified. Though the breakdown after Ctesiphon wes due partly to shortage of river
‘ransport, the reassuring impression given by this letter was profoundly misleading.
The truth was partly known to Sir Beauchamp Duff, when he thus wrote; and if it was
10t more completely known, this was due to his own neglect to enquire. He might have
sead the Surgeon-General’s letter to Sir Percy Lake and Major Carter’s Report; and he
admits that ‘ about the end of December,” he heard that the medical arrangements were
breaking down. In the circumstances to reassure the Viceroy, and to let the Viceroy
reassure the Secretary of State was a grave dereliction of duty.

69. But in deference to the Viceroy, Surgeon-General MacNeece was now sent to
Mesopotamia. He was instructed to ‘‘ confer as to medical requirements ” with Sir J. Nixon.
This was not in terms a mission of enquiry into the past, and he did not so interpret
it. ‘* My business was with the future,’”’ he writes to Sir Alfred Keogh. At any rate, for
whatever reason, he went only to Basra, and his report, unlike his letter to Sir Percy Lake,
was vague and colourless. Meantime the rumours of the breakdown were continuing,
and so were the anxieties of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. In March, therefore,
Sir Beauchamp Duff appointed Sir William Vincent and General Bingley as a Commission
to enquire into the medical arrangements in Mesopotamia during and subsequent to the
month of January, 1916. This limitation of their terms of reference would have excluded
the breakdown after Ctesiphon. But at the suggestion of the Commission, their terms of
reference were extended, and their striking account of the sufferings of the wounded after
-Ctesiphon finally enabled the truth to break through the tough veil of official reticence.

Medical Personnel.

) 70. We shall refer in another connection to a telegramt sent by the Viceroy to the
‘Secretary of State on August 16th, 1915. But this telegram so well exemplifies the evils

of the system, we are criticising, that we would also direct attention to it here. The facts
-are as follows :—The expeditionary force had, as we have seen, been sent to Mesopotamia
-without a British Stationary Hospital, and the reinforcing Division which arrived
in the spring of 1915 was unaccompanied by hospitals staff or field ambulances for two
out of three of its brigades. In papers which he laid before us, General Duff states that
. owing to shortage of medical personnel it was, and had been, impossible to despatch these
additional medical units. He seems to have thought that these units were not necessary
until the advance to Kut-el-Amara was sanctioned ; but he maintained that the deficiency
“at that date and the impossibility of meeting it ought to have been brought to his

notice by Surgeon-General MacNeece. It is therefore admitted even by the Commander-in-
’ Chief that on the date when the advance to Kut-el-Amara was sanctioned, viz. August 7th,
1915, there was a deficiency in medical personnel in Mesopotamia, which India could not
_ make good from its own resources. Four days after that date, Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed
‘to Lord Hardinge, a comprehensive enquiry as to the need of doctors, nurses, medicines,
_ hospital comforts or anything else, in Mesopotamia. On August 16th the Viceroy replied,
_ deprecating the need for assistance as regards any of these necessaries and added “ My
. Government arranged for doctors and medicines.”” A more completely misleading estimate
_ of the medical situation and of the shortage of personnel, etc., from which the Mesopotamian
_ force was suffering, and about to suffer can hardly be imagined.

Shaikh Saad Hospital Camp.

71. Surgeon-General MacNeece returned to India from Basra, and made his report
to the Indian Government on January 27th. This report was submitted to us and we have

* See Part X., para. 93. fT See para. 82 below.

80 PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
|

D. THe MIsusE oF RETICENCE.

also seen a later document dated February 16th from Surgeon-General conga li
this latter document, which was presented to the Indian Government, occurs the followin,
statement :— |

Shaikh Saad. The Meerut Stationary Hospital is under canvas here, under Major Goodbody, IMs

in excellent order, accommodating 607 cases, including 19 British ; 277 of these are suffering from dysenter
of a mild type. This hospital is worked in a thoroughly efficient manner.

This is the only official reference Surgeon-General Hathaway made to his superi:
concerning Shaikh Saad Camp. Amongst the horrors connected with the medical bres:
down, the condition of this camp up to January 18th, takes a foremost place. It 1s th:
described by the Vincent-Bingley Commission :—

After the occupation of Shaikh Saad on the 9th January, about 2,000 of the wounded were moved to a n:
camp there, the remainder numbering 1,200 being left in a camp on the left bank of the river at Musandaq:
charge of a small medical staff. The condition of the camps at Musandagq and Shaikh Saad have been descrit-.
to us by various witnesses, and we are constrained to find that the arrangements for the accommodation ::
treatment of the wounded there were very defective The medical staff was so small that the wounds of ma:
remained undressed for some days. The camps were in a very insanitary condition. The supply of surgi:
stores and appliances ran short, and there was practically no subordinate staff to see to the welfare of the patier::
The suffering and discomfort endured by the unfortunate wounded in these camps were very great, and ev
up to the 18th January, when the Meerut Stationary Hospital took over charge at Shaikh Saad, this conditu-
of affairs continued there. The Officer Commanding this hospital describes the condition of that camp in ti:
following words :—“ On arrival here we found about 195 British and 800 Indian sick and wounded in an irregul::
camp situated on filthy muddy ground behind the village ... There was one Indian temporary I.M.S. Officer u
charge of the Indians and he was ill. He had two sub-assistant surgeons and some of the personnel of an in:
provised cavalry field ambulance to help him. He had no dressings left, and many cases still had on the fx
field dressings which had been applied on the battlefield. About 200 of the patients had dysentery, and ther
were no proper latrine arrangements. The state of the camp was indescribable. Near the middle of the be
pital tents was a pile of bags of atta, etc., mostly ruined by the rain, which I was told represented 10 day:
rations.”

72. This appalling state of things continued during Surgeon-General MacNeece’s stay at
Basra. Apparently not a word was said to him by Surgeon-General Hathaway as regard:
this condition of things. Surgeon-General Hathaway took the opportunity afforded him
by the enormous improvement which Major Goodbody with the Meerut Stationar
Hospital effected in the camp, and attempted to utilise it to cover up the shocking state ¢:
things which had previously prevailed. Unless the Vincent-Bingley Commission ha:
reported, the state of this camp during the greater part of January would never have bee:
known, and it is impossible to acquit Surgeon-General Hathaway of keeping back th:
unpleasant facts connected with this camp from the knowledge of the Indian Government.

Conduct of Surgeon-General Hathaway.

73. In connection with the withholding of information from Headquarters, we mu:
explain that a very important medium of communication between the chief medic:
officer in Mesopotamia, and the Director of Medical Services in India was afforded by th
demi-official letters which it was customary for the former to send the latter at frequen
intervals. These communications were very regularly resorted to by Colonel Hehir, th
principal medical officer in Mesopotamia upto April, 1915. But Surgeon-General Hathawa'
did not make proper use either of this means, or of more formal reports, for the purpose:
keeping the D.M.S. in India au courant with the situation. In contemporary letters whic!
have been submitted to us, and in his evidence before us Surgeon-General MacNeece com:
plained several times of the manner in which he was kept in the dark by Surgeon-Genet#!
Hathaway as to the medical needs and difficulties of the Mesopotamian Expedition.

—-

74. Indeed, in our opinion, Surgeon-General Hathaway has throughout the campaigt
been the chief offender in the policy of suppressing the unpleasant. He failed to inform the
D.M.S. in India of the often deplorable conditions of the hospitals at Amara and at Orab.
He sent in reports as to the rations of the troops which induced India to believe that 4
plentiful supply of vegetables, fresh meat, etc., was available. We have not seen a single
report by Surgeon-General Hathaway emphasizing the dangers of the existing inadequate
methods of water-purification. Inaformal report to the D.M.S. in the middle of February;
1916, he wrote: “ All water for drinking and cooking purposes is of course got from the river-

This water is absolutely safe, the only precaution being necessary is the sedimet
tation of it as above referred to. The ‘ Wadi’ water is precisely the Tigris water a0
correspondingly safe.” And he had previously referred to some defects in the proces

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 8]

D. THe Misuse oF RETICENCE.

of sedimentation which he said were being rectified so as to meet all requirements. Barely
a month later the Vincent-Bingley Commission were in the country and they report in
strong terms of the inadequacy of the measures taken for purifying the water and
the consequent danger to the troops. The evidence before us strengthens their criticisms
and shows that the defects in water supply caused considerable illness in the forces and
necessitated a large expenditure before it was remedied.

75. We are happy to be able to report that we can find no evidence that the want of
frankness in medical matters continued after the departure from Mesopotamia of Surgeon-
General Hathaway and General Nixon. We believe that Sutgeon-General Treherne,
General Lake, General Aylmer, and the other responsible officers all freely disclosed to
Headquarters the medical defects and dangers with which they had to deal.

Resentment of Criticism.

76. It is also our duty to draw attention to another unpleasant feature in the Meso-
- potamian Campaign, vz., the active intolerance of all criticism of defects or suggestions
for reform. Colonel Hehir was especially asked-by Sir William Babtie, D.M.S. in India,
to give Surgeon-General Hathaway the benefit of his experiences in the earlier phases of
the campaign. At the outset, Colonel Hehir accordingly made suggestions to Surgeon-
General Hathaway, but his action in this respect was so resented that he subsequently
desisted from making even representations, which it was his obvious duty to have made.
Major Carter who, as we have seen was the first to disclose the medical debacle after
Ctesiphon, endeavoured to bring to the notice of the authorities in Mesopotamia, the real
condition of the wounded. On this account he was treated with great rudeness. Surgeon-
General Hathaway, in writing to the D.M.S. in India on this subject says, “ The Army
Commander realising the injustice ordered the D.A. and Q.M.G. and myself to deal with
him (Major Carter), with reference to his objectionable remarks.” And General Cowper,
then D.A. and Q.M.G., told us “I threatened to put him under arrest, and [ said that I
would get his hospital ship taken away from him for a meddlesome interfering faddist.’’
In another part of our Report* we refer to Sir Beauchamp Dufi’s threat to dismiss
General Cowper for sending to India too insistent demands as to the need for River Trans-
port. Such mcidents as these indicate the atmosphere of repression of complaints which
permeated Indian officialdom, and do much to explain the unfortunate suppressions of
truth with which we have dealt in this section.

EK. RESPONSIBILITY OF SECRETARY OF STATE, VICEROY AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

77. The main responsibility for the medical arrangements of the Mesopotamia Campaign
rests upon the Government of India and its officers. According to the division of function
which was laid down by the Home Government, it was only the policy of the expedition
which was to be decided in London ; the management of the expedition was to be in the
hands of the Government of India. We have commented elsewhere upon this division
of function. But since, whether wisely or unwisely, it was adopted, it would be plainly
unreasonable to criticise the India Office for the details of medical administration over
which they attempted to exercise no control. But one general responsibility does belong
to the India Office, or perhaps it would be more proper to say, to the Cabinet. Whatever
preparations were made in Hngland for a Kuropean war before August, 1914, no prepara-
tions were made in India. The Home Government and the Indian Government were
agreed that the greatest military requirements for which it was necessary to make provision
were those which might arise in defending the North-West Frontier, and maintaining the
internal security of India. This policy suggested by the Indian Government was approved
by Lord Crewe in a despatch dated March 20th, 1914. Overseas expeditions of a minor
character might be undertaken, and the Indian Army was to be mobilised so as to make
such a use of the Indian Army possible, but no additional expenditure was to be incurred
in anticipation of such expeditions. Accordingly, when the European War broke out in
August, 1914, it found the Indian Army organisation altogether unsuited for the purpose
of such expeditions as that to Mesopotamia.

The Indian Government was prepared only fora campaign on the North-West Frontier

C 48—176) BG

82 PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

kK. ReEsPonsIBILITY OF SECRETARY OF StTaTE, VICEROY AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

part of the organisation did this limitation of function fall more hardly than on the medical
service. In the all-important matter of medical personnel the establishment was kept
below what would be necessary even for the mobilisation that was intended, because it
was expected that it would be possible to obtain from England whatever additional
personnel was necessary. The personnel was therefore short of the proper establishment,
and the medical equipment was intended only for use in India and on its frontiers.

78. On the outbreak of the war, the Indian Government found it impossible to furnish
the medical personnel required, and made no appeal to England for assistance in supplying
it. It is true that they. had in March, 1914, informed the Secretary of State of the def-
ciencies in medical personnel which would arise in case of mobilisation for war. Further
in a telegram dated July 3rd, 1915, they called the Secretary of State’s attention to their
difficulties in meeting demands for medical reinforcements overseas, and also asked for
sixteen R.A.M.C. officers in order to maintain Force “ D”’ at its ‘‘ authorised strength.”
The Indian Government never, however, explained to the Secretary of State that the
“authorised strength” itself was gravely below what was required in Mesopotamia
Nor was the Secretary of State himself in a position to appreciate this technical fact,
inasmuch as, till the summer of 1916 he had no formal Medical Adviser at the India Office.
Sir Havelock Charles was President of the Medical Board to the India Office, but he had
no Official status as Medical Adviser, and no administrative authority in regard to medical
developments in Mesopotamia. Our evidence is that Sir Havelock Charles was not respon-
sible for the medical telegrams despatched to Mesopotamia, and that these were, like other
military matters, under the supervision of the Military Secretary, Sir Edmund Barrow,
who had of course no special medical knowledge. The Secretary of State was unable
therefore to give as much assistance and guidance to India in medical matters as he might
have done if his office had been better organised. For this reason we welcome Mr. Chamber-
lain’s appointment of Sir Havelock Charles as Medical Adviser in the summer of 1916.

79. The lack of preparation in India for a European war raises a larger question than
concerns only the medical services and is dealt with elsewhere in our Report.* But in
respect to the medical services, it is quite essentially important to realise that this lack
of preparation made the medical equipment of the Mesopotamia Expedition from the
very first scanty and deficient, a deficiency which grew more and more mischievous as the
Mesopotamia Force became more and more numerous. Apart from river hospital
steamers, the want of which had the most calamitous influence on the proper treatment
of the sick and wounded, and apart from the lack of personnel, which ranks next in
importance, there were other deficiencies in equipment, such as water-carts, operating-
tents, ambulance transport and other necessaries.

80. During the whole of the first year of the campaign, that is, up to November, 1915,
while there was no medical breakdown there was an increasing scantiness of medical
provision, with regrettable hardship to the sick and wounded. The margin of security
against breakdown was dangerously slight.

81. The responsibility for the general want of preparation at the outbreak of the war
belongs both to the Home Government and the Indian Government. But the Indian
Government, and particularly the Commander-in-Chief and his advisers, are specially respon-
sible for not realising more completely that the medical provision intended for the North-
West Frontier could not be sufficient or suitable for a campaign on the Tigris. Sir Beau-
champ Duff in his evidence before us, put forward two main arguments in defence of his
administration. He pointed out that the purpose and plan of the Mesopotamian Expedi-
tion were extended by the Home Government, by successive steps taken at very short
notice, from an occupation of the estuary of the Shatt-el-Arab as far as Basra, to an advance
to Ctesiphon on the road to Baghdad. The preparations which were sufficient or at least
not disastrously insufficient for an expedition to Basra, were not sufficient for an expedition
to Baghdad. But this consideration hardly serves as a defence for the Commander-in-
Chief. The medical provision for the expedition was inadequate even fiom the outset,
aud it was the business of the Commander-in-Chief and his advisers to recognise and remedy
this. Moreover, we had evidence that an advance even as far as Baghdad was known by
the Commander-in-Chief to be a contingency as early as December, 1914, and each stage
of the developments of the expedition beyond Kurna (which were precisely the develop-
ments which overstrained the scanty medical provision), were made not merely with his
knowledge and consent, but as a resuit of suggestions by Sir John Nixon in which he con-

* See Parts I. C and XI. D

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 83

E. REsponsIBILITy OF SECRETARY OF STATE, VICEROY AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEEF.

curred. Secondly, Sir Beauchamp Duff argued that he met whatever demands came from
Mesopotamia. This is not quite true, but if it had been, more than this was required of him
and his advisers, the Directors of Medical Services, who successively held office under him.
Their passive attitude was really negligent. To receive demands, to discuss them by
correspondence, to do little or nothing except slowly under the propulsion of Mesopotamian
requests, were not the right methods for meeting a deficiency which was inherent in the
scale of preparation and ought to have been vividly present to the minds of the Commander-
in-Chief and his advisers. From the moment the Mesopotamian Expedition started, and
more and more as it grew in size, the Military and Medical Authorities should have been
not merely responding to demands, but making enquiries, offering suggestions, improving
organisation, and enlarging equipment. But these things they did not do. To distribute
the responsibility exactly between the Commander-in-Chief and the Directors of Medical
services 1s not easy. The direct responsibility is with Surgeon-General Babtie and Surgeon
General MacNeece, but however heavy it may be, the responsibility of the Commander-in-
Chief cannot be light. He was their superior, and authority was in his hands. It is true
that in regard to Surgeon-General MacNeece, he states :—

I had personally warned him in July, in the presence of my Staff at Conference, to go thoroughly into the

question of the adequacy of the Medical arrangements in Mesopotamia. He should have brought to my notice
the demands which had been received, and the impossibility of meeting them.

But such instructions, though good, were not enough. It was the Commander-in-Chief’s
duty in dealing with a matter of such great and continuing importance to satisfy himself
by an active supervision that-his subordinates were not neglecting their instructions. He
must share in the blame of the Military Authorities in India, justly assigned by the Vincent-
Bingley Commission, who say :—

We cannot, however, absolve the Military and Medical Authorities in India from responsibility for many
of these deficiencies, in particular for the continuing neglect to supply the expeditionary force with that separate

transport for sick and wounded, both by land and water, which the teaching of experience has shown to be
essential in a properly organised enterprise of this character.

And to this it may be added that notwithstanding the extreme need of medical per-
sonnel in Mesopotamia the Indian Government retained in India a large supply of Medical
Officers for possible need in case of a war upon the North-West Frontier, or of internal
disturbances. Sir William Babtie and the Commander-in-Chief have both admitted that
in this respect, priority over Mesopotamia was given to India. It appears to us that a
distinction may reasonably be drawn between maintaining the necessary combatant forces
to meet all internal contingencies in India and keeping up to full strength the medical ser-
vices there. As between the potential claims of India and the actual claims of Mesopotamia
in respect to medical provision, it appears to us that the Indian Government might have
attached less weight to the potential claims of India and more to the actual need of
Mesopotamia.

82. Until the beginning of 1916 the Indian Government seem to have been altogether
unappreciative of the real insufficiency of the medical service of Force “D.” This is
shown by the correspondence that took place between Mr. Chamberlain and the Viceroy
in the latter part of 1915. On August 11th the Secretary of State sent the following
private telegram to the Viceroy :—

“Private. Lord-Lieutenant of Hampshire enquires informally whether he can usefully raise funds for sick
and wounded of regiments in Mesopotamia or India. Also whether voluntary aid societies can usefully help.
a doctors, nurses, medicines, hospital comforts required ? Anything else needed? Please telegraph your
reply.

Lord Hardinge told us in evidence that he showed this telegram to the Army Depart-
ment and, he thinks, to the Commander-in-Chief, and that his answer was determined
by the advice he received in consequence. The Commander-in-Chief had no recollection
of the matter and suggested that the answer was framed on the advice of the Director-
General of Indian Medical Services. But as Lord Hardinge definitely said that his answer
was written by the advice of the Commander-in-Chief, and the Commander-in-Chief
professed to no distinct recollection, we think it must be assumed that the Commander-
in-Chief saw, and probably advised, Lord Hardinge’s answer, the more so as they were
constantly in communication and consultation about Mesopotamian affairs. The answer
ran as follows :—

“‘T much appreciate the thought which prompted kind offer of Lord-Lieutenant of Hampshire.* Having
regard, however, to the heavy demands on charity which must arise elsewhere, I am unwilling at present to

* The offer was really on behalf of Lord Northbreok.

(C 48—176) L 2

84 PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

KE. RESPONSIBILITY OF SECRETARY OF STATE, VICEROY AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

take advantage of it. Much voluntary assistance is being afforded from private sources in all directions in
India. Money is ample and sufficient for supplying comforts for sick and wounded in Mesopotamia and in
India. Voluntary aid societies here are doing all that is necessary. Climatic and other conditions render it
undesirable to employ personnel of such societies in Mesopotamia. Arrangements have been made to provide
lady nurses from India, as it is considered that the climatic and other conditions permit. My Government
arranged for doctors and medicines.”

By way of comment on the last sentence, we would note that only a fortnight later,
Surgeon-General Hathaway informed India of a deficiency in his authorised establishment,
amounting to 17 medical officers, and 50 Sub-Assistant Surgeons, a deficiency which was
never completely made up during 1915.

83. On October 9th the Secretary of State telegraphed again, expressing anxiety as to
the health of Force “ D ”’ and especially about precautions in the hospitals against malaria
and the general provision about tropical diseases. Lord Hardinge replied to the Secre-
tary of State’s telegram on October 15th, giving details of the precautions that were being
taken in Mesopotamia against heat-stroke, malaria and dysentery. The information that
was put at his disposal seems not to have been as complete as could be wished :

“ Preventives adopted are purification of water by clarifying and boiling or chlorination, prophylactic
issue of quinine, treatment of mosquito breeding places, supply to all troops, British and native, of mosquito
nets. A sanitary committee for whole force has been formed. . . . British and Indian General Hospitals
at Basra are provided with electric lights and fans and each bed has a mosquito net, but buildings are not
suitable for use of gauze netting.”

The water supplied in Mesopotamia at this time was very far from being satisfactory,
nor was the provision of electric hghts, fans and mosquito nets so complete as Lord
Hardinge’s telegram would suggest.

84. On October 14th Mr. Chamberlain wrote in a private letter as follows :—

‘ Tam most reluctant to appear to convey to you or the Commander-in-Chief any mistrust of the arrange-
ments made by the medical authorities for the troops in Mesopotamia, but owing to reports which have reached
me I felt it necessary to telegraph an enquiry as to the fulness of the precautions which had been taken. . . .
I know that the difficulties must be great, and that it is impossible to foresee every contingency, but I trust
that you will impress upon all concerned that in this matter of health they cannot take too many precautions,
and that we shall not question expenditure required to safeguard the lives of our men.”

85. On October 29th Mr. Chamberlain wrote again :—

‘““T continue to receive from Members of Parliament and others anxious enquiries about the health of
the troops in Mesopotamia and the provision made for them. Inter alia, I have been sent a letter from some
ofiicer there in which he incidentally observes that my statement as to ice and other comforts provided at the
ase hospital ‘ was all eyewash.’ I cannot go behind your assurance that all that is necessary and possible
is being done, and you yourself are necessarily dependent on the reports of the military; but you will
remember how we received the same assurances from military and medical authorities at the time of the
South African War, and yet how much more might, after all, have been done—-at any rate, in the early days
of that campaign. As we must now look forward not only to a prolonged occupation of Mesopotamia, but
to having increased numbers of troops there, I beg that you will take all the steps in your power to stimulate
the ingenuity of the medica] authorities in making provision for their health and for the comfort of the sick.
No expense ought to be allowed to stand in the way of the best provision that science can suggest.”

86. On December 3rd Mr. Chamberlain wrote again in very strong terms :—

“You know how anxious I am about the health of our forces in Mesopotamia. _ Apart from all feelings
of humanity and the duty we owe to those who are giving their lives, men are too precious to be wasted.

‘“T wish to make all allowances for difficulties, perhaps only partly perceived by me, and not known to
my correspondents, but I am very uneasy about the reports that reach me... .

‘““T beg you not to be content with easy assurances. On your advice, comforts, &c., are not being sent
from here, and we shall have no defence if all that is possible is not done.”
It is clear that these letters ought to have led to searching enquiries into the sufficiency
of medical provisions in Mesopotamia.

87. As is natural at this distance of time, Lord Hardinge’s recollection was not very
distinct as to the precise steps he took in consequence of these communications from Mr.
Chamberlain. But we have no doubt that he communicated to the Commander-in-Chief
at any rate in substance, what Mr. Chamberlain had written. We aré afraid there can
equally be nodoubt that the Commander-in-Chief and his staff did not respond to his repre-
sentations with the zeal that the occasion required.

88. The only criticism to be made upon Lord Hardinge in the matter is that, wielding
the supreme authority of Viceroy, he should have forced the Army Department to do
more than it did. He wrote as late as February 18th, 1916, in a private letter to Mr.
Chamberlain this significant sentence :—‘‘ I may mention here that I have at last succeeded

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 85

Ki. RESPONSIBILITY OF SECRETARY OF State, VICEROY AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

in convincing the military authorities that the medical arrangements up the Tigris are as
bad ascan be.” This was, of course, after the calamitous events in December and January ;
and we think that it gravely reflects, not upon Lord Hardinge’s good will or good intentions,
but upon the manner in which he exercised his paramount authority.

89. The attitude of the Commander-in-Chief becomes vividly clear in connection with the
terrible sufferings of the wounded in the retreat after Ctestphon. He was at fi1st naturally
reassured by the very misleading telegram despatched from Mesopotamia on December
7th, on the character of which we have already commented.* But on December 14th,
Major Carter, an officer of the I.M.S., who was in medical charge of a hospital ship plying
between Bombay and Basra, sent to Surgeon-General MacNeece a Report in which,
amongst much other matter, the following sentences occur :—

‘* These were all serious stretcher cases that had lain on the ‘ Medjidich ’ for thirteen days after their first
dressing on the field of battle. Their condition was grave, and the result of an unfortunate train of circum-
stances, the most serious of which was that there ts no distinct river service of hospital steamers used alone for
the conveyance of our sick and wounded in Mesopotamia. On the ‘ Medjidieh ’ alone 28 had died on the journey.”’

And :—

‘ Deaths during the voyage total 14. It is now necessary to explain the markedly increased death-rate
on this the third journey. In the first place, we carried a high proportion of the most serious cases of gunshot
and shell wounds brought by the * Medjidieh,’ the ‘ P. 5,’ the steel boats and smaller steel barges from the
front.

‘* Unless one had actually seen the condition of the wounded on arrival, one could have had no accurate
standard by which to judge the extraordinarily difficult position in which the medical personnel have been
recently placed in Mesopotamia. For example, on the ‘ Medjidieh,’ a small river steamer, it was necessary
to crowd over 600 sick and wounded from November 24th to the evening of December 6th, 1915. The equip-
ment of the field hospitals at the front had to be abandoned to the enemy, and there was practically nothing
left with which to dress wounds or treat medical cases.

“ Everyone seems to consider that it was extremely fortunate that they got away at all. The men were
loud in their praise of the devotion to duty shown by many of the medical oflicers under heavy fire, both in
the field and at the point of attack on the Tigris. There is but little chance of recovery for men with severe
gunshot fractures, who lve on the bare decks of boats and baryes for 13 days, amid septic discharges, diarrhea and
dysentery, swept at night by a wind that dropped nearly to zero, without any protection against the cold, save thesr
clothes and country blankets, which in the cases of total cripples were sodden with ther own discharges and
dejecta.

‘IT write this to protect from hostile criticism by the laity the members of the medical services, who in
these primitive boats and cattle barges have struggled for 13 days against the difficulties of a task that is
happily exceptional in the war history of our Imperial forces. There is no shadow of doubt that the medical
staff who accompanied these sick and wounded from Ctesiphon did all that lay in their power to help and
tend their patients, but it was attempting to make bricks without straw.”

90. This Report was despatched from Bombay on December 14th. On the next day
Surgeon-General MacNeece, who was at Bombay and who had seen and fully conferred with
Major Carter, wrote as follows to Sir Percy Lake, the Chief of the General Staff, in a letter
marked “ Private and Confidential ” :—

““My DEAR Sirk Percy Lake,
_ “* T was in time to see sick and wounded on board hospital ship ‘ Varela’ when she arrived on afternoon
of Monday, and their transfer to local war hospitals and up country by hospital trains.

‘* There were many serious cases, and some fourteen deaths occurred on voyage. Many of the sick British
and Indian, particularly latter, were brought on board in a terrible condition. They had been 17 to 22 days
coming down the river from Ctesiphon. Between Kut and Amara the steamers and barges were stopped
by Arabs, and had to go back three times. Barges and steamers were crowded, sanitary measures were deficient
or wanting, and the men, particularly Indians, lay on the deck suffering from dysentery, passing their motions
under them, and getting large bed-sores. The whole business is bad. The medical authorities were only
given sufficient steamers and barges to turn into hospital ships for 500 casualties (so I am informed); then,
when the crash came, over 4,000 had to be got down any way.

Will you kindly show this letter to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and say that I have been
to the D.R.I.M. and seen the plans for river hospital steamers, and fully approve of the one which is being
forwarded to-day to Army Headquarters, Delhi, for approval, which should be given without delay.”

Sir Beauchamp Duff told us that he had never seen Major Carter’s Report ; but as we have
seen he was made acquainted with the substance of Surgeon-General MacNeece’s letter to
Sir Percy Lake at a Conference on December 23rd.t

91. Meantime, correspondence was still going on between the Secretary of State and
the Viceroy on the general question of the health of the troops in Mesopotanua. And at
the same time rumours were beginning to be heard about the breakdown after Ctestphon.
Lord Hardinge wrote in a private letter to Mr. Chamberlain on December 31st :-—

‘Tam very glad you wrote and told me of the rumours you have heard of unsatisfactory arrangements
in connection with the health and comfort of your troops in Mesopotamia, for [am now, with your letter and

* See Part X., para, 62 et seq. t See Part X., para. 67.

86 PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

KE. RESPONSIBILITY OF SECRETARY OF STATE, VICEROY AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIBEF.

the evidence it contains, able to put pressure upon the Commander-in-Chief, and also upon Sir J. Nixon, who
keeps on reporting that everything is well. It is quite clear to me that all is not well, and I have urzed the
Commander-in-Chief to send somebody to Mesopotamia to perform more or less the same duties as those which
you have explained to me had been carried out by Colonel Lee in Flanders.”

92. Sir Beauchamp Duff was asked by us-—

“In connection with another matter, you spoke of getting to hear that things were not going very well.
At what sort of period did you get to hear through what may be called private channels that the medical arrange-
ments were breaking down !—About the end of December, 1915, I think.”

In answer to further questions, Sir Beauchamp Duff modified this statement by denying
that he had heard anything in unofficial conversation. But he had seen a memorandum
by Major Carter before the battle of Ctesiphon, and had in consequence telegraphed to
Mesopotamia to enquire about the provision of hospital ships. Plans for this were indeed
being discussed. Moreover, at the Conference on December 23rd he had heard Surgeon- .
General MacNeece’s account of the suffering of the wounded after Ctesiphon.

93. Nevertheless, when the Viceroy pressed him to have a full enquirv made, his letter
of December 30th, while assenting to the enquiry, shows in our judgment a very unfortunate
spirit. This letter was the more important, because the reassuring impression which it
conveyed was repeated by the Viceroy in a telegram to London. The letter of December
30th is as follows :—

“I will certainly have the whole matter enquired into and reported on.”’

“Tam quite sure that in India itself and between India and Basra everything is right. The flow of stores,
supplies, and comforts is regular and as complete as we can make it, any deficiencies that may exist being con-
fined to articles for which we are dependent on England and the prompt supply of which we cannot always
ensure. As to what happens beyond Basra I am dependent on official reports. The private complaints
which Your Excellency mentions do not reach me. It is one of the drawbacks of military discipline that
officers will not mention such matters either to me or my Staff lest they should be looked on as throwing blame
on those under whom they have been serving directly. My official reports indicate nothing wrong except the
shortage of river transport which we are straining every nerve to supplement, and even that has only become
a burning question since “ D” Force began to grow larger. I feel sure that everyone in Mesopotamia is doing
his best, but our very long river line is necessarily a great handicap, and we cannot reproduce there French
conditions which are due to good railways, good roads and abundance of motor transport.

** But though I will leave no stone unturned to get at the actual facts, I would ask Your Excellency to
remember that the experience of previous campaigns shows that such complaints are very often exaggerated
by officers making general statements which are really based only on some particular incident. There are
also a good many cases where the fault lies with the complainant himself. For instance, Captain Bowring’s
complaint that on his voyage up the Tigris he and his companions were short of food is clearly one of these.
It was the business of these officers themselves to draw their rations for the voyage before they left Basra.
No Staff can dry-nurse officers who neglect such elementary duties.”

94. This attitude of incredulity about rumours and complaints Sir Beauchamp Duff
maintained and defended before the Commission. He was asked :—

‘The point I wish to put is that for a considerable time, perhaps six weeks or two months, you were in
possession of warnings—the Indian Government were, at any rate—coming from home, and yet your attitude
was incredulous, although you had not made any very drastic inquiry into the matter ?—Our attitude was
somewhat incredulous, certainly.”

and being further pressed, he said :—

‘The reports come in. In every campaign I have seen in my life there are complaints. A large number
of complaints come in, many of which are extremely frivolous. When such reports are sent to you anony-
mously and the names of the people who make the complaints are refused you attach little weight to them.
The moment I get a report with a name I pay strong attention to it. I find going into these anonymous reports
is simply a waste of time.”

He was further asked—
“You would treat a Jetter from the Secretary of State or the Viceroy on that footing ? ”

and replied—

‘Unless the Secretary of State or the Viceroy should supply me with the name of the person who made
the complaint.”

95. We desire explicitly to dissent from the position thus taken up by Sir Beauchamp
Duff. It is, of course, perfectly true that a great many rumours are untrustworthy and a
great many complaints unreasonable; and this untrustworthiness and unreasonableness
form a very good ground for refusing to take administrative action merely because of
rumours and complaints. But rumours that may be an insufficient ground for action may
be a good ground for enquiry. ‘They may be in themselves likely ; they may come from
several sources ; they may recur again and again; or they may be brought to notice bv

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 87

HK. RESPONSIBILITY OF SECRETARY OF STATE, VICEROY AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

me person whose character and position ensure that they deserve attention. These
v1OUS considerations seem to have been absent from Sir Beauchamp Dufl’s mind. Even
giving evidence before us he hardly seemed to feel the crushing significance of the fact
ut the rumours he disdained were true. It ought, in our judgment, to be deeply
pressed on all men of high official authority, that obstinate and exaggerated incredulity
out defects and failures in the administration, over which they have control, 1s in itself
serious and mischievous fault.

96. The language of Sir Beauchamp Dufl’s letter of December 30th to the Viceroy
1ds very unpleasantly in the light of our knowledge of the sufferings that the troops
d endured after Ctesiphon. But it is difficult to say how far his blindness to the
fferings of the troops after Ctesiphon delayed the introduction of effectual improvements.
| that it is safe to affirm is that since, when the truth was fully disclosed, impiovement
is slowly but gradually effected—the sooner tlie full disclosure had been achieved, the
oner improvement. would have begun.

97. The enquiry, to which Sir Beauchamp Duff at the mstance of the Viceroy had
sented, was first intended to be a mission entrusted to Lord Chelmsford and Surgeon-
-neral MacNeece to go to Mesopotamia and look into the state of matters there. But
1en it became confidentially known to the Viceroy and Sir Beauchamp Duff that Lord
ielmsford was to be Lord Hardinge’s successor in the Viceroyalty, it was naturally
cided not to send him on a mission to Mesopotamia, but to send Surgeon-General Mac-
eece alone. The exact nature of his mission is not clear, but in any case it was no ade-
late fulfilment of Sir Beauchamp Dufi’s promise to the Viceroy that he would certainly
ive the whole matter enquired into and reported on, and would leave no stone unturned

get at the actual facts.’’ Sir Beauchamp Duft’s telegram to Sir J. Nixon as to this was
these terms: “ Surgeon-General MacNeece is being sent to confer with you on the general
restion of medical requirements and sanitation of your force and the co-ordination of the
edical requirements of other forces with those of Force ‘D.’” ‘These instructions seem
direct Surgeon-General MacNeece to consult rather than to make any thorough in-
‘stigation. With this vague commission Surgeon-General MacNeece was sent to Meso-
tamia in January, 1916. He did not go further north than Basra, and the enquiries
ade at Basra do not appear to have been of a very searching kind. Perhaps in conse-
tence of his instructions the Report he sent in gave a very inadequate presentation of
iat had actually taken place. He said in evidence before us that he supplemented his
port when he returned to Delhi by conversations with the Commander-in-Chief. How-
er this may be, the upshot was that the Commander-in-Chief came to the conclusion
at further enquiry was called for.

98. While Surgeon-General MacNeece’s enquiry was going on matters were getting
se In Mesopotamia. The sufferings after the January battles were worse than those
dured after Ctesiphon, and it seems that the rumours of what had been endured became
‘onger and stronger. At last it was decided to hold a new and more responsible
quiry and to entrust it to Sir William Vincent and Major-General A. H. Bingley. On
bruary 22nd, 1916, Sir Beauchamp Duff telegraphed to Sir Percy Lake, who had taken
er the command of the Mesopotamia Force, as follows :-—

Terrible stories are being received here as to treatment of wounded after Sheikh Saad and later battles
1 total want of proper medical arrangements. 1 fear a serious scandal is impending and that I shall be com-
led to send out a commission to enquire. It is imperative that all this should be improved before the next
it.

Accordingly the Vincent-Bingley Commission was appointed on March 2nd, but after

that had occurred it is surprising that its terms of reference should have been at first
uted by the Commander-in-Chief, so as to exclude all enquiry into the Battle of Ctesiphon.

99. Our conclusions in regard to the responsibility of the Inaia Office, the Viceroy and
e Commander-in-Chief, may be summarised as follows :—

(a) The Home Government agreed with the Indian Government in limiting
the general military preparations of India before the war in the interests of re-
trenchment, and provision was accordingly not made for such an expedition as
that to Mesopotamia. For the purpose of this part of our subject the importance
of this policy lies in the consequent unpreparedness of the medical services in
India, which was the original source of their failure in the Mesopotamian Campaign.
Further, the deficient organisation of the India Office aud the want of a Medical

38 PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

E. RESPONSIBILITY OF SECRETARY OF STATE, VICEROY AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIE:

Adviser to the Secretary of State in our judgment hindered the India Office giv’
all the assistance that it might have done in the difficulties that arose. Since :|
management of the Mesopotamia Expedition was in the hands of the Indian Gov;
ment until 1t was transferred to the War Office, it does not appear to us that »
responsibility for the medical services further than we have here stated rested with
India Office. We may add that Mr. Austen Chamberlain’s communications to *
Indian Government, so soon as he began to be aware that the medical provision!
the Mesopotamia Campaign was not adequate, are, in our judgment, admirable int:
and. purpose. Had they been responded to in India as they ought to have been. :
medical administration in Mesopotamia would have been improved two or three mor‘ !:
sooner than it was. We only regret that these communications did not at 4°
time take the form of a formal despatch to the Government of India which it wet
have been impossible for the military administration to neglect.

(b) To Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, as Viceroy, belongs the general responsil:'} ,
attaching to his position as the head of the Indian Government, to which :],
been entrusted the management of the Expedition, including the provision of mei] ,
services. In regard to the actual medical administration he appears to us tok]
shown throughout the utmost good will: but considering the paramount authority
his office, his action was not sufficiently strenuous and peremptory.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief was responsible for the well-being of the Arn
Mesopotamia. He should have realised early in the campaign the necessity of enly.
ing and improving the medical provision of the troops fighting in that country, «| .
should have seen that his Directors of Medical Services carried out such a pol | ;
His failure to do so scems to have been due to his preoccupation with other cli'|.
upon the military resources of India, and to his want of knowledge of the true sta‘:
affairs in Mesopotamia. This ignorance would have been removed if he had thou.’
himself able to visit Mesopotamia itself, and would have been mitigated if he cu:
have spent some time at Bombay. But he remained at Simla or at Delhi relying
official reports, and refused to believe in the Mesopotamian deficiencies. He failet
respond quickly and effectively to the alarm raised by the Secretary of State and‘
Viceroy in the autumn and winter of 1915, and to institute such enquiries as the «:
demanded. It is impossible to acquit him of a dereliction of duty in depreca’
evil reports about the medical provision in Mesopotamia at a time when informs'}
was in his office which more than justified the deepest anxicty. !

as fg

pews ee

ee ee eee

KF. SuppLEMENTARY.
Positron since April, 1916.

100. Without going into too many details, we feel we should acknowledge the activ’}
of the medical authorities during the summer of 1916. In India, on the departur
Surgeon-General MacNeece, Surgeon-General Sir Pardey Lukis, 1.M.8., was appon'}
Director of Medical Services and held the post until (in accordance with the unwn'].
law that forbids a Surgeon-General of the I.M.S. to serve as D.M.S., India), Surge} ,
General O'Donnell arrived to take his place. |

101. Sir Pardey Lukis’s term of office was one of energy—much additional hosp’
accommodation was provided, convalescent sections were established both for Bri}
and Indian troops. 16 stationary sets of X-ray apparatus were ordered for military hosp]
in India, the provision hitherto being confined to mobile sets, five of which were now relea:}_
for use in Mesopotamia; electric light and fans were ordered for several hospitals, #
the status of Embarkation Medical Officers at Bombay and Karachi was improved. f-
sanction was received for the increase of the Army Bearer Corps from 9,500 to 14.0".
The Government of India was asked for the first time to purchase motor ambulance ¢*
instead of relying, as hitherto, on private donors.

102. Meanwhile, with an eye to things actually in Mesopotamia, additional stafls ©
despatched for river hospital steamers, active steps were taken to send increased appatil’
for water sterilisation: a special ‘ Mesopotamian” diet for British troops was ara
up and approved ; additional river hospital steamers and barges were ordered from hon

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 89

F. SUPPLEMENTARY.

designs were prepared for ambulance trains on the railways in Mesopotamia then being
constructed ; additional hospitals were asked for and despatched.

103. Altogether the energy displayed and the speed with which new proposals were
carried through compares well with previous conditions.

104. As regards the state of thmgs in Mesopotamia itself, it is evident that Surgeon-
General Treherne, who succeeded Surgeon-General Hathaway as Principal Medical Officer
to Force “D,” dealt energetically and in a businesslike way with the problems facing
him. The health records of the troops during this period show that there was much
cause for anxiety, and that there was much disease, but this was met by good and syste-
matic organisation. The work of the Army Sanitary Committee sent out by the War
Office and supplementing that of the officers on the spot, has undoubtedly been valuable.
Sanitation and the prevention of disease are now properly organised, and appliances of
all kinds are being continually improved, as better transport facilities on the Tigris dis-
tribute the necessary machinery and apparatus. Altogether we believe that the public
may be assured that a new spirit exists in the medical command in Mesopotamia.

Work of Executive Medical Officers.

105. There are two possible misapprehensions of this section of our Report which we
should like to forestall. The first is that the severe criticisms and censures, to which we have
been impelled, imply that the sick and wounded have been systematically and intentionally
neglected. The very contrary 1s the case. We believe that, with the means at their
disposal, and within the limits of their powers, the executive medical officers have
unfailingly spent themselves in alleviation of the sufferings of their patients, and there
have been but few isolated exceptions to this praiseworthy rule. When the disaster of
Ctesiphon was upon him, Surgeon-General Hathaway, whose administrative capacity has
been so seriously called in question by ourselves and the Vincent-Bingley Commission,
took off his coat and worked strenuously at embarking the wounded. The trouble has
been throughout failure to foresee, rather than failure to mitigate, disaster. Speaking of,
perhaps, the worst period of the medical breakdown, the fighting in January, 1916, the
-Vincent-Bingley Commission say “ the evidence before us abundantly proves that, generally
speaking, the energy, kindness and industry of the executive medical officers . . . was beyond
all praise.” We endorse this encomium and would extend it to the whole campaign,
in accordance with the consensus of the witnesses who have appeared before us.

Sanitary and Preventive Work in Mesopotamia.

106. Our second caveat is that we do not wish to be thought to belittle much good work
done by the medical authorities in combating epidemics. Mesopotamia is a hot-bed of
ravaging diseases. Plague, small-pox, cholera, malaria, dysentery and typhus, if not
actually endemic, are always menacing in this swamp-ridden and unsanitated country.
Each one of these diseases appeared amidst the forces, and any one might have decimated
them. On every occasion the efforts of the medical authorities were successful in cir-
cumscribing the epidemic and limiting its incidence. These are not despicable results
for a large force of British and Indian troops accompanied by a horde of oriental camp-
followers and whose headquarters was a Turkish town of some 80,000 inhabitants. But the
indictment against the authorities is not a lack of courage in dealing with disease so
riuch as a lack ef foresight in dealing with the predisposing conditions of disease. In
such matters as water-supply, sanitation, diet, mosquito and sun-protection, &c., the
evidence before both Commissions teems with instances of the failure to take up sufficiently
early the weapons which existed in the armoury of modern science against the ons!aught of
disease Our opinion is that, though the protection of the Mesopotamian [Expedition
against disease was by no means ineflective, it might and ought to have been a good deal
better, if the matter had been earlier taken in hand ona proper scale. The vigour and scope
of the sanitary and preventive measures found necessary by Surgeon-General ‘'rcherne
are the sternest criticism of the omissions of his predecessor, Surgeon-General Hathaway.

We are aware that the rate of sickness was comparatively low in the summer of 1915
under Surgeon-General Hathaway, and that such sick-rate was greatly exceeded in the
summer of 1916 under Surgeon-General Treherne. In this connection we must, however,
remember that the increased aggregation of troops in Mesopotamia doubtless made the
niedical problems of the summer of 1916 more difficult and increased the liability to disease.

(C 48—176) A

90 PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

F. SupPpLEMENTARY.

In view of the unsuitability of the Mesopotamian climate for the purposes of convalescenc:
the policy of shipping to India as many sick as possible was wisely pursued, though it, ¢
course, increased the statistical total of men invalided to India. During the wor:
months of the hot season of 1916 a very large number of officers and men were thus invalid.
to India, though—we are glad to say—this high imvaliding rate rapidly decreas:
as the weather became cooler. But in the battle against disease it is the preparater
work which tells, and if Surgeon-General Hathaway profited by the preparations of Cole:;]
Hehir in the spring of 1915, so Surgeon-General Treberne was bound to suffer from any |.:'}
of preparations by Surgeon-General Hathaway in the spring of 1916.

Statistical Evidence of Colonel James.

107. In this connection we would refer to the able evidence tendered to us alma
at the end of our enquiry by Lieut.-Colonel James, who was appointed Chief Staff Offic
for Sanitation in Mesopotamia early in 1916. Colonel James produced an interesti
series of statistics of admissions to hospitals for sickness in Mesopotamia in the ye
1915-1916, and he compared these with similar statistics for previous campaigns im a mant:
which shows up in a most favourable light the result of the medical authorities’ work:
Mesopotamia. But we do not agree with Colonel James that he has adopted a ii:
criterion. The latest of Colonel James’ compared campaigns was in 1904, the earl:
in 1847. No science has leapt forward more boldly and rapidly in recent years than prev:
tive medicine. Many of the prophylactic and sanitary measures against disease whi.
are now a commonplace were unknown in these earlier campaigns, and they are not, the:
fore, a fair basis for comparison. Jn one sense, indeed, the heavier sick-rates of earl
eampaigns might even be held to aggravate the indictment. We have shown that t:
Indian authorities did not provide sufficient hospitals, personnel and equipment for t:
actual number of patients. But if, as Colonel James would seem to infer, they ought»
have expected a vastly larger number of paticnts, the omission to provide even for ti:
lesser numher is all the more reprehensible.

108. Wedo not, however, ourselves consider that the Indian Medical Authorities show.
have provided for, or be judged by, the sick-rates of ten or twenty years ago. The te:
test is whether the measures taken are considered satisfactory tested by contemporr
standards. Colonel James’ calculated rate of admissions to hospital for sickness in a ye
in 1915-16 is 1,550 per 1,000 of the average strength of the force. If we understa::
Colonel James correctly, this means that, supposing no reinforcements had been sent, in vi:
year every man in the force would have been incapacitated by illness once, and more tl.’
half of the men in the force would have been incapacitated by illness twice. Inot!:
words, the preventive measures adopted would not have succeeded in protecting fn:
disease a single man in the force. We cannot believe that this is a standard, which can *
considered satisfactory, or that it could not have been improved upon by the adoption:
earlier and more energetic measures. In this our opinion is amply confirmed by t:
Report of the War Office Sanitary Commission and the other documents referred *
in para. 104 above. We might add that the backwardness and obstruction of
authorities in Mesopotamia in regard to medical and sanitary reforms is the main subje’
of Colonel James’ own evidence before the Vincent-Bingley Commission.

Neglect to apply to England for Assistance.

109. We have already referred to*¥ a despatch of March, 1914, from the Viceroy to t)
Secretary of State which shows that shortly before the outbreak of war the deficiency «
medical officers in India on mobilisation was placed at 360 and of military assistant surge:
at 246. The figures’ quoted to us elsewhere do not always agree with these, but it is qu!
evident, and, indeed, admitted, that the fuil military force in India could not be mobilised {:
wac without considerable medical] assistance from home. The effect of this was seen intl:
deficiencies in hospitals, personnel and equipment which existed from the first in Mesop¢
tamia and culminated in the disaster after Ctestphon and Sheikh Saad. It appears to u.
therefore, extraordinary that not only was assistance in medical personnel and equipme
not asked for from England ona large scale during the first. year of the operations in Mesope-
tarnia, but that, as we show elsewhere,f in August, 1915, such assistance was actually refused
by the Indian Government. The Viceroy informed us that no shortage was reported t'
him. But the deficiencies on mobilisation had been known to the Indian Government {¢’
years. The Commander-in-Chief and the D.M.S. appear to have been actuated by tli
belief that nothing could be spared from England. Some ground for this belief is afforde:’

* See Part X., para. 78. { See Part X., para. 82.

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 91

EF. SuPPLEMENTARY.

by the pessimistic tone of a demi-official letter from Sir A. Keogh to Surgeon-General
MacNeece in August,1915. But it can hardly be urged that so vital an omission by the
Indian Government in a matter for which they were responsible can be excused on the
grounds of chance expressions in a semi-private letter. Sir Alfred Keogh, who was
Director-General of Medical Services, War Office, himself gave evidence before us
that during 1916 all demands made upon him were met, and that he “ could have complied
with any demands made upon him at any time since the beginning of the Mesopotamian
Expedition.”’ Moreover, the onlydemand made to England for medical personnel before
the battle of Ctesiphon (viz., on July 4th, 1915, for 16 R.A.M.C. officers) was promptly
met, although the demand itself was couched in a form which gave no adequate indica-
tion of the deficiencies existing im Mesopotamia. We feel therefore that a grave
responsibility rests with the Indian Government for not formally and fully placing the
deficiencies in medical personnel and equipment before the home authorities and requesting
assistance on an adequate scale.

Voluntary Aid from England

110. We note with satisfaction the anxiety of various non-official bodies to help in
Mesopotamia, and our evidence testifies to the liberality of the British and Indian com-
munities in India, the activity of the Indian Branch of the St. John Ambulance Association,
and the good work done by the Indian Soldiers’ Fund, and other bodies on similar lines.

Some of our evidence on this point suggests that offers of voluntary aid were not too
well received, but Lord Hardinge strongly maintains the contrary view. One regrettable
failure to profit from voluntary assistance there can be no doubt about. The joint War
Committee of the British Red Cross Society and Order of St. John in London have been
active in Mesopotamia since the beginning of 1916; on July 17th, 1915, however, they
cabled to Sir John Nixon :—

Can British Red Cross help in any way with hospital supplies for your force ?

Acceptance was confined to two petrol-driven motor launches. The offer was repeated
on December 28th, and a reply sent :—

Nothing required at present. If anything needed in future will not hesitate to ask you.

A startling answer in view of the recent breakdown after Ctesiphon.

Shortage of ordinary River Transport and Extent to which tt excuses the Medical Breakdown.

111. There are passages in the evidence of Lord Hardinge, Surgeon-General Hathaway
and other responsible witnesses which might lead to the inference that the medical
breakdown in Mesopotamia was due to the shortage of ordinary river transport, for which,
of course, the medical authorities were not responsible. If this were true, it would
follow that the medical authorities must be relieved of blame for the results of the break-
down. We cannot agree with such a contention. No doubt the medical work, in
common with every other branch of administration, was seriously hampered by
the lack of river transport, and this lack may have been the immediate cause of some
of the sufferings of the wounded on particular occasions, as, for example, when, early in
1916, it was found impossible to send up to the front with sufficient promptitude ambu-
lances and transport which were actually at Basra. But many of the principal factors in
the sufferings of the sick and wounded were not, or need not have been, materially affected
_by the shortage of river steamers. It was not such shortage which prevented sufficient
doctors, assistant surgeons and sub-assistant surgeons being sent to.the expedition up to

the end of 1915, and yet the insufficiency of medical personnel was one of the worst features
inthe hardships, not only on the battle-field, but also on the journey down the river,
notably after the retreat from Ctesiphon. It was not the shortage of river transport which
prevented the expedition from being supplied in 1915 with sufficient hospitals; nor, as
the Viceroy himself pointed out, could the insufficiency of river transport justify the

omission to send to the front a proper supply of such unbulky necessaries as bandages,
dressings and drugs.

112. In our opinion, the known shortage of ordinary river transport, if anything, aggra-
vates rather than palliates the omissions of the medical authorities. If the ordinary boat-
service had been adequate for the sick, there might have been some excuse for omitting
to provide special river hospital steamers, but the ordinary boat service was known to be
Inadequate.

(C 48--176) M 2

92 | PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

F. SuPPLEMENTARY.

113 Similarly the device of eking out insufficient hospital accommodation by using
the field ambulances as hospitals might have been less reprehensible, if it had been possible
promptly to send all field-ambulance patients down river when necessary. But the
inadequacy of transport upset all certainty of the proper evacuation of the field
ambulances, with the result that they became congested with patients. In fact, the
known lack of river transport accentuates, but does not excuse, the unwisdom of
resorting to this practice.

114. Even in the case of the ambulances of the reinforcing divisions from France left
behind at Basra, the difficulties of insufficient transport might have been largely overcome
if the authorities in Mesopotamia had at an early date explained the situation to the
authorities despatching the reinforcements, and had asked for the field ambulances to le
sent on in advance so as to provide sufficient time for their conveyance to the front. But
this was not done; and the omission is significant of the prevailing lack of foresight and
organisation. Even in such an obvious matter as detailing an embarkation officer to se
to the proper despatch of medical equipment, stores, etc., nothing was done till quite
late in the campaign, and there are numerous instances of such equipment having failed
to reach its destination, owing to the packages being insufficiently labelled or improperly
packed in the steamers.

115. That the lack of ordinary river transport was not the principal cause of the suffer.
ings of the wounded is also proved, as Sir Beauchamp Duff points out, by the great improve
ment which is noted by the Vincent-Bingley Commission and other witnesses in March,
1916. At that time the amount of river transport was proportionately no greater than it
had been during the breakdown after Ctesiphon and Sheikh Saad; but the organisation
had been improved and the personnel had been increased, with the consequences that the
sufferings of the wounded were very materially decreased. We are convinced that very
much of the avoidable sufferings of the sick and wounded in Mesopotamia was due, not s0
much to lack of ordinary river transport as to the lack of organisation and foresight.
The difficulties of river transport were present from the first and should have stimulated
the prevision and resourcefulness of the medical authorities ; but instead, as we have sect.
they remained supine, until galvanised into unavailing action by the disasters which at
once disclosed their incompetence and aroused their fears.

Frequent Changes in Occupancy of Office of D.M.S. India.
116. Between the summers of 1914 and 1916 no less than four individuals have held th:
post or administered the duties of D.M.S. in India—vz., Sir W. Babtie, Surgeon-Geners:
MacNeece, Sir Pardey Lukis and Surgeon-General O’Donnell. Few systems of administr::
tion, even if good in themselves, could in time of war sustain the strain of such rapid ais

location of supreme authority.

Responsibility for Provision of Medical Necessities.

117. It has been made clear to us that, according to the existing system and regulations,
the higher military medical authorities themselves only directly provide doctors, nurses,
instruments, drugs and dressings. All other things required for the medical treatment
of the sick and wounded, or for their transport (many of these special to the medical service)
have to be provided by and obtained from other departments often busy with the necds

of combatant branches.

118. It is well known that the scientific treatment of sick and wounded has advanced
by leaps and bounds of recent years, and we need not argue that any appliances or arrange:
nents tending to assist or accelerate the healthy restoration of those in hospital to the
Army or to civil life, are of national importance. The question, therefore, suggests itsel
whether the higher medical authorities should not in future be given greater responsibility
as regards the purchase and provision of these matters. It 1s true that the Mesopotamm
Campaign has not redounded greatly to their credit, but at the same time, it 1s clear that
their difficulties were increased by the failures of other departments. We refrain from
making a definite recommendation on this matter, recognising that very considerable
experience elsewhere than in Mesopotamia is now available for guidance, but we think the
time is ripe for the re-examination of the practice that has obtained hitherto, and that the
distribution of responsibility amongst four departments, each of whom has to provide
something, without which the contributions of the other three may be rendered futile,
is an unwise application of collective effort.

PART X._MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 98

F, SUPPLEMENTARY.
: Major R. M. Carter, 1.MS.

t 119. Before we leave this part of our report we wish to express our appreciation of
ithe evidence given and the work done by Major R. M. Carter, I.M.S. He by his persistence
‘brought to the notice of his superiors the terrible condition of the wounded when they
‘arrived at Basra after Ctesiphon, and in other ways he revealed shortcomings which might
have beea ignored and left unremedied. His sense of duty seems to be most commendable,
and he was fertile and resourceful in suggesting remedies.

G. MrepicaL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

FINDINGS. Findings.
We find that :—

120. The medical provision for the Mesopotamia Campaign was from the beginning
insufficient ; by reason of the continuance of this insufficiency there was a lamentable
breakdown in the care of the sick and wounded after the battle of Ctesiphon and after the
battles in January, 1916; there was amelioration in March and April, 1916; but that
since then the improvement has been continual, until it is reasonable to hope that now the
‘medical provision is satisfactory.

121. The defects of medical provision caused avoidable suffering to the sick and
wounded, and during the breakdown in the winter of 1915-16 this suffering was most
lamentably severe.

122. The deficiencies, which were the main causes of the avoidable suffering of the
sick and wounded, were in the provision of the following :—

(a) River hospital steamers,
(b) Medical personnel.

(d) Ambulance land transport.

To these fifth and sixth main causes may be added in respect to the operations in

January, 1916 :— |

| (ec) The absence of the medical and supply establishments of the 7th Division.
(f) The premature efforts to relieve Kut in consequence of the erroneous estimate

of supplies in that place.

123. As to personal responsibility, the Vincent-Bingley Commission found—

That a grave responsibility for that part of the suffering which resulted from avoidable circumstances
rests with the Senior Medical Officer of the Force, Surgeon-General G. H. Hathaway, and with General Sir
John Nixon, the General Officer Commanding the Force, from April 9th, 1915, to January 19th, 1916. General
Hathaway did not represent with sufficient promptitude and force the needs of the services for which he was
responsible, and in particular failed to urge the necessity for adequate and suitable transport for the sick and
wounded with that insistency which the situation demanded. General Nixon did not, in our opinion, appreciate
the conditions which would necessarily arise if provision for the sick and wounded of his force were not made
ou a more liberal scale.

We endorse the finding as regards Surgeon-General Hathaway, who in our judgment
showed himself unfit for the high administrative office which he held. We may add,
however, as regards River and Land Transport, that, while it was the duty of Surgeon-
General Hathaway to urge its necessity, it was actually the duty of the Quartermaster-
General’s Department and Sir John Nixon’s staff to see that it was provided.

So far as Sir John Nixon is concerned, however, we think that he was throughout
solicitous as to the condition of the wounded. The main mistake he made was to rely
too absolutely on the statements made to him by his Deputy Director of Medical Service,
Surgeon-General Hathaway ; to that extent he may be blamed, but he stands, so far as
responsibility 1s concerned, in a very different position from that occupied by Surgeon-
General Hathaway.

124. The officer directly responsible for the deficiencies of medical provision in Meso-
potamia is, however, the Director of Medical Services, India. This appoitment was held
wut the beginning of the war by Surgeon-General Sir William Babtie, who held the
office between March, 1914, and June, 1915, but was away from India for six weeks
in February and March, 1915. He was succeeded by Surgeon-General J. G. MacNeece
on July 8th, 1915, and the latter proceeded home on sick leave on April 15th, 1916.
Sir William Babtie in his evidence before us impressed us as an officer of ability and °
knowledge, but we do not think that he brought these qualities sufficiently to bear

94 | PART X.—_MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.

G. MrpicAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

upon the task before him. He accepted obviously insufficient medical provision without
rotest and without any adequate effort to improve it. He cannot therefore be held
lameless.

125. Surgeon-General MacNeece did not give evidence before the Vincent-Bingley
Commission, but he appeared before us. He was, in our opinion, an officer thoroughly
desirous of fulfilling the duties assigned to him; but he was a man of advancing years
and diminishing strength, unequal to the position ‘he was called upon to fill, and his admuinis-
tration appears to us to show no signs of the vigour and efficiency that were required.

126. We find that :—

(a) The Home Government agreed with the Indian Government in limiting their
general military preparations of India before the war in the interests of retrenchment,
and provision was accordingly not made for such an Expedition as that to Mesopo-
tamia. The limitation of medical preparation and the low standard of medical
treatment in the Indian Army at the outbreak of war were the natural outcome of
this policy, which was pursued for many years, and was in force right up to the date
of the war.

(b) The private letters of the Secretary of State to the Viceroy showed an
earnest and continuous anxiety as to the condition of the wounded, and the only com-
ment that can be made upon the Secretary of State’s procedure is that he did not
fully utilise the official powers at bis disposal for the purpose of forcing at an earlier
period an investigation into the treatment of the wounded in Mesopotamia.

(c) To Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, as Viceroy, belongs the gencral responsi-
bility attaching to his position as the head of the Indian Government, to which
had been entrusted the management of the Expedition, including the provision of
medical services. In regard to the actual medical administration he appears to us
to have shown throughout the utmost good will, but considering the paramount
authority of his office, his action was not sufficiently strenuous and peremptory.

(d) A more severe censure must be passed upon the Commander-in-Chief, for
not only did he, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army in India, fail closely to superin-
tend the adequacy of medical provision in Mesopotamia, but he declined for a
considerable time, until ultimately forced by the superior authority of the Viceroy,
to give credence to rumours which proved to be true, and failed to take the measures
which a subsequent experience shows would have saved the wounded from avoidable
suffering.

127. There has been misuse of official reticence as to medical defects and the
sufferings of the sick and wounded.

128. While the protective and sanitary work of the Medical Administration
has in certain directions and at some periods (notably under Colonel Hehir) been com-
mendable, yet there has not been generally sufficient promptitude in taking the precautions
d ctated by modern science for the protection of the troops 2gainst disease.

129. Throughout the campaign (with insignificant exceptions) the exccutive and
regimental med cal officers and personnel have devoted themselves with unremitting
kindness, zeal and industry to the | care of the sick and wounded with such means as were
at their disposal.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

130. The evidence put before us indicetes the necessity for certain inmediate changes
in the existing system of medical organisation in India, which we propose to enumerate.
We are of the opinion that :—

(a) The Director of Medical Services in India, in war-time especially, should have
far greater powers, than he at present possesses to authorise expenditure and make
purchases, and to delegite such power to his subordinates. The present elaborate
system of financial check and counter-check, and correspondence with other military
departments, before what is wanted can be obtained has proved from its dilatoriness
a real danger in war-time.

(b) Whenever an expedition is sent over-seas from India, responsible officers
should at once be located at the Port of Embarkation, with wide power to act.
We have referred elsewhere to the fact that the Commander-in-Chief never visited
Bombay during the crisis of the campaign. Some of his staff did do so, but their visits

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 95

G. MepicaL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

were spasmodic, and in no case had these officers power to give orders or settle impor-
tant questions without further reference to Simla or Delhi. Further, all power being
concentrated at Headquarters, the ruling authorities deprived themselves of the
value of being in constant touch with those going to,or returning from ,Mesopotamia.
If it was true as alleged that the Headquarter Staff at Simla were tied to their secre-
tariat work there, the Bombay Government was on the spot and common-sense would
have suggested the delegation of authority to a Government so conveniently situated.

(c) At the Port of Embarkation the embarkation staffs should be responsible for
seeing that the equipment and personnel of each medical unit should not be separated
in different vessels, but embarked together in the same vessel. This rule was frequently
neglected at Bombay.

(d) There should be an immediate and general improvement in the whole standard
of comfort and accommodation in the hospitals for British troops m India. Surgeon-
General MacNeece stated “‘ even now there are practically not more than 2 or 3 up-to-
date military hospitals in India.” We are glad to note that the new war hospitals
in Bombay are reported by the Vincent-Bingley Commission as bearing favourable
comparison with any similar hospitals in the United Kingdom. This shows what can

be done in India when there is impulse to reform. We think it discreditable to the -

Indian Government that the general standard of hospitals in India should fall below
the standard of efficiency now demanded in Military Hospitals at home. To assist in
reforming this state of things, we think that the R.A.M.C. or a corps on similar lines
should be available for service in all British Hospitals in India, and that a better and
more complete female nursing service should also be organised.

(ec) As regards the medical treatment of Indian troops, no time should be lost m
substituting a Station Hospital system for the present regimental treatment, ‘ I doubt,”’
one I.M.S. witness says to us, ‘‘ whether you gentlemen would consider that the Sepoys’
hospitals in peace time in India are hospitals at all.” Sir Havelock Charles described
them as “a disgrace to the Government of India.” Surgeon-General MacNeece
states “there are no well-equipped operating theatres, X-ray rooms, laboratories, etc.”’
and Sir William Babtie,“ they are so bad that I think it would be necessary to reform
them ab initio.” The new Indian hospitals should be staffed by enlisted personnel
of all ranks, and should be used for building up trained reserves of menial establish-
ments in peace time.

(f) All deficiencies usually allowed to prevail in peace-time in the mobilisation
equipment of general hospitals should be made good. Sir W. Babtie told us that of
the general hospitals in India, “ Twelve were supposed to be mobilisable, but only
four were complete in all the different Departments of supply.”’ AJl such equipment
should be stored and in readiness, and inspected, as is done now in the case of field
ambulances, casualty clearing hospitals and stationary hospitals.

(g) Base Depéts of Medical Stores should be reintroduced into the Indian Field
Service organisation and kept ready for mobilisation.

(h) At the outset of every campaign there should be provided a separate superior
sanitary organisation and staff charged with the arrangements for preserving and safe-
guarding the health of the fighting troops, and responsible to the Principal Medical
Officer of the force, but otherwise entirely separate from the organisation for the care
of the sick and wounded ‘This implies a formation in peace time of an adequate
reserve of sanitary officers enlisting in it, if necessary, the services of specialists mm
civil employment.

(2) The Field Service Ration should receive very careful reconsideration and altera-
tion in the light of experience in Mesopotamia. This especially applies to the rations
for Indian troops. The War Office Sanitary Committee found that even ‘“‘ the improved
ration’ sanctioned as late as October last was deficient in many respects.

The above are only some of the defects revealed by our investigations, but they
are sufficient to prove the necessity for an urgent, and thorough reform by the Indian
Government of the whole system upon which their medical services are based, and
under which they are controlled. Sir Alfred Keogh, whose administration at the War
Office as Director-General, Army Medical Services, has been very successful during
this war, at the conclusion of his evidence made the following very strong statement :—

I have no hesitation whatever in saying that the medical arrangements connected with the Army in
India have been for years and years most disgraceful. I say that with a full sense of responsibility.
I have served many years in India. I have not been there for some time now, but in my opinion things
are not better than they were. Anything more disgraceful than the carelessness and want of attention
with regard to the sick soldier in India it is impossible to imagine. by

96 PART XI.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

A. DIvIsIon oF RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAMPAIGN.

CAMPAIGN IN MESoPoTAMIA—"“ No Man’s CHILD.”

1. In the story of the military successes and reverses of this campaign, there con-
stantly crops up almost from the day of the landing of the force, evidence of shortage
of transport of all kinds, of the antiquated equipment of the troops, of grave deficiencies
in medical personnel and material, occasional shortage of rations at the front, and a great.
if not total, lack of comforts. To use a current expression, the force from the first was
““ill-found ” to meet the privations and hardships inseparable from campaigning in
Mesopotamia, and as its numbers increased bad went to worse. General Gorringe grapli-
cally gave expression to the feeling which he considered pervaded the force, when he said:
‘“ It was believed to be a side-show and ‘no man’s child.’”? Though these colloquialisn:
undoubtedly err on the side of exaggeration, it is impossible to deny that there was som
foundation for them. Indeed, in a sense such haphazard expressions go right to the roc
of the causes of the failures and reverses, as will become apparent when we investigate
why this expedition did not receive from either of the great military supervising staffs in
London or Simla that care and attention, which were necessary to surmount the exceptional
difficulties of climate and country which it had to encounter.

2. When the war broke out in 1914, there were in the British Empire two greai
military administrative organisations—one in England, the other in India, at Simla. In
our self-governing Dominions such as Canada, Australasia, New Zealand and South Afnica
there were self-supporting local forces under the control of their respective Governments.
But the War Office in London and the military departments at Simla were the only con-
plete military organisations equipped for the planning, despatch, control and supply ci
expeditions beyond their respective territories 6ver the sea. As a preparation for such
operations, the Intelligence Department of each of these organisations had assigned to tt
certain territories within and concerning which it had to collect and collate topographica:
and other information during times of peace, the assumption clearly being that the arees
so defined for purposes of information would, in the event of their becoming theatres {0
warlike operations, be under the control of the organisation which had previously collected
the information.

3. Under this arrangement, Asia was divided between the Imperial and Indian Wa
Intelligence Departments. It is inadvisable to give the details of this delimitation ;
will be sufficient for our immediate purpose to state that a line was drawn through Arabi:
from Akaba to Basra, all north of that line belonging to Whitchall, all south to Simi.
Basra wit thus given to Indie, Mesopotamia to Great Britain—a somewhat confuse:
division of responsibility, inasmuch as Basra must inevitably become the base of an’
operations in Mesopotamia from the Persian Gulf. The collection of information relat:
to Persia fell within the duty of the Indian Intelligence Department, and the whole «
the Persian Gulf is patrolled by war vessels, which are under the control and policy 0
the Indian Government. Mesopotamia, being at the head of the Persian Gulf, was nei
looked upon by the War Office as an area requiring their special attention, as it was with
the radius of action of India, though outside their sphere of intelligence. The Simla Intell
gence Department had not before 1914 prepared schemes for military operations north ¢:
Basra. The likelihood of a war with Turkey in alliance with Germany did not, previow:
to that date, seem to India to be a reasonable probability. It was also asserted by 5!
Beauchamp Duff that, in order to prevent overlapping, there was an understanding thi!
the Whitehall Intelligence Department would take Mesopotamia in hand, and that the:
deprecated the Indian Authorities preparing plans for a campaign in that country. Th
information which Whitehall had collected about the country was, however, sent t
India and Mesopotamia.

4. In addition to these two Military Organisations there is a Military Departmen!
at the India Office under the authority of the Secretary of State for India, and with whe<
advice he controls and decides the gencral military policy of India, but this department }
not organised for the purpose of directly managing a campaign. It was, however, throu!
the instrumentality of this Department that the Mesopotamian campaign was started.

5. At the beginning of the war, from an Intelligence and General Staff point of vier.
Mesopotamia was “no man’s child,” or rather, was the foster-child of both Simla and
Whitehall, the acknowledged child of neither. The War Office had its own gigantic task

PART XI.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT 97
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

A. DIvIsION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAMPAIGN.

of expanding a small army int? one of national dimensions, and at the same time of
organising a series of expeditions abroad, towards which the Indian Military Authorities
were compelled to contribute largely both in the shape of pers»nnel and material. Simla
had, in addition to the task of providing these Oversea Expeditions, to guard against the
ever-present danger of attacks on the North-West frontier and a recrudescence of disafiec-
tion instigated by German agents and money in parts of India. It was only in September,
1914, after the contributions of India to the expeditions to France, Egypt and Kast Africa
had been settled, and their military establishments thus depleted, that the Secretary
of State for India directed from Whitehall the Indian Government to send a brigade to
the head of the Persian Gulf.

6. The subsequent correspondence clearly shows that the Indian Government was at
first lukewarm on a proposition which it did not originate. The scope of the expedition
grew, and its numbers increased, continuing to make a constant drain upon Indian
resources. So reluctant were the Government of India to comply with these increased
demands that in March, 1915, it was only under compulsion of a mcst imperative order from
Whitehall that the reinforcements necessary to bring up the force to a strength of two
Divisions were sent. This reinforcement secured victory and firmly established the
expeditionary force. Sir John Nixon assumed command in April, 1915, and took out with
him the Orders previously referred to, which included instructions to prepare (1) A plan
for the effective occupation of Basra Vilayet, and (2) A plan for the subsequent advance on
Baghdad.

7. The objects of the expedition up to this time had been defined to be (1) that it
would checkmate Turkish intrigues, (2) that it would encourage the Arabs to rally round
us and confirm the Sheiks of Muhammerah and Koweit in their allegiance, and (3) that it
would protect the oil installation at Abadan. But these objects were not so precisely
limited that they could not be expanded, so as to cover operations much more extensive
than were originally contemplated by the Home Government. Almost from the very
outset of the expedition, the political importance of occupying Baghdad was urged by Sir
Percy Cox, the Indian Government’s agent in the Persian Gulf. The political officers on
the spot, in Simla and in Whitehall, both at the Foreign Office and the India Office, all at
various times gave expression to a similar view, and it may be that the successive advances
from Basra to Kurna, Kurna to Amarah, and Amarah to Kut, though put forward as
necessary defensive operations, were partially prompted by this ambition. During the
later of these advances, the attitude of the India Office was one of reluctant acceptance of
the forward movements advocated by Simla. Simla and Whitchall were not pulling well
together. Up to this date no full and frank exchange of opinion seems to have taken
place either as to the scope and aim of the expedition, or as to the preparation and expendi-
ture necessary to ensure its success.

8. During the first months of this campaign the India Office was stimulating the Indian
Government to greater exertion by ordering them to send out additional troops. So soon
as the troops sent out amounted to two Divisions, then the réle was reversed, and it was
the Indian Government who were constantly pressing upon the Home Authorities the
necessity of advance. Sir John Nixon in his evidence before us criticised—and we think
with justice—the discrepancy between his Orders of March 24th, 1915,* and the telegraphic
criticism of his operations sent him a month later by the Secretary of State.

9. The Mesopotamian Expedition was one which during the early operations requircd
the closest attention. It was only hy a careful study of the abnormal nature of the con-
ditions, under which any lengthened campaign would have to be carricd on, that the in-
herent difficulty of establishing a reliable base at Basra could be overcome. Even if the
base had been consolidated and made effective, there still remained the difficulty of
providing steamer transport of a special character and if sufficient steamer transport could
not be obtained in a given time, then railroads became a necessity. But the improvement
of the harbour and the building of railroads meant permanent, and possibly unremunerative,
outlay, and no matter what the outlay might be, it could not give an immediate response
in the shape of improved communication. Makeshifts and hand-to-mouth contrivances
therefore became the ordcr of the day, as they gave at a Icss immediate expenditure a
quicker though ephemeral return.

* See’ Part IV., para. 2
(C 48—176) N

98 PART XI.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

B. Fautty ORGANISATION OF INDIAN MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.

10. During recent years certain important changes had been made in the highest
branch of Indian military administration, and certain influences were at work, which,
in our Judgment, were detrimental to the efficient supervision of this or any Oversea
Expedition. Up to 1905 there had been two high officials in charge of the administrative
and executive work of the Indian Army—namely, the Military Member of Council and the
Commander-in-Chief. By “Indian Army” we mean Indian Military Establishments, as
there is always a large proportion of the British Army stationed in India, and these troops,
so long as they are there, are upon the Indian establishment. The Military Member of
Council was in charge of what we may designate the administration of the Army, and it
was through him that the demands of the Commander-in-Chief for the Army came to the
Viceroy’s Council, though the Commander-in-Chief himself was an extraordinary Member
of that Council. Whatever may have been the drawbacks of this system, it had the advan-
tage that by this division of work, the Commander-in-Chief was free to perform his
important executive duties of inspection, and of reviewing and testing the efficiency and
wants of the troops under him, while the Military Member remained at the seat of
Government.

11. The Military Member was abolished, and in his place a Supply Member was ap-
pointed as one of the Viceroy’s Council. This post was, however, extinguished a short
time after its creation. Thus, the whole of the administrative and executive work of the
Army became concentrated in the hands of one man, who has a duality of responsibility,
for he is both Military Member of Council and Commander-in-Chief. Being the only
military representative on the Viceroy’s Council it is his duty to be present at the meetings
of the Executive Council. The two Army Departments, namely, that of which the
Commander-in-Chief in his capacity as such is the head, and that of which the Commander-
in-Chief in his capacity as Military Member of Council is also the head, are both permanently
located in Simla.

12. While there is centralisation at the head of the administration, a cumbrous
dualism remains below. These two Departments, though under the same individual, are
kept separate and distinct, and they are separately maintained in order to give substance
to the fiction that one person is two persons. The Commander-in Chief, in his capacity
as Commander-in-Chief, may think and order something in his department which in his
subsequent capacity as Military Member in another Department he may hke to unthink
and counter order. The procedure under this unique form of military administration
was described to us by Mr. Brunyate, the Financial Secretary to the Government of India.
He had been for some years Financial Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief and Military
Member of Council, and is a high expert upon the procedure which this dual system entails.
His evidence was so clear and explicit that we reproduce it verbatim. When asked to
give a concrete case of how a paper relating to a proposal for Army equipment would pass
through the two Departments, he replied :-—-

The Quartermaster-Gencral, it may be supposed, wishes to have more mules. Probably before putting
forward the proposal at all he sees the Commander-in-Chief personally as Commander-in-Chief, and ascertains
from him that he is willing to have that proposal ventilated. He then writes a note stating his facts, probably
supported by a note by the Director of the Army Kemount Department, makes a defimte recommendation,
estimates the cost and marks his note to the Army Department of the Government of India. The office clerks
of the Army Department note on the case, the Assistant Secretary notes, the Deputy Secretary may note, and
it reaches the Army Secretary—we will call him General Holloway, though he 1s not actually Army Secretary
now. He criticises the proposal if he thinks fit.... The Office of the Financial Adviser then note upon
it. ... The clerks in the Finance Adviser's office note, the Assistant or Deputy Financial Adviser notes,
and the case then comes to the Financial Adviser, now Mr. Fell. Mr. Fell may be prepared at once to accept
the proposal on behalf of the Finance Department, and may intimate that he does not intend to refer it to the
Finance Member. The file then goes back to the Army Secretary, and in that case he at once arranges for the
necessary orders to be issued to give eflect to the Quartermaster-General’s proposal, unless he thinks the case
of sufficient importance to refer it to the Army Member.

Such reference will, of course, practically always be required if the proposal is one requiring the sanction
of the Secretary of State. In that case the Army Secretary would take the Army Member's orders at this stage,
and a despatch to the Secretary of State would then be drafted in the Army Department. . . . Or again,
Mr. Fell, when the case first reached him, might have criticised the proposal, and indicated a desire to see it
modified or rejected. In, that case the file would still go back to the Army Secretary, and he would doubtless
at that stage take the orders of the Army Member unless before doing so he wished to have the opinion of
the Quartermaster-General on the criticisms and sugyvestions which had been made in the Military Finance
Branch. Mr. Fell, when criticising the proposal would probably have indicated whether he intended to refer
the case eventually to the Finance Member. Thus when the Army Secretary brought these criticisms before
the Army member, the latter would know that if he decided to over-ride the Financial Adviser’s criticisms,

PART XI.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT 99
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

B. Fautty ORGANISATION OF INDIAN MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.

he might have to face opposition from the Finance Member. The Army Member would then pass his orders.
If he adhered to the scheme as put forward by the Quartermaster-General and the Army Department he would
record a note to that effect. The file would then go back to the Financial Adviser, and the latter would not
note again, but would submit the case to the Finance Member. If the Finance Member decided not to press
the objections raised by Mr. Fell, the proposal would become a fully accepted proposal, and orders would
be issued for putting it into effect. If, however, the Finance Member definitely objected to the scheme, the
case would then go back to Mr. Fell for return to the Army Secretary for re-submission to the Army Member.
The Army Member might then defer to the Finance Member's objection, in which case the whole prorosal
would be dropped with the Army Member’s concurrence, though a reluctant concurrence. If, however, the
Army Member, in spite of the Finance Member’s objections, considered that the proposal was a necessary one,
he would intimate to the Army Secretary that the case should be referred to His Excellency the Viceroy, under
our Rules of Business, which prescribe that when two members of Council differ, the case must. be referred for
the orders of the Viceroy. The Army Secretary would then lay the case before the Viceroy. The latter might
very possibly indicate a personal opinion that in the circumstances, as a particular case he thought it perhaps
desirable that the views of the Army Member should be deferred to, and any expression of the Viceroy’s wish
in an ordinary case is very frequently—I might almost say generally—deferred to. Or the Viceroy mizht,
pursuing the ordinary procedure under our Statutory Rules of Business, simply instruct the Army Secretary
that the case was to be brought up in Council the following week. It would then be discussed in Council,
the Army Secretary being present, but not taking any part in the discussion, and would be settled by the
views of the majority of the Council.

Asked how long a disputed case might take, he replied :—

At the best a disputed proposal would, I think, ordinarily take a good many weeks. I cannot put it
more exactly than that, but a great deal depends upon whether the responsible secretary takes a grip of the
case and prevents its being constantly remitted backwards and forwards between the Financial Adviser on
the one side and the Administrative Authority, the Quartermaster-General, or whoever he may be, on the other,
inviting each in turn to reply to the other’s rejoinders and criticisms. Where a case was not taken hold of and
put to an end, I have known it very lamentably protracted from this cause, but it is always within the power
of the Army Secretary, at any time when a case reaches him on its perambulations, to say that it has been
sufficiently discussed, and to take it up at once for the Orders of the Army Member; and that should be done
after reasonable opportunity for meeting new criticisms has been given.

It was admitted by him that during the perambulations of this proposal, the
Commander-in-Chief played little or no part. When further asked if this procedure
would apply to any proposal for an increase of equipment—say, machine guns—he
replied :—

It would apply equally well, but the procedure would be somewhat more cumbersome, because instead

of our only having the Quartermaster-General’s branch to deal with, it would probably involve also the General
Staff, the Adjutant-General, and the Ordnance Department.

When further asked if this elaborate process of check and counter-check was not really
carried on to keep up the fiction that there are two people as there used to be—the Military
Member of Council and the Commander-in-Chief—whereas at present there is only one
person in these capacities, he replied :—

I think that is largely the case, particularly if it is put in this way, that in order to maintain an adequate
status and influence for the heads of the Army, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, and so on,
it is, or has been considered necessary to retain the fiction of the Commander-in-Chief’s existence in this arrange-
ment, it is through him that they derive their own status.

This astounding system has only to be described to becondemned. The Secretary of
State for India, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, in his evidence adumbrated certain Army reforms
that he had in his mind. We trust that amongst these reforms the fiction of one person
being two, and the anomaly of two establishments being maintained at public expense to
give effect to this fiction, will permanently disappear from the military system of India.

It is only fair to add that since the war began this lengthy procedure has, to a large
extent, been put on one side. Still, during this period the Commander-in-Chief has had
to perform the dual duties of the two offices which he nominally holds.

Isolation between an administrative department and its operating factors tends to
give to the secretariat. so isolated an undue sense of the importance of minute and memo-
randum writing. In the case of the Simla Departments, this is an evil which was constantly
brought to our notice, and many of our witnesses bear testimony to the inordinate dimen-
sions attained by minute-writing, check and counter-check, and the reference backward
and forward of papers and proposals in the administrative departments of the Army.

The present system of check urgently requires simplification and acceleration. It is diffi--

cult under it to ascertain where responsibility begins and ends, whilst the waste of time and

energy involved must operate detrimentally to efficient administration. Those engaged

in secretarial work seem to have forgotten that minute-writing is not the end all and be all
(CS 48-176) N2

Syed

100 PART XI.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

B. FAULTY ORGANISATION OF INDIAN MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.

of Army administration ; it is only an instrument for the co-ordination of efficiency and
economy, and for the prevention of waste and extravagance. If, by undue expansion,
it fails to achieve these ends, it tends to promote the very administrative evils it was
intended to counteract.

13. The removal of the seat of Government from Calcutta to Delhi greatly diminished,
if if, did not destroy, the contact between high officialdom and the commercial and business
elements of India. At Delhi almost the entire European population is official and con-
nected with Government departments. A few years back each Presidency had a separate
Commander-in-Chief and a separate army, and their Headquarter Stafis were permanently
Jocated in the capitals of the respective Presidencies. These armies have all now been
amalgamated, and their separate commands and staffs abolished.

14. It will thus be seen how great has become the centralisation of authority in one
man’s hands. Sir Edmund Barrow, the Senior General on the Indian List and Military
Secretary at the India Office, and an officer of quite exceptional experience, expressed the
view that the Commander-in-Chief is now trying to perform the work of six men, and he
further added that the old duties of the Commander-in-Chief have completely fallen into
abeyance. The late Commander-in-Chief, Sir Beauchamp Duff, did not agree in this
opinion. He contended that in times of peace one man could discharge the functions
of both offices, especially if he were allowed a Deputy Chief of the Staff. But he admitted
that there was more than one man could do in time of war, that during the war he had been
able to give no time to the special work of Commander-in-Chief, and that the location of
the Military department at Simla cut off the Commander-in-Chief in war time from contact
with the combatant services.

15. Simla, as is well known, is a hill-top in the Himalayas on the borders of Nepal.
Its remoteness from great towns and great cantonments of India and its inaccessibility.
render it singularly unsuitable for the residence, during the greater part of the year, of
the one high official who has to discharge this unique mass of military responsibilities.
When, however, in addition to his normal dua] work, he is also in charge of an oversea
expedition, his disconnection from the actualities of fighting and his want of contact with
those who return to and from the stricken field, become a serious impediment to the know-
ledgeable discharge of this war work.

Sir Percy Lake was for some time Chief of the General Staff at Simla, and was in
constant personal communication with the Commander-in-Chief. He was sent to Mesopo-
tamia in January, 1916, to take Sir John Nixon’s place, whose health had broken down.
If there was anyone in India who from his daily work and communications might have
been expected to have appreciated the difficulties confronting an army in Mesopotamia,
it should have been Sir Percy Lake. In his evidence before us he frankly admitted that
in no sense did he fully realise the nature of the obstacles to be overcome, or the magnitude
of the exertions necessary to enable them to be surmounted, until he took over the command
in that country.

16. The great mass of the troops, stores, and reinforcements for Mesopotamia embarked
at Bombay, and at the same port the disembarkation of the huge number of sick and
wounded returning from that country took place. Sir Beauchamp Duff as Commander-
in-Chief never visited that port during the crisis of the war, nor has any permanent member
of the Headquarter Staff been there stationed. Everything to be done was attempted
from Simla. Requisitions and indents for stores, applications for leave, and other matters,
all of which could have been easily settled in Bombay, had to go to Simla before they were
complied with. The views and opinions of those returning sick or wounded as to the
conduct and wants of the expedition do not seem to have filtered through to Simla until
quite late in the campaign. Civilians and non-officials in Bombay knew more of what was
going on in Mesopotamia than the Headquarter Staff in Simla. Ignorance at Head-
quarters produced scepticism, and this scepticism was supported by the very optimistic
reports officially received from Basra. One witness who went from Basra straight to
Delhi or Simla has informed us of the incredulity with which his statements were received,
- and how official despatches were brought out of portfolios which contradicted what he
himself had seen and knew.

17. Lord Hardinge, in one of his letters to the Secretary of State to which we have |
already alluded, writes on the 18th February, 1916: “I may mention here that I have

PART XI—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT 101

AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

B. FAULTY ORGANIZATION OF INDIAN MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.

at last succeeded in convincing the military authorities that the medical arrangements
up the Tigris are as bad as can be.” A severer comment could not have been made upon
the isolation and ignorance of those primarily responsible for the treatment of the wounded.
Bombay, Calcutta, London, the Houses of Parliament, and private individuals, both in
India and England, were all cognisant of what was going on. Simla and Delhi alone were
unmoved. Simla has so long been the established summer quarters of the Government of
India that it has almost become a tradition; but its inconvenience as the Army Head-
quarters in time of war and in the management of oversea expeditions can be well illus-
trated by imagining Thurso or Wick to be the headquarters of the British Army
Departments during this war. The idea in its nakedness is grotesque, yet something like
it was attempted in India for the first sixteen months of the Mesopotamia Expedition.

C. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL
AND THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNCILS.—PRIVATE TELEGRAMS.

18. Almost concurrently with the adoption of the principle of centralisation in
military administration, a gradual process of change in the methods of communication
between the Secretary of State for India and the Governor-General of India has taken place
which had an important bearing upon the management and conduct of the Mesopotamia
Expedition.

19. The Government and Administration of India are vested in the Secretary of State
for India in Council and in the Governor-General of India in Council, and the former body
dominates the latter. The powers of the Secretary of State for India in Council are im-
mense, greatly exceeding those exercised by an ordinary Secretary of State. So far as
finance and expenditure are concerned, the Council stands to the Secretary of State for
India much in the same relation as that in which Parliament stands to the other Secretaries
of State. It may reasonably be assumed that Parliament would not have given these
immense powers to any individual official if, in the exercise of such powers, he was
dissociated from his Council.

20. The Governor-General in Council is subordinate to the Secretary of State for India
in Council and rules are laid down in the Act of Parliament as to the procedure through
which the Secretary of State’s orders and communications to the Governor-General should
be made. Those means of communication, according to the Statute, come under three
heads :—

(a) “ Public,” or, as we prefer to designate them, official communications which
pass through the Council.

(6) “ Urgent” communications, which need not necessarily go to the Council and
which the Secretary of State has the power of sending on his own authority, though
he is subsequently under the obligation of explaining the causes for his so acting.

(c) “Secret”? communications, on which the Secretary of State has the power o
acting on his own authority, nor need he explain to his Council the reasons why he
dispenses with their advice. But these “ secret ’’ communications are limited to
certain subjects.

21. In India the power of the Governor-General to dispense with his Council is much
more circumscribed. The Government of India is throughout the Statute invariably
designated as the Governor-General in Council. If the Governor-General is away from his
Council on tour he has al]l the powers which he could exercise if he was with his Council,
and moreover he has the power, when with the Council, of over-ruling them on certain
questions, if the majority of them differ from him. But the Members of the Secretary of
State’s Council and of the Governor-General’s Council have a statutory right of protesting
in writing against any action of which they disapprove. The protest must be in accordance
with their expressed objections in Council, and such written protest can be called for and
laid before Parliament.

22. The intention of Parliament in setting up the Government of India upon this
basis seems to have been a wish to associate the Secretary of State and the Governor-
General (who under the conditions existing in this country would probably be politicians),
with Councils of trained Indian administrators ; and the power of protest was doubtless
given so that each Council might be a check upon the Secretary of State, or the Governor-
General, against taking impulsive, or, in the view of the Council, improper action.

102 PART XI._CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

C. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND
THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNCILS.—PRIVATE TELEGRAMS.

23. In addition to these authorised statutory communications it has always been the
practice of the Secretary of State and the Governor-General to communicate privately,
one with another, both by telegram and by letter. These telegrams have, up till quite
recently, been supplementary to and explanatory of the official telegrams sent, which as
a matter of course come before the Governor-General and Secretary of State in Council.
They have also dealt with personal matters, which it is not advisable should be contained
in official telegrams, and within certain limits they seem to us to be useful, 1f not necessary
links of intercommunication.

24. All the Statutes relating to the Government of India were consolidated in Acts
which received Royal Assent in 1915 and 1916; but in these consolidating Statutes
no mention whatever is made of private communications, nor is authority given either
to the Secretary of State, or the Governor-General to substitute private telegrams for the
prescribed methods ot communication laid down by the Statute. All private telegrams
are the property of the sender, and they are not necessarily recorded on the files of the
Department to which their contents may relate ; though they are occasionally so recorded
when the Secretary of State or Governor-General gives express orders to that effect. It
is usually the practice of the Secretary of State and the Governor-General to take away
their private telegrams at the close of their tenure of office, and Lord Crewe informed us
that Lord Morley so acted on vacating the post of Secretary of State for India. There 1s
therefore no public record of the purport of the vast majority of these private communi-
cations. The substitution of private for public telegrams in recent years has apparently
so developed as to become almost the regular channel of official inter-communication.

25. A very important document was laid before us containing a number of telegrams
of the gravest consequence relating to the Oversea Expeditions and Forces which the
Indian Government were ordered at the instance of the Imperial Government to provide.
Every telegram in the whole series, except one, on both sides was marked private, though
it was stated by the Viceroy that the substance of the last telegram would be confirmed
in an official telegram.

A large number—if not the larger proportion—of the telegrams quoted in our report
referring to the advance on Baghdad are marked “ Private.” One of the most important
of these private telegrams, conveying new and serious information as to the possible
concentration of 60,000 Turkish troops near Baghdad, was, in consequence of its being
marked “ Private,” not filed in the Military Department, and was not transmitted to
Sir John Nixon in Mesopotamia.

26. The substitution of private for official telegrams tends to dispossess the Council
of the functions, which by Statute they are entitled to exercise. Both the late Secretarv
of State for India and the late Governor-General justified recourse to these methods of
communication on the ground that in time of war urgency and secrecy are of paramount
importance. We at once accept that proposition ; but it 1s clear in our mind that secrecy
can be established by a properly regulated procedure; and as regards urgency, as both
Councils are small in numbers, there seems to us no difficulty whatever, at any rate in times
of emergency, in insisting on their meeting every day.

27. We have been informed by two Members of the Governor-General’s Council that
according to their recollection the Council was never consulted as to, nor were they privy
to the campaign in Mesopotamia. Their opinion was not asked as regards the advance
to Baghdad, though occasionally, from time to time, some information was given to
them in the shape of conversation at the Council. This statement, though traversed
in details by Lord Hardinge, is in the main, we believe, correct.

The despatch of any oversea expedition from India is largely regulated by considera-
tions of internal security, and, as the maintenance of order in India is a primary function
of the Council of the Governor-General, it would seem to us a necessary consequence that
they ought to be consulted in connection with any oversea expedition or with any serious
depletion of Indian military establishments.

28. As our report has already indicated, the main difficulty to be overcome in Meso-
potamia was the provision of adequate river transport, and the establishment of an effective
base at Basra for distribution of the reinforcements and supplies despatched to that place.
We cannot but believe that, if the civilian Members of the Council had from the

PART XI.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT 103
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

C. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND
THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNCILS.—PRIVATE TELEGRAMS.

outset been taken into the full confidence of the Viceroy as regards the Mesopotamia
Expedition, they would have been able to have afforded prompt and material assistance
in problems, which for want of that aid and experience were allowed to drift until they
temporarily became almost insoluble.

29. Another paper was presented to us containing correspondence relating to the
treatment of the sick and wounded in Mesopotamia. In that paper Mr. Chamberlain,
Secretary of State for India, shows a most commendable solicitude as regards the condition
of the wounded, and from October, 1915, onwards, he repeatedly, urged upon the Viceroy
the advisability of a prompt and special enquiry as to what was actually the condition
of things in Mesopotamia. All these communications were made in private letters and
telegrams, and the correspondence continued for some months until Lord Hardinge in
February made the announcement to which we have previously alluded, that he had
“at last succeeded in convincing the military authorities that the medical arrangements
up the Tigris are as bad as can be.”’ In the whole of this paper upon this subject there
was not to be found a single official despatch.

30. If the old practice of having recourse to an official despatch had been adopted,
and a despatch had been written at the outset with the full authority of the Secretary of
State in Council, conveying to the Governor-General the rumours and the nature of the
doubts which had arisen as regards the condition of wounded, and such despatch had been
received by the Governor-General in Council, the circulation of such despatch amongst
both Councils would have accelerated an investigation and prevented a great deal of the
distress and suffering which occurred during that period.

31. We have dealt at some length with this matter. We consider it necessary that the
attention both of the Government and Parliament should be called to the change we have
thus shown to have taken place in the procedure of the two branches of the Indian Govern-
ment. If the Government and Parliament are of opinion that these private personal ~
telegrams and letters are in the future to become a recognised channel of authoritative and
mandatory communication, then the Act of Parliament should be so altered.

32. As the Council of the Governor-General was not consulted, it 1s clear they cannot
be held responsible for what occurred in the Mesopotamian campaign. On the Viceroy
and the Commander-in-Chief must rest the sole responsibility for advice given and action
taken, so far as India is concerned. But the exclusion of the Ordinary Members of Council
from a knowledge of and touch with the varying fortunes of the expedition circumscribed
the sources, from which information might have been obtained upon the condition of the
army in Mesopotamia.

33. Though the organised manufacturing and industrial resources of India are small
in comparison with its enormous population, still there are a number of capable civil
managers, engineering experts and establishments which could have been useful in dealing
with the difficulties of the Mesopotamia Expedition, if their advice or assistance had
been sought in the manner and on the lines in which outside experience has heen
brought to the help of the military establishments in Great Britain. But the intense
centralisation and isolation of the bureaucracy in India was a serious obstacle to such co-
operation, for the management of the campaign was that of a close corporation in the sole
charge of two over-worked officials. In this sense the exclusion of the civil members of
the Viceroy’s Council from all responsibility for, or participation in the fortunes of the
expedition had a mischievous and contracting influence in the mobilization of exceptional
outside experience to overcome difficulties, which from their novelty were beyond ordinary
military knowledge and training.

D. ATMOSPHERE OF Economy up TO DaTE oF WAR AND EFFECT UPON MILITARY
PREPARATIONS IN INDIA.

34. The control of the expedition under the conditions, which we have
explained, 1s narrowed down to control by two high officials, both heavily charged with
many other anxious and pressing duties, and both permanently stationed in localities,
which had little, if any, private or personal touch with the forces campaigning in Mesopo-
tamia. Although the Viceroy paid a short visit to Mesopotamia early in 1915, yet in the

104 PART XI.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

D, ATMOSPHERE OF EcoNoMy uP TO DATE OF WAR AND EFFECT UPON MILITARY
PREPARATIONS IN INDIA.

main it is the fact that both he and the Commander-in-Chief in their management of the
expedition entirely depended upon their official information from that country. The
well-being and adequate maintenance of the expedition were therefore dependent on the
requisitions and demands made on Simla by the General Officer Commanding and his
subordinates in Mesopotamia. It is therefore worth noting the environment, in which
for years previously military officials had worked and lived, and which represented the
fixed policy of the India Office and Government up to the date of the sudden outbreak
of war.

35. It is a primary duty of every well-regulated Government to enforce effective
economy. In other words, to prevent waste and yet ensure efficiency. Simple as is the
phraseology of this formula, it is in practice most difficult to enforce, and economists,
when in office, not unfrequently find themselves in defence of their principles obliged
to subordinate efficiency to economy by adopting the simple process of cuttmg down
ageregates of expenditure, or at any rate, of refusing an increase of existing outlay, no
matter what may be the urgency of the fresh demand.

A policy of strict economy had been insisted on alike by the India Office and by
Simla for many years, and even as late as March, 1914, in a despatch to the Government of
India, the Secretary of State pointed out that the majority of the Army in India Committee
(a committee appointed to overhaul Indian military expenditure), had recommended
‘that the normal standard of net military expenditure should be retained at 19.5 millions
sterling, and that to the extent that reductions can be made in the figure by the economies
we have suggested, but not otherwise, our proposed measures for the improvement of
the Army should be taken in hand.” The Secretary of State concluded his despatch
by placing an arbitrary limit on nulitary expenditure as regards fresh demands in the
following words :—

I am anxious to receive from you a general assurance on similar lines as to the limits within which
military expenditure in the immediate future will be confined, and until you are in a position to give it I should

find it difficult todeal with any separate proposals that you might submit for carrying out measures involving
expense that have been recommended for adoption by the Committee.

36. Sir Douglas Haig, when Chief of the Staff, did put forward a memorandum in 1911
suggesting that the Indian Military establishments might have to furnish an expeditionary
force, armed and equipped to meet a European Army. In this paper he contemplated
the possibility of a war with Turkey either alone or supported by Germany; but it was
stated in evidence before us that this memorandum did not receive the approval of the
Viceroy, Lord Hardinge. It is a matter of common knowledge that after the Agadir
incident in 1911 there was such a possibility of war with Germany as to call for military
preparation and the consideration of plans of action. We know that such plans—and, to
some extent, preparation—were made in connection both with the Navy and Army at
home. Butin India, until late in 1913 or early in 1914, no steps whatever seem to have been
taken to consider what help could be given in such contingencies by the Indian Army.
Still less were preparations made so to equip the Indian Army as to put it upon equal
conditions with modern European troops. The responsibility for this cmission must 1est
primarily with the Cabinet. Although the Indian Government is, to some extent, inde-
pendent of the Cabinet, yet the Cabinet, through the Secretary of State for India, can
exercise control and authority over its actions, but the whole influence of the Home
Government was thrown in the direction of restriction rather than expansion of military
preparation in India.

So far as Mesopotamia was concerned, the consequences were unfortunate—there was
a lack of plans, and a lack of preparations.

Sir O’Moore Creagh was Commander-in-Chief for 44 years ending Apml, 1914. In
his evidence before us he stated that he was constantly calling attention to the deficiencies
of the Indian Army as regards modern equipment, especially in connection with machine
guns, heavy howitzers, signalling apparatus, wireless and air equipment, transport and
medical complements, and to the inadequate grants made for practice ammunition and the
insufficient sums voted for mancuvres. Sir O’Moore Creagh informed us that his repre-
sentations had no result and were practically ignored and to such an extent was he generally
over-ridden by the Finance Department and the Viceroy that he determined to resign
office some six months before the usual tenure of his appointment terminated. But his

PART XI.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF 105
JUDGMENT .AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

D. ATMOSPHERE OF ECONOMY UP TO DaTE OF WAR AND EFFECT UPON MILITARY
PREPARATIONS IN INDIA.

reasons for resigning were not explained either to the Viceroy or to the Secretary of State,
nor can he entirely escape from criticism for not having taken more definite action at an
earlier stage of his tenure of office, if he was certain that the efficiency of the Army, for which
he was responsible, was being impaired by the rigid economy which in all directions was
enforced upon military expenditure in India.

37 Under a policy so rigorously defined, it is not unnatural] that military and medical
officers thought that they were best discharging their duty to the Government by keeping
down demands, by carrying on as best they could without incurring fresh expenditure,
and by discouraging their subordinates from pressing new ideas or ideals which,
— undoubtedly beneficial to the service for which they are responsible, would
entail, at any rate at the outset, additional expenditure.

38. The Vincent-Bingley Commission report upon this tendency in language which
seems to us so accurately to represent the views of many of the witnesses who appeared
before us that we quote it in its entirety :—

The observations of a senior officer who has given evidence to the Commission may be quoted with
advantage in this connection, as they crystallise the views of many others.

This officer writes as follows in an annexure to his evidence: “In my opinion the Indian system is more
to blame for the breakdown of the Mesopotamia medical arrangements than anything else—a system which
allows officers to think, whether rightly or wrongly :—

(a) That there is more merit to be obtained by keeping quiet and not worrying the higher authorities
than by asking for what is necessary ;

“‘(b) That keeping down expenditure is more meritorious than efficiency ;

“‘(c) That nothing new is likely to be sanctioned unless a corresponding saving in something else can
be shown; and

‘*(d) That even in small matters anything asked for will be cut down by half. . . . A system of
this nature will possibly be good and economical in peace time, but is bound to break down in war.’

There is, in our opinion, much force in this criticism, and though we do not accept this statement in its
entirety, we are inclined to ascribe much of the delay in applying for, and the reluctance to insist on, the
provision of separate river hospital steamers, proper ambulance land transport, electric fans, ice machines,
and other essential requirements to this cause.

39. Assuming that such a feeling generally existed in the Indian Army, it would
affect not merely the medical officers and arrangements but also the combatant officers
and the whole equipment and organisation of the Indian Army. The Mesopotamia
Expedition, in the first instance, was equipped as if for frontier warfare against undisci-
plined tribes armed only with rifles. Its wants rapidly grew ; but there is little, if anything,
in the mass of communications between the India Office, the Indian Government and the
General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia to show that the authorities either in London
or Simla recognised the immense differences between the conditions of an Indian frontier,
and a Mesopotamian campaign.

40. Some of our witnesses expressed the opinion that the supreme Government of India
did not seem adequately to realise the immensity of the issues raised by the war, and that
their response to the necessities of the situation was not as whole-hearted and sufficient
as it might have been. We fully recognise the internal difficulties and embarrassments
which the Indian Government had to face, when the enemy to be encountered was, in his
intrigues and conspiracies, as ubiquitous and unscrupulous as the German Government
has shown itself to be, and we can well understand that in the earlier stages of the war
the Indian Authorities had to devote much of their attention and a considerable propor-
tion of their military establishments to counteract such machinations. |

But as the dimensions of the war grew, and the character of its issues became more
and more apparent, the Indian Government do not appear to us to have fully risen to the
situation. It would almost seem that they acted on the assumption that the war would
not be one of long duration, for they adhered to the routine method of normal times,
tather than to the impressment of new ideas and the mobilisation of fresh resources.

The standard of effort was regulated more by past experience of previous war than by
the magnitude of the emergency. The unprecedented exertions of Great Britain and her
self-governing Oversea Dominions did not seem to stimulate the Indian Government to
similar efforts. The attitude and disposition of the Indian Government are shown in the
nature of the argument used by them in rejecting military railway expenditure in Meso-
potamia, viz., that it might ultimately fall on Indian revenues as being possibly outside the
Imperial guarantee of indemnity for extraordinary disbursements. Neither as regards
compulsory service for Europeans, nor in the organisation of industrial resources for
purposes of war, nor in general finance was sufficient alacrity shown during the first year
and a half of the war.

(C 48—176) O

ag, A

106 PART XI.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF
JUDGMENT AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

D. ATMOSPHERE OF ECONOMY UP TO DATE OF WAR AND EFFECT UPON MIITARY
° PREPARATIONS IN INDIA.

41. As regards finance it must be remembered that the Indian Government Act, 1858
precluded the cost of overseas expeditions from being charged upon the revenues of India
unless with the consent of both Houses of Parliament. In September and November, 1914,
accordingly, resolutions were passed by Parliament empowering the Indian Government to
defray the ordinary cost of the troops employed overseas, in so far as such ordinary cost
would have been payable by India, had the troops remained in that country. Any excess
over such ordinary cost was to be borne by the Imperial Government in addition to the full
cost of any troops required to replace the troops sent overseas. The effect of these resolutions
was that, so far as the overseas expeditions were concerned, India participated in the war
without thereby incurring any direct increase of her normal military expenditure in peace
time. Whatever may have been the justice of such an arrangement as regards the expedi-
tion to France, it clearly redounded to the advantage of India in the case of the expedition
to Mesopotamia, which, as we have seen, was recognised by the Indian Government as a
military measure protecting their North-Western Frontier from attack, and they obtained
this advantage without cost to themselves. Their net military expenditure for the year
1914-15 was actually nearly £50,000 less than the estimate which had been made for
that year before war was declared, and on the assumption that expenditure would be on
a peace basis. In introducing the Indian Financial Statement for 1915-16, Sir W. Meyer,
the Finance Member, stated: ‘‘ Our chief economy occurs under the Military Services,”’
and, though the war had already been waging for more than eight months, he budgeted
for a military expenditure half a million less than the corresponding expenditure for the
previous year. Although this estimate has, in fact, been exceeded by the actual expendi-
ture, the excess, according to the latest figures available to us, has never amounted to more
than £2,000,000, or 20 per cent. of the normal military expenditure in India. It is, of
course, common knowledge that the United Kingdom’s war expenditure represents an
increase of more than 1,000 per cent., over the normal. During the period under our
review no additional taxation and no loans were raised with a view to helping England
in bearing the cost of a war in which the very existence of our Indian Empire was threatened.
The disparity between the financial war burdens of India and the rest of the Empire was
even the subject of comment in the Vice regal Council where there was a general expectation
of new taxation. One member went so far as to say in Council, ‘‘ Handsome as our offer-
ings may have been, they have not, I regret to say, been on the same princely footing and
basis as that of our fellow Colonials. However, J am confident that the demand has only
to be made, and loyal India will rise as one man and offer to pay the expenses of our Ex-
peditionary Forces, in the same way as Canada and Australia are doing,” and he went on
to suggest an Increase in taxation to meet such expenditure.

But prosperous though the country was, the Indian Government refused to listen to
such suggestions. Lord Hardinge and Sir William Meyer both recognised the financial
strength of India’s position, but, notwithstanding the financial needs of the war, they con-
sidered it permissible for India to continue to spend a sum of 9.4 million pounds (equal to
about 18 per cent. of India’s Imperial revenue) on capital works, railways, irrigation, etc.
In fact, to quote the words of a native member of the Council, this budget “made the
country almost forget the serious economic and financial effects of the war.”

It has been argued that India had no cause to be sparing in expenditure on the overseas
expeditions because the Imperial Government were bearing all the abnormal cost of the
war. But Sir F. Aylmer informed us that when he was Adjutant-General at Simla, the
Finance Department frequently demurred to proposed new war expenditure in the fear
lest the expenditure should persist after the war, and become a charge upon India, and we
know that a similar motive influenced the financial officials in their dealing with Sir J.
Nixon’s demand for a railway.

Thus the atmosphere and influence of economy continued at Simla long after the
war broke out, and there are indications of a reluctance on the part of the Indian Govern-
ment to recognise the indisputable fact that war meant extra expenditure. They seemed
to have struggled hard to carry on war upon a peace budget, and it is hardly open to doubt
that this tendency was one of the causes of the inadequate expenditure incurred, and the
lack of provision made for the wants of the Mesopotamia Expedition during the first
16 months of its operations.

_ The Government, rather than the governed, were the laggards, and in our judgment
the measures now taken by the present Viceroy and his Council in mobilising latent

PART XI.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF 107
JUDGMENT AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

D. ATMOSPHERE OF ECONOMY UP TO DaTE OF WAR AND EFFECT UPON MILITARY
PREPARATIONS IN INDIA.

resources should have been adopted some time past. Much of the bitterness felt by the
Expeditionary Force against their madequate supply and equipment can, we believe, be
traced to the idea that the Indian Government did not early enough realise their responsi-
bilities, or the strain which the climate and country of Mesopotamia imposed upon all
those sent there to fight.

42. So long as the expedition’s advance was confined to the Shatt-el-Arab its operations
were neither difficult nor costly. Every advance increased the difficulties and cost,
and both centred around the transport. We can quite understand that officers, bred up
to resist fresh and new expenditure, would hesitate, when an advance was suggested, to
insist at once upon the outlay necessary to ensure success and diminish risk. ‘‘ Risk
and economy” rather than “ safety and expenditure”’ would be the natural bent of
their past training and orders. It is quite true that no evidence has been produced
to show that any urgent demand put forward by the Military Authouities was definitely
refused by the Finance Department. The blame for inadequate attention to the special
wants of the expedition must be attached to the Military Authorities rather than to the
Finance Department.

43. Pertinacity in pressing or multiplying the requisitions from Mesopotamia upon the
Simla authorities was, however, resented, and of this we will give a remarkable illustration.

General Cowper was Adjutant-General and Assistant Quartermaster-General of the
Mesopotamia Force. In January, 1916, he, being the officer responsible for the transport,
became seriously alarmed at the increasing difficulties, which the shortage of transport
created in the employment of troops for the relief of Kut. In consultation with General
Money, Chief of the General Staff, he drafted a telegram in which they stated plainly that
unless they got adequate shipping transport, and personnel to man such transport, Sir
Percy Lake, who had recently assumed command of the force, would have to abandon the
idea of relieving Kut. They purposely had recourse to this language as they considered
the position—to use General Cowper’s own words—* So frightfully serious.” Sir Percy
Lake carefully considered the telegram, and transmitted it after some alterations. In
reply Sir Percy Lake received a personal telegram from the Commander-in-Chief at Simla,
severely rebuking him for the wording of the telegram, and the Commander-in-Chief added
these words: “ Please warn General Cowper that if anything of this sort again occurs, or
I receive any more querulous or petulant demands for shipping, I shall at once remove
him from the force, and will refuse him any further employment of any kind.”

Sir Beauchamp Duff subsequently stated to us that this reply to Sir Percy Lake’s
telegram was founded upon a paraphrase, which distorted both the purport and language
of the telegram, and that as soon as he became aware of this, he cancelled his censure.
We asked General Duff for a copy of this paraphrase, but he told us it had been destroyed.

The warning conveyed in General Cowper’s telegram was, as our narrative shows,
unfortunately realised, for the failure to break through to Kut was largely due to insufii-
ciency of numbers and of guns, there being, at the critical times of the attempted relief,
large numbers of troops and guns at Basra which could not be moved ito the front for
want of transport.

In justice to General Cowper, we must add that it was with great difficulty that we
extracted the above information from him. The incident was referred to in a letter from
Lord Hardinge to the Secretary of State for India and it was in consequence of this allusion
that we obtained the clue to the transaction. |

It seems from this letter that Lord Hardinge had complained to Sir Beauchamp Duff
of the tone of several recent telegrams from Mesopotamia to Simla. And doubtless this
complaint partly accounts for Sir Beauchamp Duff’s annoyance. But in our judgment
Lord Hardinge’s complaint was altogether unwarranted, and the reprimand which it led
Sir Beauchamp Duff to address to General Cowper was both intemperate and ill-advised.
We fear, however, that it must be regarded as an extreme but characteristic illustration
of the attitude of the authorities at Simla towards demands which they did not like or
did not consider necessary.

K. Sir Jonn Nrxon’s APPOINTMENT, INSTRUCTIONS AND STAFF.

44, It is obvious from Lord Hardinge’s evidence that, during his official visit to Meso-
potamia, he was struck by the necessity of the offensive being assumed by our forces round
(C 48—176) 02

108 PART XI—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF
JUDGMENT AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

E. Sir Jonn Nrixon’s APPOINTMENT, INSTRUCTIONS AND STAFF.

Basra, if their defensive position was to be consolidated and made secure. Sir John Nixon
had the reputation of a successful and dashing Cavalry Officer. He told us in his evidence
that he believed he was sent out in order that he might make this change in the attitude
of our forces around Basra. He took with him a new Stafi.

45. The change by an expeditionary force from defensive to offensive tactics may,
under certain conditions, be possible without necessitating fundamental changes in the
organisation of the force or in the base and line of communications. In Mesopotamia,
if the offensive was pushed beyond a certain point, its success or failure was almost entirely
governed by the extent to which the capacity of the port of Basra, and of the communica-
tions with it, were simultaneously developed.

46. This self-evident necessity was never realised either by the India Office at
home or the Government at Simla until it was too late. It 1s no exaggeration to say that
this was an undertaking utterly beyond the capacity of Sir John Nixon and his staff.
To impose upon a Cavalrv Officer with little more than the ordinary staff of a Division,
such a duty was to try him altogether beyond his experience and strength.

47. The instructions to Sir John Nixon to prepare a scheme for an advance on Baghdad
revolutionised the whole foundation and organisation of an expedition initiated and founded
for much smaller and more limited objects, and this was neither recognised by Sir J.
Nixon nor those who so instructed him. He looked at the matter from a purely fighting
point of view, and the military successes which he had achieved induced him to under-
estimate the full risk involved in an advance from Kut to Baghdad. The Government of
India never seemed to question his discretion or his want of experience of a campaign
dependent on river transport. Implicit confidence in his judgment was the basis of their
communications to the Home Government.

48. It was not merely that, through no fault of their own, Sir John Nixon’s staff were
unequal to the task of creating a practically new port, but they were seriously handicapped in
the very important work cf obtaining reliable intelligence as to the strength of their opponents.
The armies against which Sir John Nixon was operating were recruited and drawn from a
vast area of territory extending from Persia to Bulgaria and from Adento Erzerum. The
military movements inside this vast extent of country were very difficult to follow, and
the sources of information were such that London was better supplied with news than
Simla or Basra, as nearly the whole of this area was within the scope of the Intelligence
organisation of the War Office. The local area from which Sir John Nixon’s Intelligence
Staff obtained information was limited, and did not comprise those portions of the Turkish
_ Empire from which reinforcements to Irak could be sent. Sir John Nixon, having
confidence in his own staff, was not disposed to subordinate their information to that
which came from outside.

- 49. Upon the two essential considerations governing the attempt to capture Baghdad
Sir J. Nixon was therefore seriously at fault. He underrated the difficulty of transporting
reinforcements, as they arrived, from the port of embarkation to the scene of action, and
he seriously under-estimated the number of his opponents and miscalculated the dates at
which they would arrive. Sufficient allowance was not made either in London or Simla for
the probability of such miscalculations. The extreme difficulty of the first task and the
lack of reliable information do not seem to have been properly appreciated by those con-
trolling the conduct of the campaign. But though grave blame must be attached to
Sir John Nixon for his excessive optimism, those who shared in that optimism cannot
be wholly free from criticism.

I’. SECKETIVENESS AND LACK OF CO-ORDINATION OF STAFFS.

50. The character and scope of the task imposed upon General Nixon and his
Staff made it one of exceptional difficulty, and it might have been assumed that
there would have been full and frequent interchange of opinion between the Head-
quarters and the Administrative Staffs of the Army in Mesopotamia before any fresh move
was made or, if reinforcements were expected, as to how the difficulties of maintaining and

PART XI.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF 109
JUDGMENT AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

F. SECRETIVENESS AND LACK OF CO-ORDINATION OF STAFFS.

transporting such new forces could be met. General Nixon stated that Staff conferences
were frequently held, but notwithstanding this, we have evidence that reticence was carried
so far, that important Staff Officers were kept in ignorance of impending movements,
and were consequently unable to make in time the requisite preparations.

51. Commander Hamilton who was Principal Marine Transport Officer from the begin-
ning of the campaign until December, 1915, and, who was uneasy from the first as to the
river transport situation, complained to us that the policy of the campaign was kept secret
from him. At the outset of the campaign he made a proposal for providing river steamers
in advance. This was not entertained by the staff at the time, and as he was not taken
into their confidence as to the future movements of the expedition, he did not afterwards
again press his proposal. In May, 1915, the Deputy-Director of Ordnance complained
that he was never given information as to projected movements of troops. In the spring
of the same year, Colonel Dallas, when Base Supply Officer at Basra, received no warning
that his responsibilities were to be doubled by the arrival of a second division of reinforce-
ments. He was not informed when advances were to be made, and he understood that
other high administrative officers were also kept without sufficient information. Similarly
General Davison, Inspector General of Lines of Communication, did not remember
being referred to at all in connection with the transport necessary for the advance of
General Townshend’s force towards Baghdad. Nor was he consu'ted as to the provision
of transport for the promised reinforcements of two divisions, until after the advance
had been sanctioned, although it will be remembered that the availability of these divisions
as reinforcements at Baghdad was a condition precedent to the sanction by the authorities
of the advance on that place.

52. Information as to the arrival of these reinforcements was withheld until the
beginning of November from so high an officer as General Cowper, the Deputy-Adjutant
and Quartermaster-General in Mesopotamia, and even then he was not allowed for some
time to communicate it to his administrative officers, with the result, as General Cowper
admitted under cross-examination, that there was delay in making preparations for the
reception of the reinforcements at Basra. According to General Cowper’s evidence the
reason given for keeping him in ignorance of the prospective arrival of reinforcements was
fear that the news might reach the Turks, and that they would in consequence retreat
without fighting.

53. Surgeon-General Hathaway, the Director of Medical Services in Mesopotamia,
also contended that he was hampered in his work by his exclusion from the Staff Con-
ferences. General Nixon disputed this, but we are convinced that, whether with or
without General Nixon’s knowledge, secrecy as to projected movements was maintained
by the Staff to an extent detrimental to the interests of the expedition.

54. We can quite understand, in a country so full of rumour and spying as Mesopo-
tamia, the necessity of confining to as few people as possible information concern
impending movements and requirements ; but the stoppage of information was mi
to such a point that the officers, upon whose arrangements the success of the new move
largely depended, were sometimes only given information after a decision had been taken.
We have no evidence to show that a conference of any kind took place before General
Nixon informed the Viceroy that he could open the road to Baghdad. General Nixon
throughout acted solely upon his own responsibility. As one of his subordinates stated, he
“revelled in responsibility ’—a fine quality in a soldier and one which ought to be
encouraged, but it cannot stand alone, and in the present imstance this dash and audacity
were not sufficiently associated with prescient preparation or with investigation of the
difficulties to be overcome.

55. At Simla, Sir Beauchamp Duff, as Commander-in-Chief, was in absolute and
untrammelled control over every branch of military administration. The General Staff
was in no sense a separate or independent branch. The chief of that body was personally
under the Commander-in-Chief and part of his staff. The other holders of high office,
such as the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, Director-General of Operations,
were all under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief, as was formerly the case
in the War Office at home.

110 PART XJ.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF
JUDGMENT AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.

F. SECRETIVENESS AND Lack oF CO-ORDINATION OF STAFFS.

56. There were indeed almost daily meetings of the chief military officers at Simla,
but we have no evidence to show that there was ever a free discussion of the danger and
difficulties of the advance to Baghdad. Sir Fenton Aylmer, at that time the Adjutant-
General, did hear a conversational reference made by the Commander-in-Chief to the Chief
of the Staff upon the subject at one of the daily meetings of the Headquarters Staff. He
at once expressed his apprehensions of such a move, but no notice was taken of his objection,

Thus, without adequate consultation with their staffs and without fully realising the
vital elements of the problem, the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia suggested,
and the Commander-in-Chief in India accepted the move upon Baghdad. As we have
before stated, the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, did not consult the Council upon this matter,
but he threw the weight of his personal authority strongly in support of the advance.

PART XII.—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 111

A. Frinpincs AND CONCLUSIONS.
OrIGIN, INCEPTION AND CONDUCT OF CAMPAIGN.

We find that :—

1. The expedition to Mesopotamia was a justifiable wnilitary enterprise, but one of
such a character that it required, during its inception and development, the most
careful watching and preparation.

2. The division of responsibility between the India Office and Indian Government,
the former undertaking policy, and the latter the management of the expedition,
was, in the circumstances, unworkable. The Secretary of State, who controlled the policy,
did not have cognisance of the capacity of the expedition to carry out the policy. The
Indian Government, who managed the expedition, did not accompany developments of
policy with the necessary preparations, even when they themselves proposed those develop-
ments.

3. The scope of the objective of the expedition was never sufficiently defined in
advance, so as to make each successive move part of a well-thought-out and matured plan.

4. The attempt in India entirely to control and regulate the wants of the
expedition from Simla was an administrative mistake, and representatives of the
Headquarter Staff with wide powers should from the first have been stationed at Bombay.
the port: of embarkation and disembarkation to and from Mesopotamia.

5. The Commander-in-Chief himself, or his representatives acting as liaison
officers, should from time to time have visited Mesopotamia with a view to keeping the
Headquarters Staff in touch with the needs of the expedition. In consequence of such
want of touch, the Military Authorities at Simla did not appreciate or realise the difficulties
of campaigning in Mesopotamia, and from such lack of knowledge failed to make sufficient
provision for surmounting the difficulties and drawbacks.

6. The successive advances from Basra to Kurna, Kurna to Amara, and from Amara
to Kut were sanctioned as being necessary for the protection and consolidation of
positions already taken, and were therefore of a defensive character.

THE ADVANCE ON BAGHDAD.

7. The advance to Baghdad under the conditions existing in October, 1915, was
an offensive movement based upon political and military miscalculations and attempted
with tired and insufficient forces, and inadequate preparation. It resulted in the surrender
of more than a division of our finest fighting troops and the casualties incurred in the ineffec-
tive attempts to relieve Kut amounted to some 23,000 men. The loss of prestige associated
with these military failures was less than might have been anticipated, owing to the deep
impression made, throughout and beyond the localities where the combats occurred, by the
splendid fighting power of the British and Indian forces engaged.

8. Various authorities and high officials are connected with the sanction given to
this untoward advance. Each and all, in our judgment, according to their relative and
respective positions, must be made responsible for the errors in Judgment, to which they
were parties, and which formed the basis of their advice or orders.

The weightiest share of responsibility lies with Sir John Nixon, whose confident opti-
mism was the main cause of the decision toadvance. The other persons responsible were :
in India, the Viceroy (Lord Hardinge), and the Commander-in-Chief (Sir Beauchamp Duff) ;
in England, the Military Secretary of the India Office (Sir Edmund Barrow), the Secretary of
State for India (Mr. Austin Chamberlain), and the War Committee of the Cabinet. We
put these names in the order and sequence of responsibility. The expert advisers of the
Government, who were consulted, also approved the advance and are responsible for their
advice, but the papers submitted to us suggest that the approval of the naval and military
experts was reluctant and was perhaps partly induced by a natural desire not to disappoint
the hopes of advantage to the general situation, which the Government entertained.
It is, however, notable that the experts unanimously anticipated no difficulty in the
advance on Baghdad, but. only in holding it. We do not attach any share in the respon-
sibility for the decision to advance to. Baghdad to the Councils of the Secretary of State

112 PART XII.—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

A.—FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.

for India and of the Viceroy, as we have been unable to ascertain from the evidence
laid before us that the advance to Baghdad was ever brought before them in such a
manner as to allow them to give their personal advice and opinion upon it.

9. We have included the War Committee of the Cabinet and the Secretary of State
for India amongst those upon whom responsibility for this misadventure rests. It is
true that the War Committee and the Secretary of State acted upon the opinion of their
expert military advisers, and that the Secretary of State only gave his assent to the advance
after he had received an assurance from the General on the spot that he had an available
force sufficient for his purpose. But so long as the system of responsible departmental
administration exists in this country, those who are political heads of departments in time
of war, whether they be civilian or military, cannot be entirely immune from the con-
sequences of their own action. They have the option and power of accepting or rejecting
the advice of their expert subordinates. The acceptance by a chief of wrong advice from
expert subordinates may be an extenuation of, but cannot secure complete immunity from,
the responsibility for the evils which may ensue.

The Cabinet from the first laid down the aie Sa from which they never departed,
that questions jointly involving civil and military policy should, in existing circumstances,
only be decided by the Cabinet. This authority they exercised throughout, though at
times they largely delegated their powers to the War Committe of the Cabinet.

SUPPLIES, EQUIPMENTS, REINFORCEMENTS, ETC.

The second portion of our Instructions refers to the supplies, equipment and reinforce-
ments of the expedition, with special reference to the provision for the sick and wounded,
and the responsibility of the departments whose duty it was to minister to such wants.
Upon this part of our reference we find that :— |

10. The general armament and equipment were on a scale intended for an Indian
frontier expedition, were not up to the standard of modern European warfare, and were quite
insufficient to meet the needs of the Mesopotamia Expedition. These shortcomings were
the natural result of the policy of indiscriminate retrenchment pursued for some years
before the war by the Indian Government under instructions from the Home Government,
by which the Army was to be prepared and maintained for frontier and internal use.

11. During the period for which the Indian Government were responsible, the com-
missariat of the expedition cannot be said to have been up to the standard of our Army in
France, but there was no general breakdown. Discomfort and want were at times experi-
enced, mainly through lack of transport, and as we point out in our Medical Section,
illness arose from serious deficiences in diet. The whole system of supply was on too.
low a standard, and was badly organised. We have reason to believe that it has been
materially improved since the War Office became responsible for the commissariat.

The ration originally supphed to the Indian troops was deficient in nutritive qualities,
and a serious outbreak of scurvy ensued. Since then this ration has twice been improved,
but it still requires careful attention as to the adequacy of its nutritive powers.

In other essentials the expedition was badly and insufficiently equipped, and as we
have shown in previous parts of our report, little, if any, effort was made to remedy
deficiencies until the War Office took over the expedition. It is difficult to arrive at any
conclusion in this part of our enquiry other than, that the wants of the expedition received
meagre attention and illiberal treatment at the hands of the Simla authorities during the
years 1914-1915.

12. As regards reinforcements, we find that up to the occupation of Kut in September,
1915, the Mesopotamian Expedition was, in fact, numerically strong enough to cope with
the Turkish forces brought against it. The arrangements for drafts and reinforcements
had, however, from the first, been lacking in co-ordination as between the Indian and Home
authorities, and this want of co-ordination led to the failure to supply effective reinforce-
ments in connection with the advance on Baghdad and the operations for the relief of Kut.

TRANSPORT.

13. The enquiries we have made, and the evidence, both oral and documentary,
which we have taken in this part of our investigation, lead us to the following
conclusions regarding the critical period up to April, 1916 :—

(a) From the first the paramount importance, both of river and railway transport
in Mesopotamia, was insufficiently realised by the military authorities in India.

PART XII.—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 118

A. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.

(6) A deficiency of river transport existed from the time the army left tidal water
and advanced up-river from Kurna. This deficiency became very serious as the
lines of communication lengthened and the numbers of the force increased.

(d) For want of comprehensive grasp of the transport situation and insufficiency
of river steamers we find the military authorities in India are responsible. The re-
sponsibility is a grave one.

(ec) River hospital steamers were an urgent requirement for the proper equipment
of the expedition, and were not ordered until much too late.

(f) With General Sir John Nixon rests the responsibility for recommending
the advances in 1915 with insufficient transport and equipment. The evidence did not
disclose an imperative need to advance without due preparation. For what ensued
from shortage of steamers, General Sir John Nixon must, in such circumstances, be
held to blame. The extent of his responsibility in relation to the sufferings of the
wounded is considered in Part X. of our Report and in para. 17 below.

(g) During the first four months of 1916, the shortage of transport was fatal to
the operations undertaken for the relief of Kut. Large reinforcements could not
be moved to the front in time to take part in critical battles. Based upon information
received from General Townshend, as to the urgent necessity for his immediate relief,
operations were undertaken, notwithstanding the extreme transport difficulty, but
in all the circumstances we do not attach blame for this to the Generals in Mesopotamia
directing the operations.

(h) Facilities for the discharge and handling of cargo at Basra, also provision of
works for the erection and repair of river craft, were hopelessly inadequate.

(7) Proceedings in connection with the filling of orders for river craft by the
Director of the Royal Indian Marine in India, and the India Office in London, were
far from satisfactory.

(&) Looking at the facts, which from the first must have been apparent to any
administrator, military or civilian, who gave a few minutes’ consideration to the
map and to the conditions in Mesopotamia, the want of foresight and provision for
the most fundamental needs of the expedition reflects discredit upon the organising
aptitude of all the authorities concerned. General Sir William Robertson, Chief of
the General Staff, Whitehall, in a document to which we have already referred,
states: “ In general, the operations were allowed in 1915 to develop without proper
regard to the vital questions of supply and maintenance,” in which opinion our
investigations lead us unreservedly to concur.

MEDICAL PROVISION.

As regards the treatment of the sick and the wounded, our conclusions are more
lengthy and minute, as this part of our enquiry necessitates close examination into details.

We find that :—

14. The medical provision for the Mesopotamia Campaign was from the beginning
insufficient ; by reason of the continuance of this insufficiency there was a lamentable
breakdown in the care of the sick and wounded after the battle of Ctesiphon and after
the battles in January, 1916; there was amelioration in March and April, 1916;
but that since then the improvement has been continual until it is reasonable to hope
that now the medical provision is satisfactory.

15. The defects of medical provision caused avoidable suffering to the sick and
wounded, and during the breakdown in the winter of 1915-16, this suffering was
most lamentably severe.

16. The deficiencies, which were the main causes of the avoidable suffering of the
sick and wounded, were in the provision of the following :—
(a) River hospital steamers.
(6) Medical personnel.
(c) River transport.
(2) Ambulance lad transport.
(C 48—1;6) : P

. le

114 PART XII.—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

A.—FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.

To these fifth and sixth main causes may be added im respect to the operations in
January 1916 :—

(e) The absence of the medical and supply establishments of the 7th Division.

(f) The premature efforts to relieve Kut in consequence of the erroneous estimate
of supplies in that place.

17. As to personal responsibility the Vincent-Bingley Commission found :—

That a grave responsibility for that part of the suffering which resulted from avoidable circumstances
rests with the Senior Medical Officer of the Force, Surgeon-General G. H. Hathaway, and with General Sir John
Nixon, the General Officer Commanding the Force, from April 9th, 1915, to January 19th, 1916. General
Hathaway did not represent with sufficient promptitude and force the needs of the services for which he was
responsible, and in particular failed to urge the necessity for adequate and suitable transport for the sick and
wounded with that insistency which the situation demanded. General Nixon did not, in our opinion, appreciate
the conditions which would necessarily arise if provision for the sick and wounded of his force were not made
on a more liberal scale. ,

We endorse the finding as regards Surgeon-General Hathaway who in our judgment
showed himself unfit for the high administrative office which he held.

We may add, however, as regards River and Land Transport, that while it was the duty
of Surgeon-General Hathaway to urge its necessity, it was actually the duty of the Quarter-
master General’s Department and of Sir John Nixon’s staff to see that it was provided.

So far as Sir John Nixon is concerned, however, we think that he was throughout
solicitous as to the condition of the wounded. The main mistake he made, was to rely
too absolutely on the statements made to him by his Deputy-Director of Medical Service,
Surgeon-General Hathaway ; to that extent he may be blamed, but he stands, so far as
responsibility is concerned, in a very different position from that occupied by Surgeon-
General Hathaway.

18. The officer directly responsible for the deficiencies of medical provision in
Mesopotamia, is however, the Director of Medical Services, India. This appoint-
ment’ was held at the beginning of the war by Surgeon-General Sir William Babtie,
who held the office between March, 1914, and June, 1915, but was away from India
for six weeks in February and March, 1915. He was succeeded by Surgeon-General J. G.
MacNeece on July 8th, 1915, and the latter proceeded home on sick leave on April 15th,
1916. Sir William Babtie in his evidence before us impressed us as an officer of ability and
knowledge, but we do not think that he brought these qualities sufficiently to bear upon the
task before him. He accepted obviously insufficient medical provision without protest,
and without any adequate effort to improve it. He cannot therefore be held blameless.

Surgeon-General MacNeece did not give evidence before the Vincent-Bingley
Commission, but he appeared before us. He was, iu our opinion, an officer thoroughly
desirous of fulfilling the duties assigned to him ; but he was a man of advancing years and
diminishing strength, unequal to the position he was called upon to fill, and his admini-
stration appears to us to show no signs of the vigour and efficiency that were required.

19. We find that :—

(«) The Home Government agreed with the Indian Government in limiting the
general military preparations of India before the war in the interests of retrenchment,
and provision was accordingly not made for such an expedition as that to Mesopo-
tamia. The limitation of medical preparation and the low standard of medical
treatment in the Indian Army at the outbreak of war were the natural outcome of
this policy, which was pursued for many years and was in force right up to the date
of the war.

(6) The private letters of the Secretary of State to the Viceroy showed an
earnest and continuous anxiety as to the condition of the wounded, and the only
comment that can be made upon the Secretary of State’s procedure is that he did not
fully utilize the official powers at his disposal for the purpose of forcing at an earlier
period an investigation into the treatment of the wounded in Mesopotamia.

(c) To Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, as Viceroy, belongs the general responsi-
bility attaching to his position as the head of the Indian Government, to which had
been entrusted the management of the expedition, including the provision of medical
services. In regard to the actual medical administration he appears to us to have
shown throughout the utmost goodwill, but considering the paramount authority
of his office, his action was not sufficiently strenuous and peremptory.

PART XIJ.—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 115

A. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.

(d) A more severe censure must be passed upon the Commander-in-Chief, for not
only did he, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army in India, fail closely to superintend the
adequacy of medical provision in Mesopotamia, but he declined for a considerable
time, until ultimately forced by the superior authority of the Viceroy, to give credence
to rumours which proved to be true, and failed to take the measures, which a
subsequent experience shows would have saved the wounded from avoidable suffering.®

_ 20. There has been misuse of official reticence as to medical defects and the sufferings
of the sick and wounded. |

21. While the protective and sanitary work of the Medical Administration has in certain
directions and at some periods (notably under Colonel Hehir) been commendable, yet there
has not been generally sufficient promptitude in taking the precautions dictated by modern
science for the protection of the troops against disease.

22. Throughout the campaign (with insignificant exceptions) the executive and regi-
mental medical officers and personnel have devoted themselves with unremitting kindness,
zeal and industry to the care of the sick and wounded with such means as were at their

disposal.

INDIAN FRONTIER AND INTERNAL TROUBLES.

23. In the information laid before us by high authorities as to the military require-
ments of India, there was constant reference made to the ever-present risk of invasion
on the North-West Frontier and the danger of simultaneous internal disturbance. We
are satisfied of the reality of such dangers and of the necessity of keeping mobilised a large
force on this frontier. There is little doubt that on more than one occasion since the out-
break of war the Indian Government passed through a period of grave anxiety, which they
successfully surmounted. The preoccupation caused by this anxiety must not be forgotten
in blaming the Indian Government for the inefficiency of the management of the
Mesopotamian campaign.

GENERAL RESULTS OF THE EXPEDITION.

24. The character of the Instructions given to us as a Commission and the date of
our appointment compelled us to devote a large proportion of our time and attention to
that limited period of the campaign in Mesopotamia in which reverses were experienced by
our troops. We have probed to the best of our ability the causes of these failures in order
to make suggestions for their remedy and removal. Though we have spent so large a
portion of our time in looking into a period of reverses, this should not overlay or obliterate
the fact that the success of the campaign has, as a whole, been remarkable. The operations
have lasted over 2} years, and, with the exception of a few months during which there was
a serious setback, the war has been an unbroken success. Up to the date of the advance
to Baghdad, in November, 1915, contimuous victory had been achieved by the Expedition-
ary Force. During the last few months the river transport has been increased, port
facilities improved, the force has been re-organised and adequately equipped for the task
before it, and it has resumed its career of victory. Weare of opinion—reviewing the opera-
tions as a whole—that it may now be truly asserted that in the many parts of the world in
which the Allied Forces have been engaged, no more substantial results or more solid vic-
tories have been achieved than those won by the gallantry of the British and Indian Armies
on the stricken plains of Mesopotamia. |

Mora oF TROOPS.

25. Our investigations show that what is in default is not the fighting capacity and
efficiency of the combatant forces of the Indian Army, but the system of military adminis-
tration in control of that Army. Rarely, if ever, have greater courage or pertinacity been
shown by British and Indian troops than is recorded in the operations of the Expeditionary
Force both during their successes and reverses. They had to operate under unfavourable
conditions of climate, weather, flooded terrain insufficient supplies and wholly inadequate
transport, and they were surrounded by a hostile and marauding population. In out judg-
ment, no praise can be too high for the gallantry and spirit evinced by the officers and men of
allranks of the British and Indian Armies under this accumulation of difficulties. It 1s
most desirable that the governing machinery of the Indian Army should be so reformed
as to enable it to be a help and not a drag on the fighting capacity of the armies it controls.

(C 48--176) P 2

116 PART XIJ.—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. FInpINGs AND CONCLUSIONS.

NATURE OF CRITICISMS ON INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

The criticisms which it has been our duty to make upon the Government of India
divide themselves into two categories :—

26. Those relating to the error of judgment shown by their advocacy of an
advance to Baghdad in October, 1915. In this mistake other authorities participated
and we are not disposed to say more on this matter than that, lamentable as were
the consequences, the blunder was one, which is not uncommon in a protracted cam-
palgn.

27. Our second criticisms are of a different character. They relate to the failure
adequately to “ minister to the wants of the forces employed in Mesopotamia.” This
failure was persistent and continuous and practically covered the whole of the period
during which the Indian Government were entrusted with the management of the
expedition. With the knowledge of the facts which we now possess and of the extent
and scope of the preparations of the War Office since they undertook the manage-
ment of the campaign. it is impossible to refrain from serious censure of the Indian Govern-
ment for the lack of knowledge and foresight shown in the inadequacy of their preparations
and for the lack of readiness to recognise and supply deficiencies. They ought to have
known, and with proper touch with the expedition they could have known, what were
its wants and requirements. It is true that their military system of administration was
cumbrous and inept. It was, however, within the power of the Viceroy and the Com-
mander-in-Chief to have established a more effective procedure and a closer touch with
the expedition itself.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS.

In the enquiry which we have made and the evidence which we have obtained
we have received much information as regards the inner working of the highest branches
of administration of the Indian Government both in England and India. We assume that
it will not be outside our duty if we briefly refer to them for the purpose of making certain
recommendations with a view to preventing a recurrence of the want of foresight and
of efficiency, which our investigations have revealed.

RELATIONS BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE VICEROY AND THEIR RESPECTIVE
COUNCILS.

28. We have more than once alluded to the great increase in the number of private
telegrams exchanged on official business between the Secretary of State for India and the
Viceroy. Whether intentionally or not, this method of communication must more or less
deprive the Councils of both these high officials of the powers which, under Acts of
Parliament, they have in common with the Secretary of State and Viceroy, been given
in the government and administration of India. TheSecretary of State informed us that
he proposed to make some change so as to limit the scope and purport of such private
communications. Some change is certainly constitutionally required, as the present
practice seems to us to conflict with the intentions of Parliament. If the Councils of the
Secretary of State and Viceroy are to be dispossessed of their old powers, such a change
should be effected openly under an Act of Parliament and not by a change in the internal
procedure of the India Office. Independently of the question of the legality of the present
practice, the increase in the use of private telegrams must tend to accumulate work into
the hands of an already heavily worked Viceroy. In our judgment, the aim of adminis-
trative reform in India, certainly in the military departments, should be a devolution of
responsibilities and duties from the over-centralised bureaucracy of the Supreme Govern-
ment at Simla. |

MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.

29. It is clear that the combination of the duties of Commander-in-Chief in India
and Military Member of Council cannot adequately be performed by any one man in time
of war, and that the existing organisation is at once over-centralised at its head, and cum-
brous in its duality below. This was fully admitted by the Secretary of State for India, Mr.
Chamberlain, and he gave us reason to believe that changes will be made enabling the
official who ostensibly holds the post of Commander-in-Chief adequately to perform his
functions of personal inspection, and investigation of the efficiency and requirements of

PART XII.—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 117

B. RECOMMENDATIONS.

the forces under him. We hope that amongst these changes there will be an amalgamation
into one department of the two existing departments of the Commander-in-Chief and the
Military Member of Council with a single and central registry, and that special efforts will
be made to diminish the amount of minute-writing and to simplify the present elaborate
system of clerical checking and counter-checking.

30. It is also clear that, so long as Simla remains the Headquarters of the Army
Departments, it is essential that in the event of oversea expeditions, there should be estab-
lished at the port of embarkation representatives of the Army Departments with wide
power to act without reference back to Headquarters.

NECESSITY FOR ENQUIRING INTO CERTAIN MILITARY QUESTIONS.

31. We have heard some evidence to the effect that the Indian Army has lost its
old popularity, and that it is no longer regarded as a satisfactory service from a professional
point of view, and that officers anxious for advancement prefer serving at home on account
of the better methods of instruction and training which the Home Army now affords.
It may be that some such ideas have deterred senior officers from accepting employment
in India; but we understand that the candidates for commissions in the Indian Army
at the present moment show no falling off either in numbers or quality. There was
undoubtedly a grievance as to the conditions of promotion in the Indian Army compared
with those prevailing in what used to be known as “ the King’s Army,” but this disparity
has to some extent been recently modified. In both armies promotion in the lower ranks
is practically by seniority (in the Indian Army with time limitations), and in the higher
grades by selection. It has further come to our notice that there is little personal contact
between the Secretariat Departments of the Indian Army and the combatant ranks, and
that in consequence there is not that sympathetic exchange of opinion and knowledge
between the administrative branches and the executive forces of the Army which 1s
essential to harmonious co-operation. There seems to be so much writing, that military
officials have inadequate time at their disposal for inspecting, training and testing the
troops, for whose efficiency and equipment they are responsible. These are evils which
can without much difficulty be corrected, if the Indian Government, profiting by experience,
will seriously take into consideration the defects in their military methods.

32. But other and more important considerations have been brought prominently to
our notice in the course of our enquiries. The dual system under which London and Simla
tried to conduct the campaign in Mesopotamia has obvious drawbacks. The chain of
responsibility is greatly lengthened by the number of authorities, who had necessarily to
be consulted, and who had a voice in the direction of affairs. We will enumerate the various
‘authorities who had to be consulted as regards the Mesopotamia Expedition: First, the
General Officer Commanding on the spot in Mesopotamia, then the Commander-in-Chief
in India, then the Viceroy, then the Secretary of State for India with his Military Secretary,
then the War Council with the Imperial Staff, and finally the Cabinet. Such a sub-
division of authoritative control must weaken the sense of responsibility of each
authority consulted, and it certainly has made it very difficult accurately to apportion
blame or credit. It was under the dual system that the administrative failures took place
during 1915 and early in 1916 in Mesopotamia, and it was not until London took over the
sole charge that there was any marked improvement in the management of the campaign.
The improvement and success since effected are a striking illustration of the all-importance
of unity of control in time of war.

We should also like to call attention to the manner in which the army in India suffered
during the era of economy before the war, when the military estimates were ruthlessly
cut down, often, it is to be feared, without due consideration. The result was that the
army was inadequately equipped, not only for an oversea expedition, but even for frontier
requirements. We also gather that there is general dissatisfaction at the system of
microscopic financial control exercised over details of military expenditure, pay and
allowances. We give in an appendix* a few illustrations of how hardly this system operates
in individual cases.

Finally it has been admitted by practically all the witnesses examined upon the subject
that the principles, upon which the system of reserves for the native army of India had
been established had proved faulty and unreliable. The men were too old, and had
forgotten their training. It was also conceded that a new scheme on different principles

* See Appendix IV.

118 PART XII.—-FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

B,. RECOMMENDATIONS.

must be created, if this latent force was for the future to be considered a real and not a
mere paper reserve. | | : ee

We do not think that we have travelled outside our province in calling attention to
these important points, or in suggesting that into them and other germane matters invest1-
gation should be made by the Secretary of State for India and the Secretary of State
for War. | |

It is in our judgment most undesirable that the standard of efficiency in the Indian
Army should in any sense become inferior to that of the Army at home, or that the popu-
larity of the Indian Army should be allowed to deteriorate through an excess of economical
zeal or a questionable system of supervision and control.

Royau Inprian MaRINE.

33, We feel strongly that the Royal Indian Marine Department requires reorganisation
with a view to giving its Director a higher status and a staff adequate to his work.

MEDICAL REFORM.

34 The evidence put before us indicates the necessity for certain immediate changes in
the existing system of medical organisation in India, which we propose to enumerate.

35. W: are of the opinion that:— = | | 7

(a) The Director of Medical Services in India, in war-time especially, should have
far greater powers, than he at present possesses, to authorise expenditure and make pur;
chases, and to delegate such power to his subordinates. The present elaborate system
of financial check and counter-check, and correspondence with other military depart-
ments, before what is wanted can be obtained, has proved from its dilatoriness a real
danger In war-time.

(b) Whenever an expedition is sent overseas from India, responsible officers
should at once be located at the port of embarkation, with wide power to act. We
have referred elsewhere to the fact that the Commander-in-Chief never visited Bom-
bay during the crisis of the campaign. Some of his staff did do so, but their visits
were spasmodic, and in no case had these officers power to give orders or settle impor-
tant questions without further reference to Simla or Delhi. Further, all power being
concentrated at Headquarters the ruling authorities deprived themselves of the
value of being in constant touch with those going to, or returning from, Mesopotamia.
If it was true, as alleged, that the Headquarter Staff at Simla were tied to their secre-
tariat work there, the Bombay Government was on the spot, and common-sense would

have suggested the delegation of authority to a Government so conveniently situated,

(c) At the port of embarkation the embarkation staffs should be responsible for -
seeing that the equipment and personnel of each medical unit should not be separated
in different vessels, but embarked together in the same vessel. This rule was frequently
neglected at Bombay. |

(d) There should be an immediate and general improvement in the whole standard
of comfort and accommodation in the hospitals for British troops in India. Surgeon-
General MacNeece stated “‘ even now there are practically not more than two or three
up-to-date military hospitals in India.” We are glad to note that the new war hospitals
in Bombay are reported by the Vincent-Bingley Commission as bearing favourable
comparison with any similar hospitals in the United Kingdom. This shows what can
be done in India when there is impulse to reform. . We think it discreditable to the
Indian Government that the general standard of hospitals in India should fall below
the standard of efficiency now demanded in Military Hospitals at home. ‘I'o assist in
reforming this state of things, we think that the R.A.M.C. or a corps on similar lines
should be available for service in all British Hospitals in India, and that a better and
more complete female nursing service should also be organised. |

(e) As regards the medical treatment of Indian troops, no time should be lost in
substituting a Station Hospital system, for the present regimental treatment, “I doubt,”

_ one I.M.S witness says to us, ‘‘ whether you gentlemen would consider that the Sepoys’
hospitals in peace-time in India are hospitals at all.’’ Sir Havelock Charles described
them as “‘a disgrace to the Government of India.’’ Surgeon-General MacNeece
states “ there are no well-equipped operating theatres, X-ray rooms, laboratories, etc.” ;

PART XII.—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 119

B. RECOMMENDATIONS.

and Sir William Babtie, “ they are so bad that I think it would be necessary to reform
them abinitio.”” The new Indian hospitals should be staffed by enlisted personnel
of all ranks, and should be used for building up trained reserves of menial establish-
ments in peace time. | 7 | . = = : :

(f) All deficiencies usually allowed to prevail in peace-t:me in the mobilisation
equipment of general hospitals should be made good. Sir W. Babtie told us that of
the general hospitals in India. “‘ Twelve were supposed to be mobilisable, but only
four were complete in all the different Departments of supply.” All such equipment
should be stored and in readiness, and inspected, as is done now, in the case of field
ambulances, casualty clearing hospitals and stationary hospitals. 2

(g) Base Depéts of Medical Stores should be reintroduced into the Indian Field
Service organisation, and kept ready for mobilisation. . _ 2

(h) At the outset of every campaign there should be provided a separate superior
sanitary organisation and staff charged with the arrangements for preserving and
safeguarding the health of the fighting troops, and responsible to the Principal Medical
Officer of the force, but otherwise entirely separate from the organisation for the care
of the sick and wounded. This implies a formation in peace-time of an adequate reserve
of sanitary officers, enlisting in it, if necessary, the services of specialists in civil
employment.

(2) The Field Service Ration should receive very careful reconsideration and altera-
tion in the light of experience in Mesopotamia. This especially applies to the rations
for Indian troops. The War Office Sanitary Committee found that even, “‘ the improved
ration ’’ sanctioned as late as October last was deficient in many respects.

36. The above are only some of the defects revealed by our investigations, but they
are sufficient to prove the necessity for an urgent, and thorough reform by the Indian
Government of the whole system, upon which their medical services are based, and
under which they are controlled. Sir Alfred Keogh, whose administration at the War
Office as Director-General Army Medical Services has been very successful during this
war, at, the conclusjon of his evidence made the following very strong statement :—

““T have no hesitation whatever in saying that the medical arrangements connected with the Army in
India have been for years and years most disgraceful. I say that with a full sense of responsibility. I have
served many years in India. I have not been there for some time now, but in my opinion things are not better
than they were. Anything more disgraceful than the carelessness and want of attention with regard to the
sick soldier in India it is impossible to imagine.”

37. Our colleague, Commander Wedgwood, has written a dissentient Report. It
contains much that 1s interesting and, in many important points, it differs from ovr own
Report rather in emphasis than in substance. Thus, for example, in Part XI., paragraphs
40-41 of our Report we have called attention to the Indian Government’s lack of alacrity
in mobilising the resources of India for the assistance of the Empire in the war, a feature
upon which Commander Wedgwood lays so much stress in his Report. But we do not
think the evidence before us justifies attaching to Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duft
alone the blame for the mistakes and shortcomings connected with the Mesopotamia
Iixpedition. We have given reasons for a wider, and, in our judgment, amore equitable
apportionment of responsibility.

38. In our investigations we have been confronted by an enormous mass of written
evidence. Sir Beauchamp Duff supported his oral evidence by over forty Blue-books and
other documents drawn up by the Headquarters Staff in India. They were admirably edited
and annotated. But this mass of written evidence, as well as the many other documents

120 PART “II—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

B, RECOMMENDATIONS.

which poured in from all sides, and which had to be mastered before witnesses could be
examined, at times made the work of the Commission very severe. It would have been
impossible for us adequately to have discharged our duties and to issue a Report as quickly
as we have done had it not been for the ability, industry and powers of organisation of
our Secretary, Mr. R. G. Duff. His assistance was invaluable, and we wish to com-
mend his services to the head of the Department to which he belongs. He was alsv well
seconded by Mr. J. W-Fitzwilliam, our Assistant Secretary.

(Signed) —
GEORGE HAMILTON, CYPRIAN A. G. BRIDGE.
Chairman,
DONOUGHMORE. NEVILLE G. LYTTELTON.
HUGH CECIL. JOHN HODGE.

ARCHIBALD WILLIAMSON,

Signed by the Commission,
May 17th, 1917.

R. G. DUFF,
Secretary.

SEPARATE REPORT

COMMANDER J. C. WEDGWOOD, D.S.O., M.P.

1. I was added to the Commission by direct vote of the House of Commons as a
Member of Parliament who had seen a considerable amount of fighting. The fact of my
having been fighting may unwittingly have led me to be unduly severe on those who sit
behind and send other men to the front. Even making all allowance for this bias, I still
find differences, and differences of principle, between myself and my colleagues that make
the signing of their report impossible to me.

Minor points of difference.

2. It is not necessary to waste time over minor points of difference. To attribute
the disasters in Mesopotamia to the use by the Secretary of State of private telegrams,
or to Lord Kitchener’s old changes in the army in India seems to me to shew some lack of a
sense of proportion. If all the telegrams that were private had been public, and if there
had been a Military Member of Council in addition to Sir Beauchamp Duff, I do not think
even then, so long as the attitude of the Indian Administration remained the same, there
would have been much difference in result ; there might have been less decision, there might
have been more friction.

Mistakes or Crimes ?

3. My chief difference from my colleagues goes much deeper. They distribute blame
over many, in India, in Mesopotamia, and at home; but censure for honest human error
has nothing in common with the censure we should pass on an attitude of unwillingness
to help in war. If we confound mistakes with crimes the result is a dangerous leniency
towards crime.

The Decision to Advance.

4. As honest error I class any mistake that may have been made in authorising the
1915 advance on Baghdad, by the “ Military Secretary of the India Office, the Secretary of
State and the War Committee of the Cabinet.” Indeed I maintain that the publication of
the evidence will completely absolve from all blame both the Military Secretary, Sir
Edmund Barrow, and the War Committee. With the material put before them from
Mesopotamia and India they would have deserved as much, if not more, censure had they
decided, not for, but against the advance. It will be a bad day for our Empire when
soldiers and statesmen decline all risks, and withdraw confidence from the men on the spot.

General Nixon’s Advice.

5. It is possible, too, to regard as honest error General Nixon’s mistake in urging the
Bagdad advance with wholly insufficient transport. He was at least enthusiastic and ready
to take risks, and to do what I suppose he thought best for his country; while from
another point of view it would be as futile to censure General Nixon as to censure any
other of the 21 general officers of the Indian Army whom it has been found necessary to
relieve of their commands in the field. They are the natural result of Indian Army
Government, belonging to an old type, brought up to be what they are, and deprived
by long residence among Eastern subjects of that energy, wider patriotism and education
which is essential for the successful prosecution of a great war. An administration that
was content with this type and selected the generals to command in Mesopotamia, that
knew them for what they were and yet let the expedition be run as “ nobody’s child,”
must be held responsible for what happened in Mesopotamia.

Starving the Army in India.

6. One can hardly regard even as an error the effort made by Lord Crewe and the
Cabinet to reduce the cost of the Indian Army before the war. My colleagues, in implying
censure upon him and earlier Secretaries of State in this matter, seem to me to miss the
point. Economy under the new conditions of friendship with Russia there might well

(C 48—176) Q

Personnel and

Reserves.

122

have been at that time; but it should have been directed by the authorities in India
rather towards obtaining a smaller and efficient force than towards keeping the force large
but starving it of modern military accessories. It was this latter policy, pursued by Ind'a
for some years previous to the war, that made the Army as ill-found as indicated in my
colleagues’ report ; and for this policy it was hardly the Government in England that was
responsible. Further, the responsibility of the Indian Government in this respect is a
responsibility, not for an error, but for reluctance to interfere with the vested interests of
a corporation of their servants.

Training.

7. If the equipment of the Indian Army when war began was inadequate and out
of date, strictures hardly less severe must be passed upon the personnel. Evidence laid
before us has shown that the standards for the higher commands have deteriorated since
the Boer War, and the exceptionally long list of Anglo-Indian generals who have been
relieved of their commands in the field cannot be entirely set down to the normal retirement
of the aged in a war that demands young men. Nor are Mid-Victorian manceuvres, carried
on without such modern accessories of warfare as mechanical transport, air park, wireless
telegraphy, barbed wire, flares, entrenching tools, with wholly inadequate telephones, and
with two-wheeled hospital tongas drawn by bullocks, likely to be of much help as training.
And a considerable part of the Army in Southern India seem to have no manceuvres at
all, even of this unsatisfactory nature. | |

8. The same feeling of security and eastern lassitude that was content with an Army —
of this description led to the acceptance of a system of reserves of officers and men which
must in any case have completely broken down directly war came. The reserve system —
for the Native Army (rank and file) seems to have been well adapted to foster the loyalty
of political pensioners, but the old men who returned to the colours were unsuitable for
soldiers ; a reserve scheme should be concerned principally with military efficiency.

A reserve scheme for white officers had been drawn up, but as little or no pecuniary
inducement was held out to young white civilians to join the Indian Army Reserve, only
43 such officers existed at the beginning of the war. The Indian Government have since
had to draw over 2,600 Indian Army Reserve officers out of India and to give them such
hasty training as was possible.

If no provision was made for a reserve of white officers there was the less excuse for
allowing old-fashioned prejudices against colour to stand in the way of the formation of
an adequately trained cadre of Indian officers which the native rulers of India would willingly
have supplied. From evidence tendered to us it is evident that a change in this direction
would not be unwelcome to the English officers in the Indian Army.

Value of Indian Army.

9. In spite of being ill-equipped, ill-trained, and resting on paper reserves, the
regimental officers and the rank and file of the Indian Army have fought in a manner to
show that, with proper drafts and properly trained and equipped, they would have few or
no superiors. The victories at Kut and Ctesiphon—at Ctesiphon where 35 per cent. of
the whole army fell on the field and yet that army was victorious,—as well as the bloody
attacks at Wadi and Sannah that were made again and again over an open plain through
deep mud in the face of hopeless odds and almost certain failure, have led to an entire
reconsideration of the value of the Indian Army. They are worth something better than
management and control by eastern lethargy and bureaucratic incompetence. There is
no fault to find with the younger men of the Anglo-Indian Aimy, but they lose stamina
with long residence in the East.

| The good change tn the Control.

10. The success that has attended the Army of Mesopotamia since the conduct of
the campaign was taken over by the War Office, the change that has come over the feeding,
the cheerfulness, the morale, of that Army, are palpable to the public eye. That this 1s
due in part to the energy of the War Office, and to the excellent officers they have sent out
I should be the last to deny. But when all allowance has been made for this, the change
cannot but be largely accounted for by the previous attitude of the Indian Goverament
towards the expedition, an attitude which they adopted not only to the expedition but
towards the war as a whole.

123

The Charge against the Indian Government.

| 11. It is precisely Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff whom I cannot
merely charge with honest human error. They, and they alone, as is shown by my
cOlleagues, formed and were the Indian Administration during that part of the war under
cOnsideration. Throughout their conduct of the war they seem to me to have shown
little desire to help and some desire actually to obstruct the energetic prosecution of the
‘war. Asa reason for this obstruction they gave—the situation in India; and I for one
feel no sense of obligation to them for placing “ risks ” in India above the dire necessities
of the British Empire, and the welfare of their own troops in Mesopotamia.

To charge two high officials with “ little desire to help and some desire actually
to obstruct the energetic prosecution of the war ”’ is a serious accusation, and one difficult
to accept. I have therefore felt bound to support it by a considerable body of evidence.
Such evidence must necessarily take the form of extracts without context (till the evidence
is published in full), extracts from letters or cables from Lord Hardinge or Sir Beauchamp
Duff, extracts from protests by Lord Kitchener or Lord Crewe, extracts from speeches
by Lord Hardinge or his Financial Adviser, Sir William Meyer, extracts from evidence

given to the Commission on oath as to the view taken by the War Office in England of the
Indian attitude. Extracts are not a satisfactory method of carrying conviction, but the
subsequent publication of the volumes of evidence will show that the full correspondence
conveys no better impression, and that the extracts have been taken with all the fairness
possible. Furthermore, I have felt it advisable to back up the extracted evidence with
a list of the measures for helping the Empire that India has adopted since the departure
of Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff, many of them having been previously waived
_ aside as impracticable by these same officials in written evidence before the Commission.
~ Such a list will confirm my finding.

Although I had the advantage of being able to cross-examine Sir Beauchamp Duff
and the other Anglo-Indian officials that came before the Commission, I was unable
- to be present when Lord Hardinge himself came under examination. My colleagues
. examined him on none of the passages which I extract ; he may be able to give satisfactory
. explanations for all of them; he may deny the implication I give to them in every case.
. But of the meaning of plain English the public can judge, and the effect of the attitude
was such that it caused the very civilians in India to complain of the pretence that “ India
is not at war.’’ Explanations given now do not efface the impression conveyed then.

A. EVIDENCE AS TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT
FROM CABLES.

12. On the outbreak of war the Indian Government responded, liberally according
to our then estimates of what the war was likely to be, and despatched considerable
» expeditions to France and to Egypt. Very soon, however, the grudging spirit made itself
~ visible. On August 6th the loan of 15 Indian officers was refused, a small matter which
- was reversed two days later. Then, on August 12th, before indeed the defeats in France,
_ the Viceroy wired—‘ Although we are ready torunsomerisk . . . The Commander-in-
Chief complains that he is absolutely crippled by this last measure relating to officers.”

In his next telegrams the Viceroy showed his position, safety of India must come
first. August 15th—‘‘ We have, however, never wavered in our readiness to assist the
Empire to the utmost of our power, limited only by considerations of the safety of India.”
August 27th—“ We have spared no effort . . . running even a certain amount of
. misk by the depletion of our stock of rifies, ammunition.” On August 27th he must have

known of the disasters in France, but he may not have known how serious they were when
he talked of “ a certain amount of risk.”

The appeals from home to which these telegrams were a reply have not been before
the Commission, but we have a sample in Lord Kitchener’s wire of September 3rd—
“Can you manufacture any guns yourself ;’’ and the reply was—‘ Our manufacture of
guns 1s negligible.”

No effort seems to have been made in these early times to do anything to increase
the resources of the Empire in material or men. The Commander-in-Chief wired
September 5th—“ It was thought here politically inadvisable at present to agree to your
request for Nepal troops for Kgypt”’; and this though the suggestion had been made
by His Majesty himself.

(C 48—176) Q2

124

13. It is difficult to say whether Lord Hardinge or Sir Beauchamp Duff was primanil:
responsible for this attitude of negation. For instance, the Viceroy cabled, September 18th,
1914—“‘ Although I have practically met all the demands that have been made upon me
even at some risk, there is a limit beyond which risk becomesa seriousdanger . . . the
Commander-in-Chief will also never agree to any weakening of these frontier divisions.” |
To which Lord Kitchener replied, September 19th—‘‘ You hardly seem to realise the
seriousness of our position on the Continent . . . I cannot understand your refusal t«
accept the 15-pdr.”” This 15-pdr. gun has, of course, since been used by our troops or [
the Continent. The Viceroy replied, September 23rd—“ Duff was so strong on the subje:t f
of the inconvenience of having two kinds of artillery in the country that I had to giv
way tohim . . . Duff, though most willing and anxious to co-operate, 1s far mor f
nervous than I am.” Next day Lord Kitchener again appealed—“‘ I do not think yer
yet quite realise in India what the war is going to be. If we lose it will be worse for Indi: |:
than any success of internal revolution or frontier attack.’”’ The Viceroy having spoker }.
for the Commander-in-Chief, the Commander-in-Chief then spoke for the Viceroy an:
wired, September 25th—‘‘ A Governor-General can hardly sit quiet and see the whol: |.
control of Indian defence withdrawn from him altogether. You must remember that
the Viceroy and his Council cannot be disregarded.” . . . The evidence before u:
showed, however, that the Council was not consulted as to the war, and whenever Indis
was asked for help she responded generously. This incident, connected not only witb the
question of the guns, but also with direct correspondence between the War Office and
Sir Beauchamp Duff, ended as follows, the Viceroy wired, October 1st—‘ Duff objected
strongly to Kitchener . . . and received an angry message in reply . . . We
have now practically got to the bedrock.”’

14. It would almost seem as if jealousy for the conservation of the Army in India
affected their attitude towards every attempt that Lord Kitchener might make to meet
India’s wishes. He offered Territorials to replace regiments of the Line, and the Viceroy
replied, September 20th—*‘ We cannot regard Territorials as fit to cope with Pathans in
hill warfare. . . . We cannot raise new forces, because we have given up to the
Imperial Army all our new rifles and practically all our artillery and owing to number of
our officers given to meet demands in England we are already very short and with no
possibility of replacing them. Of course, any idea of an expedition to Basra will be out
of the question since we could not send Territorial Infantry and Artillery against the
Turks.” This cable was sent just at the moment that the mfle difficulty was most acute
at home, but new forces were being raised here and training proceeding, with or without
rifles. Two days later we are told that the Indian Government were “ issuing an appeal
to gentlemen in India to join the Reserve (I.A.R.)”; they had evidently made up
their minds to try to deal with the “ impossibility ” of replacing officers.

15. But what seems to me most symptomatic of their attitude towards any change
in the established order of their world is their resentment of the Territonals. When
these troops arrived, after Territorials had done good work in France against Germans,
the Commander-in-Chief cabled, January 20th—‘“ The . . . Territonals are, of
course, quite unfit for frontier work”; on January 30th, the Viceroy wired—“ Second
Line troops from home can hardly be regarded as suited for frontier defence’; and
on February 1st—‘‘ It would be madness to send Territorial troops to the North-West
frontier.”” And we have seen that it was deemed “ out of the question ” to use them
against Turks. It is not merely that their estimates of Territorial troops were mistaken,
the serious point to my mind is that this estimate was one which suited a policy of obstruc-
tion. If Territorials were not fitted for frontier war, they could have learnt that as thev
have learnt worse forms of warfare.

16. If the Indian Government gave grudgingly and was reluctant to accept the help
offered, it was also apathetic. We learn in a cable from the Viceroy, October 7th, 1914,
that “Turkey . . . is notina position to give real material assistance to the enemy.”
But in that matter Turkey has done more for Germany than India had done for England
up to this present year. It was energy that was lacking. The Viceroy wrote on
October 21st,—‘‘ I inquired of the Commander-in-Chief whether proper provision had
been made for warm clothing for the troops. He told me that he was relying on private
charity for this.’’ This, of course, the Viceroy vetoed ; but that such a suggestion should
have been made shows, either that the matter had been forgotten, or that the policy of
starvation had run mad. On January 5th the Commander-in-Chief cabled,—* As regards
reinforcements, our reservists are turning out disappointing.” Yet the population
of India is 315,000,000, of whom some 50,000,000 belong to fighting races. At last, on

125

ebruary 5th, 1915, Lord Kitchener cabled,—** Cannot you organise the volunteer forces
iat you have so that they could either relieve your garrison in India or a
nd again on February 12th,—‘“I should certainly take some slight msk . . . I
ould in addition call on European residents and Indian volunteers to enlist for general
rvice.” Yet nothing was done in this direction until this present year. The
ymmander-in-Chief replied on February 8th,—‘‘I am endeavouring to organise the
lunteers in India, but . . . even for service in other parts of India, few of those
e willing to leave their civil posts.’”’ This objection has been felt in England also and
€& measure surmounted ; in India it immobilised a force of 44,000 trained and enrolled
en. We had no evidence that efforts had been made to get the volunteers to volunteer
r general service.

17. Meanwhile complaints of the ‘‘ denudation”’ of India continued. The Viceroy wrote,
ovember 5th, 1914,—“ I am receiving complaints from the provinces that they are
nuded of troops, and that Europeans are anxious as to the future.’”’ We had no
rroborative evidence on this point, but Englishmen, though anxious everywhere, were
xt the less willing to risk their lives. When the Home Government began to
ress for fresh units to be sent to Mesopotamia complaint grew to protest. Lord
ardinge telegraphed, February 16th, 1915,—‘t We are strongly of opinion that we have
‘ached limit of risk which can justifiably be imposed on the people of India, who pay
xr the Indian Army.” On February 25th—‘ We feel that we have not been treated
irly . . . Itis the old story of treating India like a milch cow, and this creates such
deplorable impressioa here.” Not only do these two telegrams show a glaring example
Ethe “ India not at War ” theory, but the latter one is an unfair suggestion. The people
f India knew nothing of the demands that were being made, and when demands were
ade on them after Lord Hardinge left, they met them with as much patriotism and as
ttle complaining as any part of the Empire.

Nor will the people of India appreciate Lord Hardinge’s cable of March 3rd—‘‘ I do
ot think that we ought to be asked to take further risks, and in fact we must refuse to do
o9 . . . Ifthe facts were generally known there would be an outcry in this country.”
im the same day he cabled—“ India has therefore done her duty to the Empire, and it
3 quite impossible, in view of the situation on the frontier and in interior, to do more.
t is no use to suggest to us that we should take further risks in India.” To these cables
ord Crewe replied—‘‘ His Majesty’s Government definitely order the strengthening of
reneral Barrett’s force at once, and that you are both entirely relieved of responsibility for
onsequences.” It seems to me a question whether Lord Hardinge ought not to have
esigned office on receipt of such an order couched in such language. The Home Govern-
nent seem to me also to have a certain responsibility for retaining him in office. Lord
\itchener wired to Sir Beauchamp Duff on the same date—“ I advise you as an old friend
o reinforce Basra. It appears to me that the attitude adopted in India is excessively
langerous.” I hold that the Commission shculd show that it was, in fact, dangerous.

18. Still the complaints continued. On March 9th the Viceroy wired: ‘‘ I cannot
pare any more troops—an opinion in which I have the Commander-in-Chief, the whole
4 my Council, and all responsible people with me . . . I rece've an imperative order

. . The Commander-in-Chief . . . has stated his opinion . . . that he
vould like to see every European woman out of the country.’ This protest fell on deaf
‘ars as it deserved to do; and on March 14th the Army Council stated its opinion to the
secretary of State, Lord Crewe—‘‘ The maintenance of British rule in India is a duty of
igh importance . . . but it is not a duty which can claim to be paramount over
Il others.”” On April 29th, 1915, was made the last protest, the last for many months for
, reason which will appear. The Viceroy wires—‘‘ The lives of loyal British and Indian
ubjects are imperilled by the demands made upon our military resources.”

19. General Nixon had now been sent from India to Mesopotamia with a large increase
f force, and the attitude of the Indian Government changed. I cannot avoid the conclusion
hat the prospect of kudos to be gained by a successful expedition affected the judgment of
hat Government. Unfortunately it did not change their attitude towards the Home
xovernment, but merely their ambitions. No sooner did the expedition assume a creditable
ize than the Indian Government, without inquiry as to its wants or altering the policy of
loofness, began almost to urge the ill-equipped force forward.

20. As early as January 20th, 1915, the Commander-in-Chief cables—‘‘ An advance
o Amara . . . 1srequired by political considerations.’ Their instructions in March to
reneral Nixon, on his leaving for the Gulf, were to occupy the whole of the Basra Vilayet,

which included Nasiryeh, Amara and the Tigris river nearly to Kut—while the Home

126

Government were left under the impression that the General’s réle was a purely defensive
one. In June, an appreciation by the Chief of the General Staff, India, urged as a reason
for advance—‘ Now we are well equipped with River Transport, the Turks have little.”
No sooner was Nasiriyeh taken than the Viceroy wired, July 26th—‘‘ We consider it a
matter of strategic necessity that Kut should also be occupied.” :

21. When the critical decision as to the advance on Bagdad was under consideration
the following series of cables came from the Viceroy, 6th October, 1915—‘. . . Nixon
with forces at his disposal could without much difficulty capture Bagdad. . . .”
October 21st, 1915—“. . . Take and occupy Bagdad. This will present no difficulty
whatever.” October 23rd, 1915—“‘ I am confident that the right policy . . . isto
take the risk and to occupy Bagdad . . .” If the Commander-in-Chief had thougtt
of going himself to Mesopotamia he could have seen at once that the force was unfitted
for such an expedition. If he had only kept in touch with their transport and medi!
requirements, if he had merely seen and spoken to the men that returned from that country,
he could never have made such a mistake.

22. But the attitude towards the Home Government did not change. It almost
seems to have spread throughout the Service, for we have the following amazing minute
from the Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief addressed to the Military Secretary

to the Viceroy, October 17th, 1915—““. . . It is proposed by the Chief that the force
he has named should be assembled . . . for eventualities, but that the Home Goven-
ment should not be informed of this . . . The Home Government are very anxious

that Bagdad should be taken, and they will send us the required force if we hold out, but
they will give us nothing if the least sign of willingness to find reinforcements is shown by
us.” The Indian Government “ held out ” while Serbia was being overrun, and while ou
last man was being put in at.Loos. But to my mind the most regrettable feature is that
no shame was felt, even among subordinate officers, at showing not the “ least sign of
willingness.” As arranged, the Home Government was not informed, and the Vicercr
cabled, October 17th—‘. . . . Inno case could I undertake to supply from Indi,
even temporarily, a further force of the strength of a Division.”

Ctesiphon produced almost the same results as peremptory orders from home ; ani
on November 25th, the Viceroy wired—“‘I have agreed to Commander-in-Chiels
proposal to despatch immediately two brigades of infantry and one of artillery frox
India. . .” |

23. The incapacity to extemporise supplies from India is also a feature to which one
must draw unfavourable attention. It could not have arisen from inability, since
supplies are now drawn from that country. Except as regards river steamers, and thi
late in the day, commandeering private or public resources does not seem to have bee
even contemplated. That must be the conclusion from the following cables : Decembet
15th, 1915—‘“‘ The battalions should be despatched from England fully armed ant
equipped as we can do nothing more as regards providing material.” February 2n¢.
1916—‘. . . Additional transport cannot be provided from India.” February 5th—
ee . Ordnance, stores . . . local output is strictly limited.” February 7th—

. . . AT. carts and draught. mules . . . This demaad cannot be met from
India.”” One may properly contrast with these a telegram to India from the Chief of the
Imperial General Staft, February 10th—‘‘. . . Whatstepsare you taking to suppl
deficiencies end in what way can I help.” | |

- 24. It would be superfluous to quote further refusals of help, but another aspect
of the Indian Government attitude cannot be passed over. A desire to put all possible
expenditure off their shoulders on to the British taxpayer was present and seems to me
to be mean at such a time as this. This desire interfered, as the majority of my colleagues
have shown, with the construction of the railway, and is illustrated by the following

telegram from the Viceroy—“ The expenditure (on a cable from Bushire to Fao) will be

debited to the Imperial Government.”

_ Weare not building any new railways in England ; indeed, we have found it necessary

to pull up railways in this country in order to provide rails for France. What then cai

be said of an objection to a light railway in Mesopotamia raised by the Commander-2-

Chief as late as April 27th, 1916—‘ To construct an efficient two-foot six line, railways

in this country would have to be closed down, or progress on others stopped.”

127

|B. EVIDENCE AS TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT
FROM SPEECHES. |

25. The evidence of the attitude of the Indian Government is as clearly shown in
eches made before the Indian Council in March, 1915, on the Budget Debate at Simla.
March 2nd Sir William Meyer stated in Council—* In consequence of the war, ex-
iditure is being restricted to what is considered essential for the maintenance of
ciency and the protection of this country.” Lord Hardinge, in the Budget debate
March 30th said—* The imposition of additional taxation at the present time would
+ 1m our judgment have been justified either by financial requirements or by the present
nomic condition of the country.” Mr. Bannerjee added—* Although it is a War Budget
loes not add to the military expenditure ; on the contrary, the military expenditure —
slightly less than had been budgeted for.”” Mr. Abbott, of Jhansi, offered a mild pro-
t, he said—‘‘ Handsome as our offerings may have been, . . . they have not, I
ret to say, been on the same princely footing and basis as that of our fellow Colonials.
»wever, I am confident that the demand has only to be made and loyal India will
et to pay the expenses of our Expeditionary Forces in the same way as Canada and
stralia ate doing.” To which Sir William Meyer replied—‘‘ India had been paying
avily for a splendid Army . . . for the defence of India .. India had been
untaining this Army long before the Dominions thought of doing anything, to speak of,
the way of military expenditure.”
While the above extracts show clearly enough the attitude of the Government
wards expenditure on the war, two further speeches show as clearly the attitude of the
me people towards borrowing on the London market. Lord Hardinge in the same
idget debate declared—‘ Our capital programme . . . 12.e., for railways and canals
. -must be maintained on a scale ee some reasonable relation to past stan-
rds if excessive hardship and dislocation are to be avoided. Our borrowing arrangements
turally follow.” As late as October, 1915, Sir William Meyer, speaking in the Karachi
iamber of Commerce, explained the situation—‘‘ The lending capacities of India are very
aited, and we cannot face the prospect of depriving ourselves of the aid, which we shall
‘ve to look to from them, by letting them be diverted to a War Loan.’’*

_ EVIDENCE SHOWING THE OPINION HELD . BY RESPONSIBLE PERSONS
| ON THE ATTITUDE ADOPTED BY THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT. “a

«26. —It is unfortunate that Lord Kitchener could give no living testimony, but answers
y Lord Crewe, General Sir Edmund Barrow and Major-General Maurice are given below :—

Lord Crewe: “ From the first the Government of India kept camplaining almost
bitterly of the demands that were made on them. . . He (Lord Kitchener) took
precisely the same view of the denudation of British troops in India. I quite well
remember his going so far as to say, on one occasion that, even if we lost India through
a mutiny, 1t would be better than losing the fight in France.”

Lord Crewe, being asked: “ They treated the crisis rather as enough it were’an
extreme form of frontier campaign than as though it were a world-wide war for which
there was no precedent,” replied : “ Yes, I do not think that is an unfair criticism.”

General Sir Edmund Barrow, being asked : “‘ It is no use to suggest to us that we
should take further risks in India.’ Does not that indicate a rather curious spirit in
connection with this European war ? Do they put India first and England second 2”
replied : ‘ Yes, it would really read so.’

General Sir Edmund Barrow, being asked : There does not seem to be any
exceptional energy or initiative in India,” answered : ‘ I am inclined to agree.”

General Sir Edmund Barrow, being asked if he would indicate what had caused

“ this breakdown of administration,” replied : “ Yes, but [think . . . the initial
cause goes far beyond this Commi ssion. I mean it strikes at the whole eee of mili-
tary administration in India.”

Major-General Maurice, Director of Military Operations, being asked : “Do you
think that the Indian Government have made full use of the resources of India as
has been done in this country ? ” 5 uo ‘My impression is, certainly not.’

* This speech of Sir’ William Meyer’s was not put before the Commission, but came Every. into my:
ands. Sir William Meyer was not examined by the Commission as he was in India.

A War Loan.

Co., Ltd., is given :—

128

Major-General Maurice, being asked : “‘ Have you heard suggestions that Gener,
Sykes is being starved as regards officers and equipment ?” replied: ““ Yes; I hy
things are satisfactory now, but there is no question he was starved, and it cam:
our notice and we pressed the India Office very strongly.”

_Even the Vincent-Bingley Commission (composed as to two out of three of ..
members of Anglo-Indian officials) found itself compelled to put the blame cnt
Indian Government. In Sir Beauchamp Dufi’s words: “ The Commission have:
followed the headings of the terms of reference in their report. . . The Comms
have departed from their terms of reference and embarked upon criticism of «
preparations for the campaign. . . The Commission have ended by reportin;
the past and present action of the Government of India instead of carrying out t.
instructions.”

The views of the civilians in India are even more frankly stated, and to clear ther
responsibility the following examination of Mr. F: Carter, of Messrs. Turner, Mortise:

I gather from your evidence that there is a sort of feeling in India among’
civilians that India is not pulling its full weight during the war—that the In:
Government is not doing all that it might do during the war ?—Yes.

Can you say whether that feeling is general among the civilians in Cal. utta ?—Yes.

Did it never occur to the civilian population in Calcutta that more might be
been done in making ammunition at the same time that the Ministry of Munitions +.
started over here ?—Yes.

You never heard that the difficulty was that they could not get machinery ?—No.

Is there any basis for that suggestion, considering that there were the American a.
Japanese markets available ?—No.

You could have got lathes from both those countries ?—Yes. How did we ste:
making munitions at all ?

The other reason given for not making munitions in India on a considerable scale «
that the Indian native is extremely difficult to teach to workin the workshops. Is tt:
so ?—No.

Would you consider an Indian native quite as easy to teach the use of t.
ordinary lathe as a woman in England ?—Far better.

It has been stated by the Commander-in-Chief that India 1s a poor and be:
ward country and that therefore it cannot be expected to help more than it has do:
Is that your impression of India ?—No, it is not.

Is it your impression that it is a very poor country at the present time ?—No.

You have been in India for some years. Have you ever known India mr
prosperous than at the present time ?—No, never.

Do you regard—I will call it the non possumus attitude of the Governm=::
of India, as due to the Commander-in-Chief and the Viceroy, or is it due to the wh
of the bureaucracy in India ?—I should think that it is the whole of the bureaucracy!
India. I am speaking of the Imperial Government and not about Bengal or Bombay.

The whole of the Simla Government ?—Yes, the Simla Government.

D. EVIDENCE AS TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT 3:
SHOWN BY MEASURES ADOPTED SINCE THE CHANGE IN TUL
PERSONNEL OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

27. These are the measures which were not taken by Lord Hardinge, but which
I believe, have subsequently been adopted :— )

28. We had evidence put before us as to the poverty of India. This was denied by il
the witnesses who were questioned on the subject, and I cannot but think that the state
ment was made to excuse the inaction in this matter of the Indian Government. A oil
is now being raised, for the first time.

| 129
| ,
Sharing the War Eapenses.
29. The Indian Government have now offered £100,000,000. Previously the whole
expenses of the Indian ne Papier Forces in France, Egypt, East Africa and Meso-
potamia, over and above the normal peace expenditure of the Indian Army, had fallen
upon Great Britain alone; and the Indian Government was content to let this be so,
making no protest, no offer even to help in our need.

War Taxation.
30. Till this year there has been no raising of the Indian income-tax, no war-profit

tax. ,
| Compulsory Service for Whites and Eurasians.

31. This too has come about only since Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff left
india, 12 months after compulsory service was enacted in England.

7 Combing-out of the Cwilan Officials.
32. At the time of the Return put before us, probably July, 1916, only 182 civilian
officials, less than 1 per cent. of the available men, had been given leave to join the Indian
Amy Reserve, and then only ,according to Sir Beauchamp Duff, for service in India itself.
‘This Sir Beauchamp attributed to the India Office in this country. It may be so, and
[am not clear that there has as yet been any marked change in this matter.

| Mobilization of Industry.
_ 33. We had evidence that the barge-building yards at Calcutta and Bombay were

~ lying empty for the first year of the war. The Tata Steel Works were continuing to pro-

| duce steel rails for Indian railways. It was only late in 1916 that Government control.

'. of the works of the Tata Company and the Bengal Iron and Steel Company was introduced
as in Great Britain.

Restriction of Imports.
7 34. Thjs seems not to have occurred to the Indian Government till this year, but they
» had no necessity to keep up the exchange. The series of Government demands that were,

: however, made on the home country without the perception that they could not possibly
be carried out argues a lack of appreciation of the seriousness of war.

The raising of new Units for the Army.

2 35. No new units were raised till this year, although the population of India js
i $15,000,000, of whom about 50,000,000 come from fighting races.

Commissions for Natwe Officers.

36, Although they were very short of officers in the Indian regiments, executive
, (ommissions were still, as before the war, withheld from the natives of India. Indeed,
", ven now it is not the King’s commission, but the Viceroy’s that is given to the native

cadet in the new army. We had no evidence, however, that this omission was not the
: fult of the War Office at home. 7

Frank Co-operation with the Princes and People of India. —

37. This, which would have meant so much to England and India, was not adopted.
hstead even the Viceroy’s Executive Council was passed over, and the Viceroy and
ommander-in-Chief governed and thought alone. No generous appeal for help was -

_made to India, no more generous attitude shown to India. On the last point I do not
. know that there has as yet been any change.

; Supply of Shell and Stores from India.
38. This has only recently been taken seriously in hand. With America, Japan
.. and Australia to draw on by submarine-safe routes, the steps could have been taken as

well in 1915, and a safe supply to Mesopotamia by a short route would now have been

available. Colonel Collins, M.P., observed, even:last September, that the clothes of the
coolies in Mesopotamia were marked as coming from Manchestez.

|
(C 48 - 176)

130

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EVIDENCE AS TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE
INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

Effect of want of willingness to help.

39. I cannot resist the conclusion that the above evidence points to a want of willing.
ness to help on the part of the Indian Government—that is on the part of Lord Hardinge
and Sir Beauchamp Duff. That this unwillingness affected adversely the. expedition
to Mesopotamia is obvious. Had they thrown themselves heart and soul in to getting
India to do all that was humanly possible both in men and material the whole course:
of the war might have been altered. That was not done even in this country at first,
but the attitude of the Indian Government prevented the effort being made in the spring
of 1915 as was done here, and it prevented the success of their own expedition in Meso-

potamia.

The Defence of the Government.

40. The answer made by the Government of India to this charge is that the danges
in India were such that what might seem obstructiveness was in reality honest, if mistaken,
caution. There was acutely present to their minds danger from (a) mutiny, (6) a native
rising in India, (c) an invasion from Afghanistan or from the frontier tribes.

The Danger to India.

41. It is natural to assume that, since the attitude taken up by Lord Hardinge and.
the Commander-in-Chief has come under open criticism at home, every effort will have
been made to colour the risks in India as darkly as possible. The Secretary of State hi
prepared and put before us a Memorandum detailing as fully as possible the intern!
troubles which India has gone through. It is difficult to summarise, and the whole cannot
now be published.’ There have been more than the usual number of dacoities ; there
have been curious semi-religious theories about the Germans; Hindus have been
taurdered by Mohamedans ; there have been rumours of gun-running plots; the police
got wind of some general troop trouble, and a native post or two seem doubtfully to have '
thrown off their allegiance—less than a dozen men. But there has been no armed nisi,
and the capture of 50 revolvers by revolutionaries is singled out as the most serious
incident. No mutiny has taken place in India sufficiently serious to call for disarmament
or for corporate punishment of any unit. Germans were not interned in India till long after °
they were interned here in England, which omission testifies against any real fear of serious
internal trouble. The Amir has shown great loyalty, and the seven “ heavy ”’ raids tv -
which Sir Beauchamp Duff bore witness actually caused only 338 casualties. Ot
July 2nd, 1915, after the period in which reluctance to help was most marked, Si
Beauchamp cabled to Lord Kitchener, ‘‘ Though I have had to meet three heavy raids,
the frontier has been fairly quiet.” The other raids, such as they were, took place sub-

sequently.

The Serousness of the Risk. :
) 42. Therefore it was not actual trouble but possible dangers to British rule in India
behind which the Administration must shelter itself. Of these possible dangers both
Lord Kitchener and General Sir Edmund Barrow should, from their Jong residence im
India, be well able to judge ; yet no administrators are more severe in their criticism of
the attitude of the Indian Government than these two. There is always danger in this
world : it is a question of degree. :
The Council not consulted. !
43. Had the possible dangers been of a serious character, it is to me inconceivable
that the Viceroy should never have seen fit to consult his Council on the relative urgency:
of the demands made on the Indian Army by India and by the Home Government. Reil |
danger in India must have entailed the consulting of the Council, more especially in March. ;
1915, when the peremptory order was issued from Whitehall. That they were not consulted
is evidence that the danger did not then exist to the degree now put forward. |

Suppression of a Modern Rebellion.

44. Danger to British rule in India from a rising of the people, or from a mutiny.
has obviously become much less since the year 1857. Railways, the telegraph, the | |
wireless telegraphy, motor transport, magazine rifles, machine guns, aeroplanes, armourct
cars, all these costly developments of modern warfare are beyond the reach of insurgents, |

131

ind place even a few Regular troops in a position of immeasurable superiority. Further-
more, during a great war, the power of ruthless repression—falling on the just as well
ss on the unjust—is little likely to be too closely scrutinised, and adds greatly to the
lecisive power of the Executive.

Attitude displayed wm other ways.

45. In any case it does not appear that the objection to the denuding of India of troops
can be an excuse for the attitude of the Indian Government displayed in other matters.
Danger in India cannot account for the want of energy shown in India, for the non-
mobilisation of industry, for the selfish financial attitude, for the objection to building a
Tigris railway (two-foot six-inches gauge) because “ progress on railways in this country
(India) would have to be stopped,” for the reluctance to use British Territorials, for the
want of touch with their own expedition, for the ignorant advice given as regards the
advance on Bagdad. Nor even can it account for the medical breakdown, since surely
the actual needs of an army in the field must come before the problematic needs of an
army on the frontier. It would appear that, in fact, the Army Administration in India
was jealous of the Army at home ; they wished to retain the magnitude of their command ;
they felt they were neglected, “‘ out of the picture,” and they determined, perhaps un-
consciously, to be obstructive. It will be unfortunate if an attitude of this sort is passed
over.

| Attitude a Calamity.

46. Such an attitude is held unpatriotic in a private citizen; it is worse than un-
patriotic in a British official ; and in men in the positions occupied by Lord Hardinge
and Sir Beauchamp Duff it has been a calamity for England.

FINDINGS.

47. I find that, throughout the tenure of office of Lord Hardinge, the Government
of India showed little desire to help and some desire actually to obstruct the successful
prosecution of the war.

| 48. I find that the responsibility for the Mesopotamian failure of 1915-16 rests
‘ pmncipally on the Government of India, in that they gave ill-informed advice and did
not throw themselves and the resources of India into the energetic conduct of the war.

49. I find that the Government of India consisted in fact of the Viceroy, Lord
Hardinge of Penshurst, and the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Beauchamp Duff.

50. I find that no blame should be attributed to anyone, civil or military, in this

country for the initiation, consideration or sanction of the advance to Bagdad in 1915.

Iam equally convinced that the delay caused by the consideration of the advance in this
country did not retard or adversely affect in any way the chances of that advance.

51. I find that the advance on Bagdad failed because the transport was insufficient
and the force ill-found. |

52. I find that the relief of Kut failed because the transport was insufficient and
the force ill-found.

53. I find that the troops maintained the best traditions of the Service, that the
sneralship at the front was fair, but that General Townshend alone inspired in his men
that confidence and devotion without which victories such as the first battle of Kut
and Ctesiphon are impossible.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

; 1. Steps should be taken at once to put the Indian Army under the control of the

War Office in Whitehall. During the conduct of a world war it is essential that there
should be unity of control. To have an army in India (or an army in Egypt) independent
of the orders of the War Office must lead to incfiiciency. [, and L believe all my colleagues,
were impressed very much with the energy displayed by the War Office directly they took
over the control of the Army in Mesopotamia, and with the rapid improvement in the
eficiency of that force. The same energy applied to the Army in India might yet provide
us with new units and increased material from that country with its 315,000,000 inhabi-
tants. The objections that were raised to such control by Sir Beauchamp Duff early in
the war can no longer carry weight.

132

eee

2. All the evidence before us showed that the Indian Reserve system had complete
broken down. The old system seems to have been quite unsound as a military expedien
and an inquiry should be initiated at once to report on the most suitable substitute, :
provide reservists not only for the rank and file, but also for an efficient reserve of officers

3. Either the inquiry suggested above or the Indian Administration itself shoul:
immediately consider whether the old-fashioned prejudice against giving the King’
Commission to natives of India can not be set aside during this war. Even with ti
invaluable assistance given by the civilians who flocked to the Indian Army Reserve of
Officers, the evidence given before us showed a lamentable shortage of officers with the
Indian Regiments which must adversely affect their fighting value. There seems 10
reason to suppose from the Mesopotamian campaigns that Indians, as fighting men, are ;
any less capable than Turks, who have their own officers under some German guidance.
Indian officers under British guidance should do as well.

4. We had evidence that the use of the censorship in Mesopotamia did much to injure
the morale of the troops. For some time after the medical breakdown no letters hon:
were permitted except on the printed postcards, of which there were few or none availabi:
at the front. Itseems clear to me that the censorship was used to prevent people at hon
from knowing what the troops were suffering. This is not the proper use of the censorship.
and is a point that should be made clear now to all the various General Officers Commanding |
Expeditionary Forces. |

5. While concurring in the Recommendations in Part XII, paragraphs 31 and 32 of
the Majority Report (which relate to the officers of the Indian Army), I wish to record my
conviction, drawn not from evidence before the Commission but from some experience ¢!
the two armies, that the system of officering the King’s African Rifles in Africa is superit
to the Indian system. The King’s African Rifles officers are officers of British regiment:
who are attached to the well-paid African Rifles for a period which in the general cas?
does not exceed five or six years, so that the officer never loses touch with his professio::
at home or acquires the oriental lethargy that saps the vitality of those kept too long u
tropical countries.

6. The other recommendation made by the majority in which I concur is that
Part XII, paragraphs 34 and 35 (relating to medical matters). But I would urge thi
no re-organisation of the Indian (or other) medical service can be satisfactory whic)
leaves the filling of the senior posts to the ordinary promotion of seniority. Inu
branch of the service is it more important that the higher direction should be filled b:
selecting the men who have kept up to date. Long and stereotyped service in a peac’
garrison may indeed give the organising experience necessary for a campaign—thoug!
even that by no means follows—but it certainly does not enable a doctor to keep in touc!!
with the latest discoveries of a rapidly-changing science. I recommend that a Board o!
Selection, recruited in large part outside Army circles, should select for all promotion
above the rank of Major. The same Board might well make recommendations 0
sanitary, hospital and equipment matters.

7. In one of the Papers put before us by the Indian Government, in order to justi!’
the contrast between the attitude of India and the attitude of the self-goverm:
Dominions, they write as follows— The self-governing Dominions deny to India the ful
privileges of citizenship. India again, though not of her own volition, is practically 4
free market for the trade of the Empire, whereas the colonies impose upon her trade
. . . a@heavy handicap in the shape of protective tariffs ; and are at liberty, as it would
be urged, to equip themselves for an increased outlay on Imperial defence by methoe:
from which India is debarred.”’

My last recommendation is that we should no longer deny to Indians “ the full pn“
leges of citizenship ” ; but should allow them a large share in the government of their ow?
country and in the control of that Bureaucracy which in this war, uncontrolled by publi
opinion, has failed to rise to British standards. Lord Kitchener said that it would be
better to lose India than to lose the war. It would certainly be better to lose India tha:
to that for which we are fighting the war—the glorious traditions of a people old
in liberty.

(Signed) JOSIAH C. WEDGWOOD.
17.5.17.

133

APPENDIX I.

‘¢ VINCENT-BINGLEY ”’

From

THe COMMISSION APPOINTED to ENQUIRE INTO
THE MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS 1n MESO-
POTAMIA.

Tre SECRETARY To tHE GOVERNMENT or INDIA,
ARMY DEPARTMENT.
SIMLA.
June 29, 1916.
SIR,

In accordance with the instructions conveyed in your
letter No. H.-2418, dated March 3lst, 1916, we have the
honour to submit the following report on the arrangements
made for the collection, treatment, and removal of the
sick and wounded during the recent operations in Meso-
potamia. As the Government of India are aware, the
Commission, which was originally composed of two
members only (Sir William Vincent and Major-General
Bingley), was first appointed by His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief on March 2nd, 1916, with directions
to enquire into the medical arrangements in Mesopotamia
during and subsequent to January, 1916, and to report
the conclusions arrived at to the Chief of the General
Staff.

2. On receipt of these orders the Commissioners then
appointed proceeded at once to Bombay, where a number
of sick and wounded who had recently come from Meso-
potamia were detained in hospital. Several of the
hospitals in Bombay were visited, and various witnesses
were examined, many of whom, however, could not be
questioned at any great length in the time available,
as they were just about to sail for England in the hospital
steamer ‘‘ Assaye.” After completing as far as possible
their enquiries at Bombay, the Commissioners went to
Basra and continued their investigations there. At this
stage of the proceedings the terms of reference were
modified so as to include in the scope of the enquiry the
medical arrangements made for the campaign during
the last four months of 1915. From Basra the Com-
missioners proceeded to Amara, 135 miles up the Tigris.
There they recorded the statements of various witnesses,
and inspected the arrangements made for th> reception
and accommodation of the wounded at the different
hospitals. After finishing their investigations at Amara,
they travelled by river steamer up the Tigris to Wadi,
about 270 miles from Basra, where the headquarters of
the Tigris Force were encamped. Here fresh evidence
was recorded, the arrangements for accommodating sick
and wounded were further investigated, and the Com-
missioners had an opportunity of testing, by personal
observation, how far the arrangements for the evacuation
of the wounded from the battlefield to the field ambu-
lances and hospitals at Wadi were satisfactory. From
Wadi the Commissioners returned to Basra, where revised
instructions were received from the Government of
India. A copy of the letter and of the enclosure con-
taining these instructions is annexed to this report.
These instructions made the following important changes
in the terms of reference :—

(a) Mr. E. A. Ridsdale was appointed a member of
the Commission.

(6) The Commission was directed to report the result
of its enquiry to the Government of India.

(c) The scope of the enquiry was extended, so as to
include the whole. of the operations in Meso-
potamia from November, 1914, up to date.

(C 48—176)

REPORT.

(d) The Commission was directed not only to enquire
into the adequacy of the medical arrangements,
but was instructed to ascertain and assign
responsibility for any defects found and to state
whether individuals or the system were to
blame.

The addition of a new member at this stage placed the
Commission in a difficult position, as by this time Sir
William Vincent and Major-General Bingley had examined
more than 130 witnesses and had completed their investi-
gations up the Tigris. The inclusion of the earlier
operations in the scope of the enquiry added a further
complication. The enquiries hitherto made had been
confined to operations subsequent to September, 1915,
although many of the witnesses examined could have
given evidence of value on previous phases of the cam-
paign. By this time, moreover, two of the Commis-
sioners had realised the difficulty of obtaining definite
and accurate evidence on the detailed points referred
to them, in respect of the operations of September,
October, and November, 1915, as many of those intimately
connected with this portion of the campaign were either
besieged in Kut-el-Amara, or had left the country. The
difficulty of securing such evidence in regard to still
earlier operations was even greater, and it was clear
that it would not be possible in many cases to ascertain
all the details required by the reference, such for instance
as the forecast of preparations considered necessary prior
to each action. For these reasons, we asked that the
terms of reference might be amended so as to require
us to report on actions prior to Ctesiphon in general
terms. This request was refused. We wish, therefore,
to state that in dealing with the multiplicity of detail
apparent in the report, we are necessarily dependent
upon the memory of the witnesses for the accuracy of
particular statements. A more serious complication
arising from this amendment relates to a question of
principle, in that it involved the examination of the
medical arrangements of the whole expedition. The
medical organisation of a force is an integral part of
its military organisation, and cannot be considered apart
from the latter. We have, therefore, at times found it
impossible to examine the working of the medical organi-
sation without at the same time criticising other arrange-
ments which, though not under the control of the medical
authorities, indirectly affected the well-being of the sick
and wounded. We have endeavoured to avoid this as
much as possible, but we have, throughout our enquiries,
realised the difficulty of carrying out any comprehensive
investigation of medical arrangements as apart from the
general military organisation. It is true that any enquiry
into the medical arrangements of the winter of 1915-16
would not have been entirely free from this difficulty,
but except as regards transport, the causes which led
to the breakdown at that period were largely of a tempo-
rary and local character, being due to unforeseen circum-
stances rather than to radical defects in organisation.

3. On receipt of these instructions the necessity of a
second tour up the Tigris was carefully considered, and
after discussion it was decided that Mr. Ridsdale should
proceed to Amara to sce the state of affairs there for
himself and to collect further evidence, and that the other
two members of the Commission should go up the
Euphrates to Nasariyeh and continue their enquiries
there. In pursuance of this decision, Mr. Ridsdale
proceeded to Amara on May 5th, and Sir William Vincent
and Major-General Bingley went to Nasariyeh. The

134

latter two members of the Commission returned to
Basra on May 9th, visiting the hospital at Kurna en
route. On May 13th Mr. Ridsdale rejoined the Com-
mission, and after a short stay at Basra, in order to
collect certain statistical information, we proceeded to
Bombay, where we arrived on May 22nd. On May 26th
we left for Simla, where we completed our investigations.
In order to secure the fullest possible information on the
points referred to us for enquiry, we have not only
examined a large number of witnesses orally, but have
endeavourcd by personal inspection and enquiry to
ascertain the actual state of affairs and to see for our-
selves how far the medical arrangements now work
satisfactorily. We have visited numerous hospitals and
discussed various points with administrative and executive
officers. Two of the Commissioners have personally
witnessed the evacuation of the wounded from the
battlefield, and scrutinised the arrangements made for
their reception and accommodation at dressing stations,
collecting stations and field ambulances, and all have
travelled with convoys of sick and wounded down the
Tigris. Further, we have invited many persons, in a
position to give evidence of value, to submit written
statements of their experiences and opinions, and by
the courtesy of Lieut.-General Sir Percy Lake a notice
was published in Force Orders inviting anyone who 80
desired to furnish a statement to the Commission. The
266 statements recorded in the appendix represent the
results of our labours.

4. In spite of these efforts, however, we feel that we
have laboured under great disadvantage in our enquiry,
particularly in respect of the extended scope of our
investigation. In the first place, many officers whose
testimony would have been of great value—notably
Major-General Townshend, Colonel Hehir, I.M.S., Assistant
Director of Medical Services, and other officers of the
Sixth Division—were, when the enquiry was being made,
either besieged in Kut or prisoners of war. We are
therefore at an obvious disadvantage in having to criticise
their administration without affording them an oppor-
tunity of putting forward their views. Many officers
intimately connected with particular phases of the
campaign had left Mesopotamia before the Commission
was appointed, and, being separated from official records,
have not been able to give detailed information on
particular points to the Commission. In the case of
many other important witnesses we have had to be
content with written statements, although it is probable
that by personal examination detailed information, on
various points not referred to in these statements, could
have been elicited. Finally, many of the witnesses
examined were officers who, when the Commission was
conducting its enquiry, were so overwhelmed with current
official work that it was impossible for them to collect
and furnish detailed statistical information on particular
points without real detriment to their public duties. It
was manifestly undesirable to ask them during the active
prosecution of the campaign to give up much of their
time to collect such information. We also much regret
that owing to Surgeon-General J. G. MacNeece having
left India on sick leave, before our return from Meso-
potamia, we were unable to examine him.

5. Military synopsis.—As we are required to record
our opinions as to the sufficiency of the medical arrange-
ments in Mesopotamia during each phase of the campaign
up to the fall of Kut-el-Amara, and as we are directed
to bear in mind throughout our proceedings the strategical
situation during this period, and the tactical obligations
arising therefrom, it seems desirable to preface our
criticisms by a short historical résumé, so that the sequence
of events may be followed and due importance paid to
the military considerations involved. For facility of
reference a sketch map is added, showing the position
of places mentioned in the text.

The campaign in Mesopotamia up to the time of the
departure of the Commission may be divided into four
phases, viz. :—

I. The landing at Fao, the occupation of Basra and
Kurna, and the defeat at Shaiba or Barjasiyah
of the Turkish attempt to recapture Basra.

II. The expulsion of the Turks from Persian Arabistan
followed by the occupation of Amara on the
Tigris, and of Nasariyeh on the Euphrates.

[For convenience the later operations near
Nasariyeh have been included in this phase.]

III. The capture of Kut-el-Amara, advance to
Ctesiphon, and subsequent retreat to Kut.

IV. The defence of Kut-el-Amara and the unsuc-
cessful attempts to relieve it.

PHASE I.

6. Landingat Fao. Battle of Sahil. Capture of Basra.—
War was declared on Turkey on October 3lst, 1914.
Meanwhile preparations had been made for the occupation
of Abadan and the protection of the Persian oil-fields
by the organisation of a small force under Brigadier-
General W. S. Delamain, for service at the head of the
Persian Gulf. This force, consisting of the 16th Infantry
Brigade with two Indian mountain batteries, was sent
to the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab and directed to effect
a landing near Fao. This was carried out on November
6th practically without opposition. The main disem-
barkation took place at Saniyah, opposite Abadan, on
November 10th, and on the 15th General Delamain
dispersed the Turkish advanced troops at Saihan. On
November 16th Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Barrett, the
Commander of the 6th Division, who had landed with
the 17th Infantry Brigade two days before, defeated
the Turks at Sahil or Zain, inflicting heavy losses. As
the result of these operations Basra was occupied on
November 23rd, its garrison having meanwhile retired
to Kurna. Our casualties in these successful engage-
ments amounted to about 800, of which some 500 occurred
at Sahil. .

Occupation of Kurna.—By the end of November the
18th Infantry Brigade and the remainder of the divisional
troops had arrived at Basra, thus completing the con-
centration of the 6th Division which constituted the
Expeditionary Force. Preparations were at once made
for an advance on Kurna, 40 miles up the Tigris, which,
being at the junction of the Tigris with the Euphrates,
is a place of considerable strategic importance. Kurna
was captured on December 8th by a force under Major-
General C. I. Fry, with the assistance of a naval flotilla.
Our losses amounted to 27 killed and 192 wounded.
The Turkish Commander, Subhi Bey, late Vali of Basra,
surrendered with most of the garrison. The Turks then
established themselves near Rotah, six miles above
Kurna, with a view to opposing any further advance.

7 Operations round Ahwaz.—At this time the Turkish
forces were disposed in three areas, viz., on the Euphrates,
on the Tigris, and on the Karun. A jehad was preached
in Arabistan early in 1915, and a great gathering of
Arabs, supported by eight battalions of Turkish regulars
with some guns, invaded Persian territory and cut the
pipe line leading from the oil-fields on the Karun to
Abadan. A couple of Indian battalions with guns were
despatched from Basra under Brigadier-General Robinson
to protect Ahwaz and support the Sheikh of Mohammerah,
whose tribesmen were giving trouble. On March 3rd
this small force moved out a few miles to meet the enemy,
who was encountered in greatly superior numbers. A
retirement to Ahwaz was ordered, and our troops, being
closely pressed by swarms of hostile Arabs, suffered
somewhat severely. In consequence of this reverse, the
12th Infantry Brigade under Major-General K. 8. Davison
was sent to Ahwaz a few days later with orders to hold
the place and keep the enemy in check until a sufficient
force could be spared to expel the Turk and their Arab
auxiliaries from Persian Arabistan.

8. Mcanwhile it became evident that operations would
have to be undertaken on the Euphrates, as well as on
the Karun and the Tigris, necessitating the employment
of a larger force. It was accordingly decided to reinforce
the 6th Division by the 6th Cavalry Brigade and the
12th Division, the latter consisting of the 12th, 30th
and 33rd Infantry Brigades, together with a Heavy
Artillery Brigade and various special units. The force
in Mesopotamia was then organized as an Army Corps,
the command of which was given to General Sir John
Nixon.

9. General Nixon landed at Basra with the Army
Corps Staff on April 9th, 1915, and took over command
of the force from Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Barrett, who
then proceeded to India on sick leave. Certain other
changes were made about this time. The command of
the 6th Division was given to Major-General C. V. F.
Townshend, and that of the 12th Division to Major-

135

General G. F. Gorringe. Major-General K. S. Davison
was replaced in command of the 12th Infantry Brigade
by Brigadier-General K. E. Lean, and was appointed
Inspector-General of Communications. A Commandant
was also appointed for the Base at Basra, where work
had considerably increased owing to the arrival of
additional troops. Responsibility for the medical arrange-
ments of the force, which had hitherto been vested in
Colonel P. Hehir, I.M.S., Assistant Director of Medical
Services, 6th Division, devolved on Surgeon-General
H. G. Hathaway, Deputy-Director of Medical Services
of the Army Corps, who, as in the case of other Heads
of Administrative Services, was placed in the organization
orders of the force, under Headquarters, Line of Commu-
nications.

10. Battle of Shatba or Barjasiyah.—It was known some
time before this that the main force of the enemy was
concentrating at Nasariyeh on the Euphrates, with a
view to an advance on Basra. A cavalry skirmish took
place on March 16th, and on April 12th the Turks under
Sulaiman Askari Bey attacked our position near Shaiba
and were repulsed. The British force consisted of the
6th Cavalry Brigade and the 16th and 17th Infantry
Brigades with the divisional troops of the 6th Division,
the whole under the command of Major-General Fry.
On the following day the headquarters and one battalion
of the 30th Infantry Brigade arrived at Shaiba under
Major-General C. J. Melliss, and the latter as senior
officer took over command. The enemy renewed his
attacks, but was repulsed by a successful counterstroke.
On April 14th our troops assumed the offensive, and after
much hard fighting drove the Turks out of their position
near Barjasiyah with a loss estimated at 6,000. Our
cavalry followed up their retreat as far as Nakhailah,
and the enemy fled to Khamisiyah, nearly 90 miles away,
harassed in their flight by the Arabs, their former allies.
Our losses in these brilliant and decisive operations
amounted to 194 killed and 1,132 wounded.

PHASE II.

11. The security of the base at Basra having been
assured by our victory at Barjasiyah, it was decided to
despatch the 6th Cavalry Brigade and the 12th Division
under Major-General Gorringe to Ahwaz, which was
blockaded by eight battalions of Turks with eight guns,
supported by 10,000 hostile Arabs, under the command
of Mahomed Daghestani Pasha. The latter’s object was
to get between Basra and the mouth of the Shatt-el-
Arab while threatening our communications with Ahwaz
via the Karun River.

12. Operations in Arabistan.—Major-General Gorringe
arrived at Ahwaz with the leading troops of his force on
April 24th, and the Turks at once retreated to the Kharkeh
River. General Gorringe followed in pursuit and crossed
the Kharkeh River on May 7th, whereupon the Turks
retreated towards Amara. He then turned his attention
to the Bani Taruf, a recalcitrant and warlike Arab tribe
which had identified itself strongly with the Turkish
cause. Their stronghold at Khafajiyah was destroyed
and the tribesmen defeated and dispersed. The operations
of General Gorringe’s force terminated with a series of
demonstrations made with a portion of his troops from
Bisaitin against the Turkish force which lay between
him and Amara. They had the desired effect, which
was to prevent reinforcements from joining the Turkish
forces on the Tigris in time to oppose General Town-
shend’s division, then about to advance from Kurna on
Amara. By June 30th the task allotted to General
Gorringe had been successfully completed. The opera-
tions covered a period of seven weeks, and were carried
out in very hot weather under difficulties entailing severe
exertions on the part of the troops. Casualties in action
only amounted to 43, but there was much sickness,
sunstroke and dysentery being the prevailing com-
plaints.

13. While General Gorringe was clearing the Turks
and their Arab auxiliaries out of Arabistan, Major-General
Townshend and the 6th Division were preparing to move
up the Tigris to Amara. No advance could be made
until the end of May as all available river craft were
employed on the Karun. Owing to the flooded state
of the country no movements of troops were possible

(C 48—176)

except afloat. This entailed the provision of bellums*
for the infantry and the preparation of specially con-
structed rafts for guns and ambulances.

14. Action near Kurna and occupation of Amara.—On
May 3lst Major-General Townshend attacked the enemy’s
positions, which consisted of two fortified localities,
standing like islands on the face of the waters, from two
to five miles north of Kura. Supported by the fire of
a naval flotilla and of guns mounted on barges, the
operations were highly successful. The enemy’s positions
were captured with only 25 casualties, and the Turks
retreated up the Tigris in steamers and mahailas,t pursued
by our naval flotilla. General Townshend and the leading
troops of the 6th Division reached Amara on June 3rd
and occupied the town without opposition. The captures
resulting from these operations included 17 guns, 1,773
prisoners, 4 river steamers, exclusive of 2 sunk, besides
a number of lighters. The weather throughout these
operations was intensely hot and caused considerable
sickness. .

15. As soon as the Karun operations were completed
and Amara captured, instructions were issued for an
advance up the Euphrates. The objective of the force,
which consisted of the 12th Division under Major-General
Gorringe, was Nasariyeh, some 85 miles from Kurna.
The actions round Shaiba in April had shown that the
possession of Nasariyeh by the Turks constituted a
permanent menace to Basra.t Apart from this, Nasariyeh
was the centre from which political influence could best
be exercised over the powerful Arab tribes of the Euphrates
plain. Moreover, it was a place of considerable strategio
importance, as it commanded the southern exit of the
Shatt-el-Hai, one of the few existing lines of communica-
tion between the Tigris and Euphrates.

16. The approach to Nasariyeh from Kurna is via
the old course of the Euphrates and the Hammar Lake
to Hakika, where a channel known as the Gurmah Safha
gives access to the main stream of the Euphrates, some
25 miles below Nasariyeh. At the time of General
Gorringe’s advance the Hammar Lake could be navigated
by steamers drawing 5 feet as far as Hakika. By the
end of July the depth of water in the lake had fallen
to 3 feet and only small stern-wheelers could be used.
After July all steamer navigation stopped, and troops
and stores had to be poled across the lake in bellums,
which in places had to be dragged through the mud. It
will be understood from this how great were the difficulties
which General Gorringe had to overcome, especially in
regard to the evacuation of the sick and wounded during
the low-water season.

17. Action at Gurmah Safha.—By July 4th the vessels
of the naval flotilla and the troops had been passed over
an obstruction made by the Turks near Hakika, and
collected at a point about 24 miles below the junction
of the Gurmah Safha with the Euphrates. On July 5th
an attack was made on the enemy’s advanced position,
which was on both banks of the Euphrates, commanding
the Gurmah Safha channel. The position was carried
by the 30th Infantry Brigade under Major-General
Melliss soon after mid-day. Our captures included
4 guns and 132 prisoners at a cost to us of 26 killed and
85 wounded.

18. Battle of Nasariyeh.—The Turks were now found to
have taken up a series of positions astride the Euphrates
about 5 miles below Nasariyeh, with both flanks resting
on marshes. General Gorringe accordingly moved up to
Asani, some two miles below the enemy’s advanced
defences and occupied entrenchments on both banks.
An unsuccessful attack on the Turkish position was made
on the night of July 13th. The next 10 days were spent
by General Gorringe in perfecting arrangements for a
decisive assault. This was delivered at 5 a.m. on
July 24th, the 12th Infantry Brigade being on the left
bank and the 30th Infantry Brigade on the right. By
noon the enemy’s main position was captured, some

* The term bellum is used to describe the small rowin
boats used on the Shatt-el-Arab. On the Euphrates the
term includes sailing boats carrying an average load
of 20 tons.

t The term mahaila is used to describe the big sailing
boats used on the Tigris, carrying an average road of
30 tons.

S 2

136

500 of the enemy being killed in their trenches. The
Sadanawiyah position, which constituted the enemy’s
last line of defence, was captured in the afternoon, and
by 6.30 pm. the Turks were in full retreat across the
marshes. Nasariyeh was occupied without opposition
on the 25th. Our losses in these skilfully planned and
brilliantly executed operations amounted to 104 killed
and 429 wounded. Our captures consisted of over
1,000 prisoners and 17 guns.

19. No further operations took place in the neighbour-
hood of Nasariyeh until January 7th ,1916, when a mixed
force under Major-General Gorringe moved out 12 miles
north-west to Butaniyah, for the purpose of demonstrat-
ing towards Shattra. It was hoped that the Turks
might be induced to weaken their force opposing General
Aylmer on the Tigris by detaching troops to guard the
lines of approach along the Shatt-el-Hai. Although this
demonstration failed to accomplish this, it succeeded in
attracting large numbers of hostile Arabs who might
otherwise have joined the Turkish forces round Kut.

20. Minor operations round Nasariyeh.—The fighting
round Nasariyeh at this time included three minor actions.
The first was an attack made on January 14th on a small
force by some 3,000 Arabs, between Butaniyah and
Suwaij, while General Gorringe was carrying out a personal
reconnaissance. It took the form of a rear-guard action
in which our troops fell back with great steadiness to their
camp. The Arab casualties numbered close on 200,
our own amounting to 4 killed and 36 wounded and
missing. The next action took place on February 7th,
during the withdrawal of the force from Butaniyah to
Nasariyeh. Our troops, under the command of Brigadier-
General E. C. Tidswell, were attacked by some 5,000
Arabs. As the column fell back, the enemy was rein-
forced by other Arabs from the villages along the line of
retirement with the result that it was attacked in flank
as well as in rear. The enemy’s losses were heavy and
amounted to about 1,000. Our casualties numbered 373,
of whom 148 were killed. To punish certain Arabs who
had previously been friendly, but who had treacherously
turned on our troops during their retirement, a column
was sent out by Brigadier-General H. T. Brooking before
dawn on February 9th to surprise, attack and destroy
their villages. This was carried out very successfully
and with trifling losses.

PHASE III.

21. While General Gorringe was driving the enemy away
from Nasariyeh, Turkish forces were concentrating under
Nur-ud-din Pasha at Kut-el-Amara, a place of great
strategic importance. This place accordingly became
our principal objective. |

22. Owing to shortage of river steamers and the difficul-
ties of navigation during the low-water season, the transfer
from the Euphrates of the troops and guns which were
required on the Tigris, proved a slow process. The con-
centration of the force which consisted of the 6th Cavalry
Brigade and the 6th Division reinforced by various units,
the whole under the command of Major-General
Townshend, was not completed until September 12th
when it moved forward by march route from Ali-el-Gharbi
along the river bank, accompanied by its shipping.
Sannaiyat was reached on the 15th and there a halt was
made until the 25th. Intense heat prevailed with a
temperature varying from 110 to 116 degrees in the shade.

23. Battle of Es Sinn or Kut-el-Amara.—Nur-ud-din
Pasha’s army was found to be occupying an entrenched
position astride the Tigris at Es Sinn, some 8 miles from
where our troops were then encamped. The position was
some 12 miles in extent and consisted of skilfully concealed
entrenchments commanding ground which was absolutely
flat and devoid of cover. Gencral Townshend decided
to turn the enemy’s left and so threaten his line of retreat
to Baghdad. At the same time, in order to deceive
Nur-ud-din Pasha as to the direction of the real attack,
preparations were made with the object of giving the
impression that the principal attack would be on the
night bank against the southern portion of the enemy’s
yosition This ruse proved completely successful. The
16th and 17th Infantry Brigades, under Brigadier-General
Delamain, made a night march round the Turkish left
flank, while the 18th Infantry Brigade, under Major-
General Fry, held the enemy in front. By 2 p.m. on

September 28th the greater portion of the enemy’s
northern defences were in our hands, and the remainder
were evacuated by him during the night. A pursuit was
organised on the 29th, and the cavalry came into touch
with the Turks on October lst, but had to wait for the
support of the infantry which was coming up in steamers,
and the progress of the latter was unfortunately delayed
by difficulties of navigation. It was not till the 5th that
the column reached Azizieh, and by then the enemy had
retired into his defensive position at Ctesiphon where he
was reinforced.

24. The Turks lost some 4,000 men in this battle, of
whom 1,153 fell into our hands. They also lost 14 guns.
Our casualties amounted to 94 killed and 1,113 wounded.
The battle of Kut-el-Amara, or Es Sinn, as it is sometimes
called, secured for us the whole of the Basra vilayat.
It was the crowning point of an almost unbroken record of
successes. The strength of the enemy’s defences, the
improved quality of his troops and the inconvenience
caused by shortage of land and river transport had, by
this time, become very apparent. Difficulties in regard
to the collection and evacuation of the wounded owing to
a higher percentage of losses, the inadequacy of the medical
services, and the growing length of the line of communica-
tion had also come prominently to notice, thus fore-
shadowing the greater difficulties which were to be experi-
enced in later battles.

25. The next six weeks, which were utilised by the
Turks in bringing down additional troops from Mosul,
were spent by General Townshend in bringing up supplies,
transport and reinforcements from Basra, preparatory to
a further advance as soon as orders on the subject were
received. These preliminary measures were again de-
layed by the shortage of steamers and the difficulty of
navigation during the low-water season. The advance
was recommenced on November 19th, and by the 2lst
the force, with its shipping, was concentrated on the
left bank of the Tigris at Laj. A reconnaissance of the
enemy’s position showed that his defences lay astride
the Tigris covering the approaches to Baghdad which is
situated some 18 miles to the north-west. They had been
under construction for some months, and consisted of an
extensive system of entrenchments forming two main
positions. Close to the Tigris on the left bank and
midway between the two defensive lines which were
about two miles apart, was the Arch of Ctesiphon—a
prominent landmark frequently referred to in the state-
ments of witnesses.

26. Battle of Ctestphon.—General Townshend, after a
night march from Laj, attacked the Turkish position on
the morning of the 22nd at its centre and on its north-
east flank. His objective at the centre was a large
redoubt referred to by witnesses and described in operation
orders as the “‘V. P.,” 2.e., “the Vital Point.” There
was severe fighting throughout the day resulting in the
capture of the first position and more than 1,300 prisoners.
Our troops then penetrated to the second position, cap-
turing 8 guns, and established themselves in the enemy’s
trenches. Here they were subjected to heavy counter-
attacks by fresh troops. Shortly before nightfall it was
found necessary, owing to diminished numbers, to order
the withdrawal of our troop to the first position which
they had captured earlier in the day. November 23rd
was spent in reorganising the force and in collecting the
wounded. Owing to heavy losses, General Townshend
deemed it inadvisable to renew the offensive. The Turks
made heavy attacks all along the line during the night,
but were everywhere repulsed. On the 24th and 25th
the wounded and prisoners were evacuated to Laj where
steamers were waiting to receive them, and General
Townshend, under cover of an offensive movement, then
shortened his line so as to bring his flank nearer the river.
The enemy received numerous reinforcements on the 25th
and on the afternoon of that day large columns were seen
moving inland as if to turn the British right flank, while
hostile cavalry threatened its rear.

27. Finding himself faced by superior forces and short
of supplies, General Townshend withdrew to Laj under
cover of darkness and remained there during the 26th.
Laj, however, did not lend itself to defence, so he fell
back during the night of the 27th to Azizieh. On the
morning of the 30th, continuing his retirement, he halted
at Umm-al-Tubal, where he had to remain, as several of
his steamers were aground. The Turks attacked in great

137

strength at daylight on December Ist. A fierce fight
ensued in which they lost heavily. Taking advantage of
a successful counter-attack made by the Cavalry Brigade,
General Townshend broke off the fight and retired.
Shadi was reached on the night of Decomber Ist after a
march of 30 miles, and on the morning of the 3rd the
6th Division, greatly exhausted, reached Kut-el-Amara.
General Townshend then decided, with Sir John Nixon's
approval, to defend the place until its relief could be
effected by the reinforcements which were known to be
en route from oversea. Defences were improved, the sick
and wounded were evacuated, and some 1,300 prisoners,
who had been brought away from Ctesiphon, were
despatched to Basra. On December 6th the 6th Cavalry
Brigade left Kut and marched to Ali-el-Gharbi. By
December 7th the Turks had closed round the defences,
and the investment of Kut was complete.

28. Our losses in the battle of Ctesiphon and in subse-
quent operations up to the investment of Kut amounted
to 692 killed and 3,852 wounded. The evacuation of
the wounded from these actions was delayed by the
attacks of Arabs on the line of communication below
Kut-el-Amara, which compelled the steamers to turn
back more than once. These attacks also held up Sir
John Nixon and his staff, who were en rouwle from Ctesiphon
to Basra, and, pending the arrival of the troops sent to
their assistance, the escort, soldier clerks, batmen and
orderlies on the headquarters steamer, commanded by
Major-General Kemball, had to be landed in order to
repel these marauders.

PHASE IV

29. The 6th Cavalry Brigade at Ali-el-Gharbi was at
once reinforced by the 28th Infantry Brigade and some
guns from Basra. Behind thi3z covering detachment it
was decided to organise for the relief of Kut a force
composed of two divisions from overseas, designated the
Tigris Corps, the command of which was entrusted to
Lieut.-General Sir Fenton Aylmer. The Corps con-
sisted of the 6th Cavalry Brigade, the 3rd Division under
Major-General H. D’U. Keary, and the 7th Division
under Major-General Sir George Younghusband, with
corps and divisional troops.

30. General Aylmer informed Sir John Nixon on
December 15th, 1915, that in his judgment it would
be hazardous to rely on General Townshend’s holding
out beyond January 15th, and that it was therefore
advisable to relieve Kut by January 10th. He accordingly
recommended that the troops then concentrating at
Ali-el-Gharbi should move about January 3rd. Sir John
Nixon concurred, and on December 27th gave definite
orders for the advance to commence on that date.

31. On January 4th, 1916, General Aylmer’s leading
troops under General Younghusband advanced towards
Sheikh Saad, moving by both banks of the Tigris. The
instructions given him were to hold the enemy to his
position with sufficient vigour to make him show his
hand, pending the arrival of the remainder of the Corps
under General Aylmer himself. General Younghusband’s
column got in touch with the enemy on the morning of
January 6th. The Turks were entrenched astride the
Tigris some 4 or 5 miles east of Sheikh Saad. General
Younghusband’s plan was to hold the enemy’s left and
to attack and turn his right. This plan did not succeed,
owing to the presence of hostile cavalry and the superior
forces of the enemy on this flank.

32. Battle of Sheikh Saad.-—General Aylmer arrived on
the morning of January 7th with the rest of the Corps
and ordered a general attack. Major-General Young-
husband directed operations on the left bank and Major
General Kemball on the right. Heavy fighting took
place throughout the day, and by evening the encmy’s
trenches on the right bank had been captured together
with 2 guns and some 600 prisoners. On the left bank,
where our main attack was intended to develop, our
troops were unable to make any progress. They had to
entrench opposite to the Turks, who held tenaciously
to their positions, All attempts to turn their left flank
failed, owing to counter attacks and enveloping move-
ments from the north. On the following day the troops
were very fatigued and little progress was made. On
January 9th the Turks abandoned their position and
retired upstream. The pursuit proved very arduous

owing to heavy rain throughout the day, which made
the sodden and boggy ground difficult to march over.
The losses of the enemy were estimated to be about
4,590, and our own casualties amounted to 4,262. Our
losses in British officers were especially heavy, amounting
to no less than 133. The exhaustion of the troops made2
it difficult to follow up the enemy, so for the next few
days th2 force halted, while the Turks withdrew to the
Wadi position, some 7 or 8 miles further up river from
Sheikh Saad.

33. Battle of the Wadi.—On the 12th General Aylmer
concentrated his whole force on the left bank, and on
the 13th attacked the Wadi position. His plan was to
turn this position by a wide outtlanking movement to
the north. This was to be carried out by General Young-
husband with the 6th Cavalry Brigade and the 19th,
2lst and 35th Infantry Brigades, supported by field
artillery, while Major-General Kemball with the 28th
Infantry Brigade, supported by the heavy artillery of
the Corps, was to hold the enemy to his front. The
9th Brigade was to remain in reserve at Sheikh Saad.

General Younghusband’s force moved into position by
a night march on the 12th-13th, and then advanced in
a south-westerly direction towards Umm-el-Hannah,
between the Suwaikieh marsh and the Tigris,with a view
to cutting off the enemy’s retreat. This movement
was, however, checked by hostile troops occupying
trenches facing north, and as our troops endeavoured
to outflank the enemy they were in turn outflanked
themselves. Before long, therefore, General Young-
husband was held up on an east and west line to the rear
of the enemy’s main positions. Meanwhile General
Kemball attacked on the Wadi itself. His troops came
under a most destructive rifle and machine gun fire at
close range, which soon brought his advance to a stand-
atill. During the night of the 13th-l4th the enemy
evacuated the Wadi position and retired into the Umm-
el-Hannah defile, some 3 miles further west, where a
strong defensive position, stretching along a front of
1,300 yards from the Tigris to the Suwaikieh marsh,
had been in preparation for some time.

34. On January 14th the 6th Cavalry Brigade and
the 7th Division, under General Younghusband, worked
forward to a position from which they could observe
the enemy’s defences. The exhaustion of a considerable
portion of the force and the necessity for evacuating the
wounded precluded the idea of any immediate advance.
So the day was spent in consolidating positions and in
bringing the wounded down to the river bank. The
latter operation was greatly impeded by heavy rain
which made the ground slippery and difficult to traverse.
The losses of the enemy in this action were not as heavy
as our own, as they were well sheltered in trenches
throughout the day, and retired in good order after
dark. Our own casualties amounted to 1,601, including
4) British officers.

35. On January 19th Sir John Nixon had to relinquish
command of the Force owing to ill-health, and was
replaced by Sir Percy Lake.

36. Unsuccessful aitick on the Umm-el-Hannah posttion.
—The weather now became extraordinarily bad. Heavy
rain caused the river to come down in flood, overflowing
its hanks in places and converting the ground on either
hank into a veritable bog. The Wadi stream came down
in spate, and boisterous winds greatly interfered with
the construction of a bridge across the Tigris. In spite
of these unfavourable conditions, the 19th and 35th
Infantry Brigades advanced towards the Umm-el-Hannah
defile and entrenched themselves facing the enemy. At
the same time troops were ferried over gradually to Orah
on the right bank, where they came under the orders
of Major-General Kearv, commanding the 3rd Division,
part of which had arrived at the front. The object of
this move was to establish our artillery in positions from
which they could enfilade the enemy’s trenches, as without
such artillery co-operation the capture of the enemvy’s
position presented extraordinary difficulties. By the
morning of the 20th we had 14 guns in their emplace-
ments ready to bombard the Turkish trenches. On the
16th, 17th and 18th weather conditions grew from bad
to worse, and the men suffered great hardships from
cold and exposure. On the nights of the I8th-19th
and 20th-2Ist the 7th Division again moved forward
and entrenched within 500 to 6CO yards of the enemy’s

138

line, while 30 guns were placed in positions suitable
for a bombardment by direct fire. The 20th was devoted
to a systematic shelling of the Turkish position from
both banks of the Tigris, and during the night of the
20th-21st the infantry of the 7th Division pushed forward
their advanced lines preparatory to the assault. By
6 a.m. all was ready for the attack, which was to be
directed against the enemy's right, under cover of an
intensive artillery bombardment. The main attack
rushed the Turkish trenches near the river, and about
100 men got into them and held them for over an hour.
Troops were moved forward to their support under
heavy fire, but they drifted too far to the right, with the
result that they failed to give the impetus required on
the left, where their assistance was urgently needed.
Profiting by this, the Turks made a vigorous local counter-
attack, and our troops, overwhelmed by superior numbers,
were forced back and compelled to vacate the trenches
which they had captured. Orders were at once issued
for a second assault. Meanwhile it had begun to rain,
and it continued to do so without intermission until
the next day. After another artillery bombardment the
attack was renewed at 2 p.m.; but the heavy rain had
made the ground difficult to move over, advances by
rushes were impossible, the ground to be traversed was
destitute of cover, and the enemy’s fire was heavy and
well directed. Thus, though every effort was made to
press forward, not an inch of ground could be gained.

37. The weather conditions rapidly became worse, the
ground being converted into a sea of mud over which
progress was almost impossible. The troops could do no
more than maintain themselves where they were until
dark, when they were withdrawn to the trenches they
had previously held. As far as possible all the wounded
lying between our forward position and that in rear
were brought in during the withdrawal. Some, however,
were overlooked, and others could not be got at owing
to their proximity to the enemy’s trenches. Arrange-
ments were accordingly made on the 22nd for a six
hours’ armistice in order to bring in the dead and remove
any wounded who might have been left out. It was
found that few but dead remained, as all the wounded who
had fallen close to the enemy’s trenches had been
removed by the Turks. Any idea of an immediate
offensive was prohibited by the need for giving the
troops a rest after the heavy losses they had suffered.
The enemy’s casualties were estimated at 2,000. Our
own amounted to 2,741, including 78 British officers.

38. The breakdown in the medical arrangements which
undoubtedly occurred after these three battles would
have been obviated to a great extent if the attempt to
relieve Kut-el-Amara had been postponed until the
arrival of the field ambulances and clearing hospitals
of the 3rd and 7th Divisions from France. As it happened,
the supposed necessity of relieving General Townshend’s
garrison by January 15th demanded an advance not
later than January 4th, and the field ambulances of the
Tigris Corps had accordingly to be improvised from any
sources available at the time. As explained further on
in this report, the arrangements made proved totally
inadequate and led to the serious breakdown referred to.

39. When General Townshend decided, with Sir John
Nixon’s approval, to defend Kut-el-Amara, he did so
on the understanding that he would be relieved within
a month or six weeks, as he had only supplies with him
for that period. Kut was completely invested on
December 7th, so January 15th represented approxi-
mately the date up to which his supplies would last
if issues were continued on the normal scale. Sir John
Nixon and General Aylmer were thus, in our opinion.
fully justified in assuming that it would be hazardous
to rely on General Townshend’s holding out beyond
that date. Apart, however, from the question of supplies.
General Townshend sent message after message urging
the necessity for his early relief. Shortage of rifle
ammunition, deficiencies in artillery ammunition, heavy
losses, the reinforcement of the enemy, the falling-off
in moral of some of his troops, and doubts as to the
ability of the garrison to withstand a determined assault
by superior numbers, were all urged by him as reason
for the advance of the relief force at the earliest possible
date.

40. On January 22nd General Townshend informed

General Aylmer that by putting his troops on half rations
he could last out for 27 days, t.e., up to February 18th.
Three days later he intimated that by utilising additional
supplies found in Kut, and by killing his horses and
mules, he could hold out for another 84 days. He was
then asked on February 3rd by Sir Percy Lake whether

‘it would be correct to assume that he had sufficient

supplies to feed his garrison up to April 17th. He replied
on February 5th that by killing his animals and living
on grain and florse flesh he could hold out up to that
date. In point of fact he exceeded this limit by 12 days.

The period between January 21st and the first week
of March was one of preparation. The concentration of
the 3rd Division was completed, and the medical units
of this and the 7th Division also reached the front, though
without their transport. On March 7th orders were
issued for an advance from the position held by the
3rd Division on the right bank of the Tigris near Orah
to that portion of the enemy’s line which lay between
the Sinn Aftar and Dujailah redoubts. The troops
detailed for this operation were grouped in three columns.
The 9th, 28th and 36th Infantry Brigades under Major-
General Kemball made up Columns “A” and ‘“B,”
while Column ‘‘C”’ consisted of the 3rd Division under
Major-General Keary.

41. Attack on Ks Sinn.—General Aylmer’s plan was to
capture the Es Sinn position by turning its right flank
and seizing the Dujailah redoubt. Column “C,” mainly
composed of the 3rd Division, was directed against the
Sinn Aftar redoubt and the works to the south of it,
while Column “ B,”’ composed of the 9th and 28th Infantry
Brigades, was detailed to assault the Dujailah redoubt.
Column “A,” consisting of the 36th Infantry Brigade,
was directed to clear some trenches which flanked the
advance of Column “8B.” The 35th Infantry Brigade
was to protect the right, and the 6th Cavalry Brigade
the left flank of the force, and a brigade was held in
reserve. Each column was allotted its proper proportion
of guns, engineers, field ambulances and transport. The
advance was made on the night of March 7th-8th. After
a long and well-executed night march, the troops reached
the positions of deployment. All the columns should
have got there before dawn, but the march of Columns
“A” and “ B” was delayed owing to various unforeseen
circumstances, with the result that it was broad daylight
before they were ready to deploy, and this mancwuvre
had then to be executed under fire. An assault was
made and a lodgment effected in the Dujailah redoubt,
but our troops were eventually bombed out and had to
retire. Orders were then given for a fresh assault, and
at 5.15 p.m. the troops advanced according to orders,
but could get no nearer to the redoubt than about 1,200
yards. The men by this time were exhausted, and about
6 p.m. orders were received to withdraw under cover
of darkness. The night of the 8th-9th was spent in
collecting and sending away the wounded, and by 9.30
a.m. on the 9th the evacuation was completed. The
force then marched back to Orah and Wadi whence it
had started. Our losses in these operations amounted
to about 470 killed and 2,877 wounded and missing.
The total casualties from January 6th to March 9th
amounted to 12,116, of whom 2,412 were either killed
or died of wounds. The casualties among British officers
were 410.

42. Attack on the Umm-el-Hannah and Falahiyah
positions.—On March 11th General Aylmer was replaced
in command by Sir George Gorringe, and during the
month the force was reinforced by the 13th Division
under Major-General F. S. Maude, besides other troops.
On April 5th General Gorringe commenced his operations
for the relief of Kut. After the attack on Umm-el-
Hannah on January 2Ist, which was made across the
open, our trenches were pushed forward gradually to
within 100 yards of the Turkish defences. After a
heavy bombardment, to break down the enemy’s
entanglements, the assault was delivered at 4.45 a.m.
on the 5th, and the first line captured by our troops
soon after dawn. The other lines were captured in quick
succession, the artillery fire being lifted from trench to
trench until the last line was reached, fully a mile in
rear. Our losses were slight and the enemy’s resistance
was not great, as most of his troops had been withdrawn
to the Falahiyah position. The latter consisted of a
system of entrenchments 2 miles deep, which were

139

rushed after dark the same day by the 13th Division.
Our losses were not heavy considering the stubbornness
of the enemy’s resistance and the nature of the terrain.

43. Attacks on the Sannatyat position. Battle of Bei
Atessa.—Meanwhile the 3rd Division had gained ground
at Abu Roman on the right bank of the Tigris, and by

April 7th was able to enfilade the Turkish position at -

Sannalyat on the opposite shore. After a heavy bom-
bardment, the attack of this position was made early
on that day by the 7th Division, and again on the 9th
by the 13th Division, but both attempts failed. Operations
were much hampered by floods and bad weather. Our
losses on these occasions were very heavy.* On the 12th
further progress was made on the right bank. The
enemy’s advanced lines were forced back from 1} to 3
miles, and our troops had to wade across an inundated
belt from 500 to 1,200 yards wide, extending from the
Tigris to the Umm-el-Brahm marshes. The advance was
continued on the 15th, when more ground was gained
and some of the enemy’s forward trenches taken. On
the 17th this success was followed by the capture of the
Beit Aieesa position. The Turks lost heavily, and a
number of prisoners were captured. That evening the
Turks made a formidable counter-attack with some
10,000 men. The attack began at about 7 p.m., having
been preceded by a bombardment, and continued
throughout the night till 4.30 a.m. The enemy came
on in dense formations and penetrated a part of our
front. Six distinct assaults in mass were launched on
one of our brigades. Within 500 yards of its front
from 1,200 to 1,500 dead Turks were counted. Their
losses in killed alone on the night of the 17th-18th are
estimated at over 3,000. The number of wounded was
no doubt proportionately high, and close on 400 prisoners
were taken. The Turkish casualties on this occasion
are believed to have been greater than in any of the
previous actions for the relief of Kut. Our own losses
from April 17th to 19th were 126 killed and 1,200 wounded
or missing.

44. Renewed attacks on the Sannatyat position.—After a
systematic bombardment the Turkish position at Sannaiyat
was again attacked on the 22nd. Owing to floods, which
restricted the front, only one brigade could he utilised.
The leading troops penetrated the enemy’s first and
second lines through bog and submerged trenches, and
a few got up into the third line. They were, however,
unable to maintain their position under the enemy’s
counter-attacks, and other brigades, pushed up on the
right and left to reinforce, failed to reach their objectives,
which had to be approached over flooded and boggy
ground swept by fire. Although the attempt failed, the
enemy lost heavily when they left their trenches to
counter-attack, owing to the accurate fire of our machine
guns in action on the right bank. Our losses at Sannaiyat
between the 2lst and the 24th amounted to 93 killed
and 1,035 wounded or missing. Our total casualties in
the attempt to relieve Kut amounted to 21,973.

45. Capitulation of Kut.—An effort was made on the
night of April 24th to send the steamer “‘ Julnar ” through
to Kut, laden with supplies. Though carried out with
the utmost gallantry the attempt failed, the vessel being
stopped by an obstacle and forced aground near Magasis,
about 4 miles from Kut. On April 29th the garrison of
Kut capitulated after a siege of five months, and about
2,750 British and 6,500 Indian soldiers became prisoners
of war. The garrison had been put on half rations in
January, and since February had subsisted on a meagre
allowance of horseflesh and barley bread. The last day’s
ration was consumed on the day of the surrender. By
an arrangement made with Khalil Bey, the Turkish
Commander, sick and wounded British and Indian
officers and men, who were in hospital when the capitu-
lation took place, were exchanged for an equivalent
number of Turkish prisoners. Excellent arrangements
were made for their evacuation down river, and within
a few days of their leaving Kut they were en route to
India on well-equipped hospital ships, where they received
every possible care and the comforts which they had
been so long denied.

rr rr en ae ee

* The total casualties, including killed, wounded and
missing, were 4,036 between April 4th and 8th, and
1,971 on April 9th.

46. Medical arrangements of the campaign.—Having
given an epitome of the history of the campaign, we
proceed to discuss the main question referred to us for
enquiry, namely, the adequacy or inadequacy of the
arrangements made for the collection, treatment and
removal of sick and wounded during these operations,
the causes of any defects found to exist, and the results
which ensued therefrom.

47. We think it expedient to state our answer to this
broad question at the outset. We are constrained to
say that in our opinion these arrangements were mani-
festly inadequate and that, in consequence, the sick
and wounded underwent great suffering which might
have been avoided by better medical organisation.

Many of the defects which contributed to this result
were of a general character, and have affected the whole
or a great part of the campaign, and it will be convenient
to discuss them before examining those which only
affected particular phases of the operations.

48. Hospital river steamers.—The first deficiency to
which we desire to draw attention is the absence of any
river steamers equipped for the transport of sick and
wounded, and of any separate medical establishments
for such vessels. We believe that this has had more
prejudicial results than almost any other defect in the
organisation. It has constantly delayed evacuation,
dislocated medical arrangements and caused great
suffering and injury. So long as operations were confined
to the immediate vicinity of Basra there was no need
for any such transport; but directly columns advanced
up the Tigris, Euphrates and Karun the necessity of
some means of speedily evacuating the sick and wounded
by water became apparent. In December, 1914, the
expeditionary force advanced to Kurna, 40 miles up the
Shatt-el-Arab from Basra. In February there were
operations up the Karun river as far as Ahwaz, 139 miles
from Basra. In May the campaign had extended up
the Tigris to Amara, 135 miles from Basra; and in
July, 1915, a force was despatched up the Euphrates
to Nasariyeh. From all these columns the sick and
wounded, the numbers of which were large, were evacuated,
either in ordinary river steamers not properly fitted up
for hospital work, or in mahailas, the requisite personnel
and equipment being improvised from medical units on
the spot. The culminating point was reached at the
battle of Ctesiphon in November, 1915, and in the actions
on the Tigris in January, 1916, when the number of
wounded was very large.

49. It must be borne in mind that when these latter
actions took place the medical personnel and equipment
were insufficient for the due care of the wounded in the
hospitals and ficld ambulances, and that from an early
period of the war the number of river steamers and
barges available for purely military requirements was
entirely inadequate. It was, however, from this deficient
staff and equipment, and from a steamer service not
intended for the purpose, that some means of evacuating
the wounded to the base had to be improvised. This
journey was not a matter of a few hours, but of many
days. Some vessels after the battle of Ctesiphon were,
in fact, delayed a fortnight en route by various causes.
It was, therefore, the more necessary that proper accom-
modation should be provided for the patients, and that
the supply of medical and subordinate personnel, and of
surgical and medical stores and comforts, should be
complete. We have however ample evidence, much of it of
a terrible kind, to show that the failure to provide
proper hospital steamers and the necessary medical
personnel and equipment caused great suffering. The
steamers and barges employed for evacuating the wounded
on these and other occasions had often been used for
carrying animals to the front, and the decks were in
some cases soaked with urine and dirt. There was no
time to clean or disinfect them effectually, and they had
to be used in this condition. They were not fitted with
any effective protection from the sun or rain, and on
many occasions the patients were for days together wet
through. The arrangements for the supply of drinking
water were very defective. The latrines were insufficient
and insanitary. The vessels were overcrowded. The
patients were not, save in few cases, provided with
camp beds, and, according to the evidence, even rough
mattresses stuffed with hay were not often available. On
particular occasions even the supply of blankets gave

140

out. The medical personnel was insufficient to cope with
the numbers on board, and the supply of surgical and
medical stores and appliances was on occasions deficient.
The cooking galleys were so few that food could not be
prepared for all the patients, and the staff to prepare
and distribute this food was too small to meet require-
ments. There was little or no crockery or cutlery, and
a very small supply of cooking utensils. The number of
sweepers and of bed-pans was often not sufficient for the
comfort of the patients. The sufferings of many of those
who travelled by these steamers were in consequence
acute, and though the available staff was untiring in its
efforts to cope with the difficulties of the situation, we
cannot but come to the conclusion that in many cases
the lack of proper accommodation and of adequate
treatment retarded and prejudiced the chances of recovery.
It ought, however, to be stated here that the sufferings
of those who travelled on many of these steamers were
often mitigated by the resource and foresight of the
medical officers in charge. Further, when the number
of patients was small and the medical and subordinate
establishment proportionately large, the hardships of the
patients were much reduced.

50. In some cases, notably on the Euphrates, the sick
and wounded have frequently been evacuated in convoys
of sailing boats, in which all the disadvantages experienced
on river steamers are accentuated. The various boats
in the convoy must from time to time separate, and it is
impossible for the medical officer in charge to look after
the patients in the different boats properly. Moreover,
a voyage by country boat, for a long distance, must, if
the wind is unfavourable, be a very slow matter. We were,
in fact, so much impressed by the necessity for improving
the methods for evacuating the sick and wounded from
Nasariyeh, that we addressed the local military authorities
on the subject, and have been informed that in future a
hospital steamer will visit Nasariyeh from time to time
for this purpose. This.is the more necessary in view of
the increased Force which is now stationed there.

51. We shall have to deal with this point further in
discussing particular phases of the campaign, but generally
it may be said that this lack of river hospital steamers
properly equipped with medical personnel, stores and
appliances, has been a frequent source of discomfort and
suffering, which was accentuated in November, 1915,
when the number of casualties increased, and in January,
1916, when the number of wounded was very large and
the weather conditions were singularly unfavourable,
In March, 1916, conditions improved immensely, because.
regular units of medical personnel and equipment were
detailed for service on these steamers. Even when we
left Mesopotamia, the arrangements were, however, in
many respects far from satisfactory. It is true that a
regular staff of medical officers and subordinates is now
assigned to each steamer with a proper supply of medical
accessories and comforts, and that such arrangements as
are possible are improvised for the accommodation of
patients. But the steamers cannot be delayed, and it is
not possible to fit them up properly before they begin
their return journey down river loaded with sick. They
are not weather-proof, and patients get wet through when
it rains. Cots are not provided, save usually for a few
officers, and not always for them, and many of the other
defects to which reference has already been made have not
been removed or remedied.

52. We are informed by the Director of Royal Indian
Marine that in January, 1916, he was d'rected to fit out
hospital river steamers and barges to accommodate 2,000
patients. To give effect to this demand, he proposed to
equip 8 sternwheel steamers and 16 barges, the intention
being that each steamer should tow two of the barges.
Of these 8 steamers, three only have hitherto arrived,
namely—

~The “ Sikkim,” with accommodation for 144 patients

The ‘ Coromandel,” with accommodation for 104

patients ;

The “Ardhlui,’* with accommodation for 50 patients ;
and of the 16 barges four only, with accommodation for
224 patients, have so far been supplied. We were, how-
ever, informed that it has been suggested that the comple-
ment of barges should be made up by utilising 11 barges

* After structural alterations.

already sent to Basra, and that the necessary fittings for
the equipment of these vessels have been provided. ;

53. Of these steamers, the ‘‘ Sikkim” is satisfactory
though not very weather-proof; but it has been found
that she cannot tow two barges up and down tke Tieris
with safety. The ‘‘Coromandel” is in many ways
unsuitable. We were informed that on her first trip the
engines frequently broke down, that she does not steer
well, and that she is not built strongly enough for work
on the rivers of Mesopotamia. From what we saw of
her after this trip (and she had never been used again
up to the date on which we left Basra), we think there is
much force in this last criticism, unless she had been
navigated in some unskilful manner. On inquiry from
the Director, Royal Indian Marine, we were told that she
could tow two barges at a rate of 4.5 miles per hour in
still water. As the Tigris has a current of 4 miles and more
in many places, it follows that this steamer is of very
little use for towing up stream. The “ Ardhlui’”’ had
not been used when we left Basra, but the medical authori-
ties there have criticised her as unsuitable for the number
of patients she was intended to carry, and also for other
reasons. As to the barges, it is perhaps fortunate that the
full complement has not been sent, as the evidence before
us indIcated that the four which have already been des-
patched are not in any way suitable for work in Mesopo-
tamia. In the first place, they are composite barges of
wood and iron, and though the Director maintains that
barges of this kind are structurally as strong as iron
barges, the fact remains that officers with local experience
state that this is not so. It has been found also that these
barges cannot be navigated with safety in certain reaches
of the Tigris. They are, moreover, extremely hot and
none of them are fitted with electric fans, which are a
necessity for any hospital craft during the hot weather.
Finally, they are not weather-proof. The number of
barges and lighters available for work in Mesopotamin is
insufficient to meet military requirements, and doubtless
for this reason the 11 barges which the Director suggested
should be fitted out as hospital barges, have not been so
equipped. The result is that the only regular hospital
river steamer which was at the time of our departure used
for evacuating sick and wounded to Basra, nearly 18
months after the commencement of the war, was the
“ Sikkim,” which can accommodate 144 patients, and that
for the large majority of patients, ordinary river steamers
and barges, which take troops and supplies up stream,
were still employed.

54. In a telegram from the Army Commander to the
Chief of the General Staff, dated April 24th, 1916, it was
stated that, in addition to the steamers already men-
tioned, the ‘“‘ Ailee’? was being fitted out to carry 50
patients, and that it was intended that three of the Nile
paddle steamers should be used to tow hospital barges
from the front, down the Tigris to Amara. It was
anticipated that in this way 350 patients could be evacu-
ated at one time to hospitals at that place. While we
appreciate the desire of the local authorities to make the
best of the material available, we doubt if these arrange-
ments will prove entirely satisfactory. The Director,
Medical Services, Mesopotamia, in a note to which this

telegram is annexed, states that these barges are not

suitable for use in the hot weather, and they certainly are
not fitted with any electric plant, which we consider to be
an absolute necessity for properly equipped river hospital
steamers. ‘The Nile steamers are also not fitted with this
machinery. The intention, throughout, has been that
hospital steamers should be fitted with electric machinery,
and that this plant should provide the current necessary
for electric fans on the barges, and much of the advantage
of having properly equipped hospital barges will be lost
if they are not provided with electric fans.

55. We find considerable difficulty in ascertaining the
responsibility for the failure to provide hospital river
steamers for the expeditionary force. We are not clear
as to what the ultimate intentions of Government were in
regard to this campaign. If it was contemplated that the
expeditionary force should operate at a distance from
Basra, up the rivers of Mesopotamia, we think that those
responsible for the equipment of the expedition should
have sent hospital river steamers either with, or immedi-
ately after, the force. Even if the advance from Basra
was a later development, we consider that the necessity
for this class of transport might have been realised earlier

141

both in India and in Mesopotamia. We have examined a
' mass of correspondence which has been submitted to us
to ascertain why this question of river hospital steamers
was not taken up earlier, and we have made definite
inquiry from the Army Department as to when it was
first raised. We have ascertained that the question of
river transport for the sick was first considered in
February, 1915, when a private organisation in Bengal
offered to provide an ambulance steamer or barge for the
use of the force in Mesopotamia. This offer was accepted,
but the flat selected and equipped for the purpose was
unfortunately lost at sea while en route from Calcutta.
It was then suggested that motor launches should be
used for the speedy evacuation of the sick and wounded,
but for reasons which commend themselves to us as sound,
the Military Authorities in Mesopotamia did not accept
this offer. Motor launches are necessary, but. they are
not suitable means of evacuating large numbers of wounded
from great distances, and can only be used profitably for
taking patients for a short distance from one hospital to
another, or to a hospital steamer. This correspondence
is, however, of some importance, as it indicates that the
attention of the authorities in India was drawn to this
question of river hospital transport very early in the
campaign. It is, in the circumstances, somewhat surpris-
ing that systematic efforts were not then made to put
matters upon a proper footing.

56. The first indication which we have been able to
discover of any definite steps to remedy this state of
‘affairs, was in December, 1915, when a telegram was
addressed to the Secretary of State stating the necessity
for a number of regular hospital steamers. The figures
before us indicate that previous to the date upon which
this telegram was sent, more than 11,000 patients had been
evacuated down the various rivers of Mesopotamia to
Basra, and we feel, if the facts have been placed fully before
us, that steps should have been taken earlier to remedy
the want. As a result of the telegram to the Secretary
of State, the Director, Royal Indian Marine, was in
January, 1916, asked to provide four paddle steamers and
8 barges, each steamer with its two barges being suffici-
ently large to accommodate 500 patients. These were,
however, not provided, and in lieu thereof, and in spite
of the recommendations of the local officers, three stern
wheel steamers which cannot tow barges down the Tigris,
and four small composite barges which are for various
reasons unsuitable, have been aupplied.

57. While, however, we consider that the authorities
in India are in great measure responsible for this defect
_in the organization, we think that the conduct of the
medical and military authorities in Mesopotamia is also
open to criticism, and we do not believe that they realised
the serious danger that they were incurring by the failure
to provide more suitable means of evacuating the sick
and wounded by water; at least if they did realise this,
we cannot find that, up to December, 1915, they had
made any requisition on the Indian authorities for properly
equipped river hospital steamers. In the early part of
1915, Surgeon-General Hathaway, then Deputy. Director,
Medical Services, Mesopotamia, had six or eight mahailas
fitted out for hospital work; these were towed bv tugs
which accompanied the troops, and he stated that they
met his requirements well. We cannot agree with the
Surgeon-General that vessels of this kind ever were, or
could have been suitable mzans of transporting sick
and wounded on Jong journeys, particularly during the
hot season. They may, no doubt, have been very
useful as a makeshift. but we do not think that a few
country boats could have been adequate for the evacua-
‘tion of the sick and wounded of a force of 30,000
men operating in three different directions, that is,
up the Euphrates, Tigris and Karun. It is right
to say, however, that in June, 1915, Surgeon-General
Hathaway applied to the authorities in India for four
tugs for the purpose of towing these mahailas, and that
this demand was refused on the plea that such vessels
were not available. Shortly after this, Surgeon-General
Hathaway apparently recognised that some more suitable
arrangements were necessary, for we find that in August
he asked the Inspector-General of Communications that
@ river steamer, capable of accommodating 150 patients,
should be placed at the disposal of the medical services—a
demand which was summarily rejected. The provision
of such a steamer would no doubt have been useful for
' the evacuation of sick and wounded from Abwaz and other

(C 48—176)

vessels.

minor garrisons. and also for the transport of medical
units and stores ; but it would obviously not have met the
requirements of the situation in the operations on vbe
Tigris in tha winter of 1915-16, when the casualties ran
to thousands. We consider that this demand, coupled
with the one previously referred to, illustrates the failure
of the head of the medical administration in Mesopotamia
to appreciate the real needs of the situation, for what was
wanted was not one small hospital steamer, but a number
of vessels, properly equipped with necessary personnel and
appliances, capable of accommodating 2,000 or 3,000
patients. It is, nevertheless, a mattzr for some regret
that the refusal of the Inspector-General of Communica-
tions to concede this very moderate demand, and the reply
of the authorities in India to the request for tugs, were
so readily accepted as final. We believe that an officer of
greater force of character would have pressed his demands
for separate transport for the medical services much more
strongly. The only other documentary evidence of any
demand in 1915, for hospital steamers, is a telegram of
December 7th. in which the Deputy Director, Medical
Services, Mesopotamia, informs the authorities in India
that recent experience (he refers to the evacuation of the

‘wounded after Ctesiphon) had confirmed his opinion that

well equipped river hospital steamers were absolutely
necessary for the sick and wounded.

58. We also doubt whether the military authorities in
Mesopotamia treated the medical services with much
consideration in this matter, or whether they sufficiently
realised the need of such steamers. We recognise that
their difficulties in the matter of river transport were
very great, and that they found it hard to meet the many
urgent demands made upon them; but we think that
there were occasions on which the medical requirements
might have received more favourable treatment. Further,
once the need for hospital river steamers was brought to
the notice of the military authorities, we think that they
ought to have informed the authorities in India of the
position of affairs and of the imperative need for such
vessels. We are indeed forced to the conclusion that the
necessity for an adequate provision of this kind of transport
was overlooked both in India and in Mesopotamia, until
the sufferings of the wounded after Ctesiphon made it
apparent that some systematic steps must be taken to
remedy the deficiency. The delay in providing this

‘form of transport is the more to be regretted because

it is now difficult, indeed almost impossible, to get river
hospital steamers towed across the Arabian Sea to Basra.
The Director, Royal Indian Marine, has informed us that
if he had had proper notice he could, in seven months,
have had the requisite number of vessels built and equipped
in this country, according to specification. Assuming this
to be correct, if the necessary instructions had been given
early in 1915, these vessels could have been built in the
summer months and taken across the Arabian Sea to
Basra in the most favourable season of the year.

59. In view of the fact that it will probably be impossible
to send river hospital steamers from India during the
preecnt monsoon, some local arrangements ought, in our
opinion, to be made for the evacuation of the wounded.
We suggest that, as soon as military requirements admit
of this course, two of the large steamers now in use on
the Tigris and four commodious barges should be regu-
larly fitted out and equipped for hospital work. We are
informed that one steamer so fitted out could, with two
barges, accommodate 500 patients, and if the vessel were
properly equipped with electric fans and lights, and with
ice machines or large ice chests, we think that it would
probably be more convenient for hospital work in Mesopo-
tamia than some of the hospital steamers which have been
sent for that purpose.

60. For the evacuation of less serious cases, and as a
temporary arrangement pending the equipment of these
steamers, we consider that selected steamers and barges,
out of those now available in Mesopotamia, should be
used for hospital purposes and that systematic efforts
should be made to improve the accommodation on these
The awnings should be renewed and made
water-tight, or, if this is not possible, replaced by some
more adequate covering. Cots should be provided for
all patients—folding beds of the “‘X” or Amer‘can
‘« sold medal ”’ pattern, or some similar kind, would answer
very well for this purpose. Proper arrangements should
be made for the supply of pure drinking water, and a

142

sufficient number of sanitary latrines should be fitted on
each vessel. Suitable and sufficient galleys should be
provided for cooking food, and a supply of lamps, linen,
pillows, cooking utensils and the requisite crockery and
cutlery, should be stored on board each vessel. Finally,
some responsible person should be put in charge of these
articles of equipment and be detailed for permanent duty
on the vessel with a small subordinate statf to keep both
the vessel, and all the equipment, clean and ready for use.
If these improvements were effected, and an adequate
medical personnel with the necessary equipment supplied
on each occasion on which the vessel was used for trans-
porting sick and wounded, we believe that the discomfort
at present caused would be much alleviated. We recognise
that the real remedy, however, for this defect is the pro-
vision of properly equipped hospital steamers, and we
only suggest the above as a temporary expedient and as
a practical method for immediately improving the existing
condition of affairs.

61. Inadequacy of medical personnel and equipment.—
Another defect of the first magnitude has been the in-
adequacy of medical personnel and equipment.
originally despatched to Mesopotamia consisted of one
division, and the medical establishment was four combined
field ambulances of five sections each (that is, two sections
British and three sections Indian), one combined clearing
hospital of 200 beds (one section British and three sections
Indian), two and a half sections, comprising 250 beds, of
a British general hospital, six sections of an Indian
general hospital of 600 beds and one Indian stationary
hospital of 200 beds. This establishment was possibly
adequate for one division according to the authorised
scale, though a comparison with the standard prescribed
in the official manual entitled ‘‘ War Establishments,
India,” shows that the British general hospital establish-
ment was short ‘of the personnel and equipment for 50
beds. On the other hand, it is fair to say that the Indian
. general hospital complement was 100 beds in excess of the
authorised scale.

62. By February Ist, 1915, the expeditionary force
-had increased to 20,000 men, and in March it was decided
to augment the strength to two divisions by the addition
of the 12th, 30th and 33rd Infantry Brigades, and also to
send the 6th Cavalry Brigade as a further reinforcement.
No corresponding increase was made in the medical estab-
lishment. One combined field ambulance of four sections
was despatched to Mesopotamia for service with the
33rd Infantry Brigade, and an Indian cavalry field ambu-
lance consisting of three sections was sent with the 6th
Cavalry Brigade. No field ambulances accompanied
the 12th or 30th Infantry Brigades, and no additional
clearing, stationary, or general hospitals were sent for the
new division. In regard to one of these items, viz., the
field ambulance of the 30th Infantry Brigade, it is right
to state that the military authorities in India addressed
General Barrett, who was the General Officer Commanding
the expeditionary force, as to the necessity of sending a
field ambulance for this brigade, and that he replied that
he could manage without it. No satisfactory explanation
has, however, been offered as to the failure to send other
units, and the net result was that whereas the force was
increased to two divisions plus a cavalry brigade, the
- medical establishment was, save for the addition of seven
sections of a field ambulance, that which had been thought
necessary for one division only.

63. We find it difficult to understand the principle upon
which this establishment was considered sufficient. It
: was known that the campaign in Mesopotamia would have
to be conducted under singularly unfavourable conditions
Much of the country is low-lying and marshy and is
constantly liable to floods. The atmosphere is in many
parts excessively humid, and the temperature is very
_ high, rising in the hot weather, as we were informed, to

125 degrees. It might, therefore, have been anticipated |

that a high rate of sickness would prevail among the troops.
. Further, the Turkish force in occupation of the territory
, invaded was considerable and the countryside swarmed
. with hostile Arabs. There was, therefore, in our opinion,
, ho reason to think that the ordinary scale of medical units
_ 28 laid down in “ War Establishments, India,” would
not be needed. Experience has indeed shown that, if
’ anything, that standard requires to be increased.

atte]
Py

The force

64. In the early part of the war, the insufficient pro-
vision of field ambulances was, however, less serious than
the insufficiency of hospital accommodation, which
became evident as early as April, 1915. At this period,
the British General Hospital of 250 beds and the Indian
General Hospital of 600 beds, which had been established
at Basra, were overcrowded. For some time the staff
of these hospitals had been depleted by sickness, and by
the fact that the personnel for transports, which were
used for the evacuation of sick and wounded, had to be
provided out of the medical units of the force. At the
same time the sick and wounded began to increase
alarmingly, so much so that after the battle of Shaiba the
patients in the Indian General Hospital numbered over
1,000. The actual personnel available to treat these
patients was 15 medical officers and 19 medical subordin-
ates, against an authorised scale of 22 medical officers
and 40 subordinates. During this month, the Deputy
Director, Medical Services, Mesopotamia, was, it may be
added, so impressed with the need for increasing the
hospital accommodation, that. he ordered the Indian
General Hospital to expand to 1,000 beds and the British
General Hospital to 500 beds. As, however, no personnel
was at the time added to deal with the increased number
of patients, this order was of little value in effecting any
relief. It has been suggested, indeed, that the only
result was that the hospital authorities were thereby
empowered to draw cerain articles of equipment from the
Supply and Transport Corps. But this is perhaps hardly
just, as small additions to the establishment were subse-
quently made from time to time.

65. As the hot weather advanced, the deficiency in
hospital accommodation became more and more marked
and on June 15th we find the position was this, that the
British General Hospital which had started as a 250 bed
unit with 7 medical officers and 10 assistant surgeons,
had a staff of 6 officers and 8 assistant surgeons to treat
635 sick; and that in the Indian General Hospital 13
medical officers, 1 assistant surgeon, 19 sub-assistant
surgeons and 38 sepoy ward orderlies (that is, a staff
smaller than the staff authorised for the treatment of
600 patients) was endeavouring to treat 1,671 sick and
wounded. On June 17th the Officer Commanding the
Indian General Hospital reported that he had only 12
sub-assistant surgeons fit for duty. These deficiencies
were not completely made up throughout 1915, although
from time to time additional officers and subordinates
were sent out. The figures furnished to us by the office
of the Adjutant General at the Base indicate that the
only additional complete hospital units sent out to Meso-
potamia, between November, 1914, and December, 1915,
were the Bengal Stationary Hospital (which is an institu-
tion maintained by private subscription and equipped
normally for the treatment of 200 patients) and one
section of a British General Hospital, sufficient for the
treatment of 100 patients

During this period, the strength of the force increased
approximately from 12,000 to 40,000 men, and the
information which we have been able to collect makes
it clear that, from the date on which a second division
came to Mesopotamia, the general hospital accommodation
was insufficient for the needs of the force. Fortunately,
as the weather got cooler, sickness was not so prevalent,
and after July and August the number of patients in the
hospital decreased for a time, but even then the personnel
was often insufficient. It is true that when the 3rd and
7th Divisions arrived in Mesopotamia during December
and January, additional stationary, clearing and general
hospitals were sent with them; but, as explained later,
these units arrived so long after the fighting portions of
the divisions, that for some time the lack of hospital
accommodation and personnel was as apparent as it had
been during the hot weather of 1915. Another cause
which contributed to this result was the despatch of a
number of additional brigades to Mesopotamia from
India in the autumn of 1915 without any hospital units.
Indeed the figures supplied to us show that the maximum
number of patients in the British General Hospital at
Basra in the month of January, 1916, was 1,038, the staff
consisting at the time of 9 Royal Army Medical Corps
officers, and 1] assistant surgeons. ‘In the same month
the average number of patients in the Indian General
Hospital was 1,230, the establishment being 12 medical

_ Officers as against an authorised scale of 28, and 20 medical

143

subordinates as against an authorised scale of 48, for that
number of beds. It can therefore safely be said that the
officers in charge of the various hospitals have had, from
an early stage in the campaign, to contend with great
difficulties. Not only has it been impossible to secure
proper buildings for the accommodation of all their
patients, and difficult, in hospitals outside Basra, to
obtain the necessary drugs and appliances with reasonable
expedition, but there has been a consistent shortage in
the personnel necessary to treat the number of sick and
wounded. This shortage has been particularly felt in
respect of assistant surgeons, sub-assistant surgeons and
menial staff. We believe that the patients, especially
in the British general hospitals, have suffered less trom
these inadequate arrangements than might have been
expected, owing to the great resourcefulness, energy and
devotion to duty of the medical personnel and subordinate
staff. We cannot speak too highly of the efforts made
‘by the available staff in all the hospitats to cope with
the very difficult situation with which they were faced.
At the same time, the evidence before us indicates that
on particular occasions, despite the strenuous efforts of
the hospital rtaff, the medical personnel available to treat
the patients and to see to their comfort, especially in the
Indian general hospital was so deficient that the patients
underwent considerable discomfort, and that cases which
required constant medical attention and nursing did not
obtain them.

66. The deficiencies in stationary and clearing hospitals
_have been equally great. The Indian regulations contem-
plate the location of stationary hospitals at all small
posts where general hospitals are not required; but
during the whole of 1915 there was only one stationary
hospital* in Mesopotamia, and the work which should
have been done by stationary hospitals at various posts
on the Tigris, Euphrates and Karun, such as Ali-al-
Gharbi, Nasariyeh, and Ahwaz, has been done by field
ambulances. Indeed at Kurna, where the daily number
of sick was for some time large, there was for a great part
of the year not even a field ambulance to receive or accom.
modate the patients, and regimental medical officers had
to make the best arrangements they could. Similarly,
in the case of clearing hospitals, the supply of these units
has never been sufficient, with the result that hospitals of
this class at the front have been frequently overcrowded,
and that it has been necessary to supplement them by
field ambulances.

67. Dislocation of the medical organisation.—Another
consequence of the deficiency in hospital establishments
has been a general dislocation of the medical organisation
of the force. The Field Service Regulations contemplate
the following medical units for the treatment of the sick
and wounded :—

(1) Regimental medical officers,

(2) Field ambulances, which are divided into bearer
and tent sub-divisions,

(3) Clearing hospitals.

(4) Stationary hospitals.

(5) General hospitals.

The duties of each of these units are described in the
regulations on the subject. General hospitals are,
according to these regulations, large hospitals placed at
the base, or at any other post where they are required,
for the treatment of severe and prolonged cases. They
are equipped for the medical treatment and comfort of
all classes of cases, and have the requisite stocks of beds,
blankets, cooking utensils, crockery, stores and various
-appliances. Stationary hospitals are small units, generally
posted at places on the line of communications where
general hospitals are not needed, and are, according to the
regulations, equipped to deal with 25, or in cases of
emergency, 50 patients. Clearing hospitals are intended
for the temporary reception of sick and wounded, pending
and during evacuation from the front. Their functions
are similar to those of the tent sub-divisions of a field
ambulance, but on a larger scale, and they form the
central point on which the collecting zone converges and
from which the evacuating and distributing zones diverge.
They are normally located at an advanced base and should

* Excluding the Bengal Stationary Hospital, which
is maintained by private subscriptions and was being used
as a General Hospital.

(C 48—176)

be pushed up, 80 as to be in reach of the field ambulances.
Field ambulances are supposed to accompany the force
to which they are attached, to be in close touch with it
during action, and to evacuate the sick and wounded
without delay to the clearing hospitals. All of these

‘units are equipped only for the particular duties which

they are intended to perform. The supply of stores,
appliances, clothing and furniture in field ambulances
and clearing hospitals is, for obvious reasons, not large.
The organisation prescribed in the regulations has,however,
been in great measure abandoned in Mesopotamia. On the
Tigris front there were, during the operations in April,
1916, two clearing hospitals only to clear the whole of the
wounded of approximately four divisions, while a third
hospital of this kind was acting as a general hospital at the
base. At Nasariyeh, from July, 1915, to April, 1916, no
hospital of any kind was established, and the whole
medical work was done by the field ambulances. In
consequence of this dislocation, the work of clearing and
stationary hospitals has constantly been undertaken by
field ambulances which are not equipped for this purpose,
and which cannot be called upon to do the work of hospitals
without detriment to their legitimate duties. Complaints
of this misuse of the various medical units have been very
frequent and we think justified. It is not possible to
treat patients suffering from disease or wounds satis-
factorily, for any prolonged period, in a field ambulance
to which no beds and a very limited amount of clothing,
cooking utensils, crockery, linen, blankets and medical
appliances are supplied, and in which the strength of the
subordinate staff appointed to see to the comfort of the
sick is very limited. The same remarks apply mutatis
mutandis also to clearing hospitals, which are only fitted
out for the temporary accommodation of patients.

68. Responsibility for deficiencies.—As to the responsi-
bility for these deficiencies, we think that the causa causans
is the insufficiency of the medical establishment in India
to meet the demands of a great war, in which troops from
India have been largely employed overseas. There is
abundant evidence that the available supply of medical
officers and subordinates in India, including those in civil
employment, has been very largely drawn on to bring
medical establishments in Mesopotamia up to the normal
scale. Of late, indeed, these resources have been depleted
as far as is prudent, having regard to the requirements of
India and other theatres of war. We cannot, however,
avoid the finding that a serious responsibility attaches to
the military authorities in India for despatching rein-
forcements to Mesopotamia insufficiently equipped with
medical establishments. We also think that, during the
early part of the war, the authorities in India were not as
prompt as they might have been in complying with
necessary demands, and that some of the expedients
suggested for meeting deficiencies were unsound. We
consider that if the medical staff available in India was
not adequate to meet the demands of the expedition,
assistance from sources outside India might have been
sought earlier. The demands of the force, particularly
in the way of hospital staff, were frequently put before
the authorities in India from an early period in 19165.
In April of that year, when the British and Indian general
hospitals were expanded to 500 and 1,000 beds respectively,
additional Royal Army Medical Corps and Indian Medical
Service officers and assistant surgeons and sub-assistant
surgeons were more than once asked for, without any
result. It was not until the end of June, when the
General Officer Commanding represented that there would
be a breakdown if conditions were not improved, that
additional officers were despatched, together with an
Indian stationary hospital maintained by private gener-
osity and one section of a British general hospital. Even
then, however, the demands of the Deputy Director,
Medical Services, Mesopotamia, were not completely met,
and in reply to a request for sub-assistant surgeons, after
a great deal of haggling as to what was the correct estab-
lishment for the force, the Director of Medical Services,
India, came to the conclusion that there was an excess of
assistant surgeons and suggested that, in estimating his
needs in the matter of sub-assistant surgeons, the Deputy
Director of Medical Services should reckon one assistant
surgeon as equal to two sub-assistant surgeons. This
suggestion, which was not accepted by the local authorities,
is on a par with one previously made that in order to make
good deficiencies in hospital personnel, the staffs of the

T 2

144

field ambulances, which were already inadequate, should
be further depleted. We do not think that demands of
responsible officers in such a situation should have been
met in this spirit. The correspondence on this subject
illustrates, in our opinion, the danger of applying ordinary
secretariat methods to urgent demands in war time.
Instead of accepting the views of the local officers as to the
necessity for additional personnel, their figures were
challenged and suggestions made that one medical unit
should be depleted in order to make good deficiencies in
another, and that one man should be counted as equal
to two. In the meantime, while this discussion went on,
little or nothing was done to relieve the situation.

69. Again in July, the Deputy Director of Medical
Services, Mesopotamia, submitted a full statement of his
deficiencies and requirements and asked that 13 Royal
Army Medical Corps officers, 12 Indian Medical Service
officers, 1 assistant surgeon and 47 sub-assistant surgeons
should be sent to his assistance. As to the first of these
demands, the reply was to the effect that certain Royal
Army Medical Corps officers were expected to arrive in
India in August, and that some of them would be sent to
Mesopotamia. As to the remaining deficiencies, after
discussion as to the correctness of certain figures supplied
by the Deputy Director, a reply was finally sent in
October, that is, three months later, that steps were being
taken to make good the deficiencies in Indian Medical
Service officers and that 12 sub-assistant surgeons would
be sent at the first opportunity. On August 27th, the
Deputy Director of Medical Services again reported his
deficiency in sub-assistant surgeons, but the authorities
in India were unable to afford him any relief, and it was
not until November, 1915, that 10 additional sub-assistant
surgeons were actually sent.

70. Of late the demands of the expeditionary force
have, we think, been more reasonably met, and the
situation has certainly improved. In the first place, the
deficiencies in the existing medical staff have been partly
made up out of a 6 per cent. monthly reinforcement
which was sent from June, 1915, and which proved to
be more than was needed to replace actual wastage. In
the second place the medical units of the 3rd and 7th
Divisions, including well equipped hospitals of all classes,
reached Mesopotamia early in 1916, and the medical
staff of the force has been materially increased in other
ways. While, however, we admit that the situation is
now far better than it was in 1915, we cannot say that
the medical arrangements when we left Mesopotamia
were satisfactory in all respects. Not only were many
of the patients unsuitably housed, but most of the medical
units acting as hospitals were overcrowded and being
used for purposes for which they were not equipped.
Further, the paucity of the medical and subordinate
personnel was, particularly in some hospitals, a cause
of anxiety. According to a statement furnished to us
by the Assistant Director, Medical Services, India, the
total accommodation in general hospitals is now sufficient
for 2,000 British and 2,100 Indian patients. In addition
to the hospitals specified in this statement, we were
informed by the authoritics at Basra that the personnel
of two additional Indian general hospitals of 500 beds
each have arrived in Mesopotamia. The total accommo-
dation in the Indian general hospitals is, therefore, 3,100
beds. The staff of some of these hospitals is, however,
below the standard scale, and until reinforcements arrive
the position will not be entirely safe. The strength of
the force in April was 122,000 men, of whom 38,000
were British. The percentage of sick and wounded in
April, 1915, was approximately 7 per cent. The accom-
modation provided in general hospitals, even taking into
consideration the fact that a certain number of sick
and wounded must always be detained in field ambu-
lances and stationary and clearing hospitals, is thus
barely sufficient for existing needs. The total number
_of clearing hospitals in the country is four, which is
also insufficient according to the normal establishment
of the force engaged. This deficiency is, however,
eee the attention of the Director, Medical Services,

dia.

71. Future medical requirements.—It may be advisable
hcre to indicate the manner in which the local medical
authorities propose to deal with the situation during the
hot weather of 1916. In December, 1915, the Director
of Medical Services, Mesopotamia, submitted an estimate

of medical requirements for the coming year. He then
calculated that accommodation in general hospitals
should be provided for 1,800 British and 5,200 Indian
patients. He stated that, including the Bengal Stationary
Hospital which, though normally equipped for 200 patients,
can accommodate satisfactorily a very much larger
number, the existing accommodation in general hospitals
was adequate for 1,000 British and 2,400 Indians. This
left a deficit of 800 British and 2,8C0 Indian beds, and
this deficit the Government of India undertook to make
good as early as possible. The position was, however,
complicated in March, 1916, by the arrival of the 13th
Division, and on March 23rd, 1916, on this account and
presumably for other reasons, the Director of Medical
Services subinitted revised estimates of the requirements
in the way of general hospitals, estimating that he needed
equipment and personnel for 3,000 British and 6,C00
Indian patients.

72. This estimate has been accepted by the Director
of Medical Services, India, and to meet the demands for
further accommodation for British patients, in addition
to the medical units of the 13th Division, a large British
general hospital on the English scale, accommodating
1,040 patients, has been despatched to Mesopotamia. To
meet the deficiency in Indian general hospitals, one
Indian general hospital of 500 beds has already been
sent from Egypt, and the personnel and equipment of
six complete hospitals* of 500 beds each, and also of
three additional sections, each accommodating 100
patients, are being despatched from India. When the
demands of the Director of Medical Services, Mescpo-
tamia, have been fully met, and the sick and wounded
are accommodated in suitable buildings, provided with
proper equipment and fitted with electric lights and fans,
we think that the requirements of the situation will have
been satisfied. The maximum average daily number of
sick and wounded last year in any one month amounted
to 9.5 per cent. of the strength, though on one particular
date the percentage of sick and wounded exceeded
12.5 per cent. If 10 per cent. is taken as an approximate
percentage for the coming year, we think that the pro-
posed provision of accommodation in general hospitals
will be sufficient, as a certain number ot patients must
always be retained in field ambulances and stationary
and clearing hospitals. Further, it is probable that the
evacuation of the sick and wounded by hospital ships
this year will be effected more expeditiously than last
vear. In these circumstances we can see no reason to
criticise this estimate, though at least one of us is a little
apprehensive of the result of any sudden outbreak of
disease and the effect of the hot weather on a large force
of British troops not accustomed to tropical conditions.
We ought to state here that a telegram has recently
been received from the Director of Medical Services,
Mesopotamia, stating that he is about to submit revised
estimates of his requirements, and that a further increase
in the medical establishment will be required. We do
not doubt that this proposal will receive careful con-
sideration. As to clearing hospitals, the situation is not
so satisfactory, the present number of hospitals of this
class being, as already stated, insufficient for the needs
of the force; the Director of Medical Services has, how-
ever, been asked to state what his requirements are in
this respect. The number of stationary hospitals will
really depend on the length of the lines of communication,
and possibly when the general hospital accommodation
is increased as proposed, and the existing stationary
hospitals are available for their legitimate duties, no
larger increase in their number will be necessary. We
are glad to say that a number of Royal Army Medical
Corps and Indian Medical Service officers have recently
been sent to Mesopotamia, for employment in general
hospitals and to furnish the necessary personnel for
river steamers and transports used for the evacuation
of sick and wounded. The despatch of these officers
will afford great relief to medical units in that country.
A large number of additional field ambulances have
also been sent.

73. River transport—In the course of our enquiry

many witnesses, to whose evidence we attach great
weight, have laid stress on the fact that nearly all the

———_ _- -

‘ * These include the personnel of two Indian general
hospitais of 500 beds each, which have already arrived
in Mesopotamia and are referred to in paragraph 70.

145

difficulties experienced by the staff and administrative
services in Mesopotamia have been due to the inadequacy
of the river transport. We have been told, over and
over again, that owing to the shortage of steamers and
tugs of suitable draught and towing power, delays have
constantly occurred in carrying out important strategic
moves, in sending up reinforcements to the front, in
providing the supplies required for the maintenance of
the troops, in moving up medical units and their ambu-
lance transport, and in sending up urgently needed
medical stores and equipment. The same cause has
delayed the despatch of comforts generously provided
by the Order of St. John and the various funds organised
in India, and by the Joint Committee of the Red Cross
Society and Order of St. John in England, to lessen the
hardships of the troops. It has also delayed the con-
veyance up river of the building material and engineer-
ing stores required for the construction of hospitals and
quarters for medical personnel at places on the line of
communications. The delays in providing the hospitals
at Amara with electric lights and fans, in sending up
disinfectors, water purifying apparatus, water carts and
soda water machines, as well as in establishing a field
force canteen where officers and men can purchase what
they require at a reasonable cost, must also be attributed
tothe same reason. To this shortage also must be ascribed
the unnecessary suffering caused to the wounded, through
delays in effecting their evacuation down river, after
the battle of Ctesiphon last year and the battles of
Shaikh Saad, the Wadi, and Umm-el-Hannah in January
last.

74. These views, which are supported by a mass of
evidence of the most convincing character, agree with
our own conclusions on the subject. We consider that
there has been a shortage of river craft ever since the
occupation of Kurna, and that despite the large number
of steamers and barges now employed on the rivers of
Mesopotamia the river transport at the disposal of the
General Officer Commanding has never been adequate,
and at times has been seriously deficient. Strenuous
efforts have been made by the military authorities in
India to remedy this defect, but though a large number
of steamers and harges have heen sent out from time
to time, the additions to the river flotilla have not kept
pace either with the additions made to the force, or with
the increased demands for transport for the supplies,
ammunition, medical equipment, engineering and _air-
craft stores entailed by such additions, as well as by
the lengthening of the lines of communication. Thus,
though the average river tonnage available in November,
1915, was about 150 tons a day as compared with about
250 tons a day available in April, 1916, the deficit in
actual shipping requirements tended, until recently, to
increase rather than diminish.

75. When it was decided in November, 1914, to send
an expedition to the Persian Gulf, the objective of the
force was Basra, and its réle was to secure the mouth
of the Shatt-el-Arab and safeguard our interests in the
oil-fields east of the Karun. The force employed only
amounted to a division, and as its operations were at
first confined to the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, the
need for additional river transport was not felt. Supplies
could be brought up to Basra and even Kurna by sea-
going ships, and the local resources in the way of river
shipping sufficed for the movement and maintenance of
the small forces which had to be detached occasionally
from headquarters. The policy of Government as regards
Mesopotamia was one of caution, and the plan of opera-
tions prepared by the General Staff in India did not
provide for more than the occupation of Basra, the
country north of that place being, as we are informed,
outside the sphere of military intelligence for which
India is responsible. We mention this fact, as had an
advance on Bagdad been contemplated from the outset,
river transport of a suitable kind should, and no doubt
would, have been provided on a scale sufficient for the
number of troops which it was intended to employ.

76. Though the Turks were driven out of Basra, they
remained within striking distance of Kurna, and it
became evident early in 1915 that they were about to
advance from Amara on Ahwaz and from Nasariyeh
on Basra. With the prospect of having to detach forces
for operations on the Karun and Euphrates, Sir Arthur
Barrett, after consulting local experts, asked on J anuary

4th for some steamers of the ‘‘ Mejidieh”” type, drawing .

not more than 3 feet 6 inches. Knowing, however, that
this type was a special one, evolved by Messrs. Lynch
Brothers as the result of half a century’s experience of
the navigation of the Tigris, he added that any river
steamers obtainable in India or Burmah of 10 knot speed
and not more than 4 feet 6 inches draught, capable of
carrying from 500 to 800 men and towing two lighters,
would satisfy his immediate requirements. The autho-
rities in India met this demand with promptitude. By
May 20th seven paddle steamers of the type suggested
had reached Basra, and they were followed soon after
by four tugs and four launches. These vessels formed
the nucleus of the Government flotilla, consisting of the
“Pp,” “T,’ “L”’ and ‘‘S”’ classes of river craft, t.e., the
paddlers, tugs, launches and sternwheelers, which are
constantly referred to in the statements of witnesses.

77. Owing to the nature of the country and the dis-
tribution of the population and political centres, any
operations against the Turks have to be made along
the Tigris, Euphrates or Karun, and in the absence of
railways the success of these operations depends on the
number and suitability of the steamers and barges
available. The river steamers at Sir John Nixon’s
disposal in the spring of 1915 were sufficient so long
as they were only required for the carriage of supplies ;
but when it became necessary, owing to the flooded state
of the country and the expansion of the theatre of opera-
tions, to utilise them also for the conveyance of troops
and the evacuation of an increasing number of sick and
wounded, the shortage of shipping became apparent.
This shortage, moreover, was aggravated by the fact
that the steamers drawing 4 feet 6 inches, which Sir
Arthur Barrett had accepted as suitable, could, during
the low-water season, only be navigated with difficulty
through the narrows of the Tigris above Kurna, and not
at all on the Euphrates or Karun.

78. The navigation of the Tigris demands skill and
local knowledge. Some of its reaches are straight, others
are extraordinarily tortuous. Some are broad and others
so narrow that steamers can only pass each other when
one is moored to the bank. The difficulty of finding
vessels suitable for employment on this troublesome
waterway is very great, for the types evolved by Messrs.
Lynch Brothers have, we believe, no counterpart on
any other river in the East. The bends of the Tigris
are so sharp and the current so strong that the navigation
of vessels down stream is very difficult unless they are
fitted with independent paddles. Steamers are swept
from side to side and hurled against the bank. To
protect them and their paddle wheels, and at the same
time increase their carrying capacity, it is usual to attach
a barge each side. These barges must be built of iron,
which will dent on impact without breaking, as wooden
barges are crushed like eggshells. Similarly, very few
steamers are strong enough to bear the impact of the
barges which protect them from the banks, and only
steamers fitted with specially constructed cross stanchions
can be used to take the stress. Vessels like the Nile
and Thames steamers will not stand the pressure, and
can only be used in the straighter reaches above Amara.
A further complication is that steamers which can navi-
gate the Tigris in flood, will not all go up river when
the water is low. We mention these details as a river is
generally regarded as an admirable line of communication,
offering special facilities for the maintenance of a force
and the evacuation of its sick and wounded. In the
case of the Tigris, however, these advantages are heavily
discounted by the local difficilties above mentioned.

79. Realising these difficulties, which we think were
imperfectly appreciated in India, Sir John Nixon asked
on May 27th for six powerful tugs, each capable of towing
two large flats and with a draught not exceeding 3 feet
in working trim. His reasons for asking for these tuys,
and for reducing the draught limit from 4 feet 6 inches
to 3 feet, have already been stated; but they were
accepted in India only after much correspondence, and
finally the Marine authorities replied that no vessels
answering to the new specification were obtainable. The
lack of success in meeting his requirements did not,
however, make any real difference at the time to Gencral
Nixon’s plans, for even if tugs of the type required had
been found, it would not have been possible to send
them across the Arabian Sea during the mongoon. Nor
would it have been possible to send them in pieces to

146

be put together in the Shatt-el-Arab, for apart from the
delays which this would have entailed, the workshop
resources of Mesopotamia were not, at this time, suffi-
ciently developed to allow of this alternative. We
mention this as many of those who complain about the
delays which have taken place in sending out river craft
forget that for six months of the year vessels of this type
cannot be sent to sea. Indeed their despatch is always
attended with considerable risks, as is proved by the
fact that 3 paddlers, 5 tugs, 17 sternwheelers, 22 barges,
2 flats, and 1 floating dock, or a total of 50 vessels all
told, have foundered between various Indian ports and
Basra in the course of the last 14 months.

80. On July 8th, 10th and 17th, when the operations
against Nasariyeh were in progress, and the navigation
of the Hammar Lake was causing extraordinary diffi-
culties, Sir John Nixon asked India to arrange for the
construction of 6 paddlers, 3 sternwheelers, 8 tugs, and
43 barges, and at the same time laid down a very definite
specification for each class of vessel. This request was
complied with, and on August 3rd the Secretary of State
for India was asked to place the order with shipbuilding
firms at home. It was not considered advisable to order
the construction of these vessels in India, as difficulties
and delays connected with the importation of materials

and machinery from England, owing to scarcity of freights, —

made it unlikely that locally built vessels would be
completed as rapidly as those ordered from home.

81. A memorandum, prepared by Major-General Kem-
ball, in which Sir John Nixon’s requirements in shipping
were very clearly explained, was forwarded to India
about this time, z.¢., August, 1915. After stating that
his ‘principal need was light-draught steamers and the
personnel and material requisite for their maintenance,
he added the significant warning that ‘‘if steps are not
taken in good time to meet these requirements we shall
run the risk of a breakdown at possibly a serious moment.
At present we cannot make the most effective use of
the troops available owing to want of steamers, and in
any crisis insufficiency of river transport would limit
the scope of reinforcements.”’

82. Early in October—that is, just after the battle of
Kut-el-Amara—sir John Nixon asked that some powerful
light-draught tugs or sternwheelers might be purchased
in India with the least possible delay, for use as stop-
gaps pending the arrival from England of the additional
river craft ordered through the Secretary of State. He
explained that the maximum draught should be 3 feet
5 inches for tugs and 2 feet 6 inches for sternwheelers.
The Director of the Royal Indian Marine replied that
tugs of this type were unobtainable. Sternwheelers of
the kind required could be secured, but it was virtually
impracticable to tow them from Rangoon to the Persian
Gulf, as owing to their fragile construction they would
break up in the slightest sea. The correctness of this
statement is proved by the fact that out of 24 sternwheelers
sent from time to time only 7 reached their destination.
On October 24th General Nixon reported that the Tigris
was rising and suggested that more Irrawaddy paddlers
might be purchased—that is, steamers drawing 4 feet
6 inches—the very class of vessel to which he had pre-
viously objected. A great point was made by the autho-
rities in India of the apparent inconsistency of this demand,
but we do not consider that the criticism was of any
great weight, as vessels which draw too much water in
the shallow season might obviously be useful when the
river was in flood and so might help to mitigate a shortaye
which threatened to become acute. At Sir John Nixon’s
request the Director, Royal Indian Marine, then furnished
him with a list of all the river craft in India or Burma
which, though differing widely from the specifications
he had laid down, approximated to his revised require-
ments. As soon as he had made his selection of the craft
available, steps were taken to requisition the vessels
demanded, and towards the end of January they began
to arrive at Basra. They have since been supplemented
by steamers from England and Egypt, and by the
beginning of May the total number of steamers at the
disposal of the General Officer Commanding in Mesopo-
tamia was 44, exclusive of 24 steamers, 52 tugs and
3 sternwheelers either en route from, or under construction
in, England or India

83. Apart from the provision of additional river craft,
the introduction of better methods of control and adminis-

tration on the lines of communication and at the base
has recently improved the situation, and when the
steamers under construction or ordered become available,
there should be no recurrence of the serious shortage
of shipping which existed between July, 1915, and
April, 1916. The working margin is, however, still
somewhat fine, as the number of steamers withdrawn
from work for repairs tends to increase, owing to the
excessive strain imposed on them during the past year.
Having regard to the uncertainties of navigation on
the Tigris and Euphrates, we consider that the position
as regards transport will not be really satisfactory until
a channel has been dredged across the Hammar Lake,
and until the railways about to be constructed to Nasariyeh
and Amara become available for the conveyance of the
sick and wounded as well as of troops and stores.

84. We find that there has been some misunderstanding
between the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia
and the authorities in India on the subject of river
transport. The local authorities were, in our opinion,
unreasonable in their demands for steamers of a type
which is special to the Tigris, and they hampered the
action of the authorities in India by failing to state that
the specifications to which they adhered with such
insistence applied only to river craft which had to be
built, and not to vessels obtainable by purchase. Further,
had the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia
explained that his objection to vessels drawing 4 feet
6 inches applied only to the low water season, and had
he intimated earlier that he was prepared to accept
steamers of good towing capacity with a maximum
draught of 6 feet, a large number of vessels might: have
been sent to Basra during the fair weather season. It
was the limitation as to draught, combined with the
condition that they should be able to tow two large
barges, that prevented the earlier offer, by the Royal
Indian Marine, of many of the vessels which Sir John
Nixon subsequently accepted. 3

85. On the other hand, the authorities in India appear
to us to have been somewhat lacking in foresight. They
must have been aware that the advance to Kut-el-Amara,
with the possibility of an advance on Bagdad and the
despatch of reinforcements from oversea, would be likely
to create a demand for additional shipping. They must
have realised that the river craft which had barely
sufficed for two divisions would not suffice for four,
especially with a line of communications some 150 miles
longer than before. They must also have known that
the steamers ordered from England were not likely to
arrive in time to be of use in the contemplated advance,
and that local resources would ‘have, therefore, to be
supplemented from India or Burma. They seem, how-
ever, to have done little to anticipate these difficulties,
contenting themselves with trying to meet demands as
they arose. The monsoon months, which might have
been utilised in selecting river steamers, bringing them
down to Calcutta and Rangoon and preparing them for
the sea voyage to Basra as soon as the fair weather
season set in, were allowed to slip by, little being done
until Sir John Nixon made a number of fresh demands.

86. We have examined this question of river steamers
in some detail, as we are required by our terms of reference
to consider whether the amount of river transport allotted
to the medical services was sufficient ‘with regard to
the total amount available and the paramount military
requirements for transportation of troops, supplies and
ammunition.”” As we have already explained, the
shortage of river transport on the Tigris has always been
so great that prior to the arrival of the ‘‘ Sikkim ”’ and
the ‘‘Coromandel”’ it was found impossible to make
any permanent separate allotment of shipping for hos-
pital purposes. The question of the sufficiency of the
transport provided for the conveyance of the sick and
wounded thus merges into the larger question of the
transport available for the general purposes of the force,
and this, as we have pointed out, was found to be inade-
quate so far back as when the troops moved from the
vicinity of Basra. In support of this contention we
cannot do better than quote the opinions of two dis-
tinguished commanders. Writing on January 12th,
1916, immediately after the battle of Shaikh Saad,
Sir John Nixon remarked that “the wounded with
Aylmer have been called upon to suffer unnecessarily
owing to shortage of river transport. Not only is it

147°

difficult to bring the wounded down, but it is equally
difficult to get medical personnel and equipment up
the river.” Sir Percy Lake, writing on the same subject
about May 12th, soon after the failure to relieve Kut,
stated that ‘‘as the Commission is aware, the whole
situation was dominated by the question of river trans-
port. The amount available was totally inadequate for
the ordinary requirements of the force. As the
result of this shortage of river craft it was impossible
to allot any vessel wholly for hospital purposes or for
the transport of the wounded. It was only by utilising
every vessel on the river that it was possible to supply

the troops at the front with food and ammunition. Even

then I could not send up to them more than a portion
of their land transport or all their guns, or even all their
drafts of men to replace casualties.” He concludes his
remarks by saying, ‘‘I should like to record my opinion
that such defects as have been brought to notice—and
there were many-—were due primarily to the inadequacy
of the river transport which prejudicially affected many
other services besides those dealing with the care of
sick and wounded.” In the circumstances so clearly
explained by two General Officers who in succession
have commanded the expeditionary force, we are of
opinion that, prejudicial as the shortage of suitable
river transport was to the proper working of the medical
services, the latter could not, either at the time of General
Townshend’s advance from Kut-el-Amara or before
General Aylmer’s advance to the relief of that place,
have been allotted steamers for their exclusive use. The
paramount necessity of moving the troops and keeping
them fed and supplied with munitions overrode all other
demands, and necessitated the employment for general
purposes of all the river craft available.

87. We consider that with better organisation and
control of river craft on the lines of communication
and at the base, greater use could have been made of
the shipping available. Numerous instances have been
brought to our notice of the miscarriage and overcarriage
of stores, of delays to steamers through lack of arrange-
ments for discharging cargo, and of other delays caused
by bad staff work, such as the loading of reserve ammu-
nition on the top of the tents, equipment and stores
of field ambulances required for immediate use. Many
of these mistakes were due to the inexperience of the
staff at the base, including the marine transport officers,
who were suddenly faced with all the difficulties incidental
to the administration of a river flotilla and the control
of a crowded port like Basra, which was then destitute
of jetties, wharves, storage space and other facilities,
and unable to produce even the labour required to unload
the store ships which arrived in the Shatt-el-Arab almost
daily. These défects are now being made good, and with
the classification of river craft and the better system
of traffic control recently introduced the working power
of the river steamers has appreciably increased.

88. Ambulance transport—The next matter to which
we desire to draw the attention of Government is the
failure, throughout the campaign, to provide land ambu-
lance transport for the wounded. We consider this
matter to be one of great moment, as it is proved that
the defect has been the cause of intense suffering and
must have prejudiced the chances of recovery in certain
cases. The original organisation orders of Indian Expe-
ditionary Force “D” did not include any wheeled
transport for the sick and wounded. According to
*““War Establishments, India,’ each field ambulance
should have been accompanied by eight ambulance
tongas, in lieu of which the original orders for this force
allotted an additional number of riding mules. The
omission to send wheeled transport was probably due
to the fact that operations for some time were likely
to be confined to the immediate neighbourhood of the
Shatt-el-Arab. The history of the campaign shows,
however, that very shortly after the capture of Basra
the operations extended to a considerable distance from
any river, and no satisfactory reason has been assigned
for the failure to provide the ordinary form of land
ambulance transport for these operations. It is in evi-
dence that on many occasions during the campaign
-wheeled ambulances could have been employed. In
‘fact, a few motors were used in the Ahwaz operations
in April and May, 1915, and again at Ctesiphon in
November, and ambulance wagons of the English pattern
were employed with conspicuous success to our: own

knowledge in the operations up the Tigris in the beginning
of April,.1916. But throughout the campaign the usual
form of ambulance transport has been the army transport
cart—that is, a small springless cart made of wood and
iron, drawn by mules or ponies, and ordinarily employed
for the carriage of supplies.. When the evidence of the
suffering caused by this means of conveyance, particu-
larly in cases of fracture and severe injury, is considered,
it is difficult to avoid criticising the action of those
responsible for this deficiency in severe language. It
must be remembered that on occasions the wounded
were brought in for distances of 12 and 15 miles in thece
carts. We have been told that at times patients suffered
so much on these Journeys that some fainted on the way,
and others arrived at field ambulances covered with
bruises. We have also been informed that in abdominal
cases the jolting in such a cart would be likely to cause
death, and that in the case of fractures of the femur
it would endanger the chances of complete recovery.
For these reasons we consider that the use of these carts
for conveying sick and wounded, except as a means of
supplementing proper ambulance transport, is to be
condemned. Nor had this serious deficiency been
remedied when we left Mesopotamia, for on April 9th,
when there were nearly four divisions operating on the
Tigris front, only nine ambulance wagons and four motor
ambulances were available for the removal of the wounded
from the battlefield. A few more motors, which were at
that time at the hase, have since been sent to the. front ;
but in May, 1916, the majority of the wounded were still]
being conveyed from the battlefield to field ambulances
in transport carts. It is true that, in certain conditions
and in particular parts of the country, motor vehicles
and ambulance wagons cannot be used; but on many
occasions they can be employed, and tracks on which
they can travel can often be improvised without difficulty.
For such occasions the supply of suitable ambulance
transport is, in our opinion, essential. We are aware
that in many cases the removal of all the wounded after
a battle in which the casualties are numerous cannot be
effected entirely in ambulance motors or wagons; but
we think that a sufficiency of these conveyances should
be supplied for the evacuation of more serious cases.

89. An examination of the correspondence placed before
us indicates that the necessity of providing proper land
transport for the wounded was not apparently realised
by the military authorities, either in Mesopotamia or
in India, in the early part of the campaign ; and even up
to the present the force is, we believe, entirely dependent
on private generosity for the supply of motor ambulances.
In February, 1915, the General Officer Commanding,
Indian Expeditionary Force ‘‘D,” was asked by the
authorities in India if he would like to have a motor
ambulance, and the offer being accepted the ambulance
was sent to Basra early in March of that year. No
further action was taken until April 20th, when another
motor ambulance was offered to the force, an offer which
was rejected by Sir John Nixon; and it was not until
October 20th that any demand was made by the medical
or military authorities in Mesopotamia for a further
supply of such vehicles. Four were then asked for,
and three were sent. These three were supplemented
by six more sent in December and January, but there
is reason to believe that none of them were provided
by the Government. We are informed, however, that
50 ‘‘ Star’? motor ambulances, which were offered by the
Secretary of State in November, 1915, are now on their
way to Mesopotamia and will shortly arrive there.

90. Similarly, in the case of ambulance tongas, we find
that the first demand tor this necessary item of equip-
ment was made in November, 1915, when Surgeon-General
Hathaway indented for 50, a demand which he supple-
mented in February, 1916, by a request for 250 more.

Up to recently, however, the ambulance transport in
Mesopotamia was composed of the ambulance motors

above mentioned, a small number of ambulance wagons,
and 50 ambulance tongas, very few of which were available
at the front. Although, therefore, we think that the
authorities in India are responsible for the failure to
foresee the need of this transport, we consider that the
inertia of the medical authorities in Mesopotamia in
this matter is open to even more revere criticism. In
dealing with this subject we must, however, admit that
the lack of ambulance vehicles at the front was in great
measure due to the shortage of river transport and to

148

the flooded state of the country which delayed their
movement hy road. Indeed, it has for these reasons
on many occasions not been possible to get the ambulance
wagons and motor ambulances available in Basra moved
to the front.

91. Hospital buildings.—Another point of importance
is the unsuitable nature of the accommodation provided
in many of the hospitals in Mesopotamia. Buildings in
which a certain number of patients can be accommodated
with comfort, have been taken over for the use of hos-
pitals, but in many cases the accommodation thus pro-
vided is insufficient for all the patients under treatment,
and it has not been supplemented by a sufficient number
of suitable temporary buildings. At Basra a_ large
number of sick and wounded at the General Hospitals
are accommodated in temporary sheds made of matting.
These buildings are not weatherproof, and we think
that better accommodation might by this time have
been provided. At Amara, where a large number of
sick and wounded are detained in hospital, the accommo-
dation is in some respects worsee. Many hospitals are
established in suitable buildings, but this is not always
the case. In April, 1916 we found that all the patients
of a large Indian general! hospta] were locited in tents,
pitched on low and marshy ground. The difficulty of
securing a site on a high level at Amarah is insuperable,
but there is. in our opinion, no sufficient reason, save
the lack of river transport, why temporary sheds on
raised plinths should not have been erected there for
the accommodation of the sick. We were informed that
60 sheds of an approved pattern were being erected,
but 16 months after the commencement of the war
and nine months after the occupation of Amara, two
of these only were approaching completion. These sheds
appeared to be suitable for the purpose for which they
were to be used, but up to the date on which we left
Mesopotamia we were unable to obtain any definite
information as to when the rest of these buildings would
be completed. In the meantime the patients of this
and some of the other hospitals have to remain in tents.
With the climatic conditions that prevail in Mesopotamia
during the hot weather this is likely to have a prejudicial
effect on their health.

92. Electric fans and supply of ice.—Closely connected
with the question of hospital accommodation, is the
provision of electric fans and ice in hospitals. In cases
of fever and heat stroke and for the comfort of many
other patients, electric fans and ice are indispensable
in a damp hot climate, and the lack of these
essentials during the operations in 1915 was a serious
drawback. A certain number of fans were put up in the
General Hospitals at Basra last year, but these were not
sufficient for all the wards, and none of the new hospitals
there had, up to the time of our leaving Basra, been
fitted with these fans. Up to the middle of May, 1916,
there were no electric fans in any of the hospitals at
Amara, although the number of patients accommodated
there is several thousands. The same is true of Nasariyeh
and Sheikh Saad. We are informed that the necessary
plant for the hospitals at Basra and Amara was only
indented for by the authorities in Mesopotamia on
December 31st, 1915 (the letter being received on January
18th), and on February 21st, 1916. In our opinion, the
demand for these installations might have been foreseen
earlier. We think, at any rate so far as Basra is concerned,
where no question of river transport arises, that every
hospital should by this time have been supplied with
electric lights and fans. As to ice, we are informed that
ice was available for all the hospitals in Basra during the
hot weather of 1915, but it certainly was not regularly
available in hospitals at Ahwaz, Nasariyeh or Amara,
and up to the time of our departure, so far as we are
aware, Government had not supplied ice-manufacturing
plant to any station in Mesopotamia outside Basra.
At Nasariveh, an old Turkish ice manufacturing plant
has been taken out of the river and, through the energy
of General Brooking, has been put into working order.
It is now run by mechanics taken from a territorial regi-
ment. At Ahwaz, we understand that the Anglo-Persian
Oil Company has a machine which at times works satis-
factorily. In Amara, the authorities have taken possession
of an old ice-making machine, and some attempts to meet
the hospital requirements have thus been made, though
the machine is old, and last year, according to the evidence
before us, it broke down for a long period. On inquiry

as to the reason for this state of affairs, we find that on
March 6th, 1915, Sir Arthur Barrett was asked if he
required ice machines and replied that he did not need any.
On June 14th, however, a request was received from
Sir Jobn Nixon for four ice machines capable of producing
one ton of ice each a day. On July 26th one machine
producing two tons of ice, one producing 26 cwts., and
one small machine, were despatched to Basra with 2
engineers and 5 mechanics. The delay in despatching
these machines to Basra was, we think, unavoidable.
In the circumstances, we consider that the authorities in
Mesopotamia were responsible for the delay in providing
ice machines in 1915.

93. In November, 1915, the authorities in India again
addressed the General Officer Commanding Force, *‘ D,”
as to the number of ice machines he required for 1916.
On December 11th a reply was received that five machines,
each capable of producing two tons of ice daily, were
wanted. On December 22nd these demands were revised
and seven machines, capable of producing one ton of
ice cach day, were asked for. On January 6th a telegram
was despatched to the Director-General of Stores, India
Office, asking him to supply these machines. On January
19th, the Director-Gencral of Stores telegraphed that four
ice machines would be delivered in February and three
at the end of March. On February 14th, the military
authorities in Mesopotamia indented for three additional
machines, each producing one ton of ice daily, and this
indent was also forwarded to the Director-General of Stores.
On April Ist, the Director-General cabled that the ice
machines ordered were promised for shipment at the rate
of one a week, commencing from the first week of May,
1916, and that they would be sent to Basra direct. In
consequence of this information, steps were at once taken
to procure ice machines in India,and in May, four machines,
producing about five tons of ice, were despatched to
Basra. On May 27th, the Director-General of Stores
reported that four machines had been ‘shipped on April
15th and May 11th respectively, and also stated that three
would be shipped in June. On June Ist, 1916, another
machine capable of producing 1} tons was shipped by
Indian authorities from Bombay to Basra. In addition
to this, the Joint Committee of the British Red Cross
Society and Order of St. John have ordered a number of
ice machines which, however, up to the time of our
leaving Mesopotamia, had not arrived there.

94. The result of all this is that the arrangements for
the supply of ice, outside Basra, are at present very
inadequate. This is a somewhat serious matter, as ice is
not a luxury but, having regard to climatic conditions,
an absolute necessity for the treatment of the sick. In
our opinion this condition of affairs is in great measure
due to the dilatoriness of the authorities in Mesopotamia
and of the Director-General of Stores. It appears that
no one in Mesopotamia moved in the matter until
December, 1915, when the authorities in India asked what
the requirements were. The General Officer Commanding,
Force ‘‘ D,” then made demands, which he subsequently
revised and supplemented. The Director-General of
Stores, on the other hand, failed to supply the machines
on the dates specified, possibly owing to difficulties in
delivery.

95. Medical stores and equipment —The arrangements
for the supply of surgical and medical stores and appliances
to meet the requirements of the various units in Mesopo-
tamia were, up to March, 1916, unsatisfactory. In the
first place the system of supply, laid down in the Medical
Manual (War), India, was ill-adapted to meet the demands
of a large force operating 1,600 miles from India overseas.
In the second place, owing to the lack of river transport,
there was such delay and uncertainty in the delivery of
these supplies that medical officers have frequently been
hampered in their work.

96. The system prescribed in the regulations for the
supply of medical stores is that all general, stationary,
and clearing hospitals and advanced medical store depéts
indent on the nearest medical store depét in India for their
requirements, and, in their turn, the advanced medical
store depéts attached to each division issue supplies to
regimental and field medical units only. In case of need,
the advanced medical store depéts are authorised to draw
on general hospitals to meet urgent demands. The
inconvenience of such a system, for an expedition
operating overseas, is obvious and for such a large force

149

as was employed in Mesopotamia a complete depdt of
medical stores, located within reasonable distance, upon
which all unite could draw, was clearly necessary. We
are glad to say that this has now been realised and that
such a store depdét, with ample supplies to meet demands
from medical units of all descriptions, has been established
at Basra. But it was not apparently until January, 1916,
that the necessity for such a depot was recognised, and
the depét was not actually opened until March. The
arrangements for the supply of medical stores are, how-
ever, now satisfactory, and every effort is made to see
that stores indented for are despatched to their destination
as speedily as possible. Prior to the establishment of this
depét the inconvenience caused to medical units outside
Basra, by the delay in the receipt of supplies, was great.
It is difficult in ordinary circumstances to foresee many
months ahead the exact requirements of a hospital when
little is known of the climatic and other conditions; but
the hospital authorities in Mesopotamia had other diffi-
culties to contend with in this matter. In the first place,
it was impossible for any hospital to foretell the number of
patients which it maight be called upon to accommodate.
A 200-bed hospital might be expanded to 500, or a 600-bed
hospital to 1,000. Further, the hospital stores were
liable to depletion at any moment to supply advanced
medical store depéts and river convoy units, and on
occasions even field ambulances. In the second place,
it was inconvenient that hospitals up-country, some of
which were situated 200 miles up the Tigris, should have
no depét nearer than Bombay upon which to draw for
supplies in an emergency. The inconvenience of this
system was indeed such that the regulations were not
adhered to. On inspection of the advanced medical
depé6t at Basra we found that, in practice, articles were
frequently supplied to the various hospitals there, and
the advanced depdt, which should normally have been
equipped with 36 boxes of particular articles required for
field and regimental medical units, supplied a number of
hospitals with various requirements, thereby undertaking
duties for which it had neither the requisite staff nor equip-
ment. The attention of the Deputy Director, Medical
Services, Mesopotamia, was apparently drawn to this
on the 19th July, 1915, for we find that an application
was made to the Director of Medical Services, India,
for additional personnel for the advanced medical store
depét at Basra, on the ground that the stock of medicines
there must be increased. To this demand the Director,
Medical Services, India, replied that it would be more
satisfactory if frequent and smaller indents for medical
stores were made and that no additional personnel could
be sanctioned until an increase in the stock was found to
be necessary. We draw attention to this correspondence
as it indicates, in our opinion, a failure to realise the danger
and inconvenience of the system then followed. Surgeon-
General Hathaway must have been congizant of the
position of affairs and of the delay and inconvenience that
constantly occurred in procuring medical supplies. He
was also aware, from inspection, of the fact that the
advanced depét was being used in great measure as a
general depot, and that it was undertaking duties for which
it was not equipped. He failed, however, to take the
opportunity of placing the whole question of medical
stores on a sound footing by asking for the establishment
of a general medical store depot at Basra. On the other
hand, it appears to us that when the Director of Medical
Services, India, criticised the accumulation of any reserve
medical stores in Basra, he did not appreciate the import-
ance of having, n Mesopotamia, a large reserve of medical
stores from which urgent requirements could be met in
time of need. It is only fair, however, to say that the facta
were not clearly put to the medical authorities in India,
and that the delays and inconvenience which the system
then in force entailed, were not fully explained. We
cannot but think that if the facts had been properly put,
the necessity for doing what has since been done, namely,
the establishment of a properly equipped depét on the
spot, would at once have been realised. The fact, how-
ever, remains that up to March, 1916, no such depot was
established.

97. Another and possibly a more potent cause of
inconvenience in the case of hospitals outside Basra
was the difficulty of securing prompt delivery of medical
stores up-country. Under present arrangements, when
indents are received by the medical store depdét, the
articles required are packed for delivery witbout delay

(C 48—176)

and are made over to the medical embarkation officer,
whose duty it is to see that they are despatched to their
destination with reasonable expedition. As soon as the
indent is complied with, the consignee is advised by wire
of the fact, and if delivery is delayed he can at once make
inquiries as to the cause, from the authorities at the base.
There are a certain number of steamers and barges which
return up river at frequent intervals when sick and
wounded have been disembarked at the base, and these
afford reasonable facilities for the transport of medical
stores if the embarkation officer is energetic and intelligent.
The consequence is that, as a rule, medical stores are now
delivered promptly. But this was not so under the system
which prevailed before March, 1916. Throughout the
campaign there has been a great shortage of river
steamers and, in consequence, all consignments of articles
by water have frequently been delayed. The first
requirements of an army are food, ammunition, and men
to replace casualties, and when there is a deficiency in
transport, the despatch of all other articles has to be
deferred until these demands have been met. It follows,
necessarily, that in such circumstances the despatch of
medical stores must be a difficult matter and the utmost
vigilance and energy are necessary on the part of the head
of the medical services if his demands are not to be over-
looked and subordinated to the demands of other adminis-
trations. From what we have seen we doubt if the de-
mands of the medical services were pressed with sufficient
energy by Surgeon-General Hathaway, and the omission
up to January, 1916, to appoint a medical embarkation
officer to supervise the despatch of consignments of
medical stores, was a serious oversight. Cases of medical
stores from the advanced depdt, intended for units in the
field, used to be made over to the transport authorities to
be conveyed to the front and there the matter ended.
Similarly cases from Bombay, consigned to the front,
were landed at Basra and presumably made over to the
transport authorities, the duty of forwarding these articles
to their destinations being left to that agency. In such
circumstances, and in the rush to secure space on the
steamers, we fear that medical supplies were often
neglected to meet the more insistent demands of other
administrative services. We freely recognise the efforts
made by particular officers of Surgeon-General Hathaway’s
staff in this matter; but it was clearly impossible for them
to attend to this work in the midst of their multifarious
other duties. In some cases also we fear that the delay in
forwarding consignments was increased by a want of
proper organisation. It is not surprising, therefore, that
many of the medical officers examined by us have com-
plained of the delay that has occurred in the receipt of
medical stores, and we think that much of this inconveni-
ence might have been avoided by the establishment of a
general medical store depét at Basra early in the war,
and by the employment of a medical embarkation officer
to see that the despatch of consignments up-river was not
delayed. It would not, we think, serve any useful
purpose to quote instances of inconvenience caused by
these delays, though it would not be difficult to do so.
It is possible, indeed, that the citation of individual cases
in which the delay was due to lack of organisation, might
give rise to a more unfavourable impression than the
facts warrant. We are content to say that, for the reasons
given above, the supply of medical stores to various units
in Mesopotamia was, up to recently, far from satisfactory.

98. Hospital ships.—Another point to which we draw
attention is the question of suitable transport for the
conveyance of sick and wounded from Basra to India.
When the expeditionary force set out, it was not accom-
panied by any hospital ship or by any special staff for
employment on a transport, in case it should be necessary
to use such a vessel as a hospital. There was a certain
amount of sickness among the troops on the journey,
and the Turks did not surrender possession of the important
city of Basra without a struggle. The consequence was
that in December, 1914, two ordinary transporta had to
be used for the evacuation of the sick and wounded to
India, the necessary staff and equipment for these vessels
being furnished from the limited medical resources of the
expeditionary force. In January, 1915, the hospital ship
‘Madras,’ which was the gift of a private organisation, waa »
sent to Basra, and in July a second hospital steamer was
detailed to assist in the work of evacuating the sick and
wounded. Since then, a numberof other hospital ships have
also been employed for this purpose ; but the accommoda-

150

tion provided has not on all occasions been adequate, for
we find that between December, 1914 and May 15th,
1916, over 9,500 sick and wounded travelled by ordmary
transports to India. We realise that many of these were
probably convalescents who did not need much attention.
It is possible also that on some occasions a full medical
staff was not necessary ; but we cannot think that it was
desirable that so many sick and wounded should have
been sent back in these vessels. We are confirmed in this
view by the evidence recorded at Bombay, which indicates
that on particular occasions the staff detailed for these
vessels was inadequate, and that the patients arrived in
India in a condition which showed that they had not
received proper care and attention. Transports not
fitted up as hospital ships were used for this purpose on
no less than twenty-two occasions, and the depletion of the
medical staff and equipment at Basra, in order to furnish
the personnel and stores for these vessels, has frequently
been, and up to the time of our leaving Mesopotamia still
was, a source of trouble and inconvenience. The employ-
ment of empty transports for conveying convalescents
and light cases to India is, we recognise, probably neces-
sary and open to no objection. In our opinion, however,
no serious cases, demanding much medical care, should be
placed on vessels of this kind, and we think that if the use
of these transports is necessary, the requisite staffs should
be drawn from India. Further, many of the hospital
ships which have been employed on the Bombay to Basra
run, have not been able, at certain seasons, to cross the
bar of the Shatt-el-Arab, with the result that patients
have had to be taken from Basra to the bar in transports
and there transhipped. This transhipment has been the
cause of discomfort and inconvenience. On one occasion,
at least, the journey to the bar was so prolonged and the
equipment of the vessel so inadequate, that the patients
suffered considerably on’the journey from want of proper
food. We are glad, however, to observe that the number
of hospital ships now employed is being increased, and that
all the vessels which it is intended in the future to use as
hospital ships will be able to cross the bar at all seasons.

99. The personnel and equipment providcd on the
hospital ships is ample and the accommodation is excellent.
We have visited a number of these vessels and from our
own observation, and the evidence of experts and others,
we are satisfied that those now in use are admirably fitted
out and that the patients receive the greatest care and
attention. Between January, 1915, and May 15th, 1916,
about 22,500 patients were, according to a statement
furnished to us by the Director, Royal Indian Marine,
evacuated to India in these ships and in the most favour-
able conditions possible. .

100. Water-supply.—We now turn to the question of
water-supply. ‘The water for the troops and hospitals
in Basra is drawn from the river, and the position is
much the same in regard to places up the Tigris, Euphrates
and Karun. It is possible that, at Basra, a better supply
of water could be obtained from the new channel of the
Euphrates which joins the Shatt-el-Arab at Gurmat Ali,
and we understand that a scheme to obtain water from
this source is under consideration by the authorities.
Generally speaking, however, the only source of water-
supply at present is the nearest river, and we are not satis-
fied that systematic and methodical attempts are made to
render this water potable and innocuous before it is used
for drinking purposes. This appears to us a matter of
great importance in view of the prevalence of colitis and
dysentery, and more particularly so owing to the recent
outbread of cholera. We are satisfied that most of the
hospitals take great care to purify any water used, by
sedimenting and then chlorinating or boiling it; but this
is not always the case. The camp at Makina Masus, which
is a very few miles from Basra, and incidentally a large
Indian general hospital located there, are supplicd with
water which is not drawn from the middle of the Shatt-el-
Arab but is taken from a neighbouring creek. We have
the authority of a sanitary specialist for stating that the
whole system of water-supply for this camp is unsafe.
Further, the arrangements for pumping and sedimenting
this water are so inadequate that, on some occasions, the
water from the creek (in itself an unsuitable source of
water-supply) is not purified in any way before it is used.
Similarly, on the river steamers and barges, which are
utilized both for the conveyance of troops and the sick,
the arrangements for the supply of good drinking water

appear to us to be defective. On some of the vessels
there are no water tanks. On some the tanks supplied
are useless, and on many steamers and barges there are
no arrangements for purifying the drinking water that is
used by the troops. It is true that in many vessels the
energy of particular officers has been sufficient to ensure
that reasonable precautions are taken to purify water
used for drinking, but in others this is not the case and
we cannot but think that this is a source of grave danger.

101. At Amara, we were informed that a scheme for
the supply of drinking water was under consideration,
but it has not yet materialised. We believe, however,
that in the hospitals at Amara every possible precaution
is takes to ensure that good drinking water only is
supplied to the patients.

102. Generally speaking, we think that if the authorities
are satisfied that the water in the various rivers in Mesopo-
tamia can be rendered wholesome and potable by any
simple process, systematic steps should be taken for the
supply of water so puritied to all hospitals as well as to
all steamers used for the conveyance of troops, including
sick and wounded. If this water cannot be rendered
wholesome, the expediency of securing a supply of good
water by means of tube wells or some other method
should be considered.

103. Water supply arrangements at the actual front
were also, until recently, far from satisfactory. The
recent outbreak of cholera is attributed by sanitary
experts to the failure to supply the troops with a sufficient
amount of purified drinking water. It is well known that
if the men cannot get an ample supply of good water,
they will drink from any source available. The origin of
the outbreak has been traced to the water of a ditch on a
site previously occupied by Turkish troops among whom
the discase was prevalent. The failure to provide a good
water supply to the trenches was due to shortage of
carts, pumps, tarpaulins and other material for the supply
and storage of water, which could not be sent up to the
front to begin with, owing to lack of river transport.
These defects are now being rectified and the use of
motor lorries has greatly facilitated the supply of purified
drinking water to the troops.

104. Sanitation.—The provision of special sanitary
establishments on a liberal. scale is very necessary in
Mesopotamia and the absence of expert advice on sanitary
questions, and of the necessary executive staff to supervise
the sanitation of the various camps and hospitals, was,
for some time, a source of inconvenience. We understand
that the Assistant Director, Medical Services (for Sanita-
tion) has submitted proposals for the employment of the
necessary establishment, and we trust that these proposals
will receive careful consideration at the hands of the
military authorities. It will, however, be of little use to
appoint administrative sanitary officers unless the
necessary supervising establishment and menial staff is
also largely increased. In this connection, we may
observe that the lack of sweepers for sanitary work, not
only in the different camps but also in the various hospitals
and on river steamers, is a serious matter, particularly,
since the recent outbreak of cholera. Further, in some
cases, men who are not of the proper caste have been sent
out with hospitals and sanitary sections as sweepers ;
in one hospital we were told that out of 39 sweepers,
10 only were men of the class ordinarily employed for
conservancy work. We think that a very large addition
to the staff of sweepers in Mesopotamia is urgently neces-
sary, and that more care should be taken to ensure that
men of the proper caste only are sent for this work. If
the terms now offcred are not sufficiently attractive, the
expediency of employing temporary men on more liberal
terms will have to be considered, as the wages now offered
are barely adequate according to the rates which prevail
in that country.

105. We are glad to say that a serious defect in
some of the hospitals, namely the absence of any suitable
machinery for disinfecting clothing and other articles,
has recently been rectified. A number of Thresh’s
disinfectors are now available in Mesopotamia, and many
of these have been despatched up-river for use in out-
stations. Formerly, for several months, the lack of this
item of equipment was a defect in particular hospitals,
as in its absence it was difficult effectively to get rid of
lice, either from the Turkish prisoners, or from our own

151

troops. There was, in consequence, some danger of an
outbreak of relapsing or other fever of a similar type.
We understand that a proposal to supplement these
Thresh’s disinfectors by high pressure disinfectors, in
places where general hospitals are located, is now being
considered. We ought to add, however, that we have
no evidence that the lack of disinfectors has been the cause
of any serious outbreak of illness

106. Effect of economy on the medical organisation.—We
now propose to refer to the widespread feeling in Mesopo-
tamia that these deficiencies in the medical organisation
are due to the parsimony of the Government of India and
particularly to the action of the Finance Department.
It is only fair to state that no evidence has been adduced
before us of any demand made on the Finance Department,
during the progress of the campaign, having been refused.
The Government of India have also the less interest in
cutting down expenditure, because the cost of the
campaign, minus the normal charges of the troops furnished
from India, is being paid by the Imperial Government.

107. The discussion of this point naturally leads to an
examination of the larger question as to how far the rigid
economy which has been exercised in respect of military
expenditure in India for many years has affected the
medical organisation of the Army in India. Any inquiry
into the general question of military expenditure is
clearly beyond the scope of our terms of reference ; but
the question as to whether, and to what extent this policy
has affected medical arrangements in Mesopotamia is
directly relevant, and there are strong indications of its
prejudicial effect upon this organisation. It has, indeed,
been freely suggested that this spirit of economy has been
so inculcated into the minds of administrative officers,
that economy has come to be regarded by many as the
test of good administration, even at the expense of
efficiency. Such an impression cannot but be destructive
of initiative and of any desire to improve conditions in
time of peace, while in war it is productive of graver
evils. The observations of a senior officer who has given
evidence to the Commission, may be quoted with advan-
tage in this connection, as they crystallize the views of
many others.

This officer writes as follows in an annexure to his
evidence. ‘“‘In my opinion the Indian system is more
to blame for the breakdown of the Mesopotamia medical
arrangements than anything else—a system which allows
officers to think, whether rightly or wrongly—

(a) That there is more merit to be obtained by
keeping quiet and not worrying the higher
authorities than by asking for what is necessary ;

(6) That keeping down expenditure is more meri-
torious than efficiency ;

(d) That even in small matters anything asked for
will be cut down by half. A system of
this nature will possibly be good and economical
in peace time, but is bound to break down in
war.”

There is, in our opinion, much force in this criticism,
and though we do not accept this statement in its entirety,
we are inclined to ascribe much of the delay in applying
for, and the reluctance to insist on the provision of,
separate river hospital steamers, proper ambulance land
transport, electric fans, ice machines and other essential
requirements, to this cause.

108. It might also be argued that the general unpre-
paredness of the medical organisation in India to mect
the requirements of a great campaign overseas, is partly
due to this spirit and to the reluctance of the Government
of India to provide the necessary funds for improving
the medical services. It would, however, be unjust to
ascribe this lack of preparation entirely to these causes,
for it may in great measure be due to the fact that the
Army in India has, in the present war, been employed to
an extent and in a manner not foreseen. Any discussion
of this subject would, however, lead us beyond the scope
of our reference. ‘Whatever may be the cause, the inade-
quacy of the organisation to meet such demands is apparent.
Not only has the supply of personnel and equipment
proved insufficient to maintain medical establishments on
the normal scale, but it may be doubted whother that

(€ 48-176)

scale itself is adequate to meet the requirements of a
force engaged on a campaign against a well-armed enemy
and serving in unhealthy surroundings. The Commission
has, indeed, been led to the conclusion that the present
situation has arisen in great measure because a system,
framed in contemplation of an expedition in a mountainous
country on the frontiers of India, has been applied, without
the necessary modifications, to the very different circum-
stances of an important river campaign overseas. The
methods prescribed for the supply of medical stores, the
absence of any provision for the evacuation of wounded
by river, and the insufficiency of the reserves of medical
and subordinate personnel, may be cited in support of
this contention. If this view is correct, it follows that the
medical organisation of the Army in India will have to be
re-examined and revised at the conclusion of the war.
The personnel of officers, subordinates and menials will
have to be largely increased and the system by which
medical officers nominally in military service are allowed
to remain in civil employment so long that they lose all
touch with military work, will have to be reconsidered.
The substitution of station for regimental hospitals in the
Indian Army, so that patients may become accustomed
in peace time to the non-regimental system of hospital
organisation which obtains in war, is another proposal
which will require examination. It has been suggested
that such a change would have the additional advantage
of improving the technical training of officers of the
Indian Medical Service in military employment, by giving
them more responsibility and wider administrative
experience than is afforded by the charge of a regimental
hospital during the greater part of their careers. The
equipment also of the various units will have to be
improved and added to, and ample reserves of medical
requirements will have to be provided in India, for use
in case of need. It is for various reasons impossible for
us to examine this question in detail, nor would such an
examination be germane to the subject of our inquiry ;
but we are, we think, justified in expressing the view that
in this revision the following important points will have
to be considered, viz. :—

(1) The increase in the number of casualties in modern
warfare as compared with previous experiences
in India ;

(2) The inability of India to furnish or procure, in
an emergency, any great increase either in
medical personnel or equipment without delay ;

(3) The expediency of assimilating the Indian and
British medical organisations. The existing
differences in establishments, equipment and
divisibility of the various medical units, are
productive of administrative inconvenience ;

(4) The probability of Indian troops being employed
in considerable numbers overseas; and

(5) The fact that public opinion now demands a very
much higher standard of efficiency in medical
organisation than formerly.

We do not doubt that in previous campaigns, notably
in the campaign in South Africa and the Indian frontier
expedition of 1908, the wounded suffered much from
defective medical arrangements, and we believe that in
the Soudan expedition no specially equipped hospital
steamers were provided for the evacuation of the wounded
down the Nile. But a very different standard is now
rightly demanded by modern public opinion, and, to be
satisfactory, any revision of the Indian organisation will
have to be thoroughly up to date and complete, and at
the same time sufficiently elastic to allow the fullest
advantage to be taken of new discoveries and advances
in medical science.

109. We are bound to add, however, that no perfection
of organisation would allow of the reproduction, in Meso-
potamia, of the admirable arrangements for the evacuation
of the wounded which now obtain in France. Campaigning
in a civilised country possessing great resources and an
excellent system of railways, canals and roads, cannot
be compared with campaigning in Mesopotamia, where
everything required by the troops has to be imported
either from England or India, and then carried for 250
miles or more, up a tortuous river which for difficulty of
navigation must have few equals. In France there is an
abundance of good buildings which can be used for the
accommodation of the sick and the housing of the troops.
In Mesopotamia, with the exception of the General

152

Hospitals at Basra and Amara, which are partly located
in buildings, both the sick and the troops have as a rule
to be accommodated in tents or mat huts, in a country
where variations of temperature make the climate
extremely trying. We have no desire to minimise the
errors and omissions referred to in this report, but we are
not unmindful of the fact that many of the complaints
made by officers in regard to the hardships of service in
Mesopotamia, are partly due to the unfavourable com-
parisons which they draw between their present surround-
ings and those which they enjoyed in France. They miss
the spells of rest in billets which followed turns of duty in
the trenches, and many find it hard to realise that
conditions of life which are possible in Europe, even in
war time, are not possible for soldiers campaigning in
the East, in circumstances of unusual difficulty.

110. In referring to the defects attributable to a faulty
system, we do not wish to create the impression that these
defects are alone responsible for the breakdown in the
medical arrangements, for there is abundant evidence that
inertia, want of foresight and lack of co-ordination, have
been important factors in the situation. We have already
referred, and shall have occasion to refer again, to the
first two of these factors, but it will be convenient here to
discuss the question of co-ordination. It is laid down in
the Field Service Regulations that the General Staff is
responsible that, with due regard to secrecy, constant and
accurate information as to the situation and probable
requirements of the troops is furnished to the other
branches of the staff in sufficient time to enable these
requirements to be met. We doubt whether sufficient
attention was paid to this rule in certain phases of the
campaign. Complaint was made to Sir John Nixon
that the secretiveness of his General Staff was causing
inconvenience to the administrative services. Conferences
were held at headquarters from time to time, at which
plans were considered. It is stated, however, that
Surgeon-General Hathaway did not attend these confer-
ences, except when the subjects discussed related directly
to the medical administration. He was thus less in
touch with the general situation than other Heads of
Administrative Services, and we think that this had an
unfavourable influence on the working of his branch.

111. There is reason to believe that the lack of co-
ordination arising from the secretiveness referred to, and
other causes, attracted the attention of the authorities
in India, as we find that on December 24th, 1915, the
Chief of the General Staff, India, made special enquiries
of Sir John Nixon as to whether he was satisfied that
his General Staff was in sufficiently close touch with the
Medical Services to ensure that the latter knew when
extra demands were likely to be made on them. Sir
John Nixon replied that he was “ perfectly satisfied.”’
We regret that we cannot endorse this view, as there is
evidence that on this and on other occasions the want
of co-ordination and co-operation between the different
branches of the staff, particularly between the Inspector-
General of Communications and the medical services, was
the source of great inconvenience.

112. Landing at Fao and battle of Sahtl_—Having
discussed these general points, we proceed to examine
the manner in which the deficiencies referred to, and
others of a temporary and local character, have affected
the various stages of the operations, beginning with the
landing at Fao. We think that, in regard to the early
part of the campaign, it will meet all reasonable require-
ments if the operations up to and including the occupation
of Basra are considered together. The casualties at the
landing at Fao and in the two subsequent engagements
were small, and the collection of the wounded presented
no serious difficulty. It was not until the battle of Sahil
that real opposition was encountered. The number of
field ambulances landed was sufficient to deal with the
casualties, which aggregated about 500. The intention
was to remove the wounded as soon as possible to the
river bank and place them on shipboard. During the
progress of the battle, however, a violent sand-storm
occurred which rendered this impossible. The result was
that the bearer sub-divisions of the field ambulances,
having brought their patients to the river bank by evening,
had to improvise such shelter as was possible for them
in date palm groves, and there was some difficulty in
procuring suitable food. Colonel Jennings, I.M.S., who
was in command of a field ambulance and had remained

with the headquarters of his unit, was unable to get to
the river bank that night owing to want of stretchers.
He, therefore, remained out in the open with 30 patients,
making such arrangements as he could for feeding and
sheltering them. The next day all the wounded were
removed to a transport in the river. It must be admitted
that the wounded on this occasion suffered some dis-
comfort, and that it would have been better if tents
and supplies had been forthcoming on the river bank.
We think, however, that the discomfort was not very
serious, being due rather to unavoidable weather con-
ditions than to any defect in the arrangements, and we
consider that in the circumstances the evacuation of
the wounded was satisfactory. It was unfortunate that
Colonel Jennings was left out with his patients, but he
was under the protection of the rear-guard, and we are
informed that search parties were sent out to find him,
though, owing to the violence of the dust-storm, they
failed to do so.

113. The arrangements for receiving the wounded on
shipboard were, however, not satisfactory. The absence
of any properly equipped hospital ship was at once felt,
and transports, which were not suitable, had to be con-
verted into temporary hospital ships. One of these
steamers was the “ Varela,’ another being the “ Erin-
pura.”’ We have evidence that the ‘‘ Varela’’ was in no
way suitable for the accommodation of sick and wounded.
She had animals on board, and was also loaded with
ammunition, which she was discharging from time to
time, while she was being used as a hospital ship. We
cannot, therefore, but regret that a regular hospital ship
was not sent out with the force, or that some more suitable
vessel was not prepared for the reception of the sick and
wounded. There does not appear to us to have been,
at this stage, any real deficiency of medical personnel or
equipment. It has been stated that there was a shortage
of chloroform, but we do not think that this is proved.
It is true that a box which was part of the equipment of
the British General Hospital, supposed to contain a supply
of chloroform, was found to be empty ; but we have clear
evidence that sufficient supplies of this drug were available
from other sources.

114. Immediately after the action it was decided to
send back all serious cases of sick and wounded, of which
the number was now considerable, to India. The trans-
port ‘‘ Erinpura’’ was used for this purpose—a mixed
convoy of 224 British and Indians being despatched in
her to Bombay. We have no reason to think that the
medical staff and equipment for this vessel were actually
insufficient, though they were apparently only just
adequate ; but the inconvenience consequent on the lack
of a proper hospital ship, with separate personnel and
equipment, was apparent. In the first place the medical
staff of the expedition had to be depleted to furnish the
necessary medical personnel for the ship. In the second
place, it is difficult—indeed almost impossible—to treat
a large number of serious cases properly on a transport
which has not the conveniences and appliances of a
regular hospital. Thirdly, the equipment had to be
improvised out of the stores provided for the force. We
do not think that it is safe in such circumstances to
depend entirely on improvised equipment, as many articles
which are necessary may be overlooked.

115. Occupation of Basra.—The medical arrangementa
during the occupation of Basra call for very little remark.
On the arrival of the troops the Sheikh of Mohammersh’s
palace was taken over and prepared as a hospital, and
shortly afterwards the British General Hospital took
possession of it. It is a suitable building for the purpose,
and during this period of the operations the personnel
and equipment were adequate. Some complaints have
been made as to the quantity and quality of the food
supplied to the patients. We admit that there may,
for a short time, have been some discomfort owing to
the inevitable difficulties of establishing a new hospital in
a city which had only just been occupied. We do not
think, however, that there was much ground for com-
plaint, and from what we have seen and heard, we are
of opinion that the officers of the hospital, both then and
throughout the campaign, have spared no effort to secure
the maximum of comfort for the sick and wounded in
their charge. |

116. Occupation of Kurna.—In December, 1914, the
operations were contined to the actions at Muzaibila and

‘

153

the capture of Kurna. In these engagements the wounded
numbered under 200, and the medical arrangements
appear to have been generally adequate, the only serious
defect being the lack of river hospital steamers to which
reference has already been made. Owing to the climatic
conditions during this season of the year, and the short-
ness of the journey, the discomfort thus caused was
nsignificant compared with the sufferings in later stages
of the campaign.

117. The general hospitals at Basra were not over-
crowded from December to March. The personnel and
equipment were ample, and the food supplied, though
not ideal, was the best procurable.

118. Operations round Ahwaz.—The next phase in the
campaign to be considered is the operations up the
Karun river, which began with the despatch in February
of a small column under General Robinson to Ahwaz.
This force, according to the evidence given to us, was
accompanied by the bearer sub-division of a section of
a field ambulance, and one section of a clearing hospital
with four 160-lb. tents. The arrangements for the
collection and evacuation of the wounded in the engage-
ment of March 3rd cannot be said to have been satis-
factory. No field ambulance establishment, as far as
we have been able to ascertain, accompanied the column
from Ahwaz to the battlefield, and the regiments engaged
depended entirely on their own medical officers and
stretcher-bearers. During the retreat, which was of a
somewhat hurried character, a number of the severely
wounded had to be abandoned, and there is little doubt
but that they fell into the hands of hostile Arabs. Some
wagons of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which had
been commandeered, were taken out for the transport
of the wounded back to Ahwaz; but the Persian drivers
fled when the action began, and the carts were by some
mistake driven into a nullah from which the mules could
not be extricated. In consequence these vehicles could
not be used for the purpose for which they had been
taken out. The number of stretchers available was very
limited and many of these were abandoned, so that of
the seriously wounded a few only got back to camp.
Those who reached Ahwaz were treated by the medical
units there, and no complaints as to the arrangements
at this period have been made to us. In the circum-
stances we think that the want of success in evacuating
the wounded was due more to military reasons than to
any defect in the medical arrangements.

119. During the subsequent operations of General Gor-
ringe up the Karun and Kharkeh rivers, and during the
march from Illah to Amara, which have already been
described, the arrangements for the treatment of the
sick and wounded were not, in our opinion, as good as
they might have been. The medical establishment with
the force was two field ambulances plus two sections of
a cavalry field ambulance and part of a clearing hospital.
During the march to Amara one field ambulance and the
clearing hospital remained at Ahwaz, and four sections
of a field ambulance were posted at Illah. One British
and one Indian section of a field ambulance marched
with General Gorringe’s force to Amara. The number of
wounded, either at Illah or elsewhere, was very small,
but there was a good deal of sickness during the operations
and the medical arrangements, though possibly the best
that were feasible, were not satisfactory in some respects.
The field ambulance at Illah was used as a stationary
hospital, and with accommodation for 100 patients had
to treat as many as 250 on one occasion. The hospital
and field ambulance at Ahwaz were also overcrowded.
The field ambulance at Ahwaz, according to the evidence,
had to treat from May 27th up to the first week in August
an average of 375 patients, British and Indian, daily.
Indeed these operations illustrate very clearly the dis-
location in the medical organisation to which we have
already referred in criticising the general arrangements.
The difficulties of the medical services were further
increased, as the personnel was from time to time depleted
by the detailing of officers and men for convoy duty, and
by sickness and other causes. Nor was the accommoda-
tion provided for all the patients suitable. In Ahwaz,
for a part of the time, the patients of the clearing hospital
wore accommodated in dug-outs and in the house of a
local Sheikh, but a number of sick both at Ahwaz and
ut Illah were housed in single fly tents of 160 Ibs. which
are not, and cannot be rendered, suitable for sick persons

in a temperature of 125 degrees. The discomfort of the
patients was increased by a plague of flies, and at Tlah
and at other places by a lack of ice. From time to time
the supply of medical comforts was barely sufficient. In
these circumstances it is not surprising that the sick
suffered considerably, but there is no evidence that the
mortality among them was high or that this discomfort
led to any fatal results.

120. In the march to Amara the amount of land
transport supplied for medical purposes was inadequate.
Up to Bisaitin the wounded of the column, which moved
on one bank of the river, were apparently evacuated to
Ahwaz via Illah in motor cars and transport carts, and
if more motor cars had been available the use of transport
carts would not have been necessary. For the column
on the other side of the river an insufficient number of
riding mules formed the only ambulance transport.
From Bisaitin on to Amara the wounded were carried
forward with the column in transport carts ; the tempera-
ture was very high, and the patients suffered much from
heatstroke. Owing to sickness among the transport
ponies there was occasional difficulty in securing even
transport carts for the sick. Fortunately the force met
with little or no opposition from the Turks on its march,
or the consequences might have been serious.

121. For the evacuation of patients from Ahwaz to
Basra ordinary river steamers were used, and the general
criticism of the use of this form of transport applies to
this period of the campaign, though the patients were
better off than those in the large convoys which came
down the Tigris later. The evacuation from Ahwaz
was, however, sometimes delayed because the medical
staff at Ahwaz and Illah was so small that it was not
always possible to find the necessary personnel for the
steamers as promptly as was desirable.

122. Recently, the force in occupation of Ahwaz has
been very small. There is nothing to lead us to think
that the medical arangements do not work satisfactorily,
though it would be more in accordance with the normal
organisation if a small stationary hospital were located
there. The lack, however, of proper land and water
transport might at any time be a source of trouble.

123. Battle of Shaiba or Barjasiyah.—The medical
arrangements for the battle of Shaiba were generally
satisfactory, though the field units which accompanied
the force must have been pressed very severely, having
regard to the number of casualties. The medical unite
accompanying the force consisted of No. 2 Combined
Field Ambulance, half of No. 3 Combined Field Ambu-
lance, a portion of a Cavalry Field Ambulance, and No. 57
Stationary Hospital. The total number of wounded was
approximately 1,100, but the casualties, though they
occurred mainly in the last day’s fighting, were distri-
buted over several days. For unavoidable reasons the
evacuation of some of the wounded to Basra was delayed,
but according to the evidence before us they were all
properly fed and attended to immediately after the action.
Much of the country between Basra and Shaiba was at
this time under water, and the evacuation was effected
in very unfavourable conditions, as part of the journey
had to be done by land and part by water. For the first
part of the journey stretchers and transport carts were
employed, and although the suffering caused by these
carts must have been considerable, we doubt whether in
the circumstances motor ambulances, or indeed any form
of wheeled ambulance transport, could have been used.
A clearing station was located at the point where the
journey by water began. The wounded were fed and
examined at this station, the wounds of such as required
attention being re-dressed. They were then sent on in
specially prepared bellums to the Zobeir Gate, the boat
cushions being used as mattresses for lying down cases,
No other form of conveyance could have been used,
unless special motor boats of very shallow draught had
been provided. At the Zobeir Gate the wounded were
again fed and tended by the officers of No. 19 Clearing
Hospital. They were then despatched either direct to
the hospitals, or carried in motors and transport carts to
a steamer which conveyed them to the General Hospitals
at Basra. It has been suggested that there was, even
at this stage of the campaign, a breakdown in the mcdical
arrangements, and it has been said in particular that the
Turkish wounded captured in the engagement did not
receive prompt and proper attention. We are not pre-

154

pared to accept either of these contentions as correct,
There was no doubt a shortage of medical personnel and
some delay in treating such a large number of wounded,
but much of the discomfort and suffering was of a kind
that is unavoidable after a severe action. The arrange-
ments made were well-considered and methodical, and
considering the difficulties worked well, every effort
being made to expedite the journey from Shaiba to
Basra and to render the patients as comfortable as
possible. We do not doubt that certain of the Turkish
prisoners arrived at Baera in a bad state, but we cannot
accept the view that this was caused by any neglect on
the part of the British medical officers. We think that
more probably their condition was due to the time which
elapsed between the date on which they were wounded
and the date on which they were captured, and to the
inefficiency and callousness of the Turkish doctors, of
which we have had ample evidence in the course of our
enquiry. The evidence indeed indicates that throughout
the campaign the Turkish wounded have been treated
by our officers with the same consideration as our own.

124. At this period of the campaign the hospitals at
Basra were crowded ; but, as we have already stated in
@ previous part of this report, we are satisfied that the
authorities made every effort, in spite of the large number
of casualties, to treat their patients promptly and effec-
tively. On the whole we think that in very unfavourable
circumstances the medical arrangements during this phase
were satisfactory.

125. Battle of Nasartyeh.—During the operations of
General Gorringe up the Euphrates, the medical arrange-
ments were in our opinion deficient. The medical units
which accompanied the force did not include either
clearing or stationary hospitals, and were insufficient to
deal promptly or satisfactorily with the large numbers of
sick and wounded. In the second place, no river hospital
steamer accompanied the force, with the result that after
the first engagement at Gurma Safha the wounded had
to be accommodated on the ‘“ Mejidieh”’ which was
at that time being used as a gun boat, and was in action
and under shell fire. Less suitable accommodation for
sick and wounded it would be difficult to conceive,
although this was not the first time that this steamer had
served this double purpose. The wounded were shortly
afterwards evacuated in an ordinary river steamer to
Basra. After the action of July 14th the wounded were
collected successfully, though with great difficulty, by
nightfall. They were accommodated in a field ambulance
and were evacuated the next day, in a convoy, in charge
of a medical officer. The evidence as to the number of
patients in this convoy is not very consistent, but we have
definite proof that the available staff could not cope with
the work, that many of the wounds became septic, and
that a certain number of the patients did not receive
sufficient attention. The evidence of the officers at the
base, who received the patients from Nasariyeh, also
supports this statement; indeed it has been freely said
that many of the sick who arrived from these operations
up the Euphrates came to the hospitals in a very bad
state. On July 24th conditions were still worse. The
force by this time had been increased to three brigades
and the whole medical staff, according to the evidence,
was nine field ambulance sections, equipped to deal with
225 cases. During the action, the bearer sub-divisions
of these ambulances were sent out to the front, and at
their headquarters two medical officers only were left,
witk either one or two medical subordinates, to treat all
the sick and wounded, numbering avout 1,000. The
accommodation for the reception of the wounded was
insufficient, and it was not until the 25th that they were
all placed under shelter. There was, for some time, a
lack of food, and it was manifestly impoasible for the avail-
able staff to treat this number ol patients with proper
eare. There is a consensus of evidence that for some
time aftcr this action the wounded underwent consider-
able suffering and discomfort. As soon as the troops
occupied Nasariyeh, the patients were removed there.
Conditions immediately improved, and the arrangements
for the comfort of patients were better organised; but
we feel bound to say that, prior to this the arrangements
were inadequate. We are satisfied that the officers on the
spot did all that was possible to prevent suffering and to
promote the comfort of their patients, but the fact is that
the medica] staff, the accommodation, and the supply of

comforts, were alike insufficient. The wounded in this
action were evacuated to the base in ordinary river
steamers, with improvised medical personnel and equip-
ment. The general objection to this use of these steamers
has already been explained, and the evidence as to the
condition of many of the patients, when they reached
Basra, supports our criticism on the point.

126. There was no serious engagement on the Euphrates
between July and February, and the medical staff at
Nasariyeh, from July, 1915, onward, dealt mainly with
medical cases only. These were accommodated in field
ambulances, and the position here again illustrates the
dislocation, with its corollary of discomfort to the patients,
which the want of a sufficient number of hospitals in
Mesopotamia has entailed. When we visited Nasariyeh
in April, we thought it right to address the Director of
Medical Services, Mesopotamia, on the necessity of sending
a stationary or at least a clearing hospital, to Nasariyeh.
We have been informed that orders for the despatch of a
stationary hospital have been issued, but on the occasion
of our visit the position was this, that if the force there had
been seriously engaged, the field ambulances would have
had not only to deal with the wounded in the field, but
also to provide personnel and equipment for their treat-
ment in hospitals. We do not think that they could have
performed these double duties satisfactorily.

127. Since the Hammar Lake fell last year bellums have
been the only means for evacuating the sick and wounded
from Nasariyeh. As has already been stated, we found
it necessary to write to the medical authorities on this
subject, and we have reason to believe that in future a
river hospital steamer will visit Nasariyeh at regular
intervals. We have already commented on the hardships
caused by the evacuation of the sick and wounded in
country boats. We need only say further, that it is a
matter for regret that it was not found possible to provide
some more suitable craft for this purpose. We are aware
that the difficulty of crossing the Hammar Lake in certain
seasons of the year is very great, but even accepting this,
we do not see why, at least below the Hammar Lake,
some more suitable form of water transport should not
have been provided.

128. Advance on Amara.—During the advance from
Kurna to Amara, the actual arrangements in the field
for the collection of the wounded were highly successful.
The medical units accompanied the force on bellums and
rafts, and as soon as the Turkish positions were captured,
some of these units established themselves on land and,
without delay, treated not only the British, but also the
Turkish wounded. For the collection of the wounded
from the different creeks, large covered-in mahailas of
light draught were specially prepared. The personnel was
sufficient, and the equipment, which ineluded some equip-
ment captured from the enemy, was ample. The
casualties were not numerous and the collection and
treatment of the wounded was effected methodically and
well. For the evacuation of the wounded, a river steamer
was fitted up with improvised beds and a supply of medical
stores and comforts. Though we consider that a properly
equipped hospital steamer was needed on this occasion,
we think that the local arrangements made were the
best feasible. The great want at this time was ice. A
certain quantity was sent up twice a week from Basra to
Kurna, but it was not sufficient for the needs of the sick,
many of whom were suffering from heat stroke.

129. When the force reached Ezra’s Tomb, though the
sick and wounded were at once accommodated in the
coolest place possible, the discomfort and suffering caused
by the want of ice continued and was the more felt owing
to the prevalence of heat stroke, some cases of which
proved fatal. It is, in our opinion, a matter for regret
that steps were not taken to ensure a sufficient supply of
ice being provided for the sick. There was also a deficiency
in supplies of milk, beef essence and other medical comforts.
At Amarah which was reached on June 4th, the condition
of affairs was worse. No clearing hospital accompanied
the force, and the sick had all to be accommodated in
field ambulances which were much overcrowded. Ice
was not procurable until June 21st, and, according to the.
evidence before us, the supply shortly afterwards failed.
There was, if we are to accept the evidence given to us,
a shortage of drugs, including castor oil, Epsom salts,
emetine and quinine, and the supply of medical comforts

155

and of limejuice and fresh vegetables was deficient. It
has, indeed, been suggested that it was only when a
medical officer attached to the force wrote to Simla,
representing the facts, that a supply of medical comforts
was received. Colonel Hehir, I.M.S., Assistant Director,
Medical Services, 6th Division, has not been examined by
us though we have studied his war diaries, and the facts
stated above have been obtained from other sources.
We are satisfied that owing to the heat, the want of ice
and of proper hospital accommodation, medical comforts
and drugs, the sick and wounded suffered considerable
hardships during this part of the campaign.

130. Battle of Es Sinn and capture of Kut-el-Amara.—
The next phase of the operations is that which terminated
with the battle of Es Sinn on September 28th. We
regret that we have to conclude that in this action also the
medical arrangements were not satisfactory. The medical
staff available for the treatment of the sick and wounded
was below the normal scale and consisted of 14 field
ambulance sections as against 20 sections, and 2 sections
of a clearing hospital instead of 4 sections. For the
transport of wounded by land, two motor cars only were
available, and for the great majority, transport carts
had to suffice, causing the usual suffering necessarily
attendant upon their employment. We have it, on
Sir John Nixon’s authority, that the supply of these
carts for ambulance purposes was, owing to bad staff
work, insufficient for some time. There were, as on
previous occasions, no river hospital steamers, and there
is evidence that the patients, who were evacuated by
ordinary river craft, suffered considerable discomfort.
The Turks made a counter-attack on the evening of the
28th, which resulted in the estimated casualties being
largely exceeded. For these reasons the collection and
treatment of the wounded was delayed, and some left
out at night were robbed and wounded by Arabs.
_ The field ambulances were overcrowded—one field ambu-
lance having to deal with at least 500 patients. The
supply of blankets and food in the field ambulances was
short. We may mention that the defects observed on
this occasion, particularly in the collection of the wounded,
were sharply criticised by the Army Commander. It
appears also that the discomfort necessarily attendant
on a journey of some days in a vessel not suited for
hospital work and ill-equipped in the way of personnel,
medical appliances, stores and comforts, was in some
cases accentuated by a delay in starting. One steamer,
the ‘“‘P. 4,” did not apparently leave the front until
October 3rd. Although the hardships endured on this
occasion were no doubt considerable, we do not think
that they were nearly as severe as in later actions.

131. Battle of Ctestphon.—It has been impossible, in
the absence of Colonel Hehir, A.D.M.S., and other officers
of the 6th Division, to obtain anything like complete
evidence as to the arrangements made for the collection
and evacuation of the wounded from the battle of Ctesi-
phon; but we have on record abundant proof that these
arrangements proved defective and were the cause of great
suffering. We are aware that Sir John Nixon, in a
telegram dated December 7th, 1915, stated that the
** medical arrangements, under circumstances of consider-
able difficulty, worked splendidly.”” We regret that we
are unable to concur in the views of that distinguished
officer. It is true that the medical officers on the spot
displayed the greatest resource and energy in the discharge
of their duty, and we have overwhelming evidence of their
onceasing efforts to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded.
We admit also, that the difficulties of evacuating a large
1umber of wounded, after a reverse, followed by a retire-
ment through a country infested with hostile Arabs, who
did not hesitate to attack convoys of sick and wounded,
were very great; but in the face of the evidence on record
of the sufferings of the wounded on this occasion, and of
the breakdown of the medical organisation, we do not
think that it can be said that the medical arrangements
‘‘ worked splendidly.”

132. In the first placc, the evidence proves that the
casualties, were, in fact, heavily under-estimated, that
the medical establishment available on this occasion was
inadequate to meet the demands made on it, and that the
arrangements made for collecting the wounded on the
battlefield, and accommodating them pending evacuation
to the river bank, were far from satisfactory. It was
very difficult for wounded men to ascertain where they had

to go for medical aid, and when field ambulances and
collecting stations were found, the supply of food, tents,
blankets, hot water and any kind of comfort was in-
sufficient. Further, owing to the shortage of medical
personnel, many of the patients both in the field ambu-
lances near the battlefield and at the encampments by
the river bank, did not receive proper treatment. There
was some delay in evacuating the wounded to Laj, where
the steamers to convey them to the base were moored,
and it was not until the 25th that the last of the wounded
were removed to this spot. In the meantime, many
suffered from exposure, want of food and inadequate
attention. On the morning of the 23rd, there was a
violent dust storm which increased their discomfort, and
to make matters worse the largest of the collecting stations,
which was located at a place already referred to and known
as “‘ Vital Point,’ was under heavy shell fire for some time
during a counter attack by the Turks.

133. In the second place, save for two motor ambu-
lances which were employed with great success, no proper
ambulance land transport was provided for the removal
of the wounded to the river bank. There were a number
of steamers at Laj, some 8 or 9 miles from the battlefield,
two only of which, however, had been in any way prepared
for the reception of the sick. Many of the wounded
were, it is true, able to walk or ride to the river bank,

_ but for the conveyance of stretcher cases the two motors

already mentioned, and ordinary transport carts, alone
were available. We have already criticised the use of
these carts for ambulance purposes and we only wish to
add that on this occasion it was productive of intense
pain and suffering. We are aware that it is not possible
to provide proper ambulance transport for all the wounded
on such occasions, but we do feel very strongly that for
all serious stretcher cases, more especially for cases of
fracture, proper land ambulance transport is essential.

134. Thirdly, the lack of properly equipped river
hospital steamers proved, as may be well understood, in
the circumstances, disastrous. In the absence of any
such steamers some attempt was made to equip the
* Blosse Lynch” and the “ Mosul” for the evacuation
of sick and wounded to the base. These two steamers
were, however, only made over to the medical officers at
the last moment on the journey up, when it was impossible
to fit them out properly. They were already partly
filled with 500 sick and wounded who, owing to the
shortage in river transport, had not been evacuated to the
base before the battle, in accordance with normal practice.
The number of wounded at Ctesiphon was 3,852 and the
accommodation, such as it was, which these two steamers
afforded, was insufficient for a fraction of that number.
The result was that as soon as they were filled with patients,
the remainder of the wounded had to be crowded on to
other river steamers which had not been prepared in anv
way for the reception of sick and wounded, and many of
which, indeed, were not fit for passenger traffic according
to ordinary standards. The medical and subordinate
personnel for these steamers, which was taken from field
ambulances, was inadequate for the number of the patients.
The supply of medical] stores and appliances and even of
food was in some cases insufficient. The arrangements
for cooking the food were defective and the personnel to
distribute it was wanting. The arrangements for water
supply were unsatisfactory, the latrine accommodation
was insufficient, and there were not enough sweepers and
bed pans for the necessities of those patients who could
not struggle to the latrines. Finally, the wounded were
huddled together as close as they could be packed on the
decks, without beds or mattresses, and it was almost
impossible for the medical officers to attend to them
properly. In some cases the vessels had, moreover, been
used for the carriage of animals and it was impossible, in
the time available, to clean and disinfect them. As
might be expected, the suffering and discomfort caused
by a long journey in such conditions were, despite the
untiring efforts of the medical officers and others on board,
in many cases great, and we cannot doubt that the recovery
of some patients was retarded by the hardships experienced
and that the chances of complete recovery in others wero
prejudiced. The conditions varied on different steamers,
as some were better equipped than others and carried
fewer patients. On some vessels the proportion of
slightly wounded, who were able to assist their less
fortunate comrades, was larger than in others, and the

156

discomfort resulting from the lack of attendance was lesa
felt. On one steamer, indeed, the arrrangements made
were fairly good, and the number of patients was so small
that there was little ground for complaint. It is right
also to state that on arrival at Kut and again at Amara,
all possible efforts were made to feed, dress and tend
the patients, and that some of them were either landed
en route, or transhipped to other steamers which were
less crowded and better equipped.

Nevertheless, the evidence of the medical officers and
of the wounded who formed part of these convoys, and
of others who saw from time to time what the condition
of affairs was, has satisfied us that on several of these
steamers the patients suffered from cold, hunger, thirst
and want of care. Wounds which required dressing and
re-dressing were not attended to, and the condition of many
of the patients who travelled by these steamers was,
when they reached Basra, deplorable. There the wounds
of many were found to be in a septic condition and in
urgent need of re-dressing. In some cases bed sores had
developed, more than one patient arrived soaked in
feces and urine, and in a few cases wounds were found
to contain maggots. These are the facts upon which,
differing from Sir John Nixon, we find that the medical
arrangements were lamentably defective. While, how-
ever, we think it our duty to criticise these arrangements,
we freely admit that the difficulties of the situation were
such that the evacuation of the wounded at all was a
great achievement, for which the military and medical
authorities in the field deserve very great credit.

135. Operations for the relief of Kut in January.—We
now come to a period when the breakdown in the medical
arrangements of the campaign was more marked than at
any other time. The military situation and the reasons
which, in the opinion of those best qualified to judge,
rendered an immediate advance to the relief of Kut
necessary, have already been explained, and it remains
only to examine the medica] arrangements for these
operations. In January, 1916, when the order to advance
was given the total strength of the expeditionary force
in Mesopotamia, excluding the division besieged in Kut,
was approximately 51,000 men. Throughout the year
various reinforcements had been sent out, and in December
and January two new divisions arrived from France
The medical establishment of the force was, as has already
been shown, insufficient before the arrival of these two
divisions, and this deficiency was accentuated by the
fact that they were despatched from France in advance
of their medica] units. On January 3rd, when the force
marched from Ali-al-Gharbi, no part of the medical
establishments of these divisions was available for service
at the front. It may also be added that when these
units did arrive, their personnel, equipment and transport
were found to have been sent on different ships, and it
was impossible to get them despatched immediately to
the front, as all the river transport was needed for more
urgent purposes. When, therefore, General Aylmer con-
centrated at Ali-al-Gharbi, his only possible course was
to improvise medical units out of the resources available,
and for this purpose all the personnel and equipment
that could be collected was employed. By strenuous
efforts seven field ambulance sections were thus provided
for the 7th Division, upon which the brunt of the fighting
fell. Eight sections were allotted to the corps troops
and two sections of a clearing hospital were placed on
the “ Julnar,” which was to receive the wounded. Many
of these units were, however, deficient in personnel and
equipment, nor was the subordinate establishment com-
posed entirely of properly trained persons. To make up
deficiencies in equipment the hospitals were depleted of
any material they could spare, purchases were made
locally of cloth and muslin for bandages, and we are
informed that sheets and tablecloths were collected to
be used in case of necessity. Orders had been issued by
the Director of Medical Services, Mesopotamia, that a
consignment of medical accessories, then lying at Basrah
and intended for the advanced medical depét at Kut,
should be forwarded to Ali-al-Gharbi for use in case of
need. By a series of unfortunate mistakes this supply
was not sent on by steamer in accordance with the orders
issued, but was despatched by mahaila and arrived too
late for the earlier actions. The omission to forward
this consignment, the lack of which was severely felt,
was the subject of a court of enquiry, and the officers

responsible for the failure to carry out orders were cet-
sured by the Army Commander. With such deficiencies
in medical establishments and equipment, it was not to
be expected that the arrangements for the treatment of
the wounded could be very satisfactory, even in a suc-
cessful engagement with few casualties. The resistance
offered by the Turkish force was, however, more strenuous
and the casualties were far more numerous than had been
anticipated. The medical staff was entirely unable to
cope with the number of patients, and drugs and dressings
ran short. On the 7th, when large numbers of wounded
began to come in, there was not room for all of them
on the ‘‘ Julnar,” or in the few tents which had been
pitched for their reception. In consequence, the great
majority had to lie out all night on the river bank without
shelter, or sufficient clothing, food, or medical attendance.
On the 8th more tents were pitched, mainly by the efforts
of officers who were not responsible for the medical
arrangements, and some organised effort was made to
afford the necessary medical relief. For some time,
however, there was a great want of organisation, the
supply personnel was less than a quarter of its proper
strength, and the unfortunate sick and wounded appear
to have been in great measure dependant on their regi-
ments and on the kindness of officers not attached to
the medical services, both for shelter and food. We have
every reason to know that many of the executive medical
officers on this occasion, as indeed throughout the cam-
paign, worked unremittingly to do what was possible
for the relief of their patients ; but both on the “ Julnar ”’
and on the river bank the latter appear to have suffered
very greatly from want of food, shelter, and medical
treatment. While this result was mainly due to shortage
of staff and equipment, we consider that much of it
might have been avoided if the medical administrative
officers had been more prompt and resourceful in utilising
available material. We refer in particular to conditions
on the left bank of the river. On the right bank, though
the field ambulances were much overcrowded, the organi-
sation was better and more systematic, and every effort
was made to do all that was humanly possible. We are
not satisfied, however, that this was the case on the left
bank. We are aware that there was a shortage of per-
sonnel and equipment; but we do not see why better
accommodation and shelter should not have been pro-
vided for the wounded, and an adequate supply of food
and hot drinks prepared for them. The tents were
available, and food was on the spot. On the 8th addi-
tional tents were pitched by fatigue parties, and food
was supplied to most of the wounded. We think also
that better arrangements should have been made for
feeding and treating the patients on the “Julnar.’”” We
are told by the officer who acted as Assistant Director,
Medical Services, 7th Division, that he estimated the
probable number of casualties in that division at 2,000.
Such being the case it appears to us unfortunate that
tents, blankets, and food were not prepared for this
number. We may add that the arrangements for feeding
the patients, alike in the tents and on the “ Julnar,” were
so unsatisfactory that they were at the time severely,
and we think justly, criticised by a General Officer who
has given evidence before us. We have indeed to con-
clude, on the evidence adduced, that many of the wounded
were indebted to the enterprise of regimental and other
officers not connected with the medical services for any
food or shelter they received.

136. After the occupation of Shaikh Saad on January
9th about 2,000 of the wounded were moved to a new
camp there, the remainder numbering 1,200 being left
in a camp on the left bank of the river at Musandaq in
charge of a small medical staff. The condition of the
camps at Musandaq and Shaikh Saad have been described
to us by various witnesses, and we are constrained to find
that the arrangements for the accommodation and treat-
ment of the wounded there were very defective. The
medical staff was so small that the wounds of many
remained undressed for some days. The camps were in
a very insanitary condition. The supply of surgical
stores and appliances ran short, and there was practically
no subordinate staff to see to the welfare of the patients.
The suffering and discomfort endured by the unfortunate
wounded in these camps were very great, and even up
to January 18th, when the Meerut Stationary Hospital
took over charge at Shaikh Saad, this condition of affairs

continued there. The Officer Commanding this hospital

157

describes the condition of that camp in the following
words :—‘‘ On arrival here we found about 195 British
and 800 Indian sick and wounded in an irregular camp
situated on filthy muddy ground behind the village. . . .
‘There was one Indian temporary I.M.S. officer in charge
of the Indians, and he was ill. He had two sub-assistant
surgeons and some of the personnel of an improvised
eavalry field ambulance to help him. He had no dressings
left, and many cases still had on the first field dressings
which had been applied on the battletield. About 200
of the patients had dysentery, and there were no proper
latrine arrangements. ‘The state of the camp was inde-
scribable. Near the middle of the hospital tents was a
pile of bags of atta, &c., mostly ruined by the rain, which
I was told represented 10 days’ rations.”

137. In the meantime, on the 13th, the camp at
Musandaq was broken up, some of the patients being
evacuated to Basra and others removed to Shaikh Saad.
During this time the only medical stati for this hospital
was 3 medical ofticers for 1,200 patients. For the hos-
pital at Shaikh Saad, where the number of patients
varied from 2,200 on the llth to 1,000 on the 18th,
4 medical ofticers only were detailed. Of these 2 got ill,
and for some time therefore 2 officers only were available
for duty. It must also be remembered that this medical
staff could ill be spared from the very small establishment
of the field ambulances with the force. There was,
besides, a great shortage in subordinates, and of various
kinds of medical and surgical stores and appliances.

138. In the battle of January 13th and 14th the niedical
organisation continued to be equally ansatisfactory. ‘The
weather conditions had by this time become very bad.
On the evening of the 8th it began to rain, and continued
to do so intermittently from that date until the 21st,
when very heavy rain fell for some days. Even at the
time when the battle of Wadi was fought, the difficulty
of moving sick and wounded in the rain and heavy mud
was considerable, and the tield ambulances attached to
the force were still very inadequate. The evidence
indicates, however, that the available medical statf did
all that was possible to collect the wounded as soon as
the action ended, and to give them such shelter as was
available. Many were collected in an enclosure not far
from the Wadi and were there detained for the night.
We do not doubt that everything that was possible was
done to assist them, but the suffering from want of food,
cold, and lack of proper treatment was severe. On the
following day they were evacuated to Shaikh Saad, and
accommodated in the steamers moored there. On the
15th the steamers accompanying the force moved up
to the Wadi, where they remained during the action
of January 2lst and 22nd, the hospital at Shaikh Saad
being left in charge of the Meerut Stationary Hospital.
The medical establishment had by this time been slightly
reinforced, but was still much below normal. The action
took place about 3 miles from the Wadi, and shortly
after it began there was a heavy downpour of rain. This
made the country, which was already diflicult to move in,
almost impassable. The attack on the enemy’s position
was unsuccessful, and the casualties were very heavy.
The weather was extremely cold, and the whole country
was practically a quagmire. Jn such circumstances the
sufferings of the wounded would have been very great
even with the best possible organisation. They were
accentuated by the insufficiency of medical personnel,
equipment and stores, and by the fact that there was
also for some time considerable confusion and want of
organisation. Throughout the day and the following
night wounded and many unwounded men_ struggled
back to the camp as best they could—walking, riding
or carried on stretchers, or in transport carts. The
whole country was a sea of mud, and many fell from
exhaustion on the way. Those who were in the camp,
and unwounded men returning from the battlefield, did
their best to assist their wounded comrades to shelter,
but we cannot doubt that a large number failed to reach
their destination and died from exposure.

Evidence has indeed been given of one case in which
not only a wounded man, but the stretcher-bearers
bringing him in, died from this cause. We think that
the condition of affairs is well illustrated by the following
extract from the evidence of a medical officer who was
present: “I shall never forget that journey. The
wounded and sick were in army «-tisport carts, and my

(C 48—176)

personnel and myself on foot. We started off by crossing
a nullah in which there was 3 feet of water, and then
stumbled across country, sinking every step knee-deep
in mud. We were obliged to take a zigzag course to
enable the carts to avoid ditches and other obstacles.
It was a terrible night, bitterly cold, with a driving
sleet. We were wet through, and had had no food all
day. Iremember I had an attack of ague when I reached
the ship. With great difficulty we got our sick and
wounded up the two slippery steep planks which formed
the only means of getting on the ship. The ship was
overcrowded and understaffed.’”’ To add to the diffi-
culties a number of tents which had been pitched for
the accommodation of the wounded were, by an unfor-
tunate error of judgment, struck, the officer in charge
being under a misapprehension that orders had been
issued for the force to advance. When, therefore, the
wounded reached the camp the only shelter available
was the hospital steamer ‘‘Julnar.” To this steamer,
and to any other steamer they could find, both wounded
and unwounded crowded for shelter and warmth, but
large numbers failed to secure any protection. The tents
that had been struck were repitched, and a certain number
of patients were accommodated in them; but as they
had been pitched after the rain began to fall, and on
ground knee-deep in mud, they were of httie use to
persons wet through and numb with cold. Nor were
those on the steamers in much better case, for many
of these vessels were not weather-proof ; the men crowded
anywhere they could, in gangways, in the stokehold and
in the cabins for warmth; but many were and remained
for some days wet through. The small medical staff on
the spot, and officers and men not connected with the
medical services, did all they could to improve matters,
and to feed and assist the wounded. In spite of all
these efforts the evidence conclusively shows that the
sufferings of the wounded were so grievous that it would
be diflicult to exagyerate them.

139. It is impossible to deal separately with the evacua-
tion of the wounded from these three engagements, for
many individuals wounded in different battles travelled
down the Tigris together. The hardships of the voyage
were much increased during this period by the constant
rain and cold that prevailed. As the steamers were not
weatherproof, the patients were wet through and numb
with cold, and remained in this condition for the whole
journey. The steamers were overcrowded, and _ the
defects in the arrangements, to which we have already
referred, were more pronounced than on any previous
occasion. We cite the following extract from the evidence
of an officer as to his experiences on his way down. It
would be easy to quote evidence of a more sensational
character, but we think that the following is fairly
typical :—

“TI left Shaikh Saad on the morning of January 12th,
on board the “ P. 5,’ with about 300 other wounded.
This boat had arrived at Shaikh Saad the previous day,
and had just discharged the personnel and mules of a
howitzer battery. There were no proper arrangements
for food for the wounded on board, and we had to live
on bully beef, biscuits and jam; tea was also issued, but
there was no bread to be had. We all had to lie on the
deck; blankets were issued out. The medical staff on
board consisted of one doctor and one assistant surgeon
of the Indian Subordinate Medical Department and two
sweepers. On arrival at Amara the assistant surgeon
was taken off this boat for duty on shore. No one was
sent in his place,so from Amara to Basra the one doctor
had to attend to some 300 wounded, the majority being
stretcher cases. It was impossible for the two sweepers
to attend to all the wounded properly, and I know of
many cases of men urinating and defcecating in their
boots. It rained hard the whole of the voyage down
from Shaikh Saad to Basra, and everybody on the boat,
and those on the two barges, were soaked to the skin.
Bread and meat rations were put on board at Amara,
but owing to the want of cooking arrangements we never
received a proper meal.”

140. The conditions were indeed, in many ways, much
worse than after Ctesiphon, and when the steamers
arrived at Amara-the wounded were in a pitiable state,
wet through, dirty, without any dry clothes or covering,
benumbed with cold and very hungry. Their wounds
had not been properly dressed, and in some instances

158

cases of fracture were not even in splints. Many of the
steamers were overcrowded and filthy, not only with
mud and remnants of food, but also with feces and
urine. The condition of things, indeed, was so bad that
it is difficult to describe it.

141. We have now to consider the causes which led to
this very serious breakdown in the medical organisation,
and to state whether the officers on the spot were in any
way to blame for this condition of affairs. In our opinion
the main causes of the breakdown were fourfold :—

(1) The lack of proper hospital river steamers.

(2) The lack of river transport.

(3) The insufficiency of the medical and subordinate
staff and of medical stores and accessories; and

(4) The weather conditions.

We have already discussed the want of provision of
proper hospital steamers and the lack of river transport.
The insufficiency of the medical and subordinate staff
and equipment was, in our opinion, almost entirely due
to the failure on the part of the embarkation authorities
at Marseilles to despatch the medical units of the 3rd
and 7th Divisions simultaneously with the fighting troops
of those divisions. We think it necessary to set out the
facts of this failure in some detail, as we regard it as
one of the main causes of this breakdown.

142. We understand that it is a recognised principle
in embarkation work that units despatched for service
oversea should be embarked in the order in which they
are required to land, and that each unit should be shipped
complete, with its equipment, technical vehicles and
transport. As each brigade has a field ambulance allotted
to it on service, it follows that a field ambulance should
have been despatched from Marseilles with every four
battalions embarked, so as to enable each brigade to take
the field as soon as it landed at Basrah. Instead of adher-
ing to this well-known rule, the embarkation staff at
Marseilles despatched the combatant units of each division
first, keeping back the medical units till the last. Besides
separating brigades from their tield medical units, they
added to the confusion so caused by breaking up the latter
in order to economise shipping. ‘The result of this was
that, when the field ambulances arrived at Basra, it was
found in most cases that their personnel was on one ship,
their equipment on another and their transport in some
cases on a third. To make matters worse, certain of the
transports employed were of too deep draught to cross the
bar at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, thus necessitating
transhipment at Koweit. In consequence of these
unbusinesslike arrangements, the medical units from
France were not only late in arrival at Basra, but had to
be detained there for some days, while their personnel
and equipment was being sorted out and collected. Their
transport had in every case to be sent up later, generally
by march route, as the shortage of shipping precluded its
despatch by river steamer. The length of the march
and the delay caused by floods and other obstacles retarded
progress considerably, so that the animals and vehicles
of most of these field ambulances did not begin to reach
the front until March.

143. We have found it difficult to ascertain why the
- embarkation staff at Marseilles adopted this unusual
procedure, and we realise that there may have been
reasons for their action of which we are not aware; but
so far as they can be gathered, the facts of the case appear
to be as follows. Troop trains in France are of two fixed
types—the ‘“‘type combatant’’ and the ‘“‘type parc.”
The railway transport authorities would not despatch
any “‘type parc”’ trains until all the “ type combatant ”’
trains had started. The “‘type combatant ”’ trains are
unsuited to the conveyance of units such as field ambu-
lances which are equipped with a relatively large amount of
transport. Similarly the ‘‘ type parc ”’ trains are unsuited
to combatant units. The field ambulances were thus
pertorce the last units of the 7th Division to entrain, and
though all the trains arrived at Marseilles from the front
within a period of 26 hours, and a rearrangement at
Marseilles would thus appear to have been feasible, the
order of arrival seems to have governed the order of
embarkation, with the result that the medical units
were the last to be shipped.

144. No objection to this arrangement seems to have
been made by the divisional commander concerned, firstly
because the entrainig arrangements were in the hands

‘and animals.

of the higher authorities, who presumably had full informa-
tion as to the requirements of the situation, and secondly
because the War Office, in a letter dated November Ist.
1915, had stated that the primary destination of both
divisions was Egypt, where they would be reorganised.
prior to despatch to Mesopotamia in vessels which could
cross the Fao bar. This is borne out by the fact that the
transports were only rationed for the voyage to Egypt,
and that a camp was actually prepared at Tel-el-Kebir
for the reception of these Indian divisions.

145. During the embarkation of the 7th Division the
embarkation staff found it necessary to separate units
from their lst line transport and drivers from their horses.
The divisional staff objected to this proceeding, but was
told that the Base Commandant had strict orders to allow
no transport to sail without her full complement of trcops
The splitting up of units was held to be
unavoidable as, owing to differences in sanitary and cock-
ing arrangements, some transports had to be reserved for
British and others for Indian troops. We are informed
that the recommendations of the divisional staff would
have provided for the embarkation, with the headquarters
of each field ambulance, of the whole of its equipment, and
a sufficieutly large portion of personnel to allow of its
being employed as soon as it landed. Owing, however,
to the non-arrival of certain ships, the whole trooping
programme had to be recast, and the piecemeal embarka-
tion of units was insisted on, so as to utilize shipping to the
fullest possible extent. We gather that the confusion
resulting from this arrangement must have been consider-
able, as the wagons and ambulance vehicles of two medical
units were crowded out at the last moment and left on
the quay at Marseilles. Besides breaking up units and
delaying their embarkation, the order of despatch of
medical units was changed so as to conform to shipping
requirements. Thus, instead of giving priority to the
field ambulances which would be required by their brigades
immediately on landing, one of the first medical units
of the 3rd Division to be embarked was the Secunderabad
General Hospital, which could only be used at the bare
or on the lines of communication, and was less pressingly
required than the mobile medical units.

146. The urgency of relieving General Townshend made
it necessary to expedite the despatch of troops to Basra.
and the orders for the disembarkation of the two Indian
divisions in Egypt were accordingly cancelled. With the
exception of two or three units which transhipped and
were accommodated for a few days at Tel-el-Kebir, the
troops proceeded direct to Mesopotamia, no opportunity
being given them to reorganise or collect their scattered
personnel jand equipment. A statement is attached *
giving full particulars as to the dates of despatch and
arrival of each medical unit belonging to these two
divisions. It will be observed that on the date of General
Aylmer’s starting for the relief of Kut, namely, January
4th, not a single complete field ambulance had disembarked
at Basra, though portions of some units had just arrived
there. The embarkation staff made great efforts to
despatch these ambulances up-river as quickly as possible,
for the need of medical reinforcements at the front was
fully appreciated. None of them arrived, however, until
after the battles of Shaikh Saad and the Wadi had been
fought. The late arrival of the medical units of the
3rd and 7th Divisions thus created a temporary but very
serious shortage of medical personnel and equipment
in the Tigris Army Corps, which could not have been
foreseen, either in Mesopotamia or in India. The earlier
arrival of these units would not have removed the hard-
ships caused to the wounded by rain, cold and exposure,
or those arising from the lack of suitable river transport.
It would, however, have secured the presence on the field of
battle of alurge number of fully staffed and well-equipped
medical units, and so would have facilitated the rapid
collection and removal of the wounded, besides providing
the latter with the personnel required to cook and dis-
tribute their food and attend to their bodily wants. We
consider that the breakdown which occurred after the
January battles was largely, though indirectly, due to the
unsatisfactory way in which the medical units of the 3rd
and 7th Divisions were despatched from Marseilles.

147. We may explain that our remarks in regard to
the despatch of medical units, apply also to supply units.

* Annexure III.

159

Instead of despatching the latter with their brigades,
they were kept back in the same way as the field ambu-
lances, with the result that General Aylmer had only nine
supply and transport officers with him when he commenced
his advance, instead of 40 which would have been the
normal complement. The shortage in the subordinate
and follower ranks was equally marked and the complaints
made in regard to the feeding of the sick and wounded after
the January battles, were partly due to this cause. The
issue of rations was often delayed through the inadequacy
of the supply personnel, which could not cope with the
sudden demands created by the influx of hundreds of
wounded. There was no lack of food and comforts on
the steamers which acted as supply columns, but there
was not the staff to provide for their rapid issue and
distribution. This deficiency undoubtedly reacted on the
sick and wounded and accounts to some extent for the
complaints that patients in the ambulances were unable
to get food. The staff of the Tigris Corps had been
hurriedly formed, and the officer in charge of administra-
tion had not had much experience in this important work.
The staff of the 7th Division did not arrive from France
until after the battle of Shaikh Saad. Previous to that
action, it was entirely extemporised. With such defective
machinery, friction and lack of co-ordination were
inevitable, and these, doubtless, tended to increase the
difficulties of the overworked and understaffed medical
services.

148. We believe that no action on the part of the officers
responsible for the medical arrangements of the force could
have prevented, to any great extent, the sufferings endured
by the wounded on January 13th, 14th, 21st and 22nd ;
and the evidence before us abundantly proves that,
generally speaking, the energy, kindness and industry of
the executive medical officers who were directly in charge
of the wounded, were beyond all praise. We do not,
for reasons already stated, consider that the administra-
tive officers of the medical services used available resources
in the best manner possible in the engagement of the
January 7th; but we do not think that they can be held
responsible for the breakdown which occurred after the
later actions. We desire also to place on record our
opinion that the Corps Commander, General Aylmer,
cannot in any way be held responsible for this failure.
Military reasons, and the direct orders of his superior
officer, made it incumbent on him to advance without
delay to the relief of Kut with an improvised staff and a
force not properly organised. His medica] establishments
were about one-third of the authorised scale, and the
shortage in supply and transport establishments was
greater still. ‘These deficiencies he represented from time
to time to the Army Commander, both before his advance
and after the battle of Shaikh Saad, referring at the same
time to the lack of river hospital steamers. In such
circumstances it would, in our opinion be unfair to hold
any man, much less an officer whose solicitude for the
welfare of the soldier is so well known, in any way to
blame for the sufferings which resulted from these
deficiencies.

149. We have stated above, that the conduct of the
executive medical officers, generally speaking, was beyond
all praise; but we must refer to the case of an officer,
whose conduct has been severely criticised by numerous
witnesses. It has been freely stated that after the action
of January 21st, when this officer was in medical charge
of the steamship “ Julnar.”’ then used as a hospital steamer
he was negligent in his duty, that the patients who were
sent to him received insufficient food and no proper
medical treatment, and that they were discharged from
hospital with orders to return to their regiments when
they were yet unfit for duty. These facts were reported
at the time by General Kemball to Sir Fenton Aylmer,
who found, after inquiry, that the charges were not
proved. The evidence that we have recorded, and the
written statements that we have received, do not in our
Opinion support this finding; but in view of the fact that
the decision was arrived at after an inquiry made at the
time, by an officer with first-hand knowledge of the facts,
we do not think that we ought to differ expressly from
it. We may say, however, that this officer was in our
opinion very fortunate in being exonerated from blame.

150. Attack on Es-Sinn.— For various reasons the
medical arrangements for the evacuation of the wounded
at the battle of Es-Sinn were much more successful than

(C;48—176.)

during the operations of January. The weather conditions
were more favourable, the field medical unite attached to
the 3rd and 7th Divisions had arrived at the front, and
the increase in the medical establishments made it possible
to detail a fairly adequate staff of medical officers and
subordinates to each steamer used for the transport of
sick and wounded to the base. The arrangements were
in many respects far from ideal, but we have reason to
believe that the improvement was realised by everyone
and much appreciated. The battle took place on the
right bank of the river and extended to a distance of
16 or 17 miles from Wadi where the force was encamped,
the total number of wounded being approximately, 2,440.
It appears that the original intention was to collect these
wounded in a part of the enemy’s position known as the
Dujailah redoubt. As the attack was not successful,
these plans had to be changed and ultimately the wounded
were collected in a place called the Dujailah depression,
at some distance from the redoubt. Throughout the day
and during the night following the engagement, the
wounded were brought into this collecting post and were
there fed and tended at the field ambulances. On the
following morning they were sent in a convoy to Wadi
camp, a halt being made en rowte for water. The convoy
reached Wadi the same night, and the patients were there
accommodated in field ambulances and clearing hospitals.
There was some delay in crossing to the left bank of the
river by the bridge near the camp, but this delay was,
we think, unavoidable. The evacuation from Wadi
to the base was promptly effected in river steamers, to
each of which a medical staff and a supply of medical stores,
appliances and comforts was allotted. There was no
delay in the evacuation, and the wounded were received
in good condition at Basra. We think that the arrange-
ments on this occasion were as satisfactory as circum-
stances permitted. The main sources of discomfort were
twofold—the use of transport carts for the conveyance
of wounded by land, and the lack of river hospital steamers.
The want of ambulance wagons, tongas, or motor ambu-
lances, was serious, owing to the great distance of the
battlefield from the camp, and the sufferings of the
wounded during this journey of 17 miles gave rise to great
complaints.

151. Subject to these defects, we think that the
arrangements were satisfactory and that great credit is
due to the officers directly responsible for the collection
and evacuation of the wounded. In arriving at this
conclusion we are not unmindful of the criticism of a
witness who has attacked the arrangements made on this
occasion in somewhat severe language. We do not doubt
that discomfort or suffering was undergone by individuals,
and that certain patients received less attention than
others at the collecting station and on arrival at the
camp; but such experiences are unavoidable in the con-
fusion following a battle, particularly when a reverse is
experienced and the casualties are heavy. The great
preponderance of evidence before us is to the effect that
on March 8th there was a great improvement in the
medical organisation, and that on the whole the evacuation
of the wounded was effected expeditiously and methodi-
cally, and we are prepared to accept this as correct. We
believe that this is also in accordance with the opinion of
the Army Commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Peroy
Lake, an officer who has, if we may say so without
impropriety, made every endeavour to secure the ameliora-
tion of the medical arrangements.

152. Operations on the Tigris tn April.—The next
action, that of April 5th, when the Umm-al-Hannah and
Falahiyah positions were attacked, was witnessed by two
of the Commissioners who personally investigated the
working of the arrangements for the collection and
evacuation of the wounded on the battlefield. These
arrangements were carefully thought out and proved
very successful. The number of stretcher bearers was
sufficient, the collecting stations were conveniently
situated, and ample provision was made for the comfort
and medical treatment of the wounded, who were promptly
evacuated to the camp at Wadi by the “ Aerial” motor
boat and in motor cars and ambulance wagons. The
organisation was methodical and worked smoothly, and
the Commission saw nothing to call for unfavourable
criticism in the arrangements made, save that the pro-

~ vision of more motor boats and of additional ambulance

transport would have been a convenience. The Turkish

X 2

160

wounded were treated at the collecting station and
received the same attention as the British. The clearing
hospitals and field ambulances were also visited. It was
found that the latter were really acting as hospitals and
with equipment for 100 patients, were accommodating
300 or even more, in the emergency. As these units are
not equipped for so many patients, or to perform the
duties of clearing hospitals, there was necessarily some
discomfort; but the medical officers present worked
unceasingly to minimise this inconvenience and to make
their patients comfortable.

153. Fighting continued day by day, and on April 7th
and 9th attacks on the Sannaiyat position, on the left
bank of the Tigris, in which heavy casualties were incurred,
were repulsed. Progress continued to be made on the
right bank, but the medical conditions arising from this
continuous fighting call for no special comment save that,
on occasions, the lack of proper ambulance land transport
was noticeable. On April 17th an attack was made on
the Beit Aieesa position, on the right bank of the river.
The fighting was very severe, especially when a heavy
counter attack was made by the Turks. The firing was
then so heavy, that it was very difficult to collect the

wounded. Many lay all day in the Turkish trenches,
into which they had penetrated. The ground behind
these trenches was swept by fire, the Turks were sniping
the stretcher bearers, and after several of the latter had
been hit, all further attempts to move the wounded from
such situations were abandoned till nightfall. The
stretcher bearers had then to wade through a marsh
which was deep in places, but performed the task with
their accustomed devotion. We should like to take this
opportunity of calling attention to the good work done by
stretcher bearers throughout the campaign. The heroic
conduct of the men of the Indian Army Bearer Corps has
won the admiration of the whole force, and seems to
justify their being granted a higher status than that which
they enjoy at present.

154. The arrangements at Wadi were similar to those
which ebtained in the earlier fighting, but the strain
on the establishments was greater as the casualties were
very heavy. Many of the field ambulances, indeed, were
accommodating for days at a time twice and thrice the
number of patients they were equipped to deal with.

155. The arrangements on the steamers, while still
leaving a great deal to be desired, showed a great advance,
the deficiencies apparent in March having to some extent
been made good. There was, however, still much room
for systematic improvement, as is evidenced by the
different conditions obtaining on different boats. Thus
**P. 5,”’ one of the vessels employed, had cots for nearly
all lying down cases, the latrine accommodation was
good, there was no insufficiency of sweepers or bed-pans,
and the supply of food and comforts was satisfactory.
On the other hand, the ‘‘ P. 7” was very crowded and
short of trained personnel and comforts; while the
“* Medjidieh,” in addition to being overcrowded and not
well supplied with comforts, was short of food and
blankets.

156. The ineffectual effort to capture the Sannaiyat
position, which took place on April 22nd, marked the
termination of nearly three weeks’ continuous fighting,
designed to relieve the garrison of Kut. The medical
arrangements for this action were similar to those made
for the preceding engagements of the same month, and
the gradual but steady improvement observed in the
general medical conditions was fully maintained.

157. We think that the administrative and executive
medical officers deserve great credit for the successful
collection and evacuation of the large numbers of wounded
in the almost continuous fighting which took place during
this month. The casualties were very high, the available
resources in the way of accommodation, personnel and
supplies were often far from plentiful, and the difficulty
of securing river steamers was frequently considerable.
In spite of all these obstacles the wounded were, so far
as we have been able to ascertain, treated promptly and
adequately. Every effort was made to reduce discomfort
to a minimum, and the patients were evacuated expe-
ditiously to Amara and Basra and thence to India. The
strain thrown upon the medical authorities will be the
more readily aprreciated when it is realised that in the
month of April alone 5,747 sick and wounded were
evacuated to the hase

158. Supplementary considerations. Hospitals at Basra.
—We have not, in our detailed examination of certain
phases of the campaign, discussed the treatment of the
sick and wounded in the hospitals at Amarah and Basra,
as we think it is more convenient to do so separately.
The hospitals at Basra have, gencrallv speaking, been
well managed throughout. In the early stages of the
war there was undoubtedly some difficulty in securing
suitable food, but we think that complaints in regard
to dieting have been somewhat exaggerated. In April,
May and June there was considerable overcrowding, but
the consequent discomfort was much reduced by the
labour and energy of the staff. In the latter portion of
the campaign conditions improved considerably, and we
have ample testimony of the gratitude of numerous
patients for the care and excellent treatment which they
received in the British General Hospital. The intro-
duction of Sisters of Queen Alexandra’s Nursing Service
into this hospital, as also into some of the hospitals at
Amara, has added greatly to the comfort of the patients.
There are deficiencies in the way of buildings, electric
fans and personnel. These points have already been
referred to, but otherwise we think that there is little
room for unfavourable criticism, and we have every
reason to commend the medical administration of the
British General Hospital. The same observations apply
generally to the Indian General Hospital. We think,
however, that the standard of comfort is not so high in
Indian as in British hospitals, and we consider that
efforts might be made to copy the excellent models
afforded by the Indian war hospitals in Bombay.

159. Hospitals at Amara.—The Amara hospitals have
laboured under great disadvantages. Some of the accom-
modation is unsuitable, the hospitals are not fitted with
electric fans, and they have frequently been overcrowded,
particularly after heavy engagements up the Tigris. The
personnel has from time to time been depleted to meet
urgent demands at the front, and there has been occasional
delay in obtaining supplies, stores and appliances. In
spite of all these difficulties the officers of the hospitals
have done excellent work, for which they deserve great
praise. The administration of the Rawal Pindi Hospital
is specially worthy of commendation.

160. Hospitals at Bomhay.—The accommodation of the
sick and wounded on their arrival in India is so essential
a part of the medical arrangements of the Mesopotamian
force that, though not strictly within our terms of refer-
ence, we think it right to refer shortly to the matter. We
are influenced in doing this by the fact that, at the time
of our appointment, a substantial increase in the British
war hospital accommodation at Bombay was _ plainly
necessary. On April tls there was in Bombay but one
completed hospital of 500 beds for the accommodation
of British troops, and this hospital was poorly found. In
addition to this, provision had been made for 60 officers.
At Deolali, Poona, Karachi and Secunderabad there was
accommodation for 84 more patients, or a total of 644
beds. Other patients were distributed among the station
hospitals throughout India. Owing to the addition of a
British division to the force in Mesopotamia, mostly
composed of young soldiers with no experience of life
in the tropics, these preparations were clearly insufficient,
especially in view of the approaching hot weather. We
are glad to say that this danger was appreciated in time
and on our return to Bombay we were pleased to find
that in that city alone, four large new British war hos-
pitals, accommodating 2,200 patients, had been pro-
vided. Moreover, additional accommodation, to the
extent of 1,222 beds, had been prepared at Deolali,
Secunderabad and Poona, and further provision for
invalids had been made on a large scale throughout
India. In selected hill stations provision for 5,000 con-
valescents was also being arranged.

161. The general standard of equipment at Bombay
has been immensely raised, so that the new war hospitals
there would bear favourable comparison with any similar
hospitals in the United Kingdom. It was indeed a
pleasure to visit such institutions as the ‘ Victoria,”
«© Alexandra” and ‘‘ Freeman Thomas” hospitals. The
latter, which has been the special care of Her Excellency
Lady Willingdon, had been in preparation before the
time under review, but in the case of the other two,
business huildings were converted into splendidly-equipped
hospitals in less than two months.

161

162. We were much impressed by the successful efforts
of Surgeon-General Sir Pardey Lukis, ably seconded in
Bombay by Brigadier-General Knight, in grappling so
promptly and effectively with a dangerous situation. In
the case of the Victoria Hospital this work was much
furthered by the assistance given by Major Hepper, R.E.,
on behalf of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway. The
provision for the Indian wounded calls for less comment.
Nearly 3,000 beds were available in hospitals at Bombay,
Poona, Secunderabad and Karachi on April Ist, and the
number has since been increased by about 300. In
addition there are now over 2,000 beds in special war
hospitals throughout India, while some 400 more are
being got ready. Accommodation for 8,000 Indian con-
valescents is also in course of preparation, and the general
improvement in the situation is manifest. We cannot
refer to this matter of hospitals for Indian troops without
instancing the ‘‘ Lady Hardinge””’ and ‘‘ Marine Lines”
Hospitals, Bombay, as examples of the high standard of
efficiency which can be attained in favourable circum-
stances, when the officers commanding take a keen
interest in their work. The activity of charitable organ-
isations is a great feature in Bombay, and under the
energetic and popular leadership of Their Excellencies
the Governor and Lady Willingdon, an immense amount
has been done for the comfort of our invalids, British
and Indian, by the sympathetic and well directed benevo-
lence of a generous and united community.

163. Gifts and charitable organisations.—A very large
number of comforts and medical accessories of various
kinds have been supplied to the sick and wounded of
the force by various charitable organisations. The
principal of these are the Indian Council of the Order
of St. John, Lady Carmichael’s Bengal Women’s Fund,
the Women’s Branch Bombay Presidency War and Relief
Fund, the Madras War Fund, the Indian Soldiers’ Fund,
and the Joint Committee of the British Red Cross Society
and the Order of St. John; but a great deal of assistance
has also been rendered by a number of smaller charitable
associations. These organisations have done excellent
if independent work, and the medical arrangements in
Mesopotamia have been greatly helped by their assistance,
the money value of which in the aggregate has amounted
to very large figures. Unfortunately, at the beginning of
the war a system, since abolished, was in existence, under
which gifts either in money or kind for the assistance of
the medical organisation of the force had to be offered,
in the first instance, through the Director, Medical Ser-
vices, India. This led to delay and to the further unfor-
tunate result that there was a temptation to use such
gifts in substitution of Government supplies, rather than
in supplementing the latter. The provision of motor
boats is an instance in point. Whenever an offer of a
Red Cross motor boat from a private source was received
by the Director, Medical Services, India, the vessel was
described and tendered to the General Officer Command-
ing, Mesopotamia, but no suggestion was made that
Government was prepared to take any action to supply
these boats. Once it was known that such boats were
required, we should have thought that the number and
types of launches needed would have been ascertained
and the vessels provided by Government. But from
first to last it would appear that not a single Red Cross
motor boat, either of a runabout or ambulance character,
has been provided by the Government of India. The
demand for these boats is still very urgent. Ten have
already been provided by the Joint Committee, and
15 more are being sent out by that body, while the
Indian Council of the Order of St. John has sent out
four such vessels, besides two river boats and two barges.
Without this assistance the medical work on the river
could not, in our opinion, have been carried on satis-
factorily. One of these vessels, the officer of which has
kept a log, had carried over 10,000 patients before the
Commission left Mesopotamia. The neglect to procure
sufficient motor boats is, in our opinion, the more regret-
table in view of the splendid work done by the “ Aerial,”
a motor vessel of unusual type provided and _ personally
worked by a private gentleman, Mr. T.°A. Chalmers of
Jorhat, Assam. Witness after witness has borne testi-
mony to the invaluable work done by this boat in evacuat-
ing wounded from the front to the vessels in the river
acting for the time being as hospital steamers. Mr.
Chalmers, in undertaking this self-imposed duty, was
constantly within the zone of Turkish fire; but the

enemy, recognising the nature of his work, have, as we
are informed, respected the Red Cross under which he
was working and refrained from shelling the vessel. As
another example of the reliance of the authorities upon
charitable effort, we may mention that the wounded
were evacuated to India upon ordinary transports until
the hospital ship ‘‘ Madras’ was provided by the Madras
War Fund of which His Excellency the Governor is
President. At one stage there would seem to have been
a disinclination on the part of Sir John Nixon to accept
help from Great Britain, and little advantage was taken
of offers made by the Indian Soldiers’ Fund, and by the
Joint Committee of the British Red Cross Society and
Order of St. John. The final reply to the offer of assist-
ance by the Indian Soldiers’ Fund when it was at last
accepted under a renewed telegram from the Secretary
of State indicated, among other things, that of bandages
and surgical dressings ‘‘as many as possible’’ would be
useful.

164. In our opinion this failure to utilise the offers of
charitable organisations to the full extent is not a little
to be ascribed to the system, then in vogue, which stipu-
lated that all offers of Red Cross assistance should go
through the office of the Director, Medical Services, India,
and that the gifts should be distributed in consultation
with the military medical authorities, to prevent over-
lapping. It is true that charitable assistance should
mainly be employed in providing the sick and wounded
with extra comforts over and above those considered
necessary by Government, but if it is to be of real help
to the medical services in a crisis, experience has shown
it must also be prepared to meet deficiencies in articles
which are normally supplied by Government. The Red
Cross organisation cannot step in and help in this way
during an emergency unless it has prepared a surplus
over and beyond the official estimates. This preparation
may take the form of accumulated supplies on the spot,
or, if advisable, arrangements for rapid acquisition and
delivery may take the place of actual purchase. Over-
lapping of this character, entered into deliberately and
with discrimination, is a necessary and helpful form of
Red Cross assistance. If the military medical services
were perfect and could foresee every event, Red Cross
organisations would be largely superfluous; it is when
the unexpected happens that the value of a well con-
sidered overlap becomes apparent. For these reasons
we are pleased to find that Government control of volun-
tary effort has now been abandoned.

165. There is another kind of overlap, however, which
consists in the multiplication of charitable organisations
pursuing the same aims. The unregulated overlap pro-
duced in this way is wasteful, and in the Red Cross
assistance which India has so prodigally afforded to the
Mesopotamian force, the disadvantage of unco-ordinated
effort has been at times apparent. We are glad to learn
that this has now been taken in hand, and that under
the Presidency of His Excellency the Viceroy, an Indian
branch of the Joint Committee of the British Red Cross
Society and Order of St. John has been formed with a
view to co-ordinating all Red Cross work in India. The
parent body is possessed of very large funds, and the
extension of its organisation should prove of considerable
value in the future.

166. We cannot leave this subject without referring to
the fine services of the Young Men's Christian Association
in Mesopotamia. While the main work of this organisa-
tion has Jain with the troops, its members have on many
occasions been of great service in distributing comforts
to the sick and wounded and in helping to make the lot
of the convalescent soldier comfortable.

167. Turkish prisoners.—The Turkish wounded and sick
taken prisoner by our forces seem, on the whole, to have
been looked after satisfactorily. Opportunity was taken
of the existence in Basra of the Lansing Mission Hospital,
supported by an American society, to utilise the building
and the services of the missionary in charge, Dr. Bennett,
in order to provide for Turkish sick and wounded prisoners
of war. From the beginning of the campaign this hos-
pital was so utilised, convalescents being sent with the
other prisoners of war to India. The advantages secured
by this arrangement were twofold: in the first place it
relieved the overworked medical establishments of the
force of a duty which would otherwise have fallen on
them ; and, secondly, Dr. Bennett's knowledge of Turkish

162

and Arabic enabled him to do much for his patients which
a doctor ignorant of those languages could not have done.

168. The hospital was at first under the management of
Dr. Bennett, with a sufficient staff, including his wife,
who was also a qualified medical practitioner. Any extra
personnel or surgical and medical equipment required
were provided by the military authorities, who made a
capitation grant to the management of seven annas per
day per prisoner. In addition to this a sum of Rs. 10,000
was allotted to Dr. Bennett for the needs of his patients,
and in consideration of these allowances Dr. Bennett fed
the prisoners until July, 1915. In that month Dr. Bennett
proceeded to India, the hospital was shut, and its patients
were interned in a ward of the Indian General Hospital.
In December, 1915, Dr. Bennett returned, and his return
coinciding with a demand for more space for our own
sick, the Lansing Hospital way reopened. Shortly after
this a new prisoners of war camp was established to
accommodate healthy prisoners pending their evacuation
to India. A hospital hut in this camp was used for
slight cases of illness, the more serious ones being sent
to the Lansing Hospital. In the first week of February,
1916, fever broke out in this camp and in the hospital,
which, first diagnosed as malaria, proved ultimately to
be fever of a malignant character. The commandant of
the camp, Captain Burgess, was taken ill. Captain
Hebbert, I.M.S., specially detailed to be resident in the
camp to investigate the disease, was attacked by it and
subsequently died. Dr. and Mrs. Bennett and some
members of his staff were also taken ill, and Mrs. Bennett
died. At the same time there was severe mortality
among the prisoners. Systematic efforts were made to
eradicate the disease, and the Assistant Director of Medical
Services at the Base was removed to another appoint-
ment.

169. The Lansing Hospital was then taken over by the
military authorities and staffed with a section of an Indian
field ambulance under Lieutenant Stocker, I.M.S., while
the prisoners of war camp was placed under Major Sealey,
I.M.S. The abnormal death rate disappeared, and con-
ditions in both the Lansing Hospital and the prisoners of
war camp improved. To avoid any possible risk of
recrudescence of the disease at the Lansing Hospital,
that building is, for the moment, disused. For a time,
the services of Turkish medical officers taken prisoners
were utilized for the treatment of their own sick, but owing
to their want of efficiency they have been replaced by
Indian Medical Service officers.

170. On the capture of Nasariyeh, the Turkish Military
Hospital was found to contain 125 sick and wounded
Turks. These were looked after by their own medical
officers, who seem to have been jealous of professional
interference on the part of our medical staff. The sick
from the prisoners of war camp at Nasariyeh were sent
to this hospital, but the condition of the patients therein
was not satisfactory, and eventually they were all
evacuated to Basra. The death rate among the Turkish
prisoners, generally, was high, being due no doubt partly
to the inefficiency and neglect of the Turkish doctors,
and partly to their own want of cleanliness. This latter
trait has rendered them a source of danger, not only to
themselves, but to all with whom they have been brought
in contact.

171. Summary.—To sum up the position, we find that
from a very early stage in the campaign, the sick and
wounded have undergone avoidable discomfort and at
times great suffering owing to defective medical arrange-
ments. The main causes of the hardships were :—

(1) The lack of river hospital steamers ;

(2) Insufficiency of the medical personnel ;

(3) The shortage of river transport ;

(4) The omission to provide proper means of cvacuat-
ing the wounded by land; and

(5) In so far as the operations in January are
concerned, the very unfortunate omission on the
part of the embarkation staff at Marseilles to
despatch the medical and supply establishments
of the 3rd and 7th Divisions with the combatant
units.

172. The suffering thus caused, slight during the earlier
actions, and varying as it did on different occasions owing
to differing local conditions. was intensified at Ctesiphon
by the presence of powerful enemy forces, and by the

length and insecurity of the line of communications. In
January, 1916, when it culminated, the hurrying of two
fresh divisions into action before their medical personnel |
or equipment were available, and very unfavourable
weather, greatly aggravated the situation. The state of
affairs after the action of January 21st can indeed only be
described as deplorable. We are satisfied, also, that the
failure in the medical organisation had a material effect
on the moral of the troops. We recognize, however, that
in Mesopotamia, even with the best medical organisation
possible, the sufferings of the wounded, during cold, wet
weather, after an unsuccessful action, must always be

very great.

173. The fundamental defect has been the shortage of
river transport which has reacted on the medical organisa-
tion, both directly and indirectly. Not only has it
prevented a permanent allotment of river steamers to the
medical services for use as hospitals, and frequently
retarded the despatch of medical units and stores to the
front, but it has, on many occasions, forced the military
authorities to curtail the equipment and personnel of
medical units in the ficld to a dangerous extent. Its
indirect effects have been equally important. It has
delayed the completion of hospital buildings and impeded
the provision of comforts for the sick. It has also affected
the health of the troops in that it has, from time to time,
been the cause of incomplete rations being supplied to
them. We believe, also, that if river transport had been
more plentiful, better arrangements would have been made
for supply ing the troops with pure drinking water.

174. There has never been, in our opinion, anything
more than a minor and temporary shortage of any of the
ordinary kinds of medical stores at Basra; but, for various
reasons, the shortage of these stores up country has from
time to time been a cause of trouble, and the more expensive
necessaries for hospitals in the tropics, such as ice machines,
electric plant and electric fans, have been throughout,
and were at the time of our leaving still very deficient.,
Where there has been any deficiency at Basra, this has
been intensified up-river, owing to lack of transport ;
and even when Basra has been tully supplied with some
particular class of stores, this has not always been available
at places on the line of conimunications.

175. The medical personnel and subordinate staff have
always been deficient in numbers, the deficiency in
assistant surgeons and sub-assistant surgeons being very
marked, and it has only been the continuous and untiring
labours of a devoted but overworked staff that has again
and again prevented an absolute breakdown. The position
in this respect both in the higher, in the lower, and in the
menial grades, was still serious when we left Mesopotamia.
As the deficiencies in personnel and river transport have
not yet been made good, and as no adequate medical
transport, either by land or by river, has yet been
provided, it follows that the danger of a repetition of
avoidable suffering is not yet past, though every effort is
being made to improve the situation. Probably only
the completion of the contemplated railway will render
the position quite safe.

176. As to the responsibility for this state of affairs,
we think that it was in great masure due to defects inherent
in the medical organisation of the Army in India. We
also consider that the rigid economy which before the war
was exercised in respect of military expenditure in India,
and the spirit which this policy has engendered as to the
comparative merits of economy and efficiency, have
contributed materially to the breakdown. But though
much may be attributed to the system and the spirit
which it has fostered, we feel that a grave responsibility
for that part of the suffering which resulted from avoidable
circumstances rests with the Senior Medical Officer of the
Force, Surgeon-Gieneral H. G. Hathaway, and with
(General Sir John Nixon, the General Officer Commanding
the Force, from April 9th, 1915, to January 19th, 1916.
General Hathaway did not represent with sufficient
promptitude and force the needs of the services for which
he was responsible, and in particular failed to urge the
necessity for adequate and suitable transport for the sick
and wounded with that insistency which the situation
demanded. General Nixon did not, in our opinion,
appreciate the conditions which would necessarily arise if
provision for the sick and wounded of his force were not
made on a more liberal scale.

163

177. The evidence also indicates that on various
occasions the medical arrangements might have been
improved by better organisation and co ordination between
the ditferent services, and for this defect the local officers
are responsible. We cannot, however, absolve the
military and medical authorities in India from responsi-
bility for many of these deficiencies, in particular for the
continuing neglect to supply the expeditionary force with
that separate transport for sick and wounded, both by
land and water, which the teaching of experience has
shown to be essential in a properly organised enterprise
of this character. We include the military authorities
in India in this criticism, because the medical services are
part of the military organisation. The officer directly
responsible is, however, the Director of Medical Services,
India. This appointment was held at the beginning of
the war by Surgeon-General W. Babtie, who left India
on June 6th, 1915. He was succeeded by Surgeon-
General J. G. McNeece on July 8th, 1915, and the latter
proceeded on sick leave on April 15th, 1916. We are
informed that Surgeon-General McNeece was appointed
by the Secretary of State without any reference to the
military authorities in India. The responsibility for the
want of river transport, on the other hand, is a matter
which concerns the military authorities directly.

178. We realise the serious character of such findings,
but in view of the fact that we are definitely required to
assign the responsibility for the breakdown it is obviously
our duty to do so to the best of our ability. We think,
however, that the authorities referred to have been much
hampered by changes in policy, and by lack of timely
information as to the ultimate objective of the expedition.
In criticising the action of the authorities in India, we think,
further, that full consideration should be given to the
unprecedented strain which has recently been put on all
their available resources. Not only has it been necessary
to supply the demands of at least four Expeditionary
Forces overseas, and to make preparations for frontier and
internal requirements on a large scale, but arrangements
have also had to be made for the reception and treatment
in India of invalids from France, Gallipoli, Egypt, and
East Africa. Moreover, the assistance in the matter of
personnel, equipment and stores which, in less abnormal
times, might have been expected from outside India,
has, until recently, seldom been available. We have,
generally speaking, nothing but praise for the work of the
executive medical officers in Mesopotamia, and we have
abundant evidence that they have done marvellously well
with little material. On the other hand, we consider that
some of the administrative medical officers, though always
anxious to do what was right, were at times wanting in
foresight as to the probable needs of the force, less insistent
than they should have been in pressing their demands for
essential requirements, and on one or two occasions
lacking in energy and power of resource in the measures
taken for the accommodation and comfort of the sick and
wounded.

179. We desire to express our grateful thanks to many
officers who have assisted us in our inquiries. Where so
many have helped, it is difficult to select particular
persons; but we do not think that we ought to omit the
names of Lieutenant-General Sir Percy Lake, Major-
General Money, General Staff, Major-General Cowper,
D.A. and Q.M.G., Colonel Irvine, D.D.M.S., Captain
Hamilton, D.A.D.M.S., Colonel Winter, A.Q.M.G., Major
W. N. Campbell, D.A.A.G., Captain Macrae, D.A.Q.M.G.,
and Captain T. Murphy, the officer in charge of the medical
statistical branch of the Adjutant General’s office at the
Base. We have also to acknowledge the great assistance
given us by all branches at Army Headquarters, India.
We think it right to say that much of the evidence that
has been given to the Commission has been marked
confidential and we believe that many of the witnesses
have given evidence under the impression that their
statements would not be published. In these circum-
stances, we think that it would be a breach of confidence
if the evidence contained in the appendix to this report
were made public.

180. In conclusion we desire to say that we have,
throughout our inquiry, been pressed by the consideration
that time was of the essence of the matter, that substance
was more important than torm, and that it was expedient
that we should formulate our conclusions as early as
possible. In these circumstances, we have not thought

it desirable to keep back the report to remove defects in
form which, if time had been available, might have been
remedied by more careful revision.

We have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient Servants,
W. H. VINCENT.
A. H. BINGLEY.
k. A. RIDSDALE.

ADDENDUM.

On wy arrival at Bombay on April 4th, I was asked to
join this Commission by His Excellency Lord Hardinge,
who was leaving India that day. I consented and left for
Basra on April 9th, where, on arrival, I at once got in touch
with my colleagues. I found that they had been in Meso-
potamia for a month, and that acting upon an earlier and
restricted reference thay had already examined over 130
witnesses, and travelled by river to the firing line and back
again in order to acquaint themselves at first hand with
the medical conditions.

After discussion with them, since the value of the report
must be diminished by every day’s delay in its issue, we
agreed to consider the work continuous, I joining in the
inquiry at the point at which they were, and reading up at
my leisure, and investigating when necessary, the evidence
which they had already accumulated.

It follows from this that the great bulk of the very heavy
work of detail involved in this investigation, and apparent
in the appendix, has been the labour of my colleagues.

E. A. RIDSDALE.

ANNEXURE 1.
(Referred to on page 1.)
No. H.-2418, dated Delhi, March 31st, 1916.

From—MaJor-GENERAL B. Houtoway, C.I.E., Secretary
to the Government of India, Army Department.

To—The Hon. Str WILLIAM VINCENT, Knt., I.C.S.

With reference to the correspondence ending with my
telegram No. H.-2407, dated March 30th, 1916, I am to
say that it has been decided that the commission to which
you have been appointed will assemble under the orders
of the Government of India.

2. I am directed therefore to forward revised orders
and terms of reference for the commission appointed
for the purpose of investigating and reporting upon the
arrangements for dealing with the wounded and sick in
Mesopotamia in substitution of the orders and terms of
reference sent to you under letter No. 41551, dated
March 2nd, 1916, from the Chief of the General Staff.

Copy of the foregoing is forwarded to :—
Lieut.-General Sir Percy Lake, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

Major-General A. H. Bingley, C.B., C.I.E.
Mr. E. A. Ridsdale.

ORDERS FOR THE HON. SIR WILLIAM VINCENT,
Knr., LC.S., MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. BINGLEY,
C.B., C.I.E., anp Mr. BE. A. RIDSDALE.

1. The Government of India have appointed you
Commissioners for the purpose of investigating and
reporting upon the arrangements for dealing with the
wounded and sick in Mcsopotamia, in accordance with
the terms of reference attached.

2. You will proceed to Basra, where you will report
to the General Officer Commanding, Force ‘ D,”’ who
will give you every facility in the execution of your
duties.

3. Copies of all war diaries, reports, despatches, books
and maps, and other information that you may require,
will be provided both by Army Headquarters and General
Officer Commanding, Force “ D.”

4. You are entitled to call and examine any witness
whose evidence you consider necessary.

5. All communications, including your report, will be
addressed to the Secretary to the Government of India,
Army Department, Simla.

B. HOLLOWAY, Major-General,
Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department.

DELHI.

164

Terms of Reference.

1. The commission is appointed with the object of
enquiring into and recording the arrangements made
for the collection, treatment and removal of the sick and
wounded during the operations in Mesopotamia to the
date of your departure from Mesopotamia.

2. The strategical situation in Mesopotamia during the
above period, and the tactical obligations arising there-
from, will be borne in mind throughout your proceedings.

3. You will distinguish clearly between the following
phases :—

(i) From the battlefields to the line of communica-
tion.

(ii) Down the line of communication to Basra.

(iii) At Basra.

(iv) From Basra overseas.

4. In each phase the forecast of the preparations con-
sidered necessary ; the preparations actually made; and
the equipment, vehicles, stores and personnel actually
available at the localities, and on the vessel, during the
operations, will be investigated.

5. The amount of river transport allotted for the medical
services will be examined with regard to the total amount

available, and the paramount military requirements for
transportation of troops, supplies and ammunition.

6. You will ascertain and record the relative order of
arrival of the combatant and medical units coming with
reinforcements from overseas, in order to fix the respon-
sibility for any deficiencies in personnel, equipment and
stores which could be attributed to the order of embarka-
tion for Mesopotamia.

7. Having reviewed the foregoing considerations, your
opinion is required on the following points :—

(i) As to whether the wounded and sick underwent
any avoidable suffering and hardships during
any of the phases defined in paragraph 3 above.
If so, you will state the phase, and will ascertain
and assign the responsibility, showing whether
individuals or the system were to blame.

(ii) As to whether any avoidable shortage in the
personnel, equipment, vehicles and stores occurred
during any of the four phases defined in para-
graph 3 above. If so, you will state the phase,
the shortage, and the reasons for it, ascertaining
and assigning the responsibility as in (i).

(iii) As to whether any shortages which may have
existed have now been made good.

ANNEXURE I

Oi/ fields

| =
Mazaibila e : ==
—— s
Zz Aurnahs e
BY KO CUPH

Khamisiyah

an) eee, SO ey ees -

Nakhsilsh* prep
Biryasiyah*
LOWER MESOPOTAMIA
Sketch Map showing position of places
referred to in the Report

Scale 1 inch=40 miles

Miles 50 40 30 20 10 O 50 ‘eg Miles.

&. 0.0. Mo. 1540 July, 1976. | Se ah oe GENERAL STAFF INDIA.

fiawoc Gir & «0 -#08)

ent has been compiled from several sources

ked with the war diaries of medical units.
urnished by vartous authorities vary somewhat,
cies are all of a trifling character and ave due
pase to differences between the date of arrival
ictual landing.

Unib.

eta gg 8

24 29 3

sreiseristes ay
2 ath =e Ht noone

Sikhs a ana
Boe.| $53’ "Sikhs s ase
56" Rifles fs
Soman ca
Headquarters ¥- ay

biogas a am
#* Dogras ans cen aioe ae

Noli3 LFA.
Noli CCH
oem
Sacenenen ‘ite

OTHER MEDICAL ibn
Rawal Pindi BGHG-
Rawal Pind 8.6. Hk

sce PERCE
No 10 1LG.H. oo See 5e un
No 12 LG. H BHU SPeRE RSS Sa:saae oe

SaaBeeee

No6l Sra XK Hee
SGsKCRSRIGGeneGRae 4

No 83 Sra.H.
No 3 SAn. SEC. coe

N°4 SaANnSEo. EHH Stee roo
450 Medical a susbescueteceieadics ange
; ee We so ee

: 8. 0.0 No. 1689 July, 1918.
}
:

her
x-
id
or
(10,000.6}17. 48-208 )
— _-——— Sa ie RN eS

Bicit ABR Google

a
i |
a Ee tel AT

165

APPENDIX II.

MEMORANDUM ON THE REPORT OF THE ‘“ VINCENT-BINGLEY ’’
COMMISSION.

By General SIR BEAUCHAMP DUFF, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., C.LE.

Origin and Object of Commission.—Late in 1915 rumours
became current in England and India that the medical
arrangements in Mesopotamia were unsatisfactory, par-
ticularly in regard to the reception, treatment, and
evacuation of the wounded.

Early in January, 1916, arrangements were in train
for the appointment of a Commission to investigate the
question, but circumstances beyond my control caused
delay. Eventually, however, on March 2nd, I appointed
the Commission, whose report has now been received, and
gave them the following terms of reference ;_ viz :—

(i) The object of the Commission is to investigate
and record the arrangements made for the collee-
tion, treatment and removal of the wounded and
sick during the operations on the Tigris during
and subsequent to January, 1916.

(ii) Throughout your proceedings the strategical
situation in Mesopotamia during the month of
January, 1916, and the tactical obligations
arising therefrom will be borne in mind.

(iii) You will distinguish clearly between the following
phases :—

(a) From the battlefield to the line of communica-
tion.

(6) Down the line of communication to Basra.

(d) From Basra overseas.

(iv) In cach phase the forecast of the preparations
considered necessary, the preparations actually
made, and the equipment, vehicles, stores and
personnel actually available at the localities, and
on the vessels, during the operations, will be
investigated.

(v) The amount of river transport allotted for

Medical services will be examined with regard

to the total amount available and the para-

mount military requirements for transportation
of troops, supplies and ammunition.

You will ascertain and record the relative order

of arrival of the combatant and medical units

coming with reinforcements from overs*a, in
order to fix the responsibility for any deficiencies
in personnel, equipment, and stores, which could
be attributed to the order of embarkation for

Mesopotamia.

(vii) Having reviewed the foregoing considerations,
your opinion is required on the following points :—

(vi)

(a) As to whether the wounded and sick underwent

any avoidable suffering and hardships during

any of the phases detined in paragraph (iii)
above. If so, you will state the phase.

(6) As to whether any avoidable shortage in the
personnel, equipment, vehicles and_ stores
occurred during any of the four phases detined
in paragraph (iii) above. If so, you will
state the phase, the shortage, and the reasons
for it.

I empowered them to suggest extension of these terms
if they thought necessary, and they were to report to the

(C 48-176)

Chief of the Gencral Staff, for my information as Com-
mander-in-Chief.

2. Under orders of His Excellency the Viceroy, Mr.
Ridsdale Joined the Commission at Basra about April
16th, and on March 29th the terms of reference, which
had already been slightly expanded at the request of the
Commission, were further extended by the Secretary of
State to their final form; wz. :—

Terms of Reference.

(1). The Commission is appointed with the object of
inquiring into and recording the arrangements made for
the collection, treatment, and removal of the sick and
wounded during the operations in Mesopotamia to the
date of your departure from Mesopotamia.

(2) The strategical situation in Mesopotamia during the
above period and the tactical obligations arising therefrom
will be borne in mind throughout your proceedings.

(3) You will distinguish clearly between the following
phases :—

(i) From the battlefields to the line of communica.
tion ;

(ii) Down the line of communication to Basra ;

(iii) At Basra ;

(iv) From Basra overseas.

(4) In each phase, the forecast of the preparations
considered necessary, the preparations actually made, and
the equipment, vehicles, stores and personnel actually
available at the localities, and on the vessels, during the
operations, will be investigated.

(5) The amount of river transport allotted for the medi-
cal services will be examined with regard to the total
amount available and the paramount military require-
ments for transportation of troops, supplies and ammu-
nition.

(6) You will ascertain and record the relative order of
arrival of the combatant and medical units coming with
reinforcements from overseas, in order to fix the responsi-
bility for any deficiencies in personnel, equipment, and
stores which could be attributed to the order of embarka-
tion for Mesopotamia.

(7). Having reviewed the foregoing considerations, your
opinion is required on the following points :—

(i) As to whether the wounded and sick under-
went any avoidable suffering and hardships
during any of the phases defined in paragraph
(3) above. If so, you will state the phase and will
ascertain and assign the responsibility, showing
whether individuals or the system were to blame.

(ii) As to whether any avoidable shortage in the
personnel, equipment, vehicles and stores occurred
during any of the four phases defined in para-
graph (3) above. If so, you will state the phase,
the shortage, and the reasons for it, ascertaining
and assigning the responsibility as in (i).

(iii) As to whether any shortages which may have
existed have now been made good.

At the same time the Commissioners were, under my
direction, ordered to render their m port to the Secretary,

166

Army Department, instead of the Chief of the General
Staff, so as to enable me to deal with their report in my
capacity as Army Member.

Throughout, and in their final form, the object of the
terms of reference was to assist me in determining where
there had been failure, what were the causes, and who was
to blame, in India or in Mesopotamia.

I have never read, nor do I now read, the Secretary of
State’s instructions and additions as in any way altering
the above original objects of the Commission.

3. The Commission have not followed the headings of
the terms of reference in their report, though they state
that the extension of these terms placed them at a great
disadvantage in their inquiries.

However that may be, the result is unfortunate, since
the Commission have departed from their terms of refer-
ence and embarked upon criticisms of the preparations
for the campaign which were outside their purview, which
they had neither the time, knowledge, nor the qualifica-
tions to discuss, and concerning which they did not even
take the obvious and only just course of examining the
Heads of Branches at Army Headquarters, nor of discus-
sing with me, prior to the submission of their report, the
difficulties they had experienced in adherence to their
terms of reference.

In fact, the Commission have ended by reporting on
the past and present action of the Government of India
instead of carrying out their instructions to report to the
Secretary, Army Department, for the information of
myself, how certain definite arrangements had been carried
out.

4. The issues they raise require reply, but up to the
17th July the appendices containing the evidence are not
ready for examination, so that I cannot now deal with their
value; nor does the report itself contain any explanation
of their methods of receiving and appraising the evidence
taken, except the general statement that the Commis-
sioners regard the evidence given to them as confidential,
which in itself is an unusual condition to make when
assigning responsibility to officers by name for failure in
their professional duties.

5. Until, therefore, there has been time to examine the
evidence, I am not in a position to determine where the
responsibility for any administrative failure lies, in Mesopo-
tamia or in India.

I need not, however, wait for the evidence in order to
review the policy which directed the campaign, so far as
it is known in India, and which would determine the
standard and pace of preparation of the force and conse-
quently the forecasts to be made.

It is especially desirable to do this at once as relevant
to those issues raised in the report which are outside the
terms of reference, and which might be held to reflect
upon my performance of my duties as Commander-in-
Chief in India.

In this respect I have a two-fold outlook :—

(i) As director of my staff.
(ii) As supervisor of their work.

Later, when in possession of the evidence, it will be for
me to investigate the execution of my orders by the
Quartermaster-General’s Branch, the Royal Indian Marine,
and the Medical Services, which are the three Branches
of the Army Department concerned in the matter both
in Mesopotamia and in India.

6. In paragraph 55 of their report the Commission admit
they do not know what the intentions of His Majesty’s
Government were in regard to this campaign. They had
the fullest opportunity of ascertaining them, but did not
attempt to do so. Without such knowledge all accusa-
tions of want of foresight are really worthless. I must
examine this point. I would preface my remarks by
saying (a) that before this war His Majesty’s Government
required India to be ready merely for a hill campaign
against a semi-civilised enemy and for that alone, and
(6) that in the present struggle the general policy of the
Empire required that all our energies,commercial, financial,
manufacturing, and military, be directed towards the
strengthening of our position in Europe and the North
Sea. It follows that all expenditure, all utilisation of
manufacturing resources, and all interference with trade
and commerce not directly required by this object should
be reduced to the lowest possible limits, and that the
equipment of forces not employed in the main theatre

should be limited to a basis calculated to enable them to
carry out the settled policy of Government; and that it
would have been a waste of power to prepare upon a
speculative scale.

Everything in Mesopotamia, including medical arrange-
ments, depended on the supply of river transport, and the
supply of this depended on foreknowledge of the policy
of His Majesty’s Government, both as to the geographical
points to be aimed at and the number of troops to be
employed. This involves an examination of the history
of the campaign.

In paragraph 5 of their report the Commission divide
the campaign in Mesopotamia into four phases, viz. :-—

(i) The landing at Fao, the occupation of Basra
and Kurna and the defeat at Shaiba or Bar-
jasiyah of the Turkish attempt to recapture
Basra.

(ii) The expulsion of the Turks from Persian Arabistan
followed by the occupation of Amara on the
Tigris, and of Nasariyeh on the Euphrates.

[For convenience, the later operations near
Nasariyeh have been included in this phase. ]

(iii) The capture of Kut-al-Amara, advance to Ctesi-
phon and subsequent retreat to Kut.

(iv) The defence of Kut-al-Amara and the unsuccess-
ful attempts to relieve it.

I shall now state the policy in each phase as known at
the time in India, and shall then explain the preparations
made in order to keep pace with this policy. Having
done this, those paragraphs of the Commission’s report
which express their views as to essential preparation for
the campaign will be compared with the facts.

It should be noted that, so far as pre-war consideration
of what might be necessary in any theatre of operations
north of Basra was concerned, this area was reserved for
the General Staff at the War Office, and India was not
allowed to collect intelligence or formulate plans thereon.
I received no plans of operation from the General Staff,

War Office.

7. Phase I.—The landing at Fao, the occupation of Basra
and Kurna and the defeat at Shaiba or Barjasiyah of the
Turkish attempt to recapture Basra.

The original policy of Government, as known to the
Government of India, did not contemplate an advance
into Mesopotamia beyond the vicinity of Basra.

On the 26th September, 1914, India was informed that
the situation as regards Turkey was most menacing and
was ordered to hold in readiness one brigade of the 6th
Division with two mountain batteries and sappers to
move to the head of the Persian Gulf

On the 2nd October secret orders to despatch this ions
were received, their ostensible destination being Egypt,
and the transport and troops having sealed orders which
were not opened until at sea.

On the 5th October, 1914, India was informed that the
object of the expedition was to occupy Abadan and protect
the oil tanks and pipe line.

On the lst November the Secretary of State for Indis
directed orders to be given for the force to attack Fao
and clear the Turks out of the Shatt-al-Arab, if possible
as far as Shamshumiya.

A second brigade of the 6th Division which had been
prepared and despatched under orders from His Majesty’s
Government, reinforced the advanced portion and occupied
Basra on November 22nd.

On the 23rd November, 1914, the Chief Political Officer
at Basra, in a private telegram, urged an advance on
Baghdad. This, however, was not supported in India.

On the 27th November the Secretary of State wired that
His Majesty’s Government were “ not disposed to authorise
an advance on Baghdad at present,” but authorised an
advance on Kurna.

On the 9th December, 1914, Kurna was occupied.

On the 14th December, 1914, the Secretary of State for
India proposed the occupation of Nasariyeh.

On the 2nd January, 1915, India wired home stating
military reasons against the movement to Nasariyeh; and
on the 5th January, 1915, the Secretary of State agreed to
await developments.

On the 29th January, 1915, the Secretary of State urged
the sending of troops up the Karun at once for the protec-

167

tion of the oil-fields, and at the same time suggested the
reinforcement of the force to a strength of two divisions.

On the 30th January India pointed out that the Karun
and the oil-fields were a secondary objective only, and
realising how greatly their responsibilities in Mesopo-
tamia were growing, asked for the return of one of their
divisions from Egypt. Meanwhile a small force was sent
up the Karun.

On the 5th February, 1915, the Secretary of State told
India that the War Office could give no help, but impressed
on us the view that it was most important to bring the
force in Mesopotamia up to two divisions.

India did not consider herself strong enough to do this
without help from elsewhere but on the 5th March received
direct orders to do so, it being definitely stated that the
Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief were relieved of all
responsibility of possible consequences in India itself;
consequently the 12th Division was hurriedly formed and
despatched. This division was intended merely to
strengthen the local defensive

On the 9th April, 1915, Sir J. Nixon assumed the com-
mand of Indian Expeditionary Force “‘ D.”

Our policy, then, up to the middle of April did not con-
template an advance up either the Tigris or the Euphrates
beyond Kurna, and aimed only at the defence of the
vicinity of Basra and of the oil-fields. The action at
Shaiba and the occupation of Ahwaz were purely defensive
measures due to the enemy’s advance on Basra and his
activity in the direction of the oil-fields area.

The Commission in referring to arrangements made in
this phase give the impression (vide paragraphs 8 and 55)
that offensive action was intended in the earlier stages of
the campaign, that is, up to the end of this phase.

As shown above, such operations were not contemplated.
Nevertheless, in view of possibilities, on December 30th,
1914, General Officer Commanding, Force ‘‘D,” was
asked by India for his requirements in river craft for use
above Kurna, though he himself had not suggested any
such need.

8. Phase II.—The expulsion of the Turks from Persian
Arabistan, followed by the occupation of Amara on the
Tigris, and of Nasariyeh on the Kuphrates.

The policy of His Majesty’s Government during this
phase was still one of caution and in essence defensive.
The operations, which included those in Arabistan, the
advance to Amara and that to Nasariyeh, were designed
merely to secure our hold on Basra and the oil-fields.

On the 24th April, 1915, the Secretary of State laid down
that an advance beyond the then theatre of operations
would not be sanctioned by Government at present;
that during the summer we must confine ourselves to the
defence of the. oil intercsts in Arabistan and of the Basra
vilayet ; that he would be prepared to sanction an
advance to Amara, with a view to adding to the security
of the pipe line, should such an advance be possible after
smashing the enemy in the direction of the Karun und
should it receive the support of India; that, however,
any plan involving undue extension and possible demands
for reinforcements was to be deprecated; -that a safe
game must be played in Mesopotamia.

On the 23rd May the Secretary of State sanctioned an
advance on Amara, on the condition that no reinforce-
ments were necessary for this.

On the 3lst May the movement commenced and Amara
was occupied on June 3rd.

On the 11th June General Nixon showed the necessity of
occupying Nasariyeh for the effective protection of the
Basra vilayet, and asked if an advance thither required
the sanction of the Secretary of State.

On the 13th June India informed the Secretary of State
of General Nixon’s proposal to move on Nasariyeh and
supported it.

On the 22nd June no objection having been raised by the
Secretary of State, India informed General Nixon that
he had full liberty of action with regard to advancing on
Nasariyeh. Nasariyeh was occupied on the 25th July,
1915.

Paragraph 85 of the Commission’s report, in taxing
India with lack of foresight, implies that during this
Phase IT an advance to Kut-al-Amara, an advance beyond
that place to Baghdad, and the despatch of reinforcements
from oversea to Mesopotamia, should all have been fore-
seen, and preparations should have been made to meet

C 48-176)

such developments. It will be seen from the summary
above that the policy of His Majesty’s Government in
regard to such an advance was quite indefinite and appears
to have been guided by the situation rather than by an
ultimate objective. If this is so, then preparations for a
contingency which was not communicated to the
Government of India could hardly be justified.

9. Phase III.—The capture of Kut-al Amara, advance to
Ctesiphon and subsequent retreat to Kut.

Government policy in this phase cautiously sanctioned
an advance to Kut-al-Amara and then, after the capture
of that place, aimed boldly and without warning at the
occupation of Baghdad.

On the 26th July, 1915, India proposed to the Secretary
of State the occupation of Kut for strategical reasons and
suggested that for this purpose a reinforcement of one
brigade from Aden b2 sent to Force ‘‘ D.”’

On the 30th July the Secretary of State wired that no
reinforcements could be spared for Mesopotamia; that a
cautious strategy was necessary; but that the strategic
importance of Kut was recognised.

On the 2nd August Genera] Nixon en:phasised the advan-
tages of occupying Kut. In this telegram General Nixon
gave no indication of any anxiety as to his ability to
carry out the operation or of any difficulty likely to be
experienced owing to the shortage of riiver craft.

On the 4th August India informed the Secretary of State
of General Nixon’s views and supported him.

On the 7th August the Secretary of State sanctioned an
advance on Kut.

On the 29th September, 1915, Kut-al-Amara was
occupied.

After pursuing the Turks through Kut, General Nixon
on the 3rd October stated that he proposed to concentrate
at Aziziyeh, a good deal further up the river, with the
intention of opening the road to Baghdad, for which object
he considered his force was sufficient; and next day he
asked whether he was to be reinforced by a division from
France in order that his position at Baghdad might be
maintained.

The question of an advance on Baghdad now suddenly
came into prominence for the first time as a live possibility. .

Much telegraphic correspondence between England,
India, and General Nixon ensued, until on the 23rd
October the Secretary of State wired to India that if
General Nixon was satisfied that the force he had available
was sufficient for the operation, he might march on Bagh-
dad, and that two divisions would be sent to him as soon
as possible. On the 24th October this telegram was re-
peated to General Nixon.

The effect of the indefinite policy underlying these three
phases was :—

While operations were confined to the vicinity of
Basra no special arrangements for the supply of river
craft were made, for they were not required. (General
Barrett was asked on the 30th December, 1914, to report
the number of craft he would require in the event of an
advance, and his demands were completed by the end of
May, 1915.

While the change in policy underlying the advance to
Kut was under consideration, it was realised that the
river fleet would have to be augmented considerably by
vessels constructed in England and orders were placed
in August, 1915.

An indication of the attitude of the Home Government
at this time will be seen in the Secretary of State’s proposal
on the 7th September, 1915, that the number of steamers
ordered from Home should be reduced in view of the
probable towing capacity of the new naval gunboats,
which turned out to have no such capacity.

Later, when the impending arrival of large reinforce-
ments to support the policy of an advance on Baghdad
demanded immediately large reinforcements of river oraft,
any class of river vessel at all suited to the river had to
be taken up and despatched.

It is obvious that while the requirements in river craft
depended on decisions in regard to policy, and had to be
met from a distance, whether from India pr home, ready
made or built to specification, supply could not keep pace
with rapid changes of policy.

This sezms to have been lost sight of by the Commission
in their remarks in paragraph 85, which appear to have.
reference to this third phasc in particular.

Y 2

168

10. Phase 1V.—The defence of Kut-al-Amara and the
unsuccessful attempts to relieve tt.

Policy in Mesopotamia during this period centred upon
the relief of Kut. During this pcriod, in addition to the
two divisions from France which arrived in Mesopotamia
in December, 1915, and January, 1916, and of which the
fighting troops arrived greatly in advance of their medical
organisation, the following reinforcements joined Force
€¢ ID 39 —

34th Infantry Brigade

35th Ditto : sae Bis

36th Ditto a aos ... » From India.

1 Cavalry Regiment ... anh she

1 brigade, Royal Field Artillery

13th British Division ... sas Sle

No. Mountain Artillery Brigade From Egypt.
(Indian)

37th Infantry Brigade Be a |

4lst Do. a ... ‘From India.

42nd Do id ae

Simla, July 18th, 1916

This increase to the force of the equivalent of practically
3 divisions naturally necessitated an increase in all trans-
port and administrative arrangements. River transport,
as before, was the most important item, and, as has been
shown, was procurable only from India, of which the
resources in this respect were becoming exhausted, or from
Home after a considerable time.

The maintenance transport, in fact, could not be ob-
tained. constructed and sent to the Tigris in time to keep
pace with the increase of requirements.

11. Our difficulties in India throughout have been that
the direction of the campaign in Mesopotamia has rested
in London, and that we never could foresze the advances
that might be ordered or the additional troops that might
be allotted to the Tigris campaign. Working in semi-
darkness we have produced results which I do not claim
as satisfactory, but of which, when all the circumstances
are known, India has reason to be proud rather than
ashamed.

BEAUCHAMP DUFF, General,
Commander-in-Chief in India.

169
APPENDIX III.

ACCOUNT OF THE MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS, ETC., DURING
SIEGE OF KUT-AL-AMARA.

By Colonel P. HEHIR, C.B., M.D.,

THE DEFENCE OF KUT-AL-AMARA.

(a) PERIOD FROM DECEMBER 4TH, 1915, TO APRIL
297H, 1916.
1. The following statements sre made from my personal
diaries and rough notes that were made for the Medical
and Sanitary Report of the Defence of Kut.

Duration of Siege.
2. The siege of Kut-al-Amara lasted from December
4th, 1915, to April 29th, 1916—147 days.

Brief Description of Aut-al-Amara.

3. Kut-al-Amara is a small town on the left bank of the
Tigris consisting of a dense collection of houses and huts
built more or less promiscuously. The town contained
about 650 houses, including 200 shops, several cafés and
a@ few wool-presses. The better-class houses are built of
burnt brick, but the majority of the habitations are
larger or smaller mud huts. ‘The main part of the town
and most of the well-constructed houses stand near the
bank of the river, but leave a broad river front.

The town is situated about half-way down the descend-
img limb of a deep bend in the river. The area it covers 1s
roughly oblong in shape, its length about 1,000, its breadth
600 yards. The distance between the south-eastern
boundary of the town and the lowest part of the bend
is about 300 yards.

4. There is no drainage system tothe town. Each house
has in the central yard a deep soakage pit, the refuse
house water reaching it through a hole in the surface ;
it acts on the principle of a septic tank and is cleared out
twice a year or so. Many of the houses have likewise a
privy connected with a subterranean cess-pit which is
. often only 5 to 10 yards from the shallow house-well, the
water of which is brackish and impure.

5. The Covered Bazaar, which contained several of our
h >spitals, consists of a series of intercommunicating
colonnades with roofs, and a large number of small stalls.
Its main avenue runs East and West, which joins another
running North and South near the river front. On both
sides of each colonnade are rows of small cubicles each
of which accommodated from four to six patients.

6. On the North-West and South-East of the town
there are date plantations and orchards of oranges,
lemons, figs, peaches and pomegranates, and what used to
be extensive vegetable gardens.

7. This town was the most insanitary place we occupied
in Mesopotamia. The whole of the intcrior of the town,
including the streets and lanes, the banks of the river
and the surrounding area for a distance of 250 yards, were
made use of as latrines, the surfaces of the streets and
bye-lanes were the urinals. The town refuse was never
systematically collected, and on our arrival to some extent
blocked the roads and thoroughfares; mounds of it
existed on the banks of the river and immediate confines
of the town. No sanitation had been attempted.

8. The salient places of the defended areca were: The
town its lf, the brick-kilns to the East of the town, «he
Old Fort about two miles North-East of the town, the
line of block-houses extending from the Fort to the
beginning of the desc-nding limb of the bend running
roughly from East to West.

9. Our defences extended from the fort on the left bank
along the line of the four block-houses to the same bank,
1} miles to the North-West of the town ; this line roughly
corresponded with our first line trenches, the second line

Trenches and reserve troops trenches being echeloned
parallel to them in the rear. On the left bank of the
river along the whole bend were a scries of pickets in
trenches covering the right bank. The guns of the
different batteries were located at the brick-kilns, in front
of these kilns and behind the trenches in the North-West
Section, others being on the left bank near the town and
on the barges. On the right bank, almost opposite the
North-Wost anyle of Kut is the village of Wool-Press
which was occupied by two battalions of Indian Infantry ;
this force was, when neecssary, supplement:d by half a
battalion British Infantry ; its trenches were on the North-
West and South of the village.

10. The enemy occupied trenches along the whole of the
North-East, North and North-West front, also along the

I.M.S.

right bank around the village of Wool-Press and along the
South and East of Kut opposite the fort. Enemy snipers
operated from the whole of the right bank in the vicinity
of Kut and the fort, except the part at Wool-Press and
the bank of a few hundred yards North and South of it.

ll. From December Sth the town of Kut was shelled
more or less practically every day; periodically there
were heavy bombardments; sniping was perpetual day
and night, and high-explosive bombs were dropped from
acroplanes occasionally.

Strength of the Defence Garrison.

12. The garrison consisted of the 6th War Division
with the 30th Infantry Brigade, one Howitzer and two
heavy batteries.

The garrison on December 8th, 1915, was made up of
the following :—

British Officers 206
», rank and file 2,276 |
Indian Officers ee 153 Efffectives.
» Yank and file... 6,941 |
Followers (about) 3,500
13,076
In Hospitals :—
British Officers fei bu 12
» rank and file oni 258 Sick and
Indian Officers bs <a 22° Wei see
» rank and file ey 1,176 | as a
Followers ie ole en 42
1,510
Total to be rationed 14,586

13. The civil population of Kut at the commencement of
the siege was roughly 6,400; at the end of February,
1916, it was 6,225, made up as follows :—

Natives of the town:

Men... oar lak 1,538
Women and children 3,803
Immigrants from Makina Village
(called by us Wool-Press) ... 504
Maheillah men ... 316

Coolies (S. and T. employees) i 64

Location of the Troops.

14. The infantry force was distributed as follows :—
(1) One brigade occupicd the Fort and trenches to its
North and North-West ; (2) another the trenches extend-
ing from the left of the above, Westwards to the river
bank forming the North-West Section ; (3) one formed
the reserve ; (2) and (3) relieved each other weekly ; (4)
half a brigade guarded the town and picketted the bend,
its other half being quartered in Wool-Press village on
the right bank opposite the North-West angle of Kut.

15. The following were located in and near the town ;
two Indian infantry units and Headquarters of Division
and Brigades, with followers, all billeted and numbering
1,200; General Hospitals, Field Ambulances, Indian
Stationary Hospital, personnel and patients, in billets—
2,100; General Reserve in camps and dug outs (on the
North, North-East and East of the town), 1,800.

16. The troops on the right bank were cut off from Kut ;
and the only means of intercommunication were the
steamer and motor launch which crossed at night with
rations, and returned with any sick and wounded requiring
admission into hospital.

State of Troops on arrival at Kut.

17. The 6th Division had gone through a severe hot
weather, and an outbreak of malaria in Lower Mecso-
potamia, had experienced exceptional hardships, and
privations for 17 davs preceding the siege, and arrived
in Kut in an exhausted state as will have been seen from
the itinerary given in mv statement for the period (¢)
During the early stage of the sicge, the preparation of

170

the defence works threw a large amount of physical
labour on the troops who were already in a somewhat
worn-out condition.

General Health of the Garrsson.

18. After arriving in Kut, the general health of the
garrison up to the middle of January improved, especially
that of British troops. It then remained fair up to
the end of February, after which it gradually declined
to the end of March, particularly in Indians.’ Up to this
time the men were moderately cheerful and in fair spirits.
One saw, however, how deeply they were disappointed
each time the relief failed. From this time onwards
there was a rapid lowering of stamina, vitality, physical
condition and health generally to the end of the siege.
When Kut capitulated the whole garrison was in an
exceedingly low state of health.

19. During the last month of the siege, men at fatigues,
such as trench-digging, after ten minutes work had to
rest a while, and go at it again ; men on sentry-go would
drop down, those carrying loads would rest every few
hundred yards; men availed themselves of every oppor-
tunity of lolling about or lying down. There were in-
stances of Indians returning from trench duty in the
evening seemingly with nothing the matter, who laid
down and were found dead in the morning—death due
to starvation asthenia. Men in such a low state of vitality
can stand little in the shape of illness—an attack of
diarrhea that they would have got rid of in a day or so
at the beginning of the siege, often ended fatally—all
recuperative power had gone. At the end of the siege
I doubt whether there was a single person equal to a five-
mile march carrying his equipment. Personally up to
the middle of March I could make a complete inspection
of the front line trenches and Fort (about 5 miles) in the
morning ; I had then to halve it, and at the end of April
while doing even half, I had to rest on the way. Practi-
cally all officers were in the same condition of physical
incapacity

I make the following extracts from my diary :—

20. ‘* 30.12.15. Had a long conversation with the
G.O.C. Division, regarding the present fighting capacity
of the Force now at Kut. I strongly represented what
the Force went through anterior to the battle of Ctesiphon
and what they have endured since the sicge began. I
put the sick and wounded that will require evacuation
down river at 2,000, and that at least 20 per cent. of the
remainder will not be fit for active military operations
for some time to come.”

21. “‘20.1.16. The general health of the British troops
has greatly improved ; the men are looking well and many
are putting on weight. There have been no fresh cases
of beriberi for over a fortnight. The Indian troops are
in better health then when they arrived here, but are
fining down and not regaining stamina in the same way
British are ; this is due to: (1) absence of meat rations ; (2)
absence of potatoes and other vegetables ; and (3) short
allowance of atta’’; further, they were less capable of
standing the severe climatic conditions than the British,
and as they were getting no meat or vegetable ration,
they never recovered stamina.

22. On January 28th. I recommended to the G.O.C.
Division that the reliefs in the trenches should not be pro-
longed beyond a week, be ause in the Kut bivouacs ;
‘“(1) men can get clean, and to a limited extent wash
clothes ; (2) they get their meals hot «nd have greater
opportunities for supplementing rations by local pur-
chase ; (3) they get more rest and less exposure in covered
bivouacs.”

23. There were at first difficulties connected with feed-
ing the troops in the trenches, especially in serving their
meals hot, but every effort was made to overcome these.
During the latter half of the siege practically all the
troops in the firing line had their kitchens in the immediate
vicinity of the trenches.

24. “On January 18th, 19th, and 20th, the 2/7 Gurkhas
experienced overwhelming hardship. They were up to
their waists in water in the trenches and when they came
into their dug-outs in Kut on the 22nd they were absolutely
done. A large number had swollen hands and feet due
to blood stasis, and three men appeared to have collapsed
and died from the ‘effects of cold.’”’ When I inspected
the battalion on January 26th they were better, but
‘looked very tucked up.”

23. * April 5th, 1916. I have during the last week
specially noted the rapid way in which all the young

soldiers and recruits are fining down on the present very
scanty rations.”

26. On April 8th I entered in my diary: “I was
markedly struck this evening with the change that has
taken place in the 7th Rajputs, 76th Punjabis and 24th
Punjabis; the men have lost flesh considerably during
the last week; they are debilitated and somewhat apathetic,
and whenever opportunity arises lie down; they look
half starved. Sickness occurring in men in this state,
if at all serious, is fatal, or at least dangerous to life.”’
This prediction was unfortunately only too fully borne
out during the remainder of the siege and even more
emphasized after the fall.

27. On April 18th I noted: “ There is a vast amount of
suffering from hunger amongst the troops which is being
borne with admirable patience and fortitude, and arouses
enthusiastic praise at the pluck and grit displayed by
both our British and Indian soldiers. As one is amongst
the men daily one speaks with intimate knowledge of the
conditions; the behaviour of the men in meeting these
unfortunate conditions is heroic.”

28. Between April llth and 18th, 1916, I carried out
a series of observations as to the effecte of the semi-starva-
tion on our British and Indian troops; these are dealt
with in a special memorandum which I submitted under
the title State of Nutrition of the Kut Garrison between the
llth and 18th April, 1916, to the Chief of the General Staff
India, and it was sent home as a special despatch. Tho
paper is a scientific one dealing with the intimate physio-
logical processes in the human economy during starvation ;
and it gives details regarding the low state of health of
the Kut garrison at the time.

29. The British soldiers lost on an average, one stone
in weight ; Indians, about 20 lbs. In all the temperature
was on an average 1.8° Fahr. below normal; in Indians
it was frequently found to be between 95 and 96° Fahr.

30. At the beginning of April the duties of all brigades
were made as light as possible, and sentry-go was reduced
to one hour at a time.

31. In my inspections of the front line trenches during
March and April, life was much healthier in the trenches
than in the town and I was most favourably impressed
with the excellent weather the troops enjoyed in them,
the purity of the air, and the absence of smells and flies,
to say nothing of the peaceful calm and freedom from the
enemy's attentions.

32. The behaviour of the troops throughout the siege
was splendid. The defaulter’s sheets of the British soldier
was a carte blanche, and there was no grumbling; there
was almost a complete absence of suicide and insanity.

Disease and Wounds.

33. There were in Kut anterior to our arrival, 2,201
sick and wounded :—

British Officers... an see 21
» Fanks ... sles a 411
Indian Officers er aes 29
» Yanks ... ve -» 1,665
Followers 5 or 40

Turkish wounded 7 ne 365

Of these 709 were despatched down river on December
4th, 1915, leaving 1,492.

34. The total number of patients treated in the hospitals
during the. siege (excluding Arabs) was 7,423, including
2.446 wounded, and 4,977 sick.

35. The wounded were distributed as follows :—

British Officers ... won “ee 54
» rank and file 456
Indian Officers ... ais see 28
» Yankand file... -- £1,531
Followers 377
The admissions for disease were :—
British Officers Sie 118
» TYankand file... «s- 1,090
Indian Officers ... sos a 49
», Yank and file 3,054

Followers

The daily average number treated in the hospitals was
1,351.

36. There were in addition about 4,100 Arabs (663
wounded, 3,437 sick, men, women and children) treated
by our medical units ; 247 Arabs (102 men, 54 women.
and 91 children) were killed or died of wounds inflicted
by the enemy.

171

37. It is necessary to emphasize that these figures are
in no sense a measure of the state of health of the garrison.
The accommodation in medical units was limited to about
1,450, the medical staff in them was small and many
patients were discharged in a convalescent state to be
looked after by the medical officers of corps units. We
were also compelled to have the less severe cases that
would ordinarily be sent to field ambulances or general
hospitals treated regimentally to equalize the work of the
available medical officers and subordinates.

38. A convalescent depét for British troops was estab-
lished in the Serai to relieve the pressure in the British
General Hospital and the field ambulances.

Principal Diseases.

39. Scurvy caused 1,050 admissions, all in Indians.
From an early stage in the siege I was apprehensive
regarding: the disease in Indian troops and followers.
A few cases appeared in the middle of January, and the
incidence gradually rose; in the middle of February we
had 140 cases, the daily accession being about five, and
at the end of March there were 579 cases, after which it
gradually declined. Excepting the effects of starvation
nothing undermined the health of the Indians more than
scurvy. It occurred in three forms—-fully developed,
incipient and latent. The disease arose from long-
continued improper and insufficient food, especially the
absence of fresh vegetables and fresh meat from the
. diet. It was greatly predisposed to by the prolonged
hardships, exposure, heavy duties, and the generally
depressing influence of the siege. We found we could not
prevent it, but if brought under treatment early we could
cure it. All our patients were better off in food supplies
than the troops at duty, as they included a limited
amount of milk, cream, eggs, rice, dhall, lime-juice,
pickles, canned fruit and taniarind. Indian units that
were quartered in the Fort, and North-East Section, and
at Wool-Press village, suffered inordinately from scurvy
due, it was considered to their not having free access to
the supplementary articles of food purchasable in bazaars.
Indians that ate horse-flesh from the time it was com-
menced were decidedly less affected, and in those in whom
the incidence was high, it underwent reduction when this
meat was eaten, providing its consumption was not
postponed too long. Most Indians who did not eat horse
flesh before April Ist, could not digest nor assimilate it,
and in many it led to gastro-intestinal troubles ; neverthe-
less I am quite confident that it kept many of them alive.
Nor did those who ate horsemeat early run down so
rapidly as those who did not. Green herbs collected
from the alluvial plain had a marvellous effect in keeping
down the incidence of the discase.

40. On February 23rd, 1916, I wrote :—‘' We cannot
prevent the occurrence of the disease (scurvy) in units
that will not eat horse-flesh, but we can cure the disease
rapidly in the medical units (if the men are sent in early),
as we have at least eight items that cannot be obtained
regimentally—dhall, rice, fresh milk, eggs, pickles, sls,
(tamarind), chatni and chloride of calcium.” From
February 27th, we got in all incipient and suspicious cases.

41. The total number of admissions for dysentery was °

684. It afflicted Indian troops and followers much more
than British soldiers. It was one of the most prevalent
and serious maladies dealt with. It was a particularly
fata] terminal complication in a number of scurvy cases.

42. There were 55] cases of malaria ; it was relatively
more prevalent in British troops than Indians. These
were all relapses of old infections. It was observed that
in Indians previous malarial infection predisposed to
sc ;
43. Gastro-enteritts and Diarrhea gave rise to 528
admissions into hospitals. It was one of the most preva-
lent disorders during the Defence; another 1,300 odd
cases were treated regimentally. Practically everyone
got it at one stage or another of the sicge, and in many
it was chronic. It was attributable to many causes,
such as chills, night exposure, coarse and imperfcctly
cooked food, etc.

44. During the last five wecks of the siege there were
165 deaths from conditions variously diagnosed as gastro-
enteritis, enteritis, diarrhm@a, etc. The essential cause
in these cases was undoubtedly starvation. ‘lhe men
had got into such a state of debility and wasting from
shortage of food, that any added strain on the economy,
such as diarrhoea, was sufficient to lead to speedy dis-
solution. In all these cases there was finally a marked

subnormal temperature. The condition was clinically
identical with cholera ; but neither I nor any of the Medical
Officers had any doubt about its not being cholera. This
disease continued epidemically after we got to the
Prisoner’s Camp, Shamran ; during the month of May we
had over 1,500 cases, and about 180 deaths from it. I
got the malady myself; after the first few hours it was
quite painless, and one passed into an apathetic condition.

45. Pneumonia (487 admissions) was one of the most
serious and fatal discases, especially in Indian troops,
throughout the siege. It was largely predisposed to by
the intense cold at night in January and February,
exposure in trenches, and in March and April breathing of
germ-laden dust, and the more or less lowered stamina.

46. We were fortunate in having no infectious disease.
In the early stage of the siege a recrudescence of beri-beri
amongst British troops gave rise to some apprehension,
but it then disappeared; whilst in Indian troops and
followers during the latter half of the siege scurvy caused
anxiety.

47. The following table gives the numbers of deaths in
Kut from December 4th to April 28th, 1916 :—

Killed. Died of Died of Totals.
Wounds. Disease.

British Officers... 9 10 4 23
» ranks be 84 105 58 247
Indian Officers... 8 7 5 . 20
» ranks 369 278 631 1,178
Followers ... eh 67 88 123 278
537 488 721 1,746

48. On March 18th, an aeroplane H.E. bomb dropped
in the British General Hospital, killed 6, and wounded 26
British N.C.Os. and men; 12 others of the 26 died from
their injuries.

Climatic Peculiarities During Defence.

49. During the siege the climate up to the end of March
may on the whole be classed as wintry and comparable
with that of the North-West Frontier of India for the
corresponding period. In the months of December,
January and first part of February, it was very cold;
from January 15th to February 8th it froze every night ;
the troops in the trenches, especially Indians, found this
very trying. The effects were intensified by severe winds
and rain storms, On January 18th, 19th, and 20th, the
trenches were flooded with water at ice temperature. On
January 20th, several units in the first line trenches were up
to their waist in water, and about 30 Indians were brought
out of the trenches collapsed from the cold; in a few

cases the men could not be resuscitated. At this stage

frost-bite was common, which in some men led to gangrene
of the tocs, and trench rheumatism was prevalent. The
lowest temperature reached was 24:8° Fahr., on January
3ist. After the middle of February the days were warmer,
and the night cold less severe. In March there was about
ten days cold weather associated with rain ; but the days
were mostly bright and pleasant. In April the nights
were pleasant, and the days becoming hot, but not un-
comfortably so.

50. About 4 inches of rain fell during the siege—} inch
in December, 14 inches both in January and February
and } inch in March. The heaviest rainfall was from
January 18th to 2let, during which time the troops in
the trenches suffered considerable hardship. The rains
occurred in torrential tropical downpours, usually fol-
lowed by a break lasting a week or two. During the
rainy periods the roads in the town were converted into
clongated puddles from 6 to 12 inches deep making traffic
difficult.

51. On January 18th I wrote in my diary :—

“Torrential rain fell for several hours during the night
January 17th and 18th. All the trenches were swamped
with water ; the troops endured a most miserable night in
the rain.

‘The strects of the town are one continuous puddle
several inches deep. The trenches in first, middle and
second lines have from 1 foot to 2 feet of water in them.
Pumping has had but little effect. ‘Troops are making a
continuation trench to the river and lower ground to
drain them. Kit and bedding all soaked.”

Medical Units in Kut during the Siege.
52. (a) No. 3a British General Hospital. 4 Section
(50 beds) ; (b) No. 9 Indian General Hospital. 1 Section

172

officers and medical subordinates. A large part of the
equipment of Nos. 2 and 106 Field Ambulances had to be
relinquished during the withdrawal from Ctesiphon.

57. The staff attached to these units included :—

18 Medical Officers (1 died).
10 Assistant Surgeons (1 died}
11 Sub-Asst. Surgeons (1 killed).

As five medical officers, two assistant surgeons and
one sub-assistant surgeon of corps units were killed or
wounded at Ctesiphon thcir places had to be partly filled
from the above staff. During the siege one medical
officer (regimental) was killed and one died, one assistant
surgeon (regimental) was killed and one died, and one
sub-assistant surgeon was killed, while on an average
20 per cent. of the medical officers and medical subordinatee
were on the sick list, so that the work thrown on the re.
mainder left for duty was exceedingly severe and carried
out under exceptional difficulties. On January 23rd,
1916, we had cight medical officers on the sick list, and
on the 28th of the same month, nine. Seldom had we
less than four. Some of the medical officers and
subordinates previously attached to the different units
were, Just before the siege began, sent down river with
convoys of wounded after the battle of Ctesiphon, and
their services lost to the Defence.

58. The perpetual sniping on the part of the enemy and
his daily but irregular shell fire necessitated the admission
of the wounded into the hospitals at all hours of the day
and night; these cases had on several occasions to be
dressed and operated on during the enemy’s bombard-
ment.

59. There was a constant interchange of medical
officers and subordinates in the hospitals. When work of
one got very heavy one or more medical officers were
transferred temporarily from the ficld ambulances, whilst
medical officers of corps units gave their services for
several hours daily.

60. The menial establishment was insufficient. We
obtained several British privates to act as cooks and
nursing orderlics in the hospitals, and Indian soldiers to act
as ward orderlies and help in the cooking ; convalescents
also assisted in these functions.

The shortage of sweepers was made good from brigades.
the units of which had under existing circumstances
a supcrabundance.

(100 beds) complete ; (c) No. 57 Indian Stationary Hos-
pital (200 beds) complete; (d) No. 2 Field Ambulance.
2 British and 3 Indian Sections. (e) No. 4 Field Ambul-
ance. 1 British and 2 Indian Sections complete ; (f)
No. 106 Field Ambulance. 1 British and 3 Indian
Sections. (g) No.9 Advanced Depot of Medical Stores
complete. :

(a), (6), (c), and (e) were in Kut when we arrived.

(a) had 2 medical officers and 2 assistant surgeons.

(6) had 2 medical officers, 1 assistant surgeon and 2
sub-assistant surgeon.

(d) had 5 medical officers, 3 assistant surgeons and 3
sub-assistant surgeons; much of its equipment was
abandoned at Ctesiphon. One medical officer died, and
1 sub-assistant surgeon was killed during the siege.

(e) had 3 medical officers, 1 assistant surgeon, and 2
sub-assistant surgeons.

(f) had 4 medical officers, 3 assistant surgeons and 2
sub-assistant surgeons; some of its equipment was aban-
doned at Ctesiphon.

53. No. 2. Field Ambulance received the sick and
wounded of the 16th and 17th Brigades, No. 106 of the
18th Brigades, No. 4 of the 30th Brigade and Divisional
troops ; the British General Hospital admitted the more
severe cases occurring in British Units, and all British
Officers, the Indian General and Stationary Hospitals
the worse cases of all Indian units and followers.

54. The British General Hospital was expanded to
200 beds from December 4th, 1915.

Wounded and sick Arabs were mainly treated in No. 106
Field Ambulance, but in emergencies were treated in the
nearest hospital.

55. On December 8th, I issued an order that the “ field
ambulances are to admit all the slight and Jess severe
cases of sickness and wounds.” With regard to the sick
this could not be adhered to completely, for when the
Gencral Hospitals became congested the field ambulances
had to retain many cases of serious illness.

56. Normally the above-named medical units arc
eq uipred and staffed to deal with a total of 650 patients.
The daily average number of sick and wounded under
treatment was 1,351. The Gencral and Stationary
Hospitals were short of their usual number of medical

@
iY

61. StaTEMENT SHow1na NuMBER OF PERSONNEL BY CLASSES ATTACHED TO MEDICAL UNITs oF 6TH DIVISION IX
Kut-aL-AMARAH ON APRIL 26TH, 1916,

|
:

: as . © 7 a | © . a, a 7 ° ~-— { rs |
ae s2 84| si: su FE eh tarde BLS
Unrr Se; ee AeiFs “4E £25 FEEEGE Be = Total
BE BE 28 Gh ga FE FE tAS ASE BE
_ 2 (22/92 €2Z €° “9 6 oe a
: gett ae et, Se ee. a ae Satie
| ‘Personnel
No. 2 Field Ambulance 4 3 2 1: 3 | 56: 8 200 18 | 23 | 262
No. 4 Field Ambulance 3 Lk m2 1 1 : 4 = 54 | 20 2 i 88
No. 106 Field Ambulance i a: ne e - | 2 | 6 | 9 | 13 21 | 144
British General Hospital... are AQ 2 —- }; = - | 93 _ 14 18 14 13
Indian General Hospital ... sg 1 2 ee > - 10 16 - 28 | 60
Indian Stationary Hospital 2 _ 2 ee te - | 8 23 5 25 | 69
- jae a ies eM Sp ae eae (aire
TOTAL ... 2 | g | 34 | 26 | | 696

Location of the Medical Units.

62. As soon as we reached Kut I went round the town
to select buildings for the hospitals as the position of the
General Hospitals and field ambulances was dangerous.
There were only two large places suitable for hospitals.
the Serai and the Covered Bazar. The Serai, situated
at the North-West angle of the town, was directly exposed
to both rifle and gun fire. The Covered Bazar, which
could roughly hold about 1,000 patients, was selected
for the British and Indian General Hospitals, the Indian
Stationary Hospital and No. 106 Field Ambulance. It
took 200 men two days to clean it up and make it habit-
apie for paticnts

63. The four great defects of the Covered Bazar as a
hospital were: (a) Leakage to a certain extent during
the rain; this was periodically attended to by the engi-
neers ; (6) the thoroughfares became converted into a puddle

after each heavy shower ; remedied by partial rough pav-
ing with brick ; (c) dust in dry weather, and (d) exposure
to enemy shell-fire.

64. The accommodation of all the medical units was
indifferent, but it was the best that could be provided, and
it was to some degree satisfactory that all the sick and
wounded could be billeted throughout the siege.

Anterior to the commencement of the siege the British
and Indian General Hospitals were in reed and mat huts
supplemented by tents and located to the North-East
of the town; the Indian Stationary Hospital in tents in
the same vicinity; No. 4 Field Ambulance was encamped
in an orange grove to the North of the town, and close
to it was No. 9 Advanced Depot of Medical Stores. These
positions were very exposed to the enemy’s fire.

65. On arriving in Kut, the field ambulances of the 6th
Division were encamped in the orchards between the

General Hospitals and the town. The position was
exposed to both gun and rifle fire, and on December 5th,
all field ambulances were billeted in the town, No. 2 in
Third and Fourth Avenues, No. 4 in Signal Lane and No.
106 at the Southern part of the Covered Bazar. No. 131
Cavalry Field Ambulance, located in the same grove,
left with the cavalry brigade on the morning of December
6th, 1915. The Advanced Depét of Medical Stores was
housed in No. 3 Avenue.

A few hours after all patients had been removed from
the huts and camps, the enemy commenced shelling that
quarter heavily.

66. The Officers’ Hospital (which was part of the British
General Hospital), consisted of two double-storied houses
in No. 2 Street. The accommodation was bad, especially
in the ground floor, and at one time when there were over
30 officers being treated, it was overcrowded. They were,
however, in a safe position, as neither block was hit by
a shell throughout the siege.

67. Red Cross flags were hoisted over all the hospitals ;
in the Covered Bazar their positions defined the limits of
where the hospitals were. The Covered Bazar extends
over two acres of ground, and was bounded on the North
by our Ordnance Park, and on the West (bank of river)
we had 4 guns; we had about 95 shells into it. When
aeroplanes began dropping high explosive bombs, specially
large red cross emblems were laid flat on the roofs of all
the hospitals, the white ground of the emblem being 16
feet square, and the limbs of the red cross 24 feet in width
and about 8 feet in length.

68. During the siege 103 of the enemy’s shells, and 3
aeroplane bombs entered the hospitals killing 38 and
wounding 42 patients, and killing 42 and wounding 36
of the personnel of the medical units; 11 of the hospital
personnel were also wounded by snipers.

69. The general hospitals were used for the treatment
of all severe wounds, and, as far as practicable, for cases
of serious illness. The work in both these institutions
was carried out under high pressure throughout the siege.
The Indian Stationary Hospital was also overworked.

70. There were occasions when the strain thrown on the
hospitals was overwhelming ; e.g. on December 24th, No.

2 Field Ambulance was treating 202 sick, and 174 wounded,
No. 4 (3 Sections) 40 sick and 177 wounded; No. 106
(4 Sections) 84 sick and 103 wounded, the British General
Hospital (4 section) 112 sick and 93 wounded. The Indian
Stationary Hospital had at one time 546 sick, and the
Indian General Hospital (1 Section), 156 sick and 171
wounded.

71. I find the following entry in my diary for December
2Qist, 1915: ‘‘ Indian General Hospital. The work here
is under high pressure. One of the S.A.S. now ill and only
2 left to whole hospital. When an operation case comes
in (now that Captain Barber is ill), all dressing of other
cases has to cease. If possible have a regimental S.A.S.
to assist.”

72. “Indian Stationary Hospital.—316 cases under
treatment. Of these 254 wounded. Here also work is
at high pressure. O.C. (Major Bose) is crippled with a
dilated heart and tachycardia.

73. ‘““No. 106 Field Ambulance.—The work in this
unit is very considerable. In addition to treating the
18th Brigade, they treat from 50 to 60 (men, women and
children) of the civil population, and several of these
wounded. At present both Major Pearson, O.C. and Capt.
Puri are ill, and Major Aylen has charge of the Officers’
Hospital.

74. “No. 2 F.A. Work in this unit is also under high
pressure. There are 63 British and about 200 Indian sick.
Major Lambert is ill, and there are only 28.4.8.”

The medical personnel were getting worn out from
overwork.

75. ‘‘ December 28th, 1915. The general care of the
sick and wounded and dressing, and the sanitation of tha
hospitals are as satisfactory as can be expected under the
circumstances.”

76. ‘January Ist, 1916. Sick and wounded coming in
from the trenches in a most deplorable and miserable
state—clothes wet and saturated with watcr and mud,
and they are cold and shivering.”

77. “January 28th, 1916. The hospitals are fecling
the shortage of nursing and ward orderlivs on account of
the numbers of sick and wounded.”

78. About the end of February the ‘‘ cases of sickness
did not respond to treatment as they used to do, which was
attributed to the men’s resisting power bcing lowered.”

(CU 48—176)

173

79. Great difficulty was experienced in connection with
the supply of kerosine oil to hospitals from January 15th.
It was then arranged that it be “ limited to night hurricane
lamps and the operation theatres. General wards to use
heavy oil.”” (A large number of jam tins were converted
into lamps for burning heavy oil.) The operating theatres
were fitted up with acetylene lamps by the Flying Corps.

80. The shortage of fuel at one stage in January led to
some difficulty in the sterilization processes necessary
for surgical cases. This was remedied at once, and a
special allowance of fuel sanctioned for the purpose.

On February 6th there were ‘‘ 50 cases of pneumonia
under treatment in the Indian General Hospital ”’ alone.

‘81. About March 20th parados were made in the British
General Hospital and other medical units to prevent the
effects of shell fire and bombs.

82. The sanitation of the hospitals was defective in
many respects, especially during the rainy periods, but I
believe it was carried out as satisfactorily as the circum-
stances allowed of. Night soil was partly incinerated
and partly buried in deep pits. The water-supply arrange-
ments were the best in the garrison and there was practi-
cally always sufficient water for drinking, cooking, and
washing, but not for bathing. The plan of supply was:
Several 200-gallon iron tanks were placed on platforms
within the front shed of the Covered Bazar about 60
yards from the left bank of the river. A pump ina covered
place on the river bank was connected by a hose (laid along
a trench) with the tanks. From these front tanks the
water was drawn and distributed to other tanks suitably
located in each medical unit. Several adjacent combatant
units got water from here. All watec was chlorinated.

83. The conditions taken together were decidedly un-
favourable for the sick and wounded. It wasimpossible for
the available medical staff to give the patients all the care
and attention they cequired. The improvised hospitals,
especially those in thu Covered Bazar were defectively
ventilated, ill-lighted, and finally unhygienic generally.
The patients were going through a process of slow starva-
tion and we had but a limited amount of hospital comforts
for them, indeed, at the last stage, practically none.
Added to these were the depressing influences of daily
shelling and of disappointed expectations as regards the
relief. |

Contraventions of the Geneva Convention.

84. (a) Shelling of hospitals. During the siege 103
shells entered the various hospitals. Seven 40-pound
shells entered the Covered Bazar Hospitals on December
10th, 1915.

(6) Bombing of hospitals. Three bombs entered the
hospitals, one bomb killing 18 and wounding 14 men.

85. Regarding (a) and (6b). It is only fair to state that
we had four guns on the West and within 100 yards of the
Covered Bazar and the Ordnance Park within 50 yards.
The Turkish aviator who dropped the bomb on the
British General Hospital subsequently apologised to me
for doing so, and expressed his profound regret for what had
happened.

Positions of Dressing Stations, etc.

86. Dressing stations were formed in the date grove to
the North of the town for the wounded from the trenches.
They consisted of excellently made dug-outs with shell-
proof overhead cover. Here the wounded were re-dressed
if necessary, fed and rested before being sent on to the
hospitals. This place, however, was exposed to a certain
amount of sniping and shell fire and had to be abandoned.
After this bearer divisions went out to the front line
trenches and Fort in the dusk of the evenings with
stretchers and, if necessary A.T. carts, and brought the
wounded to their field ambulances.

87. The regimental aid posts consisted of dug-outs pro-
vided with covered protection against shrapnel. The
wounded were at first taken to the dressing stations along
the communicating trenches, but when dressing stations
were given up, to the field ambulances.

Field ambulances were throughout the siege daily em-
ployed in collecting the sick and wounded from the first
line trenches and the fort. In the earty stage of our
investment, before communication trenches were com-
pleted, this work was carried out under constant sniping,
and on a few occasions under heavy rifle fire, during which
some of the Army Bearer Corps personnel were wounded.

174

Efficiency of Work of the Medical Services.

88. The work of the medical services was carried out as
efficiently as the limited equipment and short handedness
allowed. I have already remarked on the more serious
difficulties that had to be contended with and indicated
that the duties of all ranks were heavy and conducted
under high pressure continuously. Medical officers,
assistant surgeons, sub-assistant surgeons, and every one
on the staff of medical units were untiring in their efforts
to ameliorate the sufferings and add to the comfort of the
sick and wounded, and throughout the siege displayed
most praiseworthy devotion to duty.

Regarding the lower establishments, on February
5th I entered in my diary: ‘‘ I have been more and more
struck by the way in which all parts of the menial establish-
ments carry out their duties amidst the utmost continuous
discomfort and under conditions by no means free from
danger.”

Embarkation Medical Officer.

89. An Embarkation Medical Officer was appointed for
the evacuation of the 700 odd patients that were sent down
on the ‘‘ Mosul’ and ‘‘ Blosse Lynch,” and for embarking
the 1,100 sick and wounded sent down river on the
capitulation of Kut.

Supply of Drugs, Dressings, etc.

90. No. 9 Advanced Depot of Medical Stores, which we
had ordered up as soon as Kut was captured by us, was
able to provide medicines, surgical dressings and disin-
fectants throughout the siege, helped by the aeroplanes.
Fortunately the possibility of requiring a good reserve in
the depdt at so remote a town from our source of supply
had been anticipated by the officer in charge and laid in.
The medicines, dressings, etc. of two previous indents on
Bombay had also just arrived in Kut. The British and
Indian General Hospitals, Indian Stationary Hospitals
and No. 4 Field Ambulance (already in Kut) were exceed-
ingly well stocked with medicines, dressings etc., and their
surplus came in most usefully.

91. On December 5th, 1915, I found 31 Reserve Dressing
Boxes (Red Cross Gifts), for British infantry units, which
with the permission of the Commanding Officers were
taken over by the Medical Stores Depot. On January
26th a few boxes of medical supplies were found in the
Supply godowns and placed in the Medical Stores.

We had a large supply of formalin and flypaper in
stock which were invaluable against the fly pest that
occurred in April.

92. Our first task was to determine for what length of
time the supply of the Advanced Depét of Medical Stores
would have to last out. Initially I put this at 3 months.
On December 5th, 1915, I made a complete survey of the
Medical Stores, and assured myself that so far as the
supply of medicines and surgical dressings went, there
would be sufficient for that period. When, however,
‘the G.O.C. Division, about January 20th, intimated
that the food of the garrison could hold out until
April I7th, we were obliged to regulate the issues
of our drugs, dressings, and disinfectants accord-
ingly. There was a decided shortage of most drugs
during the month of April, and throughout the
siege the strictest economy had to be exercised, and the
closest scrutiny on the expenditure kept up. We were
able to be much more liberal with the dressings, which
lasted out well.

93. The universal prevalence of diarrhcea and gastro-
intestinal disorders led to an early exhaustion of astrin-
gents, whilst “‘fevers’’ and malarial relapses drained
our diaphoretics. After the aeroplane service started we
were almost always able to get the drugs and dressings
more urgently required.

On December 11th, 1915, orders were given to limit
compliance with indents to one week’s requirements in
corps units, and to 3 days’ supply to medical units; all
the latter were located in proximity to the Medical Depét.

94. We had often to fall back on our own resources.
For instance, in February we urgently required chloride
of calcium for the treatment of scurvy. We had abund-
ance of HC] (used with chlorate of potash for chlorinating
water), and got some lime from the D.E.C. We issued
nearly 2 lbs. of this drug daily for 2} months, but it entailed
an enormous amount of work on the Medical Depot.
The most used astringent was Dover’s powder which we
manufactured from opium, ipecacuanha powder and

bicarbonate of soda. Castor oil we got from the Flying
Corps, who were working the grain-grinding engines ;
Epsom salts from the Veterinary Section ; cotton-wool
was bought from the bazars, cleaned, teased, sterilized
and used for our sceptic surgical cases; calico and other
cloths were bought to use as gauze and bandages, and so
forth.

95. By aeroplane we received large supplies of astrin-
gents (e.g. 20,000 lead and opium pills, 12,000 tabloids
of Dover's Powder), phenacetin, salicylate of sodium,
antitetanic serum, various surgical dressings, large-sized
drainage tubes, etc.

The stock of medicines had gone down considerably by
the end of March on the 27th of which month I wrote:

. “* With the greatest economy it will last another 14 days.

Had again to issue warning to medical units to exercise the
greatest care in the issue of medicires and published a
list of the various alternative drugs available for those
that were running out.”

96. On March 29th we sent a message to Corps Head-
quarters stating that or medicines and dressings were
running low and that we should require the whole Ad-
vanced Depot replenished on relief. On April Ist we
were informed that a complete Advanced Depét had
arrived and was ready for us.

97. The manner in which the drugs and dressings lasted
out was the most satisfactory part of the medical organi-
zation of the siege. It cannot be said that all patients
got every drug that was required, but it may be stated
that all serious cases of sickness got almost everything
that was prescribed for them by medical officers, and that
the dressings for the wounded were ample throughout.

The work of the No. 9 Advanced Depét of Medical
Stores was carried out with exemplary efficiency, and the
issue of medicines, surgical dressings, medical equipmen
and disinfectants regulated with much judgment by Capt.
Weston, who commanded this unit.

Medical Comforts.

98. As in the case of the Advanced Depét of Medical
Stores I ascertained the quantity of medical comforts in
charge of Supply Service and regulated the issue for three
months. The chief item with which we were concerned
was tinned milk of which there were 14,500 lbs. in stock.
This permitted of a liberal issue. When, however, the
time limit was extended to April 17th, it made a most
material difference. We found that we had been prodigal
and from January 21st had to reduce our issues consider-
ably and abruptly.

99. On January 30th we had the following medical com-

forts to fall back upon :— :

Milk, condensed ... 2,353 Ibs.
Oatmeal ... xa .- 1,593 ,,
Cocoa <a ae pale re 82,
Calves foot jelly eee des 6 bottles
Brandy - : 8 ,,
Beer 158 -
Port wine. 4 oi
Whisky 52 ae
Cornflour a oe --» 417 Ibs.
Benger’s food... 0% sy 15 bottles
Macaroni ... sds ee se 16 lbs.
Mellin’s food ies “ae aan ll ,
Essence, chicken es ae 74 9

: mutton... nee wale |
Extract of beef ... fos me 70 =;
Tapioca ... see sale say 21 =«s,

Pearl barley wee eee ees 60 ,,
Lime-juice, Rose’s ose

100. Throughout the siege I kept a close watch on the
Supply Stores, where periodicaJlv various articles of
food and comforts appeared in small quantities from
previously undiscovered sources. and were secured for
the hospitals. This, amongst other things, is shown in
the following extracts from my diaries :—

January 25th, 1916. Conversation with A.D.S. (re
rations) ; obtained the following for hospitals: 11 bottles
of brandy; one case whisky, some vermicelli, macaroni,
chocolate, coffee, preserved fruit, tinned soups, lime-juice
cordial, etc. ;

“January 28th, 1916. Secured through A.D&. 13
cases of lime juice to be reserved for treatment of scurvy
cases in Indian troops.

101. The issue of white bread ceased on February 10th,
1916, after which British troops’ bread was made from

175

flour and atta. We, however, were able to draw 20
one-pound loaves of white bread daily for issue to the hos-
pitals for special cases after its general issue had ceased,
and this continued throughout the siege. At the beginning
of February I got a large supply of dhall from the Supply
Stores for hospitals.

102. February 5th, 1916. ‘The number of eggs supplied
to hospital has been reduced to 20. This appears to me
to be ridiculously few considering that every mess and
many troops in trenches are able to get them. To speak
to A.D.S. re this; if it is a question of paying more, then
it must be paid for the sick’s food.”

103. On March 16th, I secured for the hospitals, 600 lbs.
preserved fresh fruit ; 350 lbs. cornflour, 45 lbs. arrowroot.

Further list of articles secured for hospitals on March
23rd, 1916 :—

Cocoa ae ‘es oe Sis 33 Ibs.

Lime-juice ee ate dex 18 gallons.
Pickles... bbe ee a 22 sm. botts.
Rice ee we ea: aes 35 maunds.
Tamarind... en eg or 40 lbs.
Cornflour ... ne ar .. 258 ,,
Essence mutton ... woh Sie + 5,
Calves foot jelly ... ee sii Ze

Extract of beef ... aes eas 4} ,,
Pearl barley aes hes eas —
Beef dripping... wate wee tL 4s
Benger’s food ... aes sh I. 4;
Sugar ss8 sv’ ae aul 19 ,,
Vinegar ane adie eee 28 gallons.
Dhall ou sa os ..» 198 Ibs.
Dry limes... “ae a ss 66s,

Arrowroot... Sas os aed 25s,
Horlick’s M. milk a re G- 5
Pineapple ‘ide ae .. 337 tins

Beer ‘ie be wi ati 15 bottles
Preserved fruit aici as
Essence of chicken ape sis 1? ,,
Fish, tins ; aia .. 260 ,,

104. Early in February several acres of land around the
town were converted into kitchen gardens and such rapidly
growing vegetables as radishes, onions, cress, and a few
varieties of spinach were sown. There was at first great
difficulty in watering them which was overcome.

From March 31st 100 Ibs. vegetables were supplied to
hospitals daily from the gardens. They had previously
been producing only 50 lbs. a day.

105. ‘‘ March 2nd, 1916. Secured all the stores suitable
for hospitals for issue to sick from the miscellaneous
collection in E. Section S. and T. In consultation with
A.D.S. allotted these to the British Officers Hospital,
B.G.H., the lime juice to I.G.H. and I.S H.”

‘* April 11th, 1916. 60 lbs. dates dropped by aeroplane,
made over to hospitals.”’

‘* April 2nd, 1916. 4} Ibs. of saccharin dropped by
aeroplane. It was insufficient for whole garrison, so
half given to hospitals, remainder to staffs’ and officers’
messes.”

106. January 6th. “ The supply of eggs is running down,
also chickens. No potatoes nor onions now being issued.”

** January 4th, 1916. Visited officers’ hospital. Asked
all officers if they were getting all they wanted as regards
food, and they answered in the affirmative; also if they
had any complaints to make and they said, ‘ No.’ ”’

‘“* January Sth. Saw and spoke to all patients of the
B.G.N.; they all said food was quite satisfactory.”

107. On February 7th I entered in my diary: ‘‘ The
Indian troops in medical units are now being much better
fed than those of the rest of force. They are practically
getting all their rations (including rice and dhall) with
only a shortage of 8 oz atta, and tea. Told officers com-
manding medical units that they can buy teain the bazar
for their Indian troops and followers.”

108. On March 6th I “directed officers commanding
medical units to buy whatever food in bazars that they
consider will improve the dietary of their patients.”

109. We were, throughout the siege, able to obtain a
limited supply of fresh milk, cream, eggs, chickens and
fish, but only with considerable difficulty as the Arab
vendors were consuming them or selling them surrep-
titiously.

110. The quantity of fresh milk varied, the average
being about 120 pints per diem; at times for a week on
end we got from 200 to 300 pints a duy; it was nearly
always of poor quality. Cream, about 8 Ibs. a day
was most useful. At the end of March several milch

(C 48—176)

buffaloes and cows were wounded and the supply of fresh
milk ran low, and this at a time when the stock of tinned
milk was nearly exhausted. I insisted that the animals
be not sent out to graze, but have the grass cut for them ©
and that the husk of barley be given them. I told the
A.D.S. on March 28th, 1916, that it was imperative that
everything possible be done to maintain the supply of
fresh milk. Until the last fortnight we were able to get
on an average about 80 eggs daily. For a time, we were
drawing 150-200 eggs a day. Fish was given to
the British officers and selected cases amongst the British
sick ; it was very costly as the catches by Arabs had to be
made in the presence of the cnemy’s snipers.

111. “February 24th, 1916 Diary. The supply of
eggs to medical units has again been falling off. The
quality of the milk has also undergone deterioration and
lately has been adulterated with flour. Yesterday I
found that the last half inch in a bucket consisted of a
semi-glutinous mass. Represented these matters to the
L.P.O. who Stated that the eggs were being brought in
at a later time—too late to be issued.’’ They were then
drawn at a later hour daily. “ Re milk, he arraigned
three contractors (suppliers) before the Military Governor,
and had them punished.”

‘** February 26th, 1916. Saw L.P.O. re milk and eggs.
The milk was short but of better quality.” On February
27th, 1916, the supply of milk had “ improved in both
quantity and quality.”

112. At the end of March obtained 25 lbs. tea from
Supply Stores ; issued to British General Hospital.

On April 2nd “ got for hospitals two maunds of gur and
7} maunds of dates.”

“ April 7th, 1916. Obtained for hospitals 50 Ibs. tea
from the Supply Service.”

113. After April 7th no further extras could be obtained
from the Supply Stores for the hospitals. We had then to
rely on about 140 pints of milk and about 40 eggs daily,
as the only medical comforts available.

114. The most that can be said of the medical comforts
is that they would have been ample for a two months’
supply. Strict economy had to be commenced as early
as January 21st, and continued until they were exhausted
—about the middle of April, which means that a good
proportion of the sick and wounded who would normally
have got them did not.

Clothing and Bedding.

115. The clothing and bedding that had been supplied
to the troops supplemented by one blanket was suitable
and sufficient. The third blanket had been provided and
issued to some of the troops before the sicge began.
Unfortunately many of the men lost part of their clothing
and blankets which were abandoned at Aziziyeh. All
available blankets in the Supply Stores were issued to
the garrison, which ensured that all men had two
blankets, a certain proportion had three. We had a
certain number of extra blankets on hand in the medical
units, which, with the bedding patients brought
in were sufficient to keep them warm.

Most of the troops had only one suit of clothes, so that
it was difficult to arrange about washing them. Cotton
suits were made for a large number to allow of this being
done.

Rations of Garrison During the Defence.

116. As previously stated the 6th Division arrived in
Kut after Ctesiphon in a worn out and exhausted con-
dition. For over a fortnight the troops had got their
rations irregularly, and had few opportunities of preparing
hot meals. Under the circumstances it was not considered
advisable to commence a reduction of their rations at
once except in potatoes.

117. The main difficulty was to determine the length of
time the siege would last. The following abstracts from
my diaries indicate the estimated quantitics of food in
stock and the progressive reductions made in the rations.

“December 11th, 1915. Had a long conversation with
A.D.S., regarding rations available during our defence.
From his tables it appears that we have full rations of
following for the period stated :—

Flour (bread, Br.) ... ... 70 days
Atta (Ind. tps. & folls.) ... 70 days
Rice, ‘5 . 70 days
Dhail _,, ‘: we ane eee 70 days
Currv stuifis. do. (are put on half rations

of this already) ‘eet sme ... 1 month
Fresh meat... ove ove eee .. Il month

176

(exclusive of beef availabie from 78 bulls of bullock
battery—each bull yields 600 lbs., ergo 18 additional
days’ rations at 3,000 lbs. per diem are available.)

Potatoes (at 6 oz. per diem.) 1 month
Onions (at 4 oz. per diem.) 1 month.

Tea and sugar, full supply.

Wood, deficiency, less than one month. (Troops put

on short rations already.)

Medical comforts—with economy one month.
dance of tinned milk.)

““A.D.S. has purchased all tinned provisions (fish,
sausages, etc.), procurable in bazars and from Sas-
soon & Co.” ;

118. A large quantity of dates were found in the town,
collected and issued from time to time, and served a very
useful] purpose when all sugar and butter were exhausted.
An issue of 3 ounces twice a week was made from Decem-
ber 18th, 1915, and of 14 oz. daily from March Ist until
they were exhausted about March 20th, 1916.

From December 18th, 2 ounces of rice were given to
British and Indian troops twice a week.

119. ‘‘ December 29th. Had a long conversation with
the A.D.S. as to how the rations were holding out. There
are the following :—

** Abundance of flour, atta, ghi, dhall, bacon, butter,
cheese ; onions and potatoes (6 oz.) about 8 days. There
is no more fresh meat so that from to-morrow tinned meat
has to be issued. A certain number of animals are kept
for the sick and wounded.

‘There is over 14,000 lbs. condensed milk, abundance
oatmeal, jam, dates, 48 lbs. Bovril, and a certain amount
of stimulants.

*‘ British troops have been receiving 12 oz. of fresh
meat up to date daily; Indian troops have only had 3
issues. Beer has been issued to British troops up to
date, but is now exhausted. A ration of rum can be issued.
This is done at discretion of the G.O.C. Brigades.”

120. Green vegetables were procurable in the bazars
until the middle of January, but the regular issue of these
to troops and followers had to be discontinued towards
the end of December.

“January 20th, 1916. As tea is running short, issue to
Indian troops and followers has been stopped and British
troops put on half allowance (4 0z.) daily. The deprivation
of tea was greatly felt by the Indian units and specially
by the weak men in hospitaJ].’”” An issue of coffee was
made every third day to British troops in lieu of tea from
February 9th. Small supplies of tea for the sick and
wounded were obtained a few days later, amd whenever
it appeared in the bazars it was bought by the C.O.’s
of Medical Units.

121. The beef of the 2 heavy battery bullocks and horse
flesh were commenced on January 29th on alternate days.
There was a prejudice against eating horse-flesh amongst
all Indian troops except Gurkhas, who ate it from the
first day of issue ; gradually other classes of Indians began
using it, especially Mohammedans ; it was with difficulty
that Mahrattas and Sikhs were induced to take to it;
Rajpoots and Mahrattas held out longest and ran down
most.

Under the G.O.C. Division’s instructions, I issued the
following :—

“Kut, February 5th, 1916. It has unfortunately
become necessary to employ horse-flesh in the rations,
and the following remarks are published with the view
to remove any prejudices that may exist against it as
an article of food.

“The horse is a clean animal, and essentially a vege-
table feeder. It will not eat unclean food nor drink
impure water. Its flesh is wholesome, digestible and prac-
tically in every respect as nutritious as that of any animal
we are accustomed to eat. It contains all tho nutritive
principles or chemical constituents that the flesh of other
edible mammialia does, and those troops who have already
eaten it here, like it. In the absence of flesh food, troops
wiil run down, be more susceptible to disease, especially
to scurvy and beriberi. Both of these diseases have
already given rise to a certain amount of inefficiency.
In the case of Indian troops the absence of dhall and gur
from the rations will have a detrimental effect on their
condition in due course.

‘Tt is natural that everything possible should be done
to keep our troops in good health, and the use of horse-
flesh is one of the means which will considerably aid in
this direction."

(Abun-

122. On January 7th, I spoke to the A.D.S. again re
rations. “The only fresh vegetable being issued was
beans. I recommended that British troops receive
pickles and that all Indian troops and followers get 4 oz.
lime-juice every second day.

123. On January 22nd, the rations consisted of :—

British.
Bread a ite . 12 oz.
Meat ales 8 ,,
Butter or cheese ... 3S 4s
Potato meal 2 <3
Pickles L x
Jam 3
Dates 2. ys
Tea wee ee ae sae ie. ae gy
Sugar ss Was. * 2° said es ae
Salt x Me ‘ies — rr 2
Ginger t ss
Fuel 2 Ibs
Indian.

Atta Efe 8 oz
Rice 8 ,,
Gur . aii ns ne ae e
Ghee aie see so — See Oe: ee
Ginger a ee Sey wale -
Dhall 2: ss
Chillies ... ma oes ies 6 CUR»
Garlic Sais ae Ses see a, or
Dates ies ae sae vas ‘ie. O° <a
Potato meal sah = es has 22 cg
Salt oe a6 oe see ee ay
' Fuel oa 1 Ib.

‘February 5th, 1916. Yesterday afternoon in con-
sultation with the A.Q.M.G. and A.D.S., arranged that
the cereal food for troops should consist of—British.
+ wheaten flour, } atta and 4 barley at once, and Indians
4 atta, } barley.”

124. Great difficulty was experienced over fuel for
cooking rations. After all brushwood had been cut, and
all available timber of houses used, we had to employ
crude oil (there was a large stock of this), for which special]
stoves had to be constructed.

An issue of } lb. of barley meal was made to Indian
troops and followers from February 6th. This was in
addition to that in the rations.

125. On February 8th I noted in my diary: “A few
days ago, 367 kerosine oil tins full of ght were found
walled up in one of the Native Officers wards of the Indian
General Hospital—taken over by Supply Service. Another
ward is full of barley—directed attention of A.D.S. to
this.”

From February 10th, British troops’ bread was made
from 4 wheaten flour and half atta. This continued
for 24 days, after which the bread consisted of 4 wheaten
flour, and half barley flour for another 24 days.

From February 14th, Indian troops and followers
received $ lb. atta and 4 lb. barley flour ; from February
19th, they received 1 lb. of barley flour only.

126. ‘‘ February 14th, 1916. At present about 28
days jam in stock for British troops at 2 oz. per diem.
As we have worked out the staple articles on a 48 days’
further siege, I recommended that jam be reduced to 1}
oz. for a week, and then to 1 oz. They are getting no
sugar.”

‘“‘ February 21st, 1916. Two ounces of oatmeal issued
every second day to British troops.”’

“February 21st, 1916. The further decrease of the
cereal ration for Indian troops is being considered. The
position appears to be that the present issue amounts to 160
maunds a day, and we can only grind 120 maunds per diem ;
there is a stored capital of (I understand), some 20 days’
supply of ground cereals. This latter is now being ex-
pended to make up the difference between 120 and 160
maunds. If this arrangement continues the A.Q.M.G
says he can carry on up to the end of March on the present
ration. He does not hope to be able to grind more than
120 maunds per diem by any further improvements
in mechanisms.

127. ‘In the original message sent by the G.O.C. to
Corps Headquarters he stated that we had grain to carry
on to April 17th. Personally I am strongly of opinion
that the cereal ration cannot further be reduced without
material deterioration in the physical condition, health
and resisting power to disease in our Indian garrison.

177

Their ration has already been redued to | Ib. a day (and
that only half barley, half atta), they receive only }
ration of ghee (1 oz. instead of 2), they get no gur, dhall
or vegetables. Potentially the ration at present is only
a trifle more than a subsistence diet (a diet of complete
rest), yet the men have to carry out their full duties in
trenches, piquets, and in maintaining the defensive
works. On the present ration they may just be able to
hold their ground, although I believe they will tend to
lose stamina. With a further reduction they will lose
weight rapidly, and be practically on a starvation ration.”
On February 27th, 1916, there were only 750 out of over
9,500 Indians eating horse-flesh. Early in April there
was a rapid rise, and on the 14th of that month 9,239
were consuming it.

128. On February 28th, I recommended that the horse-
flesh ration of British troops be increased to 1} lbs., per
diem as the men were then getting no vegetables, butter
or bacon, and only }? oz. cheese and 1 oz. jam. This
increase began on March Ist.

129. The following are the rations issued to the garrison
from March 4th, 1916 :—

Brittsh.
Bread ... valk si . 21b.
Horseflesh ‘ .1},,
Jam . 1 oz.
Salt . wa bes ae ar
Dates ... a are was cvs Ld 5
Ginger es “int san eae
Oatmeal ies =e a ae
Indian.

Barley meal ... see ae we «2b.

» whole ue nae «+ 6 OZ
Ghee ... 1 ,,
Salt ° + »
Dates . 1t,,
Ginger ey
Tumeric t »
Chillies re es ee sow. Bos
Meat (to those who draw it) eae 9

The tea had run out on March 4th.

“March 5th, 1916. The amount and variety of
‘extras’ that the men can now buy in the bazar is some-
what limited—consists chiefly of chappatties, cakes fried
in fat, and a small amount of dhall. There is still
apparently an abundance of country tobacco.”

130. On March 11th, the rations consisted of :—

British.
Bread ... ie .-» 10 oz.
Meat ... 1} lbs.
Jam 1 oz.
Salt... ‘ eo ois eee. egy
Ginger ihe oe ss iss, Sh
Oatmeal! wise ‘ive 2 is
Dates ... sale oes wus 1d ,,
Indian,
Barley flour ... waa ve ... 10 oz
» Unhusked .., or Nee, “: ~
Ghee ... sie Ea sie ae a
Ginger +,
Tumeric ee... files aes ra 2
Meat (to those who draw it) rae: ere
Dates see ons 1} 99

* For’ British this is just beyond a subsistence diet ;
for Indians it is Jess than a subsistence diet, and they
will run down on it, lose stamina and scurvy will increase.”

From March 11th, a concentrated soup was made for
all British troops, and issued in the evening—it was
greatly relished and appreciated.

131. From March 14th, British troops had the following
added to their rations twice a week ; butter 1} 0z.; bacon
1} oz. ; cheese 1 oz. This was continued for 14 days.

All units used the green herbs obtainable on the plain
as vegetables, from about the middle of March. The chief
of these herbs were: wild mustard, a species of clover,
mint, wild carrots, small kind of thistle, dandelion, and
plantain. Medical Officers were unanimously of opinion
that the use of this green stuff had a marked influence for
good in staying the progress of the epidemic of scurvy.

132. As there were some poisonous plants growing with
he herbs, samples of the edible and poisonous ones were
collected and placed in all Headquarters Offices for
comparison.

133. From about March 10th there was a very appro-

ciable decrease in the quantity of food cooked and sold in
the bazars, and on March 25th I entered in my diary:

*‘ No cakes or kababs are now being sold in bazars and
the amount of food-stuffs purchasable is quite nominal.”

“* March 29th, 1916. Interviewed A.D.S. re food supplies :

“‘ Salt is rapidly going down. I understand that
there is sufficient for British troops for a fortnight and
for Indians for only about five days. Advised that some
be got by aeroplane.” The A.D.S. after scouring the
town obtained 800 lbs. of salt. The ration issued was
about ;'; 0z. daily per man. Aeroplane at a later date,
dropped 80 lbs.

* March 30th, 1916. Owing to errors in calculations as
to quantity of barley available for issue, it is much to be
regretted that the 3 oz. now issued for parching will have
to be stopped. This pute Indians on a regular starvation
diet. The deductions will commence from April Ist,
1616.”

“ April 2nd, 1916. One of the main defects in the British
troops’ diet at present is the practical absence of hydro-
carbons—there is no fat on the horseflesh, and the great
deficiency of carbohydrates ; they get an 8-oz. loaf which
contains roughly only 6 ozs. of mixed wheaten flour and
barley.

“‘In the Indian troops and followers’ rations all the
proximate principles are deficient to a marked degree ;
their diet consists solely of 10 ozs. very inferior barley
flour and 1 oz. ghi.”’

134. On April 8th “‘ the question of still further lowering
the ration of barley flour was mooted by the A.Q.M.G.
I told him that the men were now on starvation rations,
in the technical sense of the income being greatly below
the kinetic output, that even the present rations continued
for a fortnight more would lead to many deaths. I sug-
gested that the food grain of the town Arabs should be
lowered instead of that of the troops who in every sense
as our defenders, have greatest claim on it.” The ghs
ration ceased from April 8th, 1916.

135. From April 10th, Indians received 7 ozs. of barley
flour per diem. ‘“‘ This (7 ozs. barley) with the green
stuff collected is all that non-horse-flesh eaters now
Teceive ; it is an absolute starvation ration and represents,
at most, 600 calories potential energy ; the normal ration
for field service for Indians is roughly 3,000 calories. It
is anticipated that the men at the end of a week on this
will be attenuated and many emaciated, that sickness
will increase and a certain number of men will succumb.
This reduction, however, has only been undertaken as
the result of dire military necessity and to ensure the
garrison holding out until the relief arrives. The Arabs
of the town have already been reduced in grain to less
than a subsistence scale.”

About the middle of February we wired for 7 lbs. of
saccharin. About 5 Ibs. were dropped by aeroplane on
April 2nd. It was insufficient to make a general issue
and was reserved for the hospitals, staffs, and officers of
the garrison.

136. As some men were suffering acutely from the pangs
of hunger, 2 lbs. of optum was got up by aeroplane and
14,000 one-grain pills given to medical officers of corps
units for issue to selected cases. It undoubtedly amelio-
rated the intensity of these men’s sensations.

British troops felt the want of tobacco greatly. One
day they told me that they were prepared to forego part
of their ration if they could get enough tobacco for a few
smokes a day. On April 14th I found the men of the
2nd Dorsets smoking three different kinds of substitutes—
dried used tea-leaves, powdered dry ginger, and dried and
broken-up orange leaves. Many officers were doing the
same.

April 10th, 1916. “‘ Still further reduction in rations will
take place from to-morrow. British, 5 ozs. flour, 1} lbs.
horse-flesh ; Indians, 65 ozs. (barley) flour and 12 ozs.
horse-flesh.”’

On the night of April 24th/25th the steamer “‘ Julnar”’
failed to get through to Kut. She, I was informed, had
250 tons of food on board, which it was stated would have
been sufficient for subsistence diet for from 16 to 20
days.

Sanitation of Garrison During the Defence.

137. The sanitation of the areas occupied by our troops
and followers was conducted on the principles detailed
in my statements for the periods (a), (6), and (c), and, even
under the conditions of the siege, gave rise to little trouble
and was carried out satisfactorily.

178

On December 3rd a sanitary officer was appointed to
each brigade, and the orders regarding chlorination of
water, incineration of night-soil and animal rubbish, etc.,
republished. Units that had lost their chlorinating
apparatus were supplied with others from the Medical
Depét. There were practically no difficulties encountered
in the trenches and fort, where the complete absence of
flies indicated that the sanitary work was conducted
secundum artem—pan system of removal of night soil asso-
ciated with deep burial, and absorption pits for urine ;
the water-supply was obtained from the river to which
communicating trenches were made and the water drawn
by hand pumps.

138. The sanitary task of the billeted areas was less
simple. Previous to the siege several public latrines were
erected for Arabs on the outskirts of the town. These
were kept clean by Arab sweepers who deserted when the
siege began. The latrines were taken over by the corps
units billeted in and near the town, and kept clean by an
establishment of our own. The night soil of these was
consumed in adjacent incinerators. Other latrines and in-
cinerators were erected to meet requirements. In the wet
weather the incinerators failed and deep burial had to be
resorted to. In the later stage of the siege incineration
was relinquished ; there was not enough stable refuse
(which was used as fuel) to keep it up. Urine pits were
employed throughout for the garrison in Kut.

Water-Supply of the Billeted Troops

Throughout the siege the water-supply question was an
exceedingly difficult one both as regards the billeted
troops and those in the neighbourhood of the town. For
the first few days water was drawn directly from the river,
but subsequently this was impossible on account of the
activity of the enemy’s snipers. Then trenches com-
municating with the river were made and pumps protected
by maheillahs, etc., were fixed. Even under this arrange-
ment casualities were frequent.

140, Later the water-supply was from three excava-
tions lined with canvas tarpaulins, each of 27,000 gallons
capacity and about 200 yards from the river. They were
connected with raised surface uncovered channels which
ran to the river and were filled by an oil-engine pump
working on the bank. Direct access to the channels
was prevented by a barbed wire fence. The water
from the reservoirs was drawn by hand pumps. Of the
three troughs two were used as settling reservoirs whence
the water was siphoned into the third from which the
supply was drawn. This arrangement ceased when the
level of the river fell below that of the suction pipe of
the pump and the banks fell in and blocked the sump ;
then hand pumps on the river bank had once more to be
resorted to. A similar reservoir excavated for the civilian
people reduced the casualtics from enipers. These
reservoirs were under cover.

141. A water-supply scheme for animals, horses, mules,
and battery bullocks, was also established in connection
with reservoirs at the East end of the town; this was a
great boon and saved many animals.

Disposal of the Dead.

142. As soon as the siege began separate burial places
were selected for British and Indian troops and followers ;
the British were interned in a small cemetery to the N.E.
of the town; the Indians in the old cemetery adjacent to
the brick kilns.

Disposal of Dead Animals.

143. The disposal of carcases of dead animals (horses,
mules, cattle, etc.) was associated with numerous diff-
culties. During the early stage of the siege, when the
mortality from snipers and gun fire was high, the carcases
were partially incinerated, and then deep buried, or they
were thrown into the river. In the mid-period of the
siege they were completely incinerated, heavy oil being
used to help in the process—deep burial was too big a
task to continue. Using the river became dangerous as
the men dragging the animals were sniped. Finally,
the carcases were deposited in a deep ravine, partially
incinerated and covered with two feet of earth. At the
time of capitulation we had to destroy a number of horses ;
these were placed in deep pits, shot in situ, and covered
with earth.

Sanstation of the Civil Town of Kut.

144. On December 4th, I appointed a health officer,
organized and started the sanitary work of the civil town.

This proved to be one of my heaviest duties throughout
the siege.

The sanitary personnel consisted of the health officer,
one British and one Indian N.C.O., and some privates from
British and Indian infantry units, several Indian and Arab
sweepers, six donkey boys and 12 donkeys for removal
of dry refuse; Arab coolies were employed when required
to assist in the work. The sanitary squad supervised the
work of the Arab sweepers and the donkey boys, and, as
far as was practicable, saw that the elementary sanitary
rules promulgated were duly observed.

The supervision of the conservancy was heavy; the
civil population used the thoroughfares as latrines, and
sweepers threw the night-soil in unauthorized places
instead of into the deep pits for the purpose ; disciplinary
measures had to be resorted to frequently. Sniping and
bombardment necessitated the trenching grounds being on
the confines of the town, and carrying on conservancy work
mainly at night when supervision was limited.

145. Rough latrines were improvised in various parts of
the town from which the ordure was regularly removed to
the deep trenches outside the town. Owing to the over-
crowding in some quarters the latrine accommodation was
insufficient ; a large number of houses had no privies at
all. To meet these cases latrines were erected on the roofa
and the excreta remaved daily and buried. This arrange-
ment was greatly interfered with during rainy days
Urine pits were excavated, but the Arabs continued to use
the thoroughfares and their own compounds as urinals.

When the siege began large quantities of dry refuse
which had been collected in heaps promiscuously in various
parts of the town for years had to be removed. As the
donkeys could not remove all this A.T. carts were used,
the refuse being put into gunny bags. The streets and
bazars were daily swept and the refuse deposited at the
dumping ground to the East of the town.

Flies.

146. For the first two months of the eiege the flies were
in smal] numbers only. During March and April, however,
they increased very considerably, and before the capitu-
lation were in swarms everywhere. Climatic conditions
and use of disinfectants were, to some extent, unfavourable
to their breeding to the end of February, then the rising
temperature, shortage of disinfectants and insanitary con-
dition of the town genera!ly fostered their multiplication.

147. The Health Officer and Military Governor were in
perpetual conflict with the Arabs of the town who persisted
in their insanitary practices which have heen already
alluded to. The custom of using the alluvial plain on
the outskirts of the town as a latrine having been inter-
fered with by the enemy’s snipers and bombardments,
the people defzcated in any available spot within the town,
mainly at night. The streets continued to be used as
urinals. Corporal punishment had little effect in stopping
these habits. Our sanitary squads went round the whole
town regularly and cleared up all visible filth. The
ultimate effect was that when the hot weather began,
about the time of the capitulation, the whole town was
distinctly malodorous. Kut was, of course, densely
overcrowded and housed considerably more people than
it did before the siege began.

148. The civil population experienced much difficulty
regarding its water-supply. After the first few days of
the siege all the approaches to the river were dangerous
as they were covered by the enemy’s snipers. This
necessitated the inhabitants drawing water after dark.
After December 20th, 1915, the enemy sniped everyone
coming to the bank. On December 28th, one girl was shot
dead, two women sustained gunshot fractures of the legs,
One man was hit in the head and another in the chest.
Covered trenches communicating with the river were made
on the Western side of the town. We assisted them as
mentioned in the last section.

149. Although the covered bazar was allocated to the
General and other hospitals, some shops were opened in
various parts of the town and the people started food
stalls in several of the main streets. The chief of these
was in No. 1 Avenue which was for the first three months
thronged with vendors and purchasers. There was 8
much smaller bazar in No. 3 Avenue. These were the
two bazars used by our troops and followers.

Separate shops for the sale of staple articles of food—
atta, barley flour, lentils, dried beans, dates and meat,
were opened for the sale of these articles to the civil
population only ; these were under the Military Governor.

INDEX TO COMMISSION’S REPORT.

N.B.—Roman numerals refer to Parts, and Arabic numerals to paragraphs of the Report.

A.
Abadan Island :

Oil refining works ... ae sae .. I, 19
Abu Rummanah Sas ae Se .. LV, ll
Admiralty ac aac im ial see LE, 2
Ahwaz :

Fighting at . a oe III, 3; IV,5
Aircraft :

Deficiency in as be ... VIII, 9-10

Nixon to report on ee see rae Pe

Pre-war conditions ... nt aie ens Day
Allegations against officers... Sih va 1,4
Amara :

ACCESS TO ... ou ater as oe 115

ADVANCE TO oe bag Sh IV

Medical Arrangements it In... . X, 21
Reasons for IV, 4, 6, 1: XI 6
Sanctioned a : =e ... LV, 6
Transport not considered in sanction-

ing ues seis See .. LX, 25

HOSPITAL... eon ae ike wee &, 14

OccuUPATION OF wad sua .. IV,5, 6,8
Ambulance :

(See Hospital Transport (Lanp); Field

Ambulances.)
Ammunition _... — VIT, 10; VIII, 5
Anglo-Persian Oil Company . 1,19; II, 2
Arabs :

Effect on, as objective’... ae II, 1, 4, 8
Armament ia .. VIII

(See also Artillery, Equipment, )

Army in India Committee .. see we XI, 35
Army, Indian

(See Indian Army.)
Army Transport Carts, use for wounded
(See Hospital Transport, (Lanp).)
Artillery :
Delay in applying for i as ... VIII, 3

Delayed by lack of transport __... VII, 2
Manufacture in India ams ee VIII, 3
Sent to Europe VIII, 3

Shortage... I, 23 ; VI, 3, 98 : VIII, 3, 4, 5
Asia: -
Delimitation for Intelligence purposes ... XI, 3
Aylmer, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Fenton J.
Command of Kut Relief Force... .. VII, 1
Omission to ascertain Kut supplies ... VII, 5
Protest against advance to Baghdad XI, 56
Aziziyeh :
Advance to ... ion Vid
Concentration at, protracted from lack of
transport aes See ie .. VI,6

Retirement to ss se ve co VAG
B.
Babtie, Surgeon-General Sir William :
Medical Administration of te X, 39-51
Report on Colaba Hospital, Bombay X, 53-55
Responsibility

Experience and, of... see X, 39, 45
For madical breakdown X, 39-51, 124; XII,
18

Baghdad :
ACCESS TO ... pe sate aut I, 16,17
ADVANCE TO
As possible objective IV,1; V, 1, 2, 3,6;
X, 81; X1,7
Cause and effect of _... 533 XII, 7
Character of V, 32; XI, 47

Correspondence as to Y, 5-8, 12, 14, 17, 18
Delay, effect of, on . V, 15; VI,6
Inter-Departmental Committee on

ee V, 11, 21-23,
Memoranda on... V, 4,19
Nixon’s plan as to TV, 2; “Y, 4-6, XI, 47
Optimism as to sce | We 95, 27 ; VI, 3
Political motives for ... V, 13, 15, 18, 26
Responsibility for —... — XII, 8,9
Sanctioned by Secretary of State ... V, 20
Stafis not consulted asto ... XI, 54, 56
Stopping, Possibility of sag V, 10, 25

Townshend’s protest against V, 28-31
Transport shortage and its effect on
IX, 5, 18

Transport shortage ignored in

sanctioning V, 22-24; IX, 25

INTELLIGENCE as to wee ae .-LX, 24
Bahrein :

Landing at... un bent IT, 4, 6
Barges.

(See Transport (River). Hospital Transport

(RIVER).)

Barjisiyah = a III, 4
Barrett, Lieut. Gen. Sir Ae:

INSTRUCTIONS Sok _ Ss .. II,9

OccuPATION OF Basra... sae .. II,6

TRANSPORT, RaILway suggested .. IX, 52

TRANSPORT, RIVER
Delay in ordering __... ses st 1X, T
Estimate oe sive we. LX, 25

Barrow, General Sir Edmund :
MEMORANDA by
RESPONSIBILITY for

II, 1; TII,1;V,19

Advance to Baghdad ... va XII, 8
Medical telegrams... sets . A, 78
Neglect to consider transport TX, 19
Base Supply Officer, Basra :
Secretiveness of Staff to... Se XI, 51
Basra :
ACCESS TO ... or see .. 1,13

BucHanan, Sir G., “at wo? .. IX, 45, 46
ConcESTION at ss os .. TX, 42, 44
DESCRIPTION OF ... ee cee 6. a 1S
HospiItaL... ms sce eae w. AX, 21
INTELLIGENCE as to me sed S66) dy cad
OBJECTIVE of expedition ... oy sve ED
OccCUPATION OF .... ae bay . II,6
Port Faci.ities
Need of I, 21, 22; IX, 41-47, 62; XI, 9,
45, 46; XII, 13.
Provision of ...V, 32; XI, 46
Statistics as to IX, 43, 46, 47
Time taken for discharge of supply
vessels .... .. IX, 46, 47
War Office, result of control on IX, 46

N.B.—Roman numerals refer to Parts, and Arabic numerals to paragraphs of the Report.

Basra Vilayet :

Limitation of operations to IV, 2,4; IX, 13

Biles, Sir John ... ve IX, 32, 33, 39

Bingley, aes General A Bex : . I, 10

Bisaitin . ae . IV, 5
Bombay :

HosPiTa.s

Colaba ... Be aes X, 53-55

Reform in arrangements X, 130 (d); XT,

35 (d)

Not visited by Commander-in-Chief X, 130 (8) ;
XI, 16; XII 35 (6)

Suitability as headquarters .. AIT, 4
Brunyate, Mr. J.B. :
Account of Indian Military Procedure XI, 12
Buchanan, Sir George :
Report on Basra TX, 46
Visits to Basra IX, 45-46
C.
Cabinet :
Baghdad advance
Committee appointed to consider ... V, 11
Political motives for ... .. V, 138, 15, 26
Objective April, 1915 .. V,8

Cabinet War Committee :
Responsibility for advance to Baghdad XII, 8, 9
Carter, Major R. Markham, I.M:S.:
CTESIPHON, WOUNDED FROM

Account of a .. AX, 60
Report to India on X, 66, 89
Report to Nixon on ; . X, 63
Resentment caused by report on ... X, 76
TRIBUTE TO ... 5 we. &, 119
Casualties :
Amara . IV, 8
Basra... rae :
Ctesiphon VI, 3, 5; X, 2
Hannah = VIL, i:
Kut Relief Force VIL, 27
Nasariyeh ... ... IV, 9
Sheikh Saad i VII, 10
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Austen :
Endorsed policy of Lord Crewe ... IV,7; V,9
Succeeded Lord Crewe as Secretary of State
IV,7;V,9
(See also sipabaeats of State.)
Chaplains a Sas ssi VIII 1¢
Charles, Sir Havelock :
Appointment as Medical Adviser tc Secre-
tary of State ... i ree? Car f
Chief of General Staff, India :
Communications with Nixon as to river
transport IX, 29
Cholera ... X, 106
Climate of Mesopotamia I, 18
Clothing for Troops :

Proposed supply from charitable sources VIII, 8

Unsuitable supplred - VIII, 8
Colaba Hospital, Bombay :
Official reticence as to defects X, 53-55
Commander-in-Chief :
BaGHpaD, ADVANCE TO
Attitude to - V2.5, 42:17
Responsibility for XII, 8
Staff not consulted on XI, 56

CLOTHING FOR TROOPS
Proposal to supply F from charitable
sources VIII, 8
Duatity oF FuNcTION
Delegation of authority recommended
AX, 130(b) ; XII, 30, 35(6)

Effect of XI, 10-12, 14; XII, 29

180

Commander-in-Chief (continued) :
HospPiTAL TRANSPORT, RIVER

Attitude to IX, 49
MepICAL BREAKDOWN
Attitude to X. 68, 89-96

Responsibility for, X.81, 99,126; XII, 19
MESOPOTAMIA, EXPEDITION

Attitude to : XII, 27

Responsibility for XI, 32
REINFORCEMENTS

Sent under compulsion .. III, 3; XI, 6
SIMLA

Unsuitability as headquarters of XI, 15-17
TOWNSHEND’S PROTEST

Knowledge of ... . V, 29
TRANSPORT, RAILWAY
Attitude to IX, 56

TRANSPORT, RIVER

Attitude toshortage ... V;12,24; XI, 43
Reference to shortage suppressed by
Viceroy ° she ... Vy, 12
Responsibility for shortage | a IX, 19
VINCENT-BINGLEY ComMrsston
Appointed by ... X, 69
Limitation of terms of reference X, 98

Memorandum on ee i . I, ll
(See APPENDIX IJ.)
Visits TO BomBay AND MESOPOTAMIA
Need for X, 130 (b); XI, 16;
XIT, 5, 35 (6)
Communications between Secretary of State

and Viceroy XI, 18-26
CLASSIFICATION OF . .. Al, 20
PRIVATE ” XI, 23-26

Effect on Coineils a we AL, 26

Effect on medical arrangements of

| XI, 29-30
Need of statutory action as to . XI, 3L
TELEGRAMS, PRIVATE I, 29; V,25; XI,

18-33; XII, 28
Conclusions :

Summary of XII, 1-27
Control :

Mesopotamia Expedition VII, 31; XII, 2, 4

Overseas expeditions from India I, 28

Co-ordination :

Effect of lack of VIII, 17; XI, 50-56; XII,
2, 12, 31
Council, India:
(See Secretary of State.
Council, Indian Executive.
(See Viceroy. Council.)
Cowper, Major-General M. :
Reprimand to sei Be X, 765
Secretiveness of Staff to
Cox, Sir Percy:

Political Officer to Expedition II, 8,9; III,1;

Council.)

XI, 43
XI, 52

IV, 2
Suggestion of Advance to Baghdad Vy i523
XI, 7
Opposed expulsion of Arabs from Kut ... VII, 7
Creagh, General Sir O’Moore:
Appointment and régime ... . I, 23
Protests against economy . i Al, 36
Crewe, The Most Honourable the Marquess
of
Succeeded as Secretary of State by Mr.
Chamberlain 1V,7; V, 9
(See also Secretary of State. )
Ctesiphon :
ACCOUNT OF VI, 4,5
ADVANCE TO VI
CASUALTIES ... z: Be sel VED
Under- sapanation of ... VI,3; X, 23

EVAcuaTION oF WounDED VI, 3,7; x, 58-61

N.B.—Roman numerals refer to Parts, and Arabic numerals to paragraphs of the Report.

181

Ctesiphon (continued) :

Forces at VIII, 13
MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS aT . X, 23-26, 58
Official reticence as to X, 25, 57-68
REPORTS on condition of wounded from
X, 66, 89, 90
D.
Dallas, Colonel :
Secretiveness of Staff to AL, 51
Davison, Major-General K. S.
Responsibility for port administration
IX, 43, 44
Secretiveness of Staff to . XI, 51
Delamain, Major-General W.S. :
Command of expedition . Il, 6
Instructions to . II,8
Delhi ue Sea XI, 13
Despatches :
of Sir P. Lake ste I, 12
Director of Medical Services, ‘India :
Changes in occupancy of office X, 116

Greater powers recommended X, 130(a); XII,
35

Director of the Royal Indian Marine :
Need of improved status .... IX, 69; XII, 33
(See also Lumsden, ee Indian Marine. )

Disinfection . X, 18
Drafts __... a VII, 11-14
For British troops sie , V,14; VIII, 13
For Indian troops ... ae I, 28; VIII, 14
Dressings ng ae o . X, 14
Drugs _... . A, 14
Duff, General Sir Beauchamp :
(See Commander-in-Chief.)
Dujailah Redoubt :
Attack on VII, 11-22
E.
East Africa :
Expeditions to I, 27

(See also Expeditions | Overseas. )
Economy: Poticy oF, in Inpia I, 23; XI, 34-43

EFFECT ON
Army .. VITI, 2 ; XI, 34-43 ; XII,32
Equipment . VIII, 2; XI, 36; XII, 10

Medical Arrangements X, 126 (a); XII, 19 (a)
Officers X, 52; XI, 37-39, 42; XII, 31
Port Facilities ... IX, 40, 44; XI, 9
Transport, Railway IX, 54-58; XI, 9
RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIII,2; X,126; XII, 10

Egypt :
Expedition to I, 27
Safety of, as objective si ted SEE,
(See also Expeditions Overseas. )
Embarkation :

X, 130 (c) ; XII, 35 (c)
X, 130 (6) ; XII, 35 (b)

Duties of officers
Officers recommended
England :

Neglect to apply for al to X, 109
Offers of help from 3 X, 110
Transport (river) ordered in ‘IX, 8, 9, 31-39
Enver Pasha in evs, “ALS
Equipment Bae VIII
Effect of economy 0 on VILL, 2: XL 36; XII,

Effect of War Office control on ... a ll
Expeditions overseas I, 28

Frontier warfare, suitability for L 23-6 : II, 7;
VIII, 1; XI, 36, 39; XII. 10, 39
I, 23, oA > VII, 3, 28 ; VIII, 1, 2,

Inadequate
5-10; XI, 1, 36; XII, 5

Equipment (continued) :

Need of, suited to climate I, 21

Sources of I, 26
Es Sinn :

Account of battle ... VII, 11-22

Medical arrangements .. A, 30
Euphrates :

Navigation difficulties I, 16
Evacuation of wounded.

(See Wounded.)
Evidence :

Principal sources of ‘ies sai . 13,8

Publication of <i : I, 9
Expeditions Overseas from India. L 27-30

+ Transport of I, 28; IX, 27; X, 130; XI, 35
(See also Indian ‘Army. MILITARY OpsEcTIVES.)
Expedition to Mesopotamia.
(See Mesopotamia Expedition.)

Fans, Electric ... . Xx, 15
Field Ambulances :

Pre-war standard ... Soe aby 24

Shortage of X, 3, 27, 35, “46, 114, 122; XII, 16

Use as general hospitals X, 35, 113

Field Service Regulations as to:
Reinforcements . VIII, 12-14
Transport, River IX, 20-23

Finance :

Attitude of Indian Government to XI, 40-42;

XIT, 32
Expenditure on expeditions overseas I, 28
(See also Economy.)

Findings :

General ; XII, 1-27
Medical X, 120-129 ; XIT, 14-22
Transport IX, 62; AIT, 13

Floods :

Kut relief force delayed oy .. VII, 25, 27 |

Tigris subject to... ; I, 18; TX, 15

Turkish forces delayed by sa LV gD
Food.

(See Rations.)

Forces, Size of XII, 12
October, 1914 . IAL4
November, 1914 II, 6-7
March, 1915 - _ IU, 3
April, 1915 ... as .. ITI, 4; IV, 5
October, 1915 se aay .. V, 29
November, 1915 VI, ‘L, 2; VIII, 13
January, 1916 . VE 1

(See also Reinforcements. 7
France :
Divisions from (See Reinforcements.)
Expedition to ; $6
(See also » Expeditions overseas. )
Fuel or re oe -

Gorringe, Major-General Sir are Fes
Karun fighting ee aes
Nasariyeh captured by... sat aw LV, 9

Government of India Act.

(See India.)

Governor General of India.

(See Viceroy.)

Haig, Sir Douglas :

Memorandum on military objectives XI, 36

N.B.—Roman numerals refer to Parts, and Arabic numerals to paragraphs of the Report.

(C 48—176)

2 A

182

Hamilton, Commander Anthony, R.I.M.

Demands for river transport IX, 7
Secretiveness of staff to XI, 51
Survey of Tigris IX, 7, 24
Hammar Lake :
Navigation ... .. 1,16
Hannah, Battle of fs VII, 10
Medical arrangements at ... X, 27, 28 °
Hardinge of Penshurst, Lord.
(See Viceroy.)
Hathaway, Surgeon-General H. G.:
Misleading reports by X, 56-65, 71-74
Resentment of suggestions for reform . &, 76
Responsibility for :
Hospital river transport ... IX, 48-49
Medical Breakdown X, 123; XII, 17
Reticence, Undue ... : X, 73, 74
Sanitary work of .. &, 106
Secretiveness of staff to .. XI, 53
Hehir, Colonel P.:
Medical Administration of X, 32-38
Medical Arrangements
Ctesiphon ... X, 26
Kut Siege ee . X, 31
(See also APPENDIX ITT. )
Suggestions for reform resented ... .. A, 76
Help :
Neglect to apply to England for ... X, 109
Offers of, from England X, 110

Holderness, Sir Thomas :

Chairman of Inter-Departmental Committee

V, 21-23
Interpretation of Nixon’s oe on
transport

Home Government :

Attitude to economy

Co-ordination with Indian Govt., “Lack of
VIII, 17; XII, 12

. V, 22
. XI, 36

Objective not realised by ... ; . I,5
Responsibility for advance to Baghdad
XII, 8, 9
Hospitals in India (Mizirary):
BomBay :
Colaba Hospital X 53-55

Reform in arrangements X, 1380 (d); XII,
35 (d)
Reticence as to defects X, 53-55
Revision of mobilisation equipment recom-
mended X, 130 ( W) XII, 35 (f)
Standard, pre-war ... .. I, 24
For Britis Troops:
Improvement recommended X, 130 ; XII, 35
For Inpian Troops
Station hospital system recommended
X, 130; XII, 35

Training of menial reserves recom-

mended X, 130; XII, 35

Hospitals in Mesopotamia :
Accommodation, required . I, 21
Amara Sod we A, T4
Basra, May, 1915 . X, 21
Orah . ; . xX, 74
Sheikh Saad — sat Xx, 71, 72
Shortage ree. 11, 34-35, 47, 111- 113

Hospital Transport (Lanp) :
Army Transport Carts, use of ... X, 37, 38, 50
Motor AMBULANCES we X, 13
Used by Turks.. X, 13
MULEs, Riding ive X, 12, 37
RESPONSIBILITY for providing sii, ey DO
SHORTAGE ae. X, 12, 13, 38
See caused oe X, 122; XII, 16
STRETCHERS .. ; . Xx, 37
TONGAS 7 Xx, 12, 50

Hospital Transport (River) :
BarcE “‘ BENGALI” IX, 48; X, 7, 49

Hospital Transport (River)—continued
CONDITION OF WOUNDED on steamers VI, (i.
23, 28, 57-61, 89, 90
DEMANDS FoR IX, 48, 49, 62 ; X, 21, 36; XII, 13

LacK OF _... ; x, 6-8, 36
Effect of IX, 49; X, 79, 112, 122
Responsibility for IX, 49; X, 49

SUPPLY OF IX, 48-50
Alteration of specifications for TX, 50

Howitzers wih bie me Ses VIII, 4
I.

Ice X, 16, 17

India :

Assistance to Empire eas a I, 27-30

Government and administration of XI, 18-22

Government of India Act XI, 20-24

(See also Indian Government.)
Internal Troubles ... . XI, 5,40; XII 23
Resources... .. 1, 26; VIII, 3
Mobilisation of. . XI, 28, 33, 41
Transport, River
Provision of IX, 7, 10, 14, 17, 24-30
Voluntary contributions to expedition
IX, 48; X, 7, 49, 50, 110
India Council :
(See Secretary of State.
India Office :
DirecToR GENERAL OF STORES

Council.)

Responsibility for aaa aula .. 1X, 39
MEDICAL ADVISER ... a6 . &, 78
MILITARY DEPARTMENT

Powers a ‘ ww. AI, 4

Responsibility as : to transport .. TX, 19
Minirary SECRETARY

(See Barrow, General Sir E.)

Nixon’s Instructions, Knowledge of IV, 3-4
PoLicy OF ECONOMY sas XI, 35

, TRANSPORT, RIVER
Knowledge of shortage ane IX, 19

Lynch Brothers not consulted IX, 31-32,
36, 37
Re-erection arrangements .. EX, 39

Supply of . IX, 9, 33-39, 62 XI, 13
India Office and Indian Government :

Division of responsibility unworkable... XII, 2

Discrepancies in attitude to campaign ... XI,8
Indian Army :

ConDITION OF, at outbreak of war I, 23-26

DELHI as capital, effect on . XI, 13

Economy, efiect on I, 23; VIII, 2; XI, 34-43;
XII, 32

Equipment. (See Equipment.)
Miuirary OsJectives VIII, 2; X, 77, 79, 81;
XI, 36; XII, 10

OFFICERS
Allegations against... ae 2:
Economy, effect on ...X, 52 ; XI, 37-39, 42
Promotion se ae XII, 31
Reticence X, 52, 76
Supply of — I, 26
Taken by War Office .. we ... I, 26

RESERVE SYSTEM VIII, 14; XIJI1,32

UNPOPULARITY ie a XII, 31

(See also Indian Military Administration.)
Indian Executive Council.
(See Viceroy. Council.)
Indian Government :
Attitude to campaign III, 4; XI, 6, 40; XII,5
Criticism of i XU, 26, 27
Delay in applying for artillery VIII, 3

N.B.—Ronian numerals refer to Parts, and Arabic numerals to paragraphs of the Report.

183

Indian Government (continued).
Economy. (See Economy.)
Equipment. (See Equipment.)
Finance Department. (See Finance.)
Intelligence. (See Intelligence.)
Medical Personnel. (See Medical Personnel.)

Procedure. (See Indian Military Adminis-
tration.)
Reinforcements. (See Reinforcements.)

Transport, Railway
Attitude to
Responsibility for

Transport, River

. IV, 12; IX, 51-61
yee .. TX, 61

Failure to supply available IX, 28-30
Intelligence of available IX, 24-26
Responsibility for shortage ... .. IX, 23

Indian Military Administration :
Dualism XJ, 10, 11, 12

Organisation XL 10-17 ; XI, 27

Over-centralisation XI, 11, 13, 14; XII, 29
Indian Military Authorities :

Attitude to transport IX, 62 (a2); XII, 13(a)

Responsibility for transport IX, 62 (d); XII,

13 (d)

Indian Soldiers’ Fund see - X, 110
Inspector-General of Communications : :

Hospital steamer refused by .. IX, 48

Responsibility for port administration IX, 42-44

Secretiveness of staff to . AL, 51
Instructions to:

Barrett, Sir A. - II, 9

Delamain, Major- General . II, 8

Nixon, Sir J. IV, 2,3, 4,6; 5V, 45 1X, 13; XI, 6,

8, 44-50
Intelligence :
Delimitation of areas XI, 2,3
Difficulty of obtaining ... XI, 48
Handbook on .. IX, 24
Inadequacy of XI, 3,5
Indian Government ... IX, 24
Nixon’s attitude to . :.. XI, 48
Inter-Departmental Committee :
Appointment of ay Noll
Composition and procedure of V, 21-23

James, Colonel :
Statistical evidence of, as toSickness X, 107-108
Jehad :

Attempts to raise ... II, 3

Karun River :
Navigation ..
Operations on
Kemball, Major-General G. Vie
Memotanduin on river transport IV, 13; IX, 8,

ds I, 19, 20
III, 3; IV, 5, 15

17, 19
Operations against Dujailah Redoubt VII, 11-22
Visits to Townshend se : seer Vy 2

Keogh, Sir Alfred:

Criticism of medical arrangements in India

X, 130; XII, 35

Kurna :
Access to I, 14
Advance to ... bas, - LE
Sanction of ~ TIL, 2; XII,6
Capture of . III, 2
Occupation of . Il, 1

Kut :
ACCESS TO : a I, 16
ADVANCE TO 4 IV
Correspondence a as to. ‘IV, 10; V,6
Sanction of IV, 10: XIL 6
Transport, shortage in IX, 18. 25
ADVANTAGES of possession of .. LV, 16
CAPITULATION . VII, 6, 28
CAPTURE . IV, 11; V,7

Medical Arrangements a at IV, 15; X, 22, 56

Transport, effect of eer . V, 31
INVESTMENT OF VI, 8 ; VII, 6
RELIEF OPERATIONS oe VII

Casualties VII, 27

Causes of failure VII, 28

Causes of premature start VII, 4, 5

Difficulties and deficiencies VI, 3; VII, 25-

27
Medical Arrangements X, 27-31
Transport, effect of shortage IX, 3, 5, 62;
XII, 13

(See also Tigris te )
RETIREMENT TO... . VI, 5

SIEGE :

Account of VII, 6, 7, 28
Caste difficulties VII, 28
Medical Arrangements sue ey OL
Moral ... VII, 28
Retention of Arab population VII, 7
Supplies in ... VII, 4, 5, ; X, 122

(See also APPENDIX IIT.)

L.
Lake, Lieutenant-General Sir P.:

Command taken by VII, 1
Despatches of site Bs ses 112
Knowledge of condition of ‘wounded after
. Ctesiphon ve X, 67, 90
Nixon’s plan of advance endorsed by... v, 5
Policy after fall of Kut VI, 30
Transport, attitude to railway IX, 56, 59
Lukis, Sir Pardey X, 100-104
Lumsden, Captain W.:
KNOWLEDGE of :
Scope of expedition .. [X, 27
Transport available .. LX, 30
Transport shortage .. IX, 27
SupPPty of :
.. [X, 50

Hospital river transport i

River transport IX, 28, 30, 62 ; XI, 13

(See also Director of the Royal Indian Marine. )
Lynch Brothers :

Failure to consult ... IX, 32, 36, 37

Knowledge of Tigris river craft . LX, 31

Steamer service es I, 20
M.

VITT, 5

Machine Guns ... ;
MacNeece, Surgeon-General J.G.:
Letter. to Sir P. Lake on condition of

wounded after Ctesiphon X, 67, 90
Responsibility for medical breakdown X, 125:
XII, 18
Visit to Mesopotamia .. A, 69, 97, 98 -
Magill ;
Port facilities .. LX, 42
Mahailas :

(See Transport (RivEx).)

N.B.—-Roman numerals refer to Parts, and Arabic numerals to paragraphs of the Report.

(C 48—176)

2A 2

184

Maude, Sir Stanley :

Operations at Sanaiyat VII, 23, 24
Policy after fall of Kut - VII, 30
Medical Administration of :
Babtie, Surgeon-General X, 39-51
Hehir, Colonel ve X, 32-38
Medical Adviser to SECRETARY OF STATE ... X, 78
Medical Arrangements :
To April, 1915 .. A, 33
May, 1915 we &, 21
Summer, 1915 rr wee MX, O2
To November, 1915 ... A, 80
January, 1916 se X, 27-29
March, 1916, onward xX, 30, 31, 100-104,
115, 120
Amara ee X, 21, 74
Commander- in-Chief :
Attitude to reports of deficiencies X, 89-96

Conclusions, findings and recommenda-
tions .... X, 100-130; XII, 14-22, 34-36
Ctesiphon : ; . X, 23-26, 58

: X, 126
X, 17, 79-81, 120
X, 115, 121, 122

Economy, effect on..
Insufficiency of
Effect of

Karun River operations ee LIV, 15

Kut, first battle of ... IV, 15; X, 22, 56

Kut relief operations X, 27-31

Kut siege... ashi ae OL
(See also APPENDIX Ill. )

Nasariyeh IV, 15; X. 21

X, 130; XII, 35

Recommendations a as 3 to
Responsibility as to

Economy : X, 126
Redistribution recommended. X, 117, 118
Telegrams as to : . vA, 78
Reticence, Misuse of official X, 127
Sahil, Battle of we A, 34
Sheikh Saad camp . X, 71, 72
Secretary of State, Enquiries as to .. &, 68,

83-86 ; XI, 29, 30
(See also Wounded, Evacuation OF)

Medical Arrangements in India :
Criticism by Sir A. Keogh X, 130; AIT, 35
Medical Breakdown ... .. &, 21, 111-115, 120
Responsibility for ... X, 77-99 123-126
Medical Equipment :

INSUFFICIENCY OF. I, 21; 11,7; III, 4;

IV, 15; X, 9, 10, 14-17, 79, 111; XI, 1
Responsibility for a . X, 39
Misleading report as to . X, 70

Medical Establishment :
At outbreak of war se sas .. =, 24

Original for Force ‘‘ D ”’ . X, 10
Medical Personnel :

Delay in asking England for .. &, 48, 78, 109

Praise of executive X, 105, 129

Recommendations as to, for hospitals in
India X, 130 (d), (e); XII, 35 (d), (e)
Retained in India ... X, 48, 81

SHORTAGE I, 24; IV, 15 ; xX, 2, 9, 10, 46,
71, 82,109; XI, 1

Effect of sis - x, 122
Misleading report on ... X, 70, 82
Responsibility for . XX, 10, 48
Secretary of State’s knowledge of ... X, 78
Transport as affecting X, 111

Medical Stores :

Base Depots recommended X, 130; XII, 35
Reserves... ai oe sas .. I, 24
Shortage . X, 14
Supply arrangements X, 14-17

Meyer, Sir William is
Military Department, India Office :

Moral

‘« Medjidieh ”’ :

Alteration of type ... bis IX, 31-35
Condition of wounded on, after Ctesiphon

X, 60, 61
Melliss, Major-General Sir C. J. ... . III, 4
Mesopotamia
Commander-in-Chief, Omission to visit XII, 5
Intelligence as to IX, 24; XI, 3,5
MacNeece, Visit to . ..&, 69, 97, 98
Physical and Climatic peculiarities I, 13-22
Resultant diseases : .. X, 106
Mesopotamia Expedition :
Control assumed by War Office ... VU, 31
Equipment. (See Equipment.)
Forces, Size of. (See Forces.)
J ustification of ie .. SII, 1
Objectives. (See Objectives. )
Origin. (See Origin.)
Policy controlled by War Office ... VII, 31
Responsibility for
Division of : is X, 77; XI, 1-9
Of Viceroy’s Council ... XI, 27, 28, 32
Results of Jeg XII, 24

IX, 55; XI, 41
(See India Office.)

Military Member :

(See Viceroy. Council.)

Mobilisation of Resources :

(See India.)

ree XI, 1; XII, 25

Kut Relief Force ? i VII, 8, 29

Townshend’s Force IV, 16: V, 29, 30; VI, 6,7
Kut siege , ove VII, 28

N.
Nasariyeh :
Access to... ies ou ae .. I, 16
Capture of ... ... IV,9

“IV, 15; X, 21

Medical arrangements at

Railway to, proposals for building IX, 52-61
Navigation :

Kuphrates... ae snd as .. I, 16

Hammar Lake S25 Nee oe .. 1,16

Intelligence as to : IX, 24

Karun River I, 19, 20

I, 13-14

Shatt-el-Arab ee a
I, 14-18; IX, 15, 16, 33, 34

Tigris...

Nicholson Committee :

(See Army in India Committee.)

Nixon :

APPOINTMENT OF III, 4; IV, 1; XI, 6,
44-50
Change of tactics on ... XI, 14, 4447
BAGHDAD, ADVANCE TO
Responsibility for ae XII, 8
Staff not consulted before ... XI, 54, 56
(See also Baghdad.)
INSTRUCTIONS TO IV,2; V,4; IX, 13;
XI, 6, 8, 44-50
Knowledge of Viceroy and India
Office of ... IV, 3

INTELLIGENCE as to Turkish tondea V, 95 : “XT, 48
INVALIDED HoME — VI, 1
MepicaL BREAKDOWN

Knowledge of ... ss a we &, 63

Responsibility for IX, 49; X, 123
OPTIMISM IV, 11; V, 25; VI, 3; XI, 49
REINFORCEMENTS, Views as to... V,18
SUPPLIES IN KuT

Omission to ascertain Rae VII, 5

N.B.—Roman numerals refer to Parts, and Arabic numerals to paragraphs of the Report.

185

Nixon (continued) :
TRANSPORT. Port FAaciLities
Provision of
TRANSPORT, RAILWAY
Demand for
TRANSPORT, RIVER
Demands for

IX, 40; XI, 46
. TX, 53-58; XI, 41

IV, 12; V, 24; IX, 8
10, 26, 29

IX, 26; XI, 48, 49
TX, 11-23, 28, 49,

Miscalculations as to ...
Responsibility as to...

62; XII, 13
Telegram on navigation difficulties ... V, 12
Interpretations of V, 22, 24
Northbrook, Lord :
Offer of medical personnel . X, 82
Nursing Service in hospitals in India:
Improvement needed X, 130; XII, 35
O.
Objectives of Expedition :
26th September, 1914... II, 1
5th October, 1914 II, 4
March, 1915 IX, 13
April, 1915 IV, 4-6
After fall of Kut VII, 30
Baghdad. (See Baghdad.)
Barrett, Sir A., Instructions to II, 9
Basra... IT, 9

Delamain, Major- General, ‘Instructions to II, 8

Lack of defined TI, 5; II,1; X1,7
Xi 3
Effect of, on medical arrangements... X, 81

Nixon, Sir John, instructions to
(See Nixon.)

Offensive, Change to IV, 1; XI, 4447

Changes necessitated by XI, 45, 46
Political considerations, Effect of... . V, 26
O’Donnell, Surgeon-General X, 100
Officers :
(See Indian Army, OFFIcErRs, and
Medical Personnel. )
Oil Installation ay ; 26 . 119
As objective ‘IL, 1, 2, 4,8; III, 3;
IV, 2, 3,4; IX, 13
Orah hospital : ww. A, 74
Ordnance, Deputy-Director of:
Secretiveness of Staff to ; XI, 51
Origin of campaign Il, 1; XII, 1-9
Over-Centralisation.

(See Indian Military Administration.)
Overseas Expeditions.
(See Expeditions Overseas.)

Parsimony :
(See Economy.)
Persia :

Neutrality to be respected... . I,8; IV, 2

Physical Peculiarities or Mesopotamia IJ, 13-22
Intelliyvence as to IX, 24
Policy :
(See Objectives of Expedition.)
Port Facilities :
(See Basra, Magill, ore a
Powers of Commission cs I, 2
Prestige :
Effect on, of failures of campaign... .. XII, 7
Principal Marine Transport Officer :
Secretiveness of Staff to XI, 51

Procedure of Commission ... I, 1-12
. MepicaL ARRANGEMENTS
Inadvisability of interim report I, 5

REASONS FOR NOT VISITING INDIA OR

MESOPOTAMIA ... I, 3
Q.
¢
Quartermaster-General, India :

TRANSPORT, RIVER
Responsibility for IX, 27
Shortage not appreciated by... IX, 27

R.
Railway :
(See Transport, (Lanp).)
Rations :

Kut siege. Caste difficulties VII, 28

Misleading reports on . X, 74

Need of varied I, 21

Neglect to improve aa X, 41, 42

Recommendations as to X, 1380; XII, 35

Shortage from lack of transport VIII, 2; XI, 1;

XIT, 11

Sickness due to * X,41; XII, 11

War Office control, effect on XII, 11
Recommendations :

General . .. ALI, 28-36

As to medical arrangements X, 130:;; XII, 35

Red Cross Society _... ..&, 110

Reinforcements em VIII, 11, 15-18 ; XII, 12

November, 1914 : II, 6

February, 1915 2; . IT, 3

March, 1915 . I, ‘3; IV, 2

May, 1915 se ae LV 46

October, 1915 ... Vv, 14, 16, 28, 29

BaGHpaD, ADVANCE TO... V, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20

DIvISIONs FROM FRANCE . ae : V, 16

Delay in arrival of medical units “VIL, i;
X, 3, 27, 114, 122
INDIAN GOVERNMENT

Attitude asto .... III, 3; V, 17; XI, 6
RESPONSIBILITY for ... VIII, 15-18
TRANSPORT, RIVER

Lack of, causes delay ... IV, 13; VI, 3;

VII, 28; IX. 3, 8, 62; XI, 49; XII, 13

Increased need of to carry .. TX, 18
Report, Period covered by I,8
Resources :
(See India, see ae
Reticence, Misuse of .. *; 52-76
Hatuaway ae on . &, 74
INTOLERANCE of entice at xX, 76
MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS ... X, ‘127; “XI, 20
Colaba Hospital, eed x 53-55
Ctesiphon ee .. &, 25, 57-68
Kut, First battle of .. A, 56
Sheikh Saad Camp X, 71, 72
MEDICAL BREAKDOWN x, 68

MeEpIcAL PERSONNEL and Equipment X X, 70, 82

SANITATION ... . &, 83
Unpvur, None in Tater stages ‘of cam-
paign X, 75
WATER SUPPLY X, 74
Reserve System.
(See Indian Army.)
Ridsdale, Mr. E. A. ... I, 10
River Hospital Steamers.
(See Hospital Transport (RIveERr).)
River Steamers.
(See Transport (RIVER).)
Roads :
Absence of ... .. LX, 24
Kut to Baghdad rare as i
Rotah, Battle of X, 37, 38

N.B.—Roman numerals refer to Parts, and Arabic numerals to paragraphs of the Report.

186

R.A.M.C.
Need for, in hosnitala in India X, 130; XII, 35
Royal Indian Marine :

Intelligence as to Tigris sia eane Ro. 24
Status and functions site 1X, 63-69

Need of improved 1X, 63 64; XII, 33
Training, suitability of IX, 42, 43
Transport of troops IX, 27, 66

(See also Director of Royal Indian Marine,
and Lumsden.)

S.
Sahil, Battle of - ar X, 34, 38
St. J ohn Ambulance Association X, 110
Sanaiyat, Battle of oes ... WII, 23-26
Medical Arrangements at . , X, 31

Sanitary Committee (War OrFIce) X, 42, 104, 108
Sanitation :
Preparations X, 18, 19, 106, 128
Report on... . X, 83

Reserve Staff recommended Xx, 130 (h) ;
XII, 35 (h)
Scurvy oe. Me ves w. &, 41

Secretary of State :
BacupaD, Advance to
Attitude to

V, 2, 3, 6, 10, 13, 14, 20
Responsibility for Bos

XII, 8, 9

CHAMBERLAIN succeeds CREWE as’ IV,7; V,9
CoMMUNICATIONS with Viceroy.
(See Communications.)
Economy, Attitude to X, 126; XI, 35;
XII, 10, 19
KEMBALL’S Nisiienaeoun not shown to ie 19
MEDICAL ADVISER appointed ints . X, 78

MEpIcAL ARRANGEMENTS
Enquiries as to X, 68, 83-86 ;
XI, 29, 30
Responsibility as to ... X, 77-99, 126
MEDICAL PERSONNEL
Knowledge of shortage ie gia dny 10

Nrxon’s INSTRUCTIONS

Knowledge of . ... IV, 3, 4, 6
OBJECTIVES, Definition 6: IL, 4; III, 2;
. IV, 4, 6, 10; V, 8

RELATION TO CoUNCIL XI, 19-22

Recommendations as to io XIT, 28
(See also India Office.)
Secretary of State for India in Council :

Statutory Powers ... us .. AI, 18-22
Secretary of State. Council XI, 19-22; XII,
28

Private telegrams, effect on status ... AL, 26
Responsibility for advance to Baghdad XII, 8
Statutory rights of members ne ... &I, 21

Secretiveness of Staff in Mesopotamia :
(See Staff, oe eobewnnen
Shadi... . VI, 5

Shaiba, Battle of JI, 4; X, 38
Shatt-el-Arab :
Navigation ... I, 13, 14
Sheikh Saad :
Battle of _... spe “ies a: VIT, 10
Casualties ea . eas VII, 10
Medical arrangements at oe X, 27, 28
Medical arrangements at camp | X, 71, 72
Townshend at ae aes ie ede TI
Sickness :
Due to rations 5 X, 41; XII, 11
Due to water supply ais ee we A, 74
Preventive work ae X, 106, 128
Probability of s8% ses = ree ey

Statistics as to X, 107, 108

Simla :
As headquarters of Commander-in-Chief
. XI, 15,17; XII, 4, 30
Staff, General, India :
Baghdad. Advance to—

Memoranda on... bak aie .. V,4

Responsibility for _... 5a XI, 56
Bombay as headquarters of oe XII, 4
Intelligence as to Mesopotamia ... IX, 24
Transport, Shortage—

Knowledge of . wu ... TX, 25, 26

Responsibility for. ae IX, 19

Staff, General Imperial, London :
Baghdad, Advance to— |
Memoranda on bas ats .. V,19
Staff, Mesopotamia :
Baghdad, Advance to—

Inadequate consultation as to XI, 54, 56
Conferences ... cae aa XI, 53
Co-ordination, Tack of .. M1, 50-56
Kut Relief Force -... ue ree .. VI,3

Secretiveness of _... sins .. M1, 50-56
Stone, Local Supplies of ste .. 1,16

Stretchers. (See Hospital Transport,
(LaNpD).)
Sunstroke ee. ea bei I, 18; VIII, 7
Supplies :
Kut Siege... ee VII, 4, 5
Organisation after fall of Kut a VIT, 30
Supply Member.
(See Viceroy. Council. )
Sweepers che wea ww. X, 18
qT:
Tactics
Change to offensive .. IV,1; XI, 4447
Effect on port facilities XI, 45, 46

Telegrams, Private. (See Communications.)
Tel-el-Kebir - VII, 13, 15, 18

Tents... ssc Ss 1,18; VIII, 7
Terms of Reference an a sah Ses “ee
Tigris :

Floods, subject to ... st . 1,18; 1X, 15

Lynch Brothers’ knowledge of IX, 31, 39, 36, 37
Navigation difficulties I, 14-16 ; IX, 15, 16, 33,

34
Intelligence as to x ive .o LX, 24
Survey sak =e sie _ IX, 7, 24
Tigris Corps :
Commanded by Sir F. ae itis sae? Ved
Composition - st say ky
Equipment ... 53h ss sti VII, 28
Moral 2% : .. VII, 8, 29
(See also Kut, RELIEF OPERATIONS.)
Timber ... ds — sui sie .. I, 16
Tongas.

(See Hospital Transport (Lanp).)
Townshend, Major-General C. V. F.:

Amara, Capture of .. si Sl .. IV,8

Baghdad, Advance bo:

Protest against are bes V, 28-31
Command of 6th Division bis voce AN ei
Divisional order issued by fue ... V,10
Kemball’s visits to ... Ae ais ... V,29
Kut, Capture of _... ve seg ee oe |
Kut Siege, Supplies in re VII, 4, 5
Popularity ... es ai .. VI, 28
Reinforcements sent 6 . V, 28, 29
Statement as to condition of troops Jas Vg 29
Turkish forces, not told of a .. V,3l

N.B.—Roman numerals refer to Parts, and Arabic numerals to paragraphs of the Report.

187

Transport (LAND) :
AMBULANCE. (See Hospital Transport.

ANIMAL eae IV, 2
IMPRACTICABLE in wet weather ‘ ee 17; 1X, 15
Motor 3 IV, 2: X, 13
(See also Hospital Transport. )
RAILWAY... : = IX, 51-61
Barrett, suggested by ss TX, 52
Construction, Cost and time of 1X, 60
Development of VII, 30

Indian Government :

Attitude to . IV, 12; IX, 51-61

eee for is IX, 61
Need of i ; = ia X19
Nixon to report ¢ on ... 6g V2

Nixon’s demand for ... IX, 53-58 ; XI, 41
Position after ae 1916 IX, 59, 60
Roaps, Absence of .. : ss x IX, 24

Transport (Port Factiries)
Economy as to : TX, 40, 44
Erection and repair shops .. IX, 40, 62 ; XII, 13
(See also Basra, Magill. )

Transport (RIVER) :

BaRGES

Alteration of specitications

Use for wounded

(See Hospital Transport (River).)

Barrett, estimate of necessary... ... LX, 25
Civilian experience not used: ae ... XI, 28
Conclusions as to... ; IX, 62; XII, 13
Cowper’s aiseaen as to shortage X, 76; XI, 43
Definition... ie eter Agee
DIFFICULTIES IGNORED IN BAGHDAD ADVANCE :

IX, 36-38

Home Government V, 23, 24
Inter-Departmental Committee V, 22, 23
Nixon ... ie see she . Vi4
Risk from ae aie .. LX, 18
Draught limitations IX, 8, 14, 15, 17

Hospital. (See Hospital Transport. )
INDIAN GOVERNMENT :
Attitude to .. UX, 24, 62; XII, 13
Enquiries as to —- is .. 1X, 25
Intelligence as to sie ase .. LX, 24
Kemball’s memorandum on IV, 8, 13, 17, 19
Kut, Risk of advance to, from shortage ... IX, 18

Mahailas ... LX, 6, 11, 48
Miscalculations as to: .. IX, 25; XI, 49
Need of ies . 1,21; IX, 18,62; XI,9;
XII, 13
NIXON :

Demands for ... 1V, 12; V, 24; IX, 8-10,
26, 29
Report on ane oe ue .. IV, 2
Specification of bis Sas ... LX, 28
Telegram on navigation difficulties ... V, 12
22, 24

ORDERED :
November, 1914 eo sue . IX,7
After January, 1916 ... ats IX, 10
ORDERED IN ENGLAND IV, 14; IX, 8, 9,
31-39
Delay in building __... Sg .. IX,9
Re-erection arrangements _... ... LX, 39
Specifications altered ... IX, 33-39
ORDERED IN INDIA ... IX, 7, 10
Available : TX, 28-30
Difficulty in obtaining — .. TX, 14,17
Procedure for obtaining ues _ 1X, 27
Provision of a IX, 24-30
SHORTAGE ... be IX, 1-52; XI, 1
After December, ‘1914. IV, 1, 12; IX, 2,
62 ; ‘XIL, 13
April, 1915... bes wih .- IIT, 4

Transport (RrveR)—(continued).
SHORTAGE :

May, 1915... ae Ae .. TX, 14
January, 1916 ... sie = VI, 1
Attempts to remedy ... IX, 62; XII, 13
Campaign, effect on ... IX, 2, 3, 5, 62;

XI, 13

Concentration protracted by ... VI, 6
Information as to, withheld ws V, 12,
22; 1X, 18

Kut, effect of, after battle of see Vic ok
Lack of appreciation of Bs .. LX, 27
Medical breakdown, effect on nea X,
111-115, 122

Rations, effect on XIT, 11

Reinforcements delayed by ... IV, 13; VI,
3; VII, 28; IX, 3, 62; XI, 49;

XII, 13

IX, 11-23, 25-27,
39, 62; XII, 13
Responsibility for advance with IX, 19, 49,

Responsibility for

62; XII, 13
Secretiveness of staff, effect on w. Al, 51
Statistics as to 1X, 4, 6, 11

Supply of... .» IX,62; XII, 13

Time needed for building .. . IV, 14; IX, 7, 14

War Office control, Effect of VII, 30; IX, 4
Transport (Sea) :

Expeditions overseas as ... I, 28

Royal Indian Marine, Work as to IX, 27, 66

Tim2 taken for discharge, Basra ... IX, 46, 47
Treherne, Suryeon-General . A, 104, 106

Troops :
Composition of Force “ D ” VII, 29
Despatched overseas oa se .. I, 30
Turkey :
War declared ses ae ee .. II,6
Turkish Forces :
Delayed by floods: ... - .. IV,5
Equipment ... a ‘VII, 6, 9,10; X, 13

i V, 18, 95, 31; VI, 2
Miscalculations as to baa XL 48, 49
Moral. oer ates .Y, 27; VI,2; VII,3
Size of bee oan sie .. V, 18; VI, 2

Intelligence as to

U.
Umm-el-Tubal, Battle of =... ok .. VI, 5

V.
Véry Lights VIII, 5, 6
Viceroy :
Amara, Attitude to advance to ... IV,6,7 -

BaaupapD, Advance to
Attitude to . V, 1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 17
Responsibility for... as XII, 8
CoMMUNICATIONS with Secretary of State.
(See Communications.)

Counciy. Relation to XI, 20-22
Recommendations XII, 28
CRITICISM of o XII, 27
Economy, Attitude to X, 126; XI, 36;
XII, 19
Kut, Attitude to advance to i IV, 10
MEpIcAL ARRANGEMENTS
Authority as to si X, 88

Responsibility for X, T1- 99, 126 ; “XII, 19
MEDICAL PERSONNEL

Misleading report on ... . XX, 70, 82
Nrxon’s InstRUCTIONS not seen by IV, 3; V,6
RESPONSIBILITY for campaign __... XI, 32

N.B.—Roman numerals refer to Parts. and Arabic numerals to paragraphs of the Report.

Viceroy (continued).
RESPONSIBILITY for depleting Indian

forces ... . ... Bas III, 3; XI, 6
SANITATION
Masleading report on ... shee. ade eee
TRANSPORT SHORTAGE
Information as to, withheld by .. V,12
VISIT TO MESOPOTAMIA XI, 34
Viceroy in Council :
Statutory powers XI, 20-22
Viceroy. Council :
Attitude to India’s Finance policy .. XI, 41
Military member, position of XI, 10
Responsibility for :
Baghdad advance _... eg XII, 8
Campaign ~ XI, 27, 28, 32
' Statutory: rights of thembers XI, 21
Status, Effect of private telegrams on XI, 26
Supply Member _... ee XI, 11
Vincent, The Hon. Sir William ae .. I, 10
Vincent-Bingley Commission :
Appointment , ad I, 10; X, 69, 98
Date of conclusion ... ei a3 i, 1
Members a oe .. I, 10
Terms of reference ... I, 10; X, 69, 98
Vincent-Bingley Commission Report _... L 11
Appreciation of ie I, 12; X, 1-5
Conclusions ... : X, 1-31
Adopted ee eG ae, Ga |
Criticisms of X, 2, 3, 32, 123
Memorandum on ... ee au ay bd

(See APPENDIX IT.)

Quotation from, as to economy XI, 38
(See APPENDIX [.)
Voluntary aid :

Offers from England X, 110

188

War Council :

Knowledge of Kemball’s memorandum IX, 19
War Office :

CAMPAIGN

Attitude to, at outbreak of war... XI, 5

CoNTROL

Assumed by Vil, 31
Results of VII, 31
Equipment “s XII, 11
Hospital river transport... IX, 48
Rations ... ve XII, 11
Transport IX, 4, 46, 57-61

KEMBALL’S MEMORANDUM forwarded to IX, 19
Water Supply ... des ee ay ae X, 18

Misleading reports on is sa ois) any A

Sickness caused by sis ee w. &, 74
Witnesses :

Names of chief iis wi She Ad
Wolseley, Lord ‘VO, 13, 15, 18
Wounded :

VI,7; X, 23,

CONDITION ON RIVER STEAMERS
; 28, 57-61, 89, 90
EVACUATION OF

Amara ... X, 21
Ctesiphon VI, 3, 7: x, 23, 57-61, 89, 90
Ks Sinn - ate X, 30
Hannah se ‘ Xx, 27, 28
Kut, First battle ae ee ao X, 56
Nasariyeh shes ar es bo Dey BL
Rotah ... os sad de X, 37, 38
Sahil “2 bsg ale w. &, 38
Sanaiyat oy Sits in .. A, Sl
Shaiba ... uy — att we &, 38
Sheikh Saad... ee es X, 27, 28
Wadi ... eae. ate X, 27, 28

HARDSHIPS TO ‘X, 21, 121, 122

Wadi ve eA: Soe: sues ae X, 27,28 Younghusband, Major-General Sir George VII, 10

N.B.—Roman numerals refer to Parts, and Arabic numerals to paragraphs of the Report.

Printed under the Authority of His Majesty’s Stationery Office
By Hagnison anv Sons, Printers in Ordinary to His Majesty, St. Martin’s Lane, London, W.C. 2.

Low

for Ge
ee ee —

— ———— ~ — : ‘ . ‘ ——— ae =

» i?"
. ™

\, a=. . its

VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS AND OF ra. WS AND
. CUSTOMS OF WAR IN BELGIUM.

Reports of the Official Commission of’ the Belgian Government.

Preface by Monsieur J. Van Den Heuvel, Minister of State. Names of the Comniission of Enquiry. Reports,
Nos. 1 to 12, of the Commission; with Illustrations. Appendix :—Instructions to Belgian Authorities’ issued on
4th August, 1914, and Advice to Civilians ; Extracts from the Pastoral Letter of His Eminence Cardinal Mercier, Arch-
bishop of Malines, Primate of Belgium. ys

Price 6d., post free 83d. -

Reports, Nos. 13 to 22. Facsimiles of German Soldiers’ Diaries ; Correspondence between His Eminence Cardina]
Mercier and the German Authorities ; Solemn Protest of Monseigneur Heylen, Bishop of Namur.

Price 6d., post free 83d.

FOREIGN OFFICE.
Miscellaneous, 1917.

No. 1.—Proposed Release of Civilians Interned in the British and German Empires. Further Correspondence
respecting the. ;
[Cd. 8437.] Price ld., post free 14d.

No. 2.—Examination of Parcels and Letter Mails. Memorandum addressed by the French and British Govern-
ments to the United States Government respecting the.
[Cd. 8438.] Price 2d., post free 24d.

No. 3.—The Allied Note of 10th January, 1917. Despatch to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Washington respecting
the.
[Cd, 8439.] Price ld., post free 14d.

No. 4.—German Peace Note. Reply communicated by the French Government, on behalf of the Allied Powers,
to the United States Ambassador in Paris, 30th December, 1916.
(Cd. 8467.] Price 1d., post free 1}d.

No. 5.—Reply of the Allied Governments to the Note communicated by the United States Ambassador on
20th December, 1916, containing the suggestion by the President of the United States of America that the Belligerents
in the present European War may state the terms on which the War might be concluded. |

(Cd. 8468.] Price 1d.; post free 14d.

No. 6.—Methods hitherto adopted for dealing with Ships and Cargoes brought into British Ports under the Order in
Council of 11th March, 1915. Report of the Committee appointed to enquire whether any avoidable delay is caused by the.
[Cd. 8469.] Price 1d., post free 1}d.

No. 7.—Treatment of British Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians in Germany. Further Correspondence with
the United States Ambassador respecting the.
[Cd. 8477.] Price 3d., post free 4d.

No. 8.—Mining of the Kogrund Passage. Correspondence’ with the Swedish Government respecting the.
[Cd. 8478.] Price 2d., post free 24d.

No. 9.—Prisoners’ Camps in Germany. Correspondence respecting the Use of Police Dogs.
[Cd. 8480.] Price 2d., post free 24d.

* PROTEST BY THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT
against the German allegation that Belgium had forfeited her Neutrality before the Outbreak of War.
Price ld., post free 14d.

THE SECOND BELGIAN GREY BOOK.

lish Translation, containing only those portions of the book which are material to the position of Great Britain,
viz. :—Part I.—Certain Documents relating to the War and Correspondence on the Subject of the Rupture of Diplo-
matic Relations between Belgium and Turkey ; Part II. (Section 10 only) deals with the Accusations brought against
Belgium of having concluded a Military Agreement with Great Britain. (1915.)

Price'3d., post free 44d.

COLLECTED DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS.
relating to the Outbreak of the European War.

This volume includes the British Diplomatic Correspondence and Translations of the French’ Yellow Book, the
Russian Orange Book, and the Belgian Grey Book, each of which has already been published in separate form. It also
contains Translations of the Serbian Blue Book, the German White Book, and the Austro-Hungarian Red Book,
together with Telegrams and Letters published officially in the Press by the Governments of Great Britain, Russia,
and Germany. There are also included, as an appendix to the German White Book, the Report of the Speech ‘delivered
by the German Imperial Chancellor before the Reichstag on 4th August, 1914, and, as an appendix to the Serbian Blue
Book, the Speech of Signor Giolitti before the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 5th December, 1914. The preface furnish-
ing a tentative guide to a comparison of the various Official Documents and to their value as a whole; and a list is
given of the principal persons mentioned in the Correspondence, showing their official positions.

Price, in paper boards, with cloth back, 1s., post free 1s. 5d.

e : = ae - ;

—

- Commission Appointed y Act of Parliament to Enquire
rae, - into the "Operations of War — > a
| a IN ce :

4 *
Ogee - Ans Pees
a

MESOPOTAMIA,

¢
-" “4°.
oa] -
> . +
‘ 's
. (> ;

. .

- Se ee :

J Das gs Sat ener | a
stat eee bs é ea | | e eat my
<: ‘BY a = oa, ys “a. Eee

: COMMANDER J. WEDGWOOD, D.S.0., MP,

a 2 a pues fT Ae 27)
2 4 . j x ‘
= oo . | | - 7 os . ; ce & |
pene Sa an Qet ppendices st = ip =
; Spi

= «: ~ “Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. SP a

| 3 ;
\ : - arr
; Nis sc .2

| ~~ e ,
: LONDON: = ia

PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE. fine

To be ased through an Bookseller or directly ‘fro
ye . H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following siddvonsee -
) IMPERIAL Housg, Kincsway, Lonpon, W.C. 2, and 28, ABINGDON Street, Lonpon, 8.W. 1 :
37, Paver SrREET, MANCHESTER ; 1, St. ANDREW’s CRESCENT, CARDIFF ;
23, FoRTH STREET, EDINBURGH ;
or from E. PONSONBY, Lrp., 116,. GRAFron STREET, DUBLIN ; "
or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies, ;
. heat be States of America and other Forei ees of
- | T, FISHER UNWIN, Ltp.; Lowpon, W.C. 2

} | 1917.

[Cd. 8610,] - Price Two Shillings Net.

;

Internet Archive Audio

Featured

Top

Images

Featured

Top

Software

Featured

Top

Texts

Featured

Top

Video

Featured

Top

Mobile Apps

Browser Extensions

Archive-It Subscription

Save Page Now

Full text of "Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire Into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia: Together with a Separate Report by Commander J. Wedgwood and Appendices. 1917"

See other formats